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 This study examines the containment policy that the United States and its allies imposed 
on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War and argues for a new understanding of why the United States 
invaded Iraq in 2003. At the core of this story is a political puzzle: Why did a largely successful 
policy that mostly stripped Iraq of its unconventional weapons lose support in American politics 
to the point that the policy itself became less effective? I argue that, within intellectual and 
policymaking circles, a claim steadily emerged that the only solution to the Iraqi threat was 
regime change and democratization. While this “regime change consensus” was not part of the 
original containment policy, a cohort of intellectuals and policymakers assembled political 
support for the idea that Saddam’s personality and the totalitarian nature of the Baathist regime 
made Iraq uniquely immune to “management” strategies like containment. The entrenchment of 
this consensus before 9/11 helps explain why so many politicians, policymakers, and 
intellectuals rejected containment after 9/11 and embraced regime change and invasion. 
This project makes several important historiographical contributions. First, I challenge 
arguments that the Bush Administration’s concerns about weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
were a disingenuous pretext for war. In fact, regime change advocates from the Gulf War 
forward articulated a unified strategy in which the threat of WMD and terrorism and the need for 
political transformation in the Middle East were inseparable planks. Second, I demonstrate that 
while neoconservatives led the political coalition against containment, this coalition also drew 
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significant support from Democrats, liberals, and humanitarian activists, creating a wider than 
expected base of support for the 2003 invasion. Finally, while historians have focused on the role 
of cultural perspectives like Orientalism in shaping U.S. policy in the Middle East, my study 
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The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 is now widely seen as one of the worst U.S. foreign 
policy blunders since the Vietnam War. Between 2003 and the departure of U.S. combat forces 
in 2011, 4,410 American military personnel died in Iraq and 31,957 were wounded, according to 
the Department of Defense.1 Iraq descended into a civil war during the occupation that cost the 
lives of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians.2 Although the “surge” of U.S. troops in Iraq 
from 2007 to 2008 helped tamp down this violence, the Iraqi state continued to be dominated by 
corrupt Shia parties that rigged elections, hoarded resources, and abused the Sunni minority.3  
The persistence of these political tensions combined with the upheaval of the Arab Spring 
in Syria to set the stage for the rise of the Islamic State, which seized several major cities in Iraq 
in 2014 and perpetrated horrible atrocities. The United States and its allies were forced to re-
                                                        
1 U.S. Department of Defense, “Operation Iraqi Freedom U.S. Casualty Status,” February 5, 2019, dod.defense.gov, 
accessed February 5, 2019, https://dod.defense.gov/News/Casualty-Status/ 
 
2 Estimates of Iraqi civilian casualties between 2003 and 2011 vary considerably based on different methodologies 
in different studies. The website Iraq Body Count states that 120,026 Iraqi civilians died in the conflict between 
from 2003-2011. This is a more conservative estimate because Iraq Body Count measures only deaths with a 
“verifiable documentary record,” using cross-referenced media sources, hospital, morgue, non-governmental 
organization, and official government figures. See: “Iraqi Deaths from Violence 2003-2011,” January 2, 2012, 
iraqbodycount.org, accessed February 5, 2019, https://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2011/. 
Household surveys calculate increases in the death rate over time have calculated far higher totals. One survey from 
a University of Washington public health team in the early 2010s found 405,000 excess deaths from violence and 
indirect war-related causes like the collapse of infrastructure. See: Amy Hagopian et. al., “Mortality in Iraq 
Associated with the 2003-2011 War and Occupation,” PLoS Medicine 10, no. 10 (2013), available at 
https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1001533#abstract1. 
 
3 Useful sources on continued corruption, violence, and ethno-sectarian division in the post-Baathist Iraqi 
government include: Ranj Alaaldin, “Sectarianism, Governance, and Iraq’s Future,” November 26, 2018, 
brookings.edu, accessed January 11, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/research/sectarianism-governance-and-iraqs-
future/; Emma Sky, The Unraveling: High Hopes and Missed Opportunities in Iraq (New York, Hachette Book 
Group, 2015); Michael Kirk and Mike Wiser, Losing Iraq, July 29, 2014, pbs.frontline.org, accessed May 2, 2016, 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/losing-iraq/credits/. 
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engage in fighting in Iraq and Syria and to counter an international resurgence of Islamic State-
inspired terrorism.4 A U.S. Army War College study released in early 2019 concluded that “an 
emboldened and expansionist Iran appears to be the only victor,” as one of its main geopolitical 
rivals was destroyed and a weaker and more friendly regime put in its place. Without the Iraqi 
counterbalance, Iranian influence has spread in the Middle East, further destabilizing countries 
like Syria and Yemen.5 Meanwhile, in domestic politics, the failure to find significant weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) programs and the poorly handled occupation undermined public 
faith in basic governmental competence. The cost, length, brutality of this war, moreover, 
weakened many Americans’ willingness to bear the burdens of global leadership, empowering 
more anti-interventionist wings of both major parties.6 As of this writing in 2019, the ripple 
effects of the Iraq War continue to flow and the fate of the Iraqi state remains uncertain.  
With this dismal story in mind, it becomes especially important to understand how 
alternatives to war were discredited. The primary alternative to regime change was containment, 
a policy that the United States installed on Iraq following the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Under 
this policy, the United States and an international coalition imposed economic sanctions, 
                                                        
4 Islamic State-inspired terrorist attacks outside of the Middle East have included the 2015 San Bernardino attack 
that killed 14 and the November 13, 2015 attacks in Paris that killed 130. For sources on the rise of the Islamic State 
and its global reach and appeal, see: Daniel Byman, “ISIS Goes Global,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 2 (March/April 
2016), 76-85; Joby Warrick, Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS (New York: Doubleday, 2015); Graeme Wood, The Way 
of the Strangers: Encounters with the Islamic State (New York: Random House, 2017); Peter Bergen, The United 
States of Jihad: Investigating America’s Homegrown Terrorists (New York: Crown Publishers, 2016); Martin 
Smith, Confronting ISIS, October 11, 2016, pbs.frontline.org, accessed November 5, 2016, 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/confronting-isis/. 
 
5 Joel Rayburn and Frank Sobchak, eds., The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, Volume 2: Surge and Withdrawal, 2007-
2011 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, 2017), 639-640. 
 
6 Political scientists John Mueller coined the term “Iraq Syndrome” to describe the United States’ greater hesitation 
about foreign intervention in the years after the Iraq War. See: John Mueller, “The Iraq Syndrome,” Foreign Affairs 
84, no. 6 (November, 2005), 44-54; John Mueller, “The Iraq Syndrome Redux,” June 18, 2004, foreignaffairs.com, 
accessed February 7, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2014-06-18/iraq-syndrome-redux. For an 
interesting RAND and Foreign Policy Magazine-sponsored panel discussion of the idea of the Iraq syndrome 
featuring Douglas Feith, Paul Pillar, Stephen Hadley, see: J. Dana Stuster, “The Iraq Syndrome,” March 19, 2003, 
foreignpolicy.com, accessed February 5, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/19/the-iraq-syndrome/. 
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weapons inspections, no-fly-zones, and occasional military strikes on Iraq. Containment sought 
to keep Iraq militarily weak, prevent it from threatening its neighbors and vulnerable internal 
minorities, destroy its weapons of mass destruction, and, if possible, create the conditions for 
Saddam’s downfall. Many experts and commentators who predicted some of these dismal 
outcomes have declared that the United States would have been better off sticking with 
containment, which they claim managed the Iraqi threat at reasonable cost. Nonetheless, most of 
these scholars have not asked tough questions about why an ostensibly effective policy became 
so intensely unpopular in American politics in the 1990s.7  
In essence, over the course of the 1990s a consensus formed in U.S. political and 
intellectual circles that the Iraqi threat could not be contained and that the Baathist regime must 
be removed and democracy established in Iraq. Critics of containment believed that this regime 
could not be contained because Saddam’s personality and the totalitarian nature of his regime 
made Iraq immune to “management” strategies like containment. Saddam would never cease his 
pursuit of WMD and regional domination, and as the pillars of containment inevitably weakened, 
Saddam would break out of this “box,” rebuild his WMD, and again threaten regional stability. 
Before 9/11, relatively few supporters of this consensus called for an invasion, but they did see 
containment as a failure and regime change as the only realistic solution. 
Furthermore, the critics of containment claimed that Saddam’s totalitarian control of Iraqi 
society meant that there were few social or political points of leverage that containment could 
exploit to bring about his moderation or removal. Even a coup that removed Saddam was seen as 
                                                        
7 See: David Cortright and George A. Lopez, “Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 4, (July 
2004), 90-103; James Bamford, A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America’s Intelligence Agencies 
(New York: Doubleday, 2004), 382; Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004), 269; Richard 
Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 269; 
James Rubin, “Arguing Iraq: Ten Years Later, A Symposium,” The New Republic, March 20, 2013, 
https://newrepublic.com/article/112701/iraq-war-10th-anniversary-symposium. 
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an inadequate solution. Real regime change meant the uprooting of the entire Baathist system 
and ideology, not just the replacing of Saddam with a less brutal figure. Only democratization 
could ensure that Iraq would no longer seek WMD, threaten its neighbors, or mistreat its people. 
The framing of Iraq as totalitarian, moreover, appealed to a longstanding narrative of the United 
States as engaged in an ongoing struggle against totalitarianism, whether it came in the form of 
Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, or modern “rogue states” like Iraq.  
I call the interpretation of the Iraqi threat outlined in the preceding paragraphs the 
“regime change consensus.” This study documents the formation of a political and intellectual 
coalition formed after the Gulf War around this set of ideas. Neoconservatives led this coalition, 
but it also drew significant support from Republicans and Democrats, liberal intellectuals, and 
left-wing and religious anti-sanctions activists. At times of intense focus on Iraq, these actors 
functioned as a united political coalition against containment, while at other times they formed a 
more general base of intellectual common ground about the Iraqi problem. 
This project is primarily concerned with actors who not only make policy inside the 
government but shape public debates of foreign affairs and influence policymakers and 
legislators. The critics and defenders of containment with whom I am concerned had access to 
political power and to the media. They tried to create broad consensus on issues like Iraq by 
writing books, reports, and articles, testifying before Congress, creating lobbying networks, and 
other methods. Although I will examine public perceptions through polling data, I am mainly 
interested in the formation of the regime change consensus among influential policy-makers, 
politicians, activists, and intellectuals. 
This broad coalition made the regime change consensus the dominant viewpoint on Iraq 
in American politics by the end of the 1990s. Their signal achievement was the 1998 Iraq 
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Liberation Act, which declared regime change in Iraq as an official U.S. foreign policy goal. 
President William Clinton pursued a containment policy to the end of his term, but the decisive 
shift toward the regime change consensus had occurred before he left office in 2000, leaving 
containment with few defenders in the public sphere.  
This analysis of the political delegitimization of containment raises important new 
questions about the causes of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. In many respects, containment was 
a successful policy, at least in terms of the limited goals of the George H.W. Bush and Clinton 
administrations. The Iraqi military and economy remained weak throughout the decade. Iraq 
made few threats to its neighbors in this period, and when it did, it quickly backed down in the 
face of U.S. threats of retaliation. U.N. weapons inspectors destroyed the vast majority of Iraq’s 
WMD programs, and after 2003 it became clear that Saddam had neither large WMD stockpiles 
nor active programs before the invasion.8 If, however, containment was more successful than 
most Americans in the 1990s recognized, why did it become so widely discredited in American 
politics? 
One answer is that although containment was successful in part, key planks of the policy 
weakened over the course of the 1990s. The international coalition’s willingness to enforce 
sanctions and support punitive military strikes on Iraq faded over time, allowing Saddam’s 
regime to access more resources and more brazenly challenge inspections. In addition, Saddam 
expelled the weapons inspectors in December 1998, undermining the coalition’s ability to 
control his WMD production. Lastly, by the mid-1990s Saddam had survived a series of internal 
                                                        
8 The 2004 Duelfer Report concluded that Saddam aspired to renew his WMD and ballistic missile programs, but 
this report found no “formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions.” Iraq retained a base of 
scientific knowledge, personnel, and some infrastructure for the revival of these programs. However, this report also 
concluded that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons arsenal in 1991, ceased efforts to 
produce nuclear weapons in 1991, and abandoned work on biological weapons after 1996. See section on “Regime 
Strategic Intent” in Volume 1 of Department of Central Intelligence, Iraq Survey Group, Key Findings, September 
30, 2004, cia.gov, accessed July 15, 2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/ 
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challenges and re-established his control of Iraq, thus presenting the possibility that containment 
might have to stay in place for decades. 
The idea that containment became discredited because it “failed” as a policy, however, is 
neither a self-evident nor a satisfying explanation of its delegitimization in American politics. 
This claim of failure played a central role in the regime change consensus, and architects of the 
Iraq War like Donald Rumsfeld have since asserted that containment was obviously and 
irredeemably broken when they took office.9 In reality, this view was an interpretation of an 
ambiguous situation. The ideas that critics of containment advanced mattered in terms of how 
Americans interpreted this ambiguity. The central ideas of the regime change consensus 
combined with events to undermine the policy’s political credibility and create energy for a shift 
to regime change.  
In particular, it mattered that advocates of regime change argued both that containment 
was not working and that it inherently could not work against this particular target. They 
believed that this fanatical, brutal, totalitarian regime, with its recalcitrant and vicious leader, 
could not be contained, and every day spent trying to do so only allowed Saddam to recover. 
This idea shaped the conversation about Iraq in ways that scholars have not yet acknowledged. 
Because of this interpretation, growing numbers of influential Americans believed that the 
United States should not waste time and resources trying to restore containment, which they 
thought would fail to arrest Saddam’s ambitions even if its main pillars were fully intact. When, 
for example, Saddam threw the inspectors out of Iraq in 1998, most regime change advocates 
argued against their return. They claimed that this would provide a false sense of security and 
                                                        
9 Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011), 416-418; Douglas Feith, War 
and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (New York: Harper Collins, 2008), 194-
200. Some scholars have echoed this claim. See: Hal Brands and Peter Feaver, “The Case for Bush Revisionism? 
Reevaluating the Legacy of America’s 43rd President,” Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 1-2 (2018), 1-41. 
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that inspections simply could not work against a police state determined to hide its WMD 
programs.  
Scholars have also not explored how key flaws in the first Bush and Clinton 
administration’s defense of containment made the policy vulnerable to political attack. 
Containment’s advocates failed to plausibly explain the policy’s end point, or how its 
mechanisms would bring about either a change in Saddam’s strategic intentions or the downfall 
of the regime. George H.W. Bush and Clinton declared that as long as Saddam remained in 
power, no political rapprochement or lifting of sanctions would be possible, even if Saddam 
cooperated with weapons inspections. These declarations were made under the assumption that 
Saddam would fall from power relatively soon, and they sought to assuage domestic critics. 
However, they only made more credible the critics’ claims that Iraq policy was incoherent while 
damaging the international coalition needed to enforce containment. Moreover, after the Gulf 
War, the first Bush and Clinton administrations spent far less time defending containment than 
its political enemies spent attacking it. The result was an under-theorized, under-defended, 
politically vulnerable policy that became more defined by its shortcomings than its 
accomplishments. 
Understanding how a consensus in American politics formed around the idea that 
containment not only was not working, but could not work, demands that we look at both the 
policy itself and the broader intellectual and political conversations about Iraq and U.S. foreign 
policy in the 1990s. We can then deepen and reframe our historical explanation of the 2003 U.S. 
invasion. 
The standard explanation for the Iraq War from scholars and journalists is that from the 
Gulf War until 2003, the neoconservative movement fixated on overthrowing the Baathists as 
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part of an agenda of asserting U.S. global hegemony. Neoconservatives and other Iraq hawks 
assumed key positions inside the second Bush administration, especially Dick Cheney as Vice 
President, Donald Rumsfeld as Defense Secretary, and Paul Wolfowitz as Undersecretary of 
Defense. They used 9/11 to convince Bush that Iraq should be the main target of the U.S. 
response. They based this argument on the idea that rogue states like Iraq might hand WMD to 
terrorists to use against the United States. The “nexus” between WMD, rogue states, and 
terrorists undermined containment and deterrence and necessitated a “pre-emptive” response.10 
Bush then took this argument public, using selective or exaggerated intelligence, fear-mongering, 
and the post-9/11 psychological need for action to build political momentum for the war.11  
This narrative is valid in many ways, and I do not seek to minimize the importance of 
9/11 or the neoconservatives in the road to the Iraq War. 9/11 served as a “precipitant” of the 
Iraq War, or an “immediate, incidental factor” that triggers a massive change in perspective or 
action.12 Absent this event, the war almost certainly would not have happened. Without the anger 
and fear generated by these attacks, it seems unlikely that Iraq hawks could have created the 
political momentum for an invasion. Furthermore, the presence of neoconservatives with a 
particular fixation on Iraq was crucial for reorienting the U.S. response to 9/11 toward Iraq. 
Nonetheless, there are limitations to this explanatory framework. Most importantly, this 
                                                        
10 In reality, this was a preventive war, a distinction explored in Chapter 5 of this study. 
 
11 Both defenders and critics of the Iraq War have focused on the role of neoconservatives. Prominent examples of 
neoconservative-focused interpretations include: James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War 
Cabinet (New York: Viking, 2004); Stephen Kinzer, Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii 
to Iraq (New York: Times Books, 2006), 288; Jacob Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the 
Neocons (New York: Doubleday, 2008); Todd Purdum, A Time of Our Choosing: America’s War in Iraq (New 
York: Times Books, 2003); David Korn and Michael Isikoff, Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the 
Selling of the Iraq War (New York: Crown Publishers, 2006), 16-17, Pillar, Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy, 
15-20, 55, Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neoconservatives and the Global Order (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 201-210; William Kristol and Robert Kagan, “The Right War for the 
Right Reasons,” The Weekly Standard, February 23, 2004, 20-28. 
 
12 Lawrence Stone, “Theories of Revolution,” World Politics 19, no. 2 (January 1966), 164. 
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framework does not explain how a wide swathe of Americans, including many legislators, media 
outlets, intellectuals, and much of the public, came to accept the worst-case portrayal of the 
threat.  
In short, Bush may have put Iraq on the table after 9/11, but why did so many Americans 
seem primed to buy his argument for war? Why was there not a political brick wall against the 
push for war on the grounds that the administration had generated little new evidence that 
Saddam had reinvigorated his WMD programs or played a role in 9/11? Why, moreover, did so 
few prominent Americans argue that the United States should use the urgency and international 
sympathy of the post-9/11 moment to reinvigorate containment rather than invading? Answering 
these questions requires that we trace the evolution of the broader political and intellectual 
spectrum of debate about Iraq, especially the ascendency of the regime change consensus before 
9/11. 
Studying this consensus also provides a better understanding of the opposition to Bush’s 
case for war. As the Iraq hawks pushed for invasion in 2002, a large set of skeptics pushed back, 
including Secretary of State Colin Powell, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Congressional 
leaders like Senators Chuck Hagel and Joseph Biden, and influential former policymakers like 
James Baker and Sandy Berger. Following what I call the “Powell-Blair approach,” they argued 
that the evidence of Iraq’s WMD programs and links to al-Qaeda were weak, that the 
administration had not prepared adequately for occupying Iraq, and that Bush should build a 
coalition before going to war. However, these ostensible skeptics actually shared most of the 
major assumptions about Iraq that the hawks held. Most parties to the debate believed that Iraq 
would remain a threat until Saddam was removed, that the core cause of Iraq’s aggression was 
the nature of its regime, that even a renewed containment policy could not disarm Saddam or 
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change his strategic goals, and that only democratization could definitively solve the Iraq 
problem.  
These assumptions, all tenets of the regime change consensus, became entrenched in 
American politics during the 1990s. Thus, the terms of debate between 9/11 and the March 2003 
invasion of Iraq should not be understood as regime change against containment. This question 
had largely been settled by the late 1990s as the regime change consensus ascended. Rather, this 
was a conversation about how to pursue regime change, not whether it must be pursued. The 
dominant explanation of the Iraq War, with its focus on neoconservatives, misses how other 
actors came to think about Iraq within these boundaries and assumptions. The public figures who 
argued firmly against invasion and for the renewal of containment became a decided minority. 
The dominant understanding of the causes of the Iraq War does not explain how the 
terms of debate developed in a way that gave the Bush administration a fundamental advantage 
in building a wide base of support for invasion. I show how the delegitimizing of alternatives and 
the building of the regime change consensus before 9/11 helped form this base of support while 
undermining calls for a renewal of containment. 9/11 and the presence of neoconservatives in the 
Bush administration thus emerge as necessary but insufficient causes of the Iraq War. Along 
with these factors, the regime change consensus served as an essential precondition for the 
success of the Bush administration in taking the United States to war.13 This preexisting 
consensus lent plausibility to claims that Iraq was constructing WMD, that Saddam remained 
fixated on revenge, that he might hand WMD to terrorists, and that containment could not 
eliminate these threats. 
                                                        
13 A precondition in this usage can be understood as long-term, structural factors that create the potential for 
revolutionary change. They can be ideologies, socio-economic structures, political or geopolitical conditions, etc. 
See: Perez Zagorin, “Theories of Revolution in Contemporary Historiography,” Political Science Quarterly 88, no. 
1 (March, 1973), 44-45. 
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Between Triumph and Tragedy: The Bigger Historical Picture 
This project places Iraq policy and politics in a broader context, showing how trends and 
ideas in the historical moment of the 1990s shaped the debate about Iraq. The political legitimacy 
of containment suffered because this policy stood between two massive triumphs for the United 
States and one horrible tragedy.  
The first triumph was victory in the Cold War as the Soviet Union moved toward 
reformation and then total collapse. The end of the Cold War undermined the containment of 
Iraq because it fueled the sense that the world was moving inexorably toward liberal democracy 
and capitalism, making containment appear intolerably status-quo oriented or even cynical.14 
Universalistic thinking about human rights and democracy saturated U.S. thought about the 
world. Liberals, neoconservatives, and humanitarian activists all intensified their assaults on the 
concept of state sovereignty, treating it as a right to be earned rather than inherent in statehood, 
thus paving the way for armed interventions.15 Containment’s defenders argued that the United 
States should be careful about destabilizing Iraq because of its fractious ethnic politics and lack 
of experience with liberal democracy. However, even though the containment of the Soviet 
Union was seen as a success, the ideological mood of the 1990s ironically put the defenders of 
the containment of Iraq at a disadvantage. The temper of the times made it easy to portray them 
as racially and culturally insensitive or stuck in a Cold War mentality. 
                                                        
14 Two influential texts from the 1990s that posited a global movement toward democracy, liberalism, and free 
market capitalism were: Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon Books, 1992); 
Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1991). 
 
15 Of course, these groups disagreed on what behaviors states had to exhibit or eschew to preserve their right to 
sovereignty. For a discussion of this issue, see Chapter Four of this dissertation. For discussions of the 1990s an era 
of crisis for the concept of sovereignty, see: G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and 
Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 238-240, 245; 
Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: The Evolution of an Idea (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2007), 114-135. 
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The second triumph was the 1991 Persian Gulf War, in which the United States led a 
coalition to eject Saddam’s forces from Kuwait in an unexpectedly easy fight. This 
overwhelming military victory fed the belief that the United States was now the world’s military 
hegemon and that it could remove rogue regimes at will. The term “unipolar moment” may have 
been a neoconservative creation, but this concept influenced most Americans’ thinking about the 
use of U.S. global power in this period. Why tolerate the existence of an odious dictator like 
Saddam when the United States had the power to remove him and no superpower rival could 
stand in its way?16 Why not remove the Baathist regime when a democracy can be expected to 
grow in its place, just as democracies were rising in Eastern Europe, East Asia, and Latin 
America? Containment was a poor fit for the national mentality that emerged from these 
triumphs, one of universalistic political thinking, optimism about U.S. power, and frustration 
with holdouts to this wave of world-historical progress like Baathist Iraq.  
The tragedy came with the al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on 9/11, which killed nearly 3,000 
Americans in one terrible morning. Before 9/11, politicians and intellectuals, including Clinton, 
had defined the post-Cold War world as globalized and interdependent. They recognized that 
these factors meant greater vulnerability to events in other states, but they generally saw greater 
interdependence as a net positive. The free movement of ideas, goods, and people would 
universalize values and cultures, foster prosperity and democracy, and discredit retrograde 
ideologies.17  
                                                        
16 John Mearsheimer stresses how a “crusading” mentality always latent in U.S. foreign policy was unleashed by the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, setting the ground for decisions like the invasion of Iraq. See: John Mearsheimer, The 
Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018). 
 
17 Probably the most influential version of this argument in the 1990s came from Clinton’s first National Security 
Advisor, Anthony Lake, in 1993. See: Anthony Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement,” (speech, Washington 
D.C., September 21, 1993), accessed April 15, 2017, https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/lakedoc.html; For 
discussion of the nature of post-Cold War global politics and economics, including this optimistic vision, see: Derek 
Chollet, America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11: The Misunderstood Years Between the Fall of the Berlin 
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9/11 instantly reversed this optimistic script by highlighting the negative aspects of 
interdependence and the ability of small groups to cause asymmetrical destruction. U.S. 
awareness of international terrorism and weapons proliferation had increased throughout the 
1990s, but 9/11 drove home the true potential of these menaces. Terrorists plotting in rural 
Afghanistan and unstable dictators tinkering with biological weapons in Iraq now appeared as 
imminent threats in a shrunken world.  
Growing numbers of Americans, including high-ranking members of the Bush 
administration, felt that the United States could no longer tolerate the political dysfunction, 
religious extremism, and authoritarianism of the Middle East and the terrorism that these 
pathologies had spawned. The mostly neoconservative vision of the United States using its 
massive power in a unipolar moment to accelerate the world’s movement toward democracy now 
took on a greater urgency and a wider appeal. Action became imperative as domestic and 
international constraints on armed intervention abroad fell away. The United States needed to 
respond to defeat the active terrorist threat and transform the politics of the Middle East. 
In a historical moment bookended by two victories and one tragedy, containment, a 
strategy of management and restraint, satisfied neither the optimistic mood engendered by the 
victories nor the atmosphere of fear and vulnerability fostered by the tragedy. Before 9/11, 
containment did not do enough to create the better world that many Americans envisioned, nor 
did it promise to eliminate a threat to vital U.S. interests in the Gulf. After 9/11, relying on a 
policy of containment to hamstring Iraq’s WMD programs appeared unrealistic and risky, even if 
the policy could be restored to its earlier strength. To paraphrase philosopher Gary Dorrien, after 
                                                        
Wall and the Start of the War on Terror (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 312-314, Michael Hunt, The American 
Ascendancy: How the United States Gained and Wielded Global Dominance (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2007), 266-276; 
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9/11 the Bush administration and other U.S. leaders wanted to abolish problems like Saddam 
entirely, not to cope with them.18 
The combination of triumphs and tragedy created a combustible mix of restlessness, 
idealism, and vulnerability that made containment seem inadequate for either creating a better 
world or preventing disaster. The triumphs and tragedy noted here were vital structural 
preconditions for the Iraq War because they created a conducive environment for the ascendency 
of the regime change consensus. Nonetheless, in order to explain the Iraq War fully, we have to 
understand how, in between these major turning points, a set of organized political actors 
delegitimized containment and made the elimination of Saddam and his regime the only 
acceptable solution. This coalition, led by but not limited to neoconservatives, constructed an 
interpretation of these events that posited regime change as the means to achieve the better world 
and prevent disaster. 
The Iraq War as Historiography and History 
A historical study of such a recent period presents unique challenges. The type of in-
depth analysis of the evolution of policy within an administration, something akin to Frederik 
Logevall’s Choosing War, is not feasible because of the lack of declassified sources. This study 
relies on declassified online collections, available archival sources, interviews, memoirs, and 
journalists’ accounts to reconstruct the policy history of containment. My focus on the broad 
political and intellectual conversation about Iraq opens up a host of useful sources, including 
Congressional documents, media sources, think tank archives, scholarly books and journals, and 
correspondences.  
                                                        
18 The actual quote is “They believed in abolishing problems entirely, not coping with them.” Gary Dorrien, 
Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana (New York: Routledge, 2004), 245.  
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Scholarly and political debates about the causes of the Iraq War have been heavily 
influenced by the conflict’s downward turn into civil war and the failure to find WMD programs. 
Many politicians and intellectuals have asserted that they would not have supported the war if 
not for the inflation of intelligence about Iraq’s WMD. It is noteworthy that both presidential 
candidates in 2016 tried to distance themselves from their initial support of the war.19 
Congressional studies have likewise focused heavily on intelligence failures, overlooking the fact 
that containment, the main alternative to regime change, had been delegitimized well before the 
WMD debate heated up. Debates about the Iraq War have also featured much recrimination and 
a tendency to pin all responsibility on neoconservatives. Many accounts of the Iraq War skip 
over the 1990s entirely or treat the decade as insignificant.20  
The focus on the manipulation of evidence about WMD has drawn attention away from 
an in-depth, historically contextualized look at the political and intellectual building blocks of the 
war dating back to the early 1990s. Connecting the formation of the regime change consensus in 
                                                        
19 Hillary Clinton in particular has asserted she was misled by the Bush administration’s portrayal of the WMD 
threat from Iraq. For Clinton, Trump, and a variety of other who say they were misled into supporting the Iraq War, 
see: Michael Kranish, “Hillary Clinton Regrets Her Iraq Vote,” Washington Post, September 15, 2016, A12; 
Michelle Ye Hee Lee, “Timeline of Trump’s Comment on Iraq Invasion,” February 26, 2016, accessed January 8, 
2019,  https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/02/25/timeline-of-trumps-comments-on-iraq-
invasion-not-loud-not-strong-and-no-headlines/?utm_term=.01572bbf6997; Editorial, “Were We Wrong?” The New 
Republic, June 28, 2004, https://newrepublic.com/article/67651/were-we-wrong; Anne Marie Slaughter, “Arguing 
Iraq: Ten Years Later, A Symposium,” The New Republic, March 20, 2013, 
https://newrepublic.com/article/112701/iraq-war-10th-anniversary-symposium; “Politicians Regret, Reflect on Iraq 
War Vote,” npr.org, December 16. 2011, accessed January 8, 2019, 
https://www.npr.org/2011/12/16/143837072/politicians-regret-reflect-on-iraq-war-vote; Jordain Carney, “Reid: Iraq 
War Vote ‘Biggest Regret,’” thehill.com, June 9, 2016, accessed January 8, 2019, https://thehill.com/blogs/floor-
action/senate/282852-reid-iraq-war-vote-greatest-regret; Jeffrey Goldberg, “How Did I Get Iraq Wrong,” 
theatlantic.com, March 19, 2008, accessed January 8, 2019, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2008/03/how-did-i-get-iraq-wrong/8302/ 
 
20 For examples, see: Kinzer, Overthrow, 288; Christian Alfonsi, Circle in the Sand: Why We Went Back to Iraq 
(New York: Doubleday, 2006); Peter Galbraith, The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War 
Without End (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006); 67-69; Lawrence Freedman, “Iraq, Liberal Wars, and Illiberal 
Containment,” Survival 48, no. 4, (Winter 2006), 51-65. 
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the decade after 1991 to the critical period from September 2001 to March 2003 allows us to 
rethink key interpretations of the Iraq War and modern U.S. foreign policy.  
One of the main interpretations of the Iraq War is what I call the “pretext school.” Many 
scholars have argued that Bush’s focus on Iraq’s WMD programs and possible links to terrorist 
groups was a mere pretext for a war based on a broader agenda. The word pretext here implies 
that the threat of WMD and terror connections was a disingenuous justification for a decision 
already made, or a misleading “cover story” or “window dressing” for the real but unstated 
reasons. Journalist James Bamford offers a standard pretext claim in asserting that the WMD 
argument was “fraudulent…it was simply a pretext for a war long advocated by a small group of 
hardline neoconservatives with their own agenda.”21 This agenda is described as a combination 
of asserting U.S. hegemony, controlling oil resources, enriching U.S. defense contractors, 
ensuring Israel’s security, and democratizing the Middle East.22  
The pretext school rightly points out that the Bush administration led with the nexus 
concept in its case for war and that it shifted its rationale toward democratization once the United 
States failed to find WMD or connections to al-Qaeda.23 This point raises reasonable suspicion 
that WMD and terror connections were covers for other priorities. However, the pretext school 
                                                        
21 Bamford, A Pretext for War, 423. 
 
22 For examples of the pretext school, see: Pillar, Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy, 15-17, 41; Lloyd Gardner, 
The Long Road to Baghdad: A History of U.S. Foreign Policy from the 1970s to the Present (New York: Farrar, 
Straus, and Giroux), 4; Andrew Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History (New 
York: Random House, 2016), 223; Dorrien, Imperial Designs, 181-182; Kinzer, Overthrow, 290-293; Isikoff and 
Korn, Hubris, 16-17; John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: 
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux), 229-230; Mearsheimer and Walt Israel Lobby 229-230, Steven Hurst, The United States 
and Iraq Since 1979: Hegemony, Oil and War (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 19.  
 
23 At a speech in November 2003, Bush started to reframe the Iraq War as a quest to foster democracy in Iraq. See: 
George W. Bush, “President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East,” November 6, 2003, 
whitehouse.archives.gov, accessed January 4, 2019, https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html; For a discussion of this shift in rationale, see 
Bacevich, War for the Greater Middle East, 240. 
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fails to appreciate that concerns about WMD and terrorism had been vital to the argument 
against containment since the early 1990s. Regime change advocates had openly put forth a 
coherent argument that linked WMD, terrorism, the nature of the Iraqi regime, the importance of 
assertive U.S. global leadership, and the need for democracy in the Middle East.  
Despite its many empirical flaws, this argument had a logical flow, which proceeded as 
follows. Saddam was an implacable totalitarian bent on acquiring WMD and dominating the 
Gulf. Containment by its nature could not address this kind of threat. Permanently removing this 
threat required a firm assertion of U.S. power in toppling Saddam, uprooting the Baathist system, 
and fostering democracy. These steps would guarantee the free flow of oil from the region, 
eliminate Iraq’s threat to its neighbors, and deflate the appeal of radical ideologies. As I will 
show, these beliefs and principles worked together in the minds of regime change advocates. No 
one plank of this mindset can be singled out as the “real reason” for which other reasons were 
misleading pretexts. 
9/11, moreover, was no mere pretext for war.24 It did create a political opening for Iraq 
hawks to press for invasion, but it also highlighted to even the most fervent regime change 
advocates the potential danger of rogue states asymmetrically striking the homeland by arming 
terrorists with WMD. Most regime change advocates had thought of Iraq primarily as a threat to 
national interests rather than national security, but 9/11 changed this perception and created a 
new sense of urgency.  
A second interpretation of the Iraq War that I challenge in this project is what I call the 
Orientalism school. Many scholars have portrayed this war as a product in part of American 
Orientalism, drawing on the work of the literary critic Edward Said. They argue that advocates of 
                                                        
24 Bamford, A Pretext for War, 269, 285. 
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regime change portrayed Saddam and the Iraqi leadership as irrational, inscrutable, inhuman 
others who were not reasonable like Western leaders. The Iraqi people, moreover, became 
passive, helpless subjects who needed a Western messiah. Said, for instance, wrote after the 
invasion: “Without a well-organized sense that the people over there were not like ‘us’ and 
didn’t appreciate ‘our’ values-the very core of traditional orientalist dogma-there would have 
been no war.” Said contended that U.S. policy in the Middle East was predicated on longstanding 
cultural and media representations of Arabs as “irrecusably, and congenitally Other.”25 Scholars 
in this school connected the Iraq War to a history of Western imperialism in which essentialist 
portrayals of foreign peoples justified exploitation and the abrogation of sovereignty.26 
There is some validity to this Orientalist interpretation, especially the idea that many 
regime change advocates viewed Iraqis as needing Western tutelage in democracy and 
capitalism.27 However, the causal relationship between Orientalism and Iraq policy may not be 
what these critics expect. In debates about Iraq from 1990 to 2003, those who preferred 
                                                        
25 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 160-161. See also: Melani McAllister, 
Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East since 1945, 2nd edition (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2005), 9-29. 
 
26 Said made this connection explicitly, saying that the U.S. case for war relied on “demeaning stereotypes” and the 
“same justifications for power and violence…as the scholars enlisted by the Dutch conquerors of Malaysia and 
Indonesia, the British armies of India, Mesopotamia, Egypt, West Africa, and the French armies of Indochina and 
North Africa.” See: Edward Said, “A Window on the World,” August 1, 2003, theguardian.com, the Guardian, 
accessed November 2, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2003/aug/02/alqaida.highereducation; For 
scholarship that has stressed the role of Orientalism in the Iraq War and U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East more 
generally, see: Osamah Khalil, America’s Dream Palace: Middle East Expertise and the Rise of the National 
Security State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 5, 264-265; Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, 
Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004), 32; Zachary 
Lockman, Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 270; Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle 
East since 1945, 3rd edition (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2008); 10-11, 35-43, 308; 
McAllister, Epic Encounters, xi, 287-299. 
 
27 The influence of Bernard Lewis in the Bush administration, which included several visits to top Bush officials 
after 9/11, further speaks to the influence of Orientalism on U.S. policy toward Iraq. Another important example is 
the influence of the heavily Orientalist book The Arab Mind, by deceased Hungarian anthropologist Raphael Patai, 
in the U.S. military’s cultural training. For further discussion, see: Little, American Orientalism, 317-319, 335. 
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containment frequently argued that Iraqi and Arab political cultures differed in essential ways 
from the West. They argued that certain conditions in Iraqi society made it a poor candidate for 
liberal democracy, including the absence of an independent civil society, the lack of experience 
with constitutionalism and representative government, and the presence of intense ethnic 
divisions. Some regime change skeptics viewed these problems as part of a fixed, essential Arab 
or Islamic political character, while others treated them as historically contingent developments, 
created in large part by the Baathist regime. Whatever their origins, for containment’s defenders 
these deep-seated problems were reasons to eschew regime change and pursue U.S. interests in 
the region under the assumption that most countries would remain authoritarian for some time.  
For most advocates of regime change, especially liberals and neoconservatives, this was 
an unacceptably relativistic and condescending position. They asserted universalistic notions of 
human rights and democracy and claimed that pluralistic, representative government could 
succeed in Iraq. They frequently accused containment’s defenders of racism and Orientalism. For 
regime change advocates, the bursting potential and desire of the Iraqi people to have democratic 
and humane government was all the more reason to seek Saddam’s overthrow.  
This is a somewhat unexpected outcome given standard explanations of the relationship 
between Orientalism and Western interventions in the Middle East. It poses a problem for the 
portrayal of the Iraq War as an Orientalist enterprise. To invert Said’s quote above, it was 
precisely because so many hawks viewed Iraqis as like “us” and in tune with “our” values that 
they saw regime change as desirable and feasible. Containment’s defenders had to fend off 
charges of condescending Orientalist thinking, which put them at a political disadvantage even 
though their argument was more that democracy had to evolve slowly within Iraq rather than be 
imposed from without. This is not a conclusive statement about Orientalism in U.S. diplomatic 
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history, but it does suggest that the link between cultural lenses like Orientalism and real policy-
making are multidirectional and contextually specific. 
Lastly, I challenge an historical interpretation of the Iraq War that treats it as the long 
unfolding of the logic of the Carter Doctrine. The Carter Doctrine responded both to the collapse 
of the United States’ strongest ally in the region, Iran under the Shah, and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979. Instead of relying on proxies, Carter pledged to resist, with force if 
necessary, any attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf and its vital resources. In historian 
Andrew Bacevich’s telling, Carter had fatefully tied the American way of life, based on 
profligate use of oil, to control of the Persian Gulf.28 In the 1980s, the United States built a 
military infrastructure in the Gulf that enabled the rapid deployment of forces.29 The Carter 
Doctrine originally aimed to stop Soviet penetration of the Gulf, but in the 1980s and early 1990s 
the United States intervened to defeat regional actors, namely Iran and Iraq, in their attempts to 
control this region. 
Some scholars treat the 2003 Iraq War as a consequence of a deep and consistent set of 
U.S. priorities in the Gulf as established by the Carter Doctrine. They claim that Carter made the 
area into an “informal American protectorate” that required the United States to impose order in 
the region.30 According to this interpretation, pursuing these longstanding “hegemonic 
ambitions” in the Gulf after 9/11 demanded the removal of Saddam and the transformation of the 
region’s politics.31 As political scientist Steven Hurst puts it, the Iraq War emerged less from 
                                                        
28 Bacevich, War for the Greater Middle East, 246. 
 
29 For an excellent account of the building of this military infrastructure, see: Michael Palmer, Guardians of the 
Gulf: A History of America’s Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 1833-1992 (New York: Free Press, 1992). 
 
30 Bacevich, War for the Greater Middle East, 30.  
 
31 Sheila Carapico and Chris Toensing, “The Strategic Logic of the Iraq Blunder,” Middle East Report 238, 
(Summer 2006), 7. 
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9/11 and the neoconservatives than from “a long established American determination to maintain 
the position of the United States as the dominant power in the Gulf” and the “need to maintain a 
dominant position in the international oil system.”32 I call this interpretation the Long War 
School.33  
This interpretation, however, erases key distinctions between how different presidencies 
pursued the goals of the Carter Doctrine. George H.W. Bush and Clinton may have extended 
U.S. involvement in the region, but they also exercised restraint. They and their advisors 
believed in multilateralism and the limits of military power, and they grasped the difficulties of 
implanting democracy in foreign nations with deep social divides. Their enforcement of the 
containment of Iraq was predicated on recognizing these problems and limitations. For both of 
these presidents, regime change was both too risky and unnecessary for achieving U.S. goals in 
the region.  
Moreover, the Long War school overlooks the significance of 9/11 in transforming the 
perception of Iraq from a threat to the national interest to a threat to national security. The Carter 
Doctrine and subsequent U.S. interventions like the Gulf War centered on symmetrical military 
efforts by hostile states to control the resources and political balance of the Gulf. The 
containment of Iraq, in large part, flowed from that logic as well, requiring the United States to 
maintain political and economic pressure to prevent Saddam from destabilizing the region. 9/11, 
however, changed the perception of the international security environment dramatically. By 
developing the nexus concept, the Bush team framed Iraq and other rogue states as threats to 
                                                        
32 Hurst, United States and Iraq since 1979, 1, 20. 
 
33 For other examples of the Long War Hypothesis, see: Melvyn Leffler, “9/11 in Retrospect,” Foreign Affairs 90, 
no. 5 (September 2011), 43; John Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” The National Interest, September 2011, 16-
34; Gardner, Long Road to Baghdad, 8; Andrew Bacevich, “The United States in Iraq: Terminating an Interminable 
War,” in Between War and Peace: How America Ends its Wars, ed. Matthew Moten, (New York: Free Press, 2011), 
315-319.  
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national security. This necessitated and justified, in their minds, preventive wars to destroy these 
latent threats and support for democratization to undermine the sources of extremism. In keeping 
with the Carter Doctrine, Bush also wanted to overthrow Saddam to prevent him from using 
WMD to try to control the Gulf. Nonetheless, the overwhelming thrust of his case for war was to 
prevent an Iraqi-sponsored repeat of 9/11, this time with WMD.  
In other words, George W. Bush’s foray into Iraq was not an incremental intensification 
of his predecessors’ actions but a radical break based on a different logic of intervention. The 
prominent presence of longstanding regime change advocates and “democratic imperialists” in 
his administration mattered in making regime change in Iraq, a doctrine of preventive war, and 
the goal of democratic transformation central to his foreign policy.34 In short, the Carter Doctrine 
did not predetermine the Iraq War. The specific people in power and the ideas they held made a 
difference in terms of how these goals were pursued. Moreover, 9/11 mattered in terms of 
changing U.S. perceptions of its security and its foreign policy goals in the Middle East. 
My argument begins by examining how the George H.W. Bush administration developed 
a containment strategy during the Gulf Crisis. Chapter One shows how Bush envisioned using 
sanctions and the threat of military action after the Gulf War to compel Saddam to surrender his 
WMD. However, before the war began in January 1991, Bush and his top advisors decided 
against trying to topple Saddam, fearing that this would rupture the coalition, destabilize the 
region, and entrap the United States in an occupation. The Bush administration hoped that the 
war would lead to Saddam’s ouster, but they did not see regime change as a goal of the conflict. 
                                                        
34 The term “democratic imperialists” is taken from Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, who claim that figures like 
Wolfowitz and Richard Perle believe “the United States should actively deploy its overwhelming military, 
economic, and political might to remake the world in its image-and that doing so would serve the interests of other 
countries as well as the United States.” See: Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush 
Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 46-47. 
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Chapter Two demonstrates that Bush’s Iraq policy enjoyed broad political support until 
the end of the Gulf War in early March 1991. Although the United States soundly defeated Iraqi 
forces, the end of the war proved messier than Bush had anticipated. Many critics blamed the 
president for ending hostilities before the Iraqi Republican Guard had been destroyed. They also 
blamed him for not intervening more decisively to support the Kurdish and Shia rebellions 
against Saddam.  
A widely accepted political narrative emerged after the Gulf War that Bush had missed 
an opportunity to eliminate a serious threat. Containment became the official U.S. policy in an 
atmosphere of disappointment and recrimination that created a bias in American politics against 
flexible or restrained approaches to Iraq. Bush himself added to this bias by asserting that the 
United States would not lift sanctions on Iraq until Saddam was out of power. This political 
fallout from victory added converts to the argument that containment was at best a temporary 
solution because it did not address the fundamental cause of Iraqi misbehavior: the regime.  
In this chapter, I also introduce the three main schools of thought about the containment 
of Iraq that shaped the political and intellectual debate after the Gulf War. The first school, the 
“conditional” approach, was composed largely of realists and some liberal internationalists who 
claimed that containment could manage and limit the Iraqi threat if it was enforced rigorously. 
They often criticized Bush and Clinton’s execution of the policy, but they agreed that it was the 
best of a bad set of options on Iraq. In contrast, members of the “inevitable decline” argued from 
the outset that containment inherently could not work against totalitarian regimes like Iraq and 
leaders like Saddam because they would never cease their pursuit of WMD and regional 
dominance. Composed mainly of neoconservatives but including many liberals and Democrats, 
they argued that containment would inevitably collapse as Iraq provoked repeated crises and the 
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international coalition steadily eroded. They concluded that the United States should shift 
immediately to a regime change strategy before Saddam escaped containment completely. The 
third approach, the “humanitarian” school, was composed mainly of leftist and religious activists 
who believed the sanctions were immoral because of their effect on Iraqi public health and 
wanted them lifted immediately. As containment faced increasing crises over the course of the 
1990s, the conditionalist defenders of containment became squeezed between the growing 
inevitable decline and humanitarian camps, which both wanted to abandon containment. 
Chapter Three addresses Clinton’s first term containment policy, which successfully 
limited the Iraqi threat, compelled more cooperation from Iraq, preserved the coalition, deterred 
Iraqi challenges to the United Nations, and maintained domestic support. The relative success in 
enforcing U.N. resolutions and degrading Saddam’s power protected Clinton’s political flank as 
long as there was a chance for a coup. Nonetheless, Clinton was increasingly torn between 
domestic critics who wanted tougher action and an international coalition that wanted a faster 
lifting of sanctions. Clinton also faced pressure from humanitarian critics of sanctions, both at 
home and abroad, who claimed that sanctions were causing a massive health crisis in Iraq and 
should be lifted immediately. 
By the end of Clinton’s first term, Saddam had crushed the opposition inside Iraq and 
removed the chance that a coup or rebellion would topple his regime. These events undermined 
containment, which had long relied on a coup or rebellion to solve the Saddam problem. These 
events set the stage for a domestic political push for an open regime change strategy in Clinton’s 
second term. Furthermore, in 1995 Iraqi defection of Hussein Kamel revealed a trove of 
information about WMD programs that Iraq had hidden from inspectors. This disclosure 
reinforced the argument that full disarmament was impossible without Iraqi cooperation, which 
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would never happen because of the nature of the regime. In short, these events added greater 
legitimacy to the main ideas of the regime change consensus. 
Chapter Four examines containment in crisis during Clinton’s second term. In 1997 and 
1998, Saddam and the United Nations engaged in several showdowns over inspections, and in 
late 1998 he expelled the inspectors from Iraq. Clinton responded with a series of air and missile 
strikes in Operation Desert Fox in December 1998. The United States became increasingly 
isolated on Iraq policy as countries like France, Russia, and China refused to support military 
action and called for the lifting of sanctions. 
Containment’s critics exploited these crises to build a political coalition that sought to 
discredit containment and shift policy toward regime change. They advocated an alternative 
strategy of regime change called rollback in which the U.S. military would provide air cover, 
training, and weapons for an insurgency led by the Iraqi opposition. This movement’s greatest 
achievement was the October 1998 Iraq Liberation Act, which declared Saddam’s removal and 
the fostering of democracy in Iraq as U.S. foreign policy goals. This was a non-binding 
resolution that Clinton offered rhetorical support for but ignored in practice. Nonetheless, the 
ILA represented the entrenchment of the regime change consensus as the dominant, bipartisan 
view of Iraq. Containment was now widely seen as a failure that could not be revived. Squeezed 
between regime change advocates and humanitarian critics of sanctions, containment retained 
few public defenders. 
Chapter Five shows how the preexisting regime change consensus shaped the entire post-
9/11 debate about Iraq and made it easier for the George W. Bush administration to take the 
country to war in 2003. Administration hawks like Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz reoriented the U.S. 
response to 9/11 from al-Qaeda and Afghanistan to Iraq. Under the Bush Doctrine, the 
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administration argued that containment and deterrence could not address the nexus of rogue 
states, WMD, and international terrorism, which meant that the United States needed to invade 
Iraq. 
Bush faced significant public pushback on his rapid march to war from members of the 
Blair-Powell approach to Iraq, who nonetheless usually did not recommend the renewal of 
containment. They too believed that a restored containment would eventually relapse into the 
difficulties of the 1990s while failing to address the root of the problem: Saddam and his regime. 
Figures like Powell, Blair, and a variety of legislators succeeded in convincing Bush to give 
inspections and diplomacy more time and effort. However, they ceded to the administration the 
point that regime change should be pursued if these measures failed. When Bush declared that 
diplomacy and inspections had failed in early 2003, the vast majority of the political 
establishment either supported the war or offered few alternatives. Ultimately, the regime change 




















CHAPTER 1: A HOPE, NOT A POLICY: CONTAINMENT AND REGIME CHANGE 




 Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 sounded the death knell for the 
U.S. policy of constructive engagement toward Iraq. This policy had continued U.S. support for 
Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War in an attempt to moderate Iraqi behavior. In the long run, the 
failure of engagement ingrained the “lesson” in U.S. thinking about Iraq that any attempt to 
incentivize Saddam to change his behavior was pointless. The August 1990 invasion transformed 
Iraq from a potential partner into a serious threat to U.S. interests.  
George H.W. Bush responded to the invasion of Kuwait by mobilizing U.S. forces to 
deter an invasion of Saudi Arabia in Operation Desert Shield, forming an international coalition 
to impose sanctions on Iraq, and demanding that Saddam leave Kuwait. The United Nations 
Security Council resolutions passed in the fall of 1990 defined the coalition’s main goals as the 
ejection of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the restoration of full Kuwaiti sovereignty. Resolution 
678 in November 1990 authorized the use of “all necessary means,” including the use of force, if 
Iraq did not withdraw by January 15, 1991.1 
 In the United States, President Bush received widespread support for rallying the 
international community behind this strategy. Americans across the political spectrum agreed 
                                                        
1 United Nations Security Council Resolution 678, (November 29th, 1990), in The Gulf War Reader: History, 
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that Saddam threatened the U.S. ability to maintain the free flow of oil from the Middle East.2 
Many were also shocked by Iraq’s brutalization of Kuwaiti citizens and agreed, echoing the 
cultural memory of Munich, that the United States needed to stop aggressors like Saddam before 
their power and ambition expanded. The fact that this invasion came in the waning days of the 
Cold War made this crisis even more important in terms of setting a precedent for how the 
United States, its allies, and the U.N. would deal with aggression in the post-Cold War world. 
Secretary of State James Baker aptly summarized the case for intervention: “A very dangerous 
dictator, armed to the teeth, is threatening a critical region at a defining moment in history.”3 
This early consensus began to falter after November 8, 1990 when Bush announced that 
the United States would double its conventional forces in Saudi Arabia in order to create a 
“viable offensive option” to force Iraq from Kuwait.4 At this point, Americans divided along 
more partisan lines over how to achieve the U.N.’s goals at a tolerable cost. Most Congressional 
Democrats argued that the use of force against Iraq was unnecessary and risky, preferring to stick 
with sanctions and isolation. In contrast, the Bush administration, Republicans, and some 
Democrats contended that sanctions would take too long and that the coalition might fray before 
the economic damage compelled Iraq’s withdrawal. They therefore defended the use of military 
force after the January 15th deadline as the only guaranteed way to force Saddam out of Kuwait. 
                                                        
2 Polls in the fall and winter of 1990-1991 repeatedly showed that Americans approved of Bush’s handling of the 
crisis. His lowest approval rating during the crisis was 57% in early December. The embargo was particularly 
popular, with 83% approving of this measure in August 1990. Polls also demonstrated that Americans thought 
protecting global oil supplies was the main reason that U.S. troops were in the Gulf. Bush did receive bipartisan for 
sending troops to the Gulf, although Republicans were more likely to back the deployment of troops and the use of 
offensive military force against Iraq. See Rosita Thomas, American Public Opinion on the Iraq-Kuwait Crisis Until 
January 15 (CRS Report No. 91-109) (Washington D.C., Congressional Research Service, 1991), 1-3, 8-11, 17, 33. 
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Alongside these public and private debates about how to liberate Kuwait was a difficult 
problem about how to deal with Saddam Hussein as a long-term threat to U.S. interests in the 
Middle East. Most policymakers and commentators agreed that it was not enough for the United 
States to allow a return to the status quo ante at the end of this crisis. Even if Saddam Hussein 
agreed to all the Security Council’s demands, he would retain a massive military machine, 
advanced weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, and vengeful intentions against his 
neighbors and the United States.  
This problem led the United States to consider a host of goals that went beyond the 
Security Council mandate. A minority of commentators, mostly outside of the government, 
argued that the United States should directly seek the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and his 
regime. The Bush administration unanimously rejected this idea. Nevertheless, the White House 
believed that the United States needed to severely weaken Saddam during this crisis and impose 
a containment regime on him afterwards that would, among other things, ensure the destruction 
of his WMD programs. One question that generally went unanswered in the debate was whether 
the United States could stabilize the region and prevent Iraq from threatening its neighbors if 
Saddam Hussein remained in power. 
 Historians Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh call this question about how to deal 
with Saddam Hussein in the long run the “Saddam problem.” They distinguish it from the 
Kuwait problem: the short-term question of how to eject Iraq from Kuwait and restore and 
maintain Kuwaiti sovereignty.5 Some solutions to the Kuwait problem, such as compelling 
Saddam to freely withdraw from Kuwait, would do little to address the Saddam problem. The 
United States would still need a policy after the Kuwait crisis to prevent future Iraqi aggression. 
                                                        
5 Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World 
Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), xxxii.  
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The consensus assumption was that if the United States permitted the world’s relationship to Iraq 
to return to pre-August 1990 normalcy, Saddam would ultimately rise again as a nuclear-armed 
power, rebuild his military, and again try to dominate the Gulf. At that point, he might be 
unstoppable. The United States would have to contain Saddam Hussein at the minimum and 
engineer his overthrow at the maximum in order to preclude this nightmare scenario.  
Most accounts of the Gulf War that were published shortly after the conflict focus heavily 
on military planning, the formation of the coalition, the public debate over sanctions and war, 
and the war itself. They spend comparatively little time on the underlying question of how to 
deal with Saddam in the long term. This study highlights early thinking and planning for the 
Saddam problem because after the liberation of Kuwait this became the primary challenge facing 
U.S. policy makers in regard to Iraq for the remainder of the decade.6 
During the Gulf Crisis, the debate between the minimalist and the maximalist approaches 
to the Saddam problem bubbled beneath the more immediate argument over how to liberate 
Kuwait. For the Kuwait problem the ends were clear; the only debate was over the means. The 
Saddam problem was about both means and ends. The maximalist approach, a minority view 
during the Gulf Crisis, believed that U.S. interests in the Gulf would never be safe without the 
removal of Saddam Hussein and the entire Baathist regime. Its advocates argued that the United 
States should seek this objective directly by declaring his ouster as a goal of the conflict, 
although few such commentators developed a strategy for bringing about regime change until 
after Desert Storm ended. 
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This chapter argues that the minimalist approach to the Saddam problem held sway in 
American politics during the Gulf Crisis, including within the Bush administration. The Bush 
team welcomed Saddam’s ouster, but they contended that the United States could still achieve its 
goals in the region by containing and enfeebling him. The indirect toppling of Saddam was 
acceptable to Bush, but only as a byproduct of sanctions and the use of force to liberate Kuwait. 
If, as the administration expected, the devastation inflicted by sanctions and war prompted 
disgruntled Iraqi generals to remove Saddam, the United States would welcome this 
development and try to get his hopefully more compliant successor to accept U.N. demands.  
However, the Bush administration decided against directly pursuing regime change 
because it believed the United States might become bogged down in an occupation, the coalition 
might fracture, and the region would become even less stable. They also doubted that Saddam’s 
removal would make the handling of postwar Iraq significantly easier. Thus, regime change 
remained a vague hope throughout this crisis, not a policy. Instead, the policy was to hit Saddam 
as hard as possible during Desert Storm and then organize a multilateral containment regime that 
would use economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and the threat of renewed military force to 
box in Iraq until Saddam or his successor fully conceded to the UN’s demands. 
Constructive Engagement: 1988 to August 1990 
 The United States supported Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War to prevent Iran from becoming the 
dominant power in the Persian Gulf. This policy became known as “the tilt” because it was never 
an overt alliance. U.S. assistance began in 1982 in response to major Iraqi setbacks in the 
conflict. Over the next six years the United States provided agricultural and Export-Import Bank 
credits, licensing for advanced dual-use technology, and military intelligence on Iranian forces. 
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Through Operation Staunch, starting in 1983, the United States sought to limit international arms 
sales to Iran even as U.S. allies like France and West Germany sold billions in arms to Iraq. The 
United States removed Iraq from the terrorist state sponsor list in 1983 and restored full 
diplomatic relations in 1984. Lastly, from 1987-1988, the United States deployed naval forces to 
the Gulf to protect Kuwaiti oil tankers from Iranian attacks. This move benefitted Iraq by 
protecting Kuwaiti shipping, a key source of revenue for Iraq, and providing a de facto American 
shield for Iraq to attack Iranian shipping.7 
When the war ended in a bloody stalemate in August 1988, Iraq emerged as the 
preeminent military force in the Gulf and Iran had been drastically weakened. This situation 
raised a crucial new question for U.S. policy: Should the tilt to Iraq continue? Many in Congress 
and the media argued that the strategic rationale for supporting Iraq ceased with the end of the 
conflict. These critics of engagement pointed out that Iraq had not in fact stopped its support for 
terrorism after 1983 and that Saddam had become the new threat to stability in the Gulf. 
Moreover, outrage erupted after Iraqi forces killed thousands of Kurdish civilians with chemical 
weapons in the city of Halabja in 1988. Both houses of Congress, with significant bipartisan 
backing, passed legislation in the fall of 1988 to sever U.S. aid to Iraq and impose sanctions.8   
By contrast, the Bush administration solidified the tilt under a policy it called 
constructive engagement. In October 1989, Bush signed a new policy directive called National 
Security Directive 26 (NSD-26). This paper concluded: “Normal relations between the United 
States and Iraq would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and 
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the Middle East. The United States Government should propose economic and political 
incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior.”9 This policy aimed to bolster Iraq as a bulwark 
against Iranian and Soviet power in the region, expand trade ties in order to incentivize moderate 
behavior, and limit criticism of Iraq to avoid feeding the leadership’s sense of conspiracy. The 
Bush administration also assumed that Iraq was so exhausted and indebted from the Iran-Iraq 
War that it would focus on reconstruction, creating an opening for the United States to nudge 
Saddam towards restraint.10 NSD-26 did warn Iraq that the United States would respond with 
sanctions to the use of chemical or biological weapons or the pursuit of nuclear weapons.11 
However, in practice the policy would be much more carrot than stick, despite mounting 
evidence of Iraqi development of WMD and its abuse of U.S. export credit programs.12 
Constructive engagement shaped U.S. policy toward Iraq from its inception to the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990. It also sparked a tense public debate on how to deal with Iraq. 
Critics in Congress and the press blasted the policy as both inhumane and unrealistic. Columnists 
like Jim Hoagland and William Safire as well as legislators as varied as Claiborne Pell (D-RI) 
and Jesse Helms (R-NC) accused Iraq of committing genocide against the Kurds and continuing 
to build WMD.13 Congressional opposition to this policy, however, was inconsistent and often 
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hypocritical. Efforts to sanction Iraq frequently died because of procedural and partisan 
squabbles. Furthermore, lawmakers from agrarian states whose constituencies benefitted from 
agricultural credits for Iraq either opposed or watered-down bills that punished Iraq.14 
Doubts about constructive engagement accelerated in the spring of 1990 in response to a 
series of troubling Iraqi actions that Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly labeled the “spring 
of bad behavior.”15 In March, the Iraqi government executed British journalist Farzad Bazoft on 
false charges of espionage. Later that month, British and American agents halted the export of 
specialized equipment for the production of nuclear weapons and a “supergun” that Iraq was 
attempting to import. On April 2, Saddam threatened to strike Israel with chemical weapons if it 
launched a pre-emptive attack on Iraqi weapons facilities, saying “we will make fire eat half of 
Israel if it tries to do anything against Iraq.”16 Finally, the State Department issued several 
reports in the spring of 1990 determining that Iraq’s human rights practices had not improved 
since the end of the Iran-Iraq War.17 Critics of constructive engagement in Congress and the 
media responded to this string of provocations by labeling Bush’s policy as appeasement, calling 
for sanctions, and challenging the policy’s core assumption that United States could push 
Saddam towards moderation.18  
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Internally, the Bush administration re-examined constructive engagement and made some 
minor adjustments in the spring of 1990. On April 10, National Security Advisor Brent 
Scowcroft and his assistant Richard Haass wrote a memo to Bush arguing that although the 
policy had not pushed Iraq toward moderation thus far, the United States had little choice but to 
continue this approach. Cutting off economic links would barely hurt the Iraqi economy, since 
other states would simply jump in to fill those gaps. In addition, punishing Iraq might backfire by 
feeding Saddam’s sense of an American-led conspiracy against him. Haass and Scowcroft 
concluded that the United States needed Iraqi cooperation in several areas and that pushing 
forward with the same policy was the only viable option.19  
At the State Department, James Baker, Policy Planning Director Dennis Ross, and Under 
Secretary of State Robert Kimmitt concluded in an April 3 meeting that the engagement policy 
was failing and that the United States needed to shift to punishing Iraqi misbehavior. They 
instructed April Glaspie, the ambassador to Iraq, to instruct the Iraqi leadership that continuing 
these actions and threats would put Iraq “on a collision course” with the United States and 
compel them the withdrawal of U.S. aid. In late May, the United States suspended agricultural 
credits for Iraq, but the administration explained this move as a response to allegations of Iraqi 
misuse of the credits instead of reprimand for foreign policy misbehavior.20  
Despite these mild alterations to constructive engagement, in public the administration 
continued to defend the policy in the spring and early summer of 1990. It opposed Congressional 
efforts to sanction Iraq, which accelerated as Saddam threatened his neighbors. John Kelly 
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appeared before several Congressional hearings to defend the administration’s policy. While he 
admitted that Iraq’s actions were troubling, he argued that sanctions would have little impact 
because no allies would join the effort, which meant that sanctions would only hurt U.S. 
exporters. In line with the thinking of NSD-26, he added, “Sanctions would not improve our 
ability to exercise a restraining influence on Iraqi actions.”21 Secretary Baker likewise told a 
Congressional committee that sanctions were “a bit premature” that U.S. allies in the Middle 
East continued to support a policy of flexibility toward Iraq.22  
The Bush administration’s policy may have been shifting slowly toward a tougher line on 
Iraq, but it remained tethered to the assumptions of constructive engagement when Iraq escalated 
its threats against its neighbors in the summer of 1990. On July 15, Iraqi troops started to deploy 
on the border with Kuwait. The next day Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi foreign minister, accused Kuwait 
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of intentionally overproducing oil in order to cripple the 
Iraqi economy. He demanded the raising of oil prices, a moratorium on Iraq’s massive wartime 
loans, and the creation of a fund through which the Gulf states would repay Iraq for defending 
them against Iran. Iraqi threats and troop deployments continued for the next two weeks.23  
Critics of the administration pointed to this escalation as evidence for the failure of 
engagement. The House and Senate passed bills on July 27 to cut off economic aid to Iraq, but 
the administration continued to oppose these efforts.24 Republican Senator Alphonse D’Amato 
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(R-NY) cried, “We’ve waited for Hussein to take a more humane course and it has not been 
done. He is a butcher, a torturer, a manipulator.”25 Many former opponents of severing aid to 
Iraq now voted to punish Saddam, including Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS) who said that 
despite her reservations about hurting food exporters, “there comes a time when I think we have 
to stand up and be counted.”26 Meanwhile, the Bush administration’s reaction to these threats 
was concerned but cautious. They generally assumed that Iraq was blustering in order to exact 
concessions from Kuwait but did not want a conflict because of its exhaustion from the Iran-Iraq 
War.27 Saudi Arabia and Egypt encouraged this view and asked the United States to let them 
handle Saddam.  
Critics of Bush’s handling of pre-invasion diplomacy later condemned Ambassador 
Glaspie for her conciliation of Saddam in a meeting on July 25, but she was following a policy 
that required officials to pepper nebulous warnings with reassurances that the United States still 
sought Iraqi friendship. For example, a cable from Bush to the Iraqi government on July 28th 
read: “We believe that differences are best resolved by peaceful means and not by threats 
involving military force or conflict. My administration continues to desire better relations with 
Iraq.”28 U.S. messages repeatedly stated that the United States had no defense treaties with 
Kuwait or positions on Iraq-Kuwait border disputes.29 A mere two days before the invasion, John 
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Kelly reiterated the administration’s desire for good relations with Iraq while refusing to 
speculate on what the United States would do if Iraq invaded Kuwait.30 Although the 
administration was starting to question constructive engagement, their restrained, ambiguous 
response to Saddam’s threats still flowed from that policy and prevented the United States from 
deterring Iraq more effectively.  
Responding to the Invasion of Kuwait, August-November 1990 
The Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait in August 1990 shattered every assumption 
underpinning constructive engagement: that Iraq was too exhausted from the war with Iran to try 
to dominate the Persian Gulf; that Western and conservative Arab support for his war effort had 
mellowed Saddam in the 1980s; and that Saddam could be positively incentivized to align with 
U.S. policies. This paradigm shift initially led to a policy of containing and deterring Iraq but 
quickly escalated to the use of force to eject it from Kuwait.  
Bush immediately started building an international coalition to condemn the invasion, 
stop further Iraqi aggression, and create a legal basis for action against Iraq. This effort led to the 
passing of a number of Security Council resolutions in the early fall that established the U.N.’s 
demands for Iraq and the tools to enforce them. Resolution 660 on August 2 called for Iraq to 
“immediately and unconditionally” withdraw its forces from Kuwait and allow the restoration of 
the Kuwaiti government. Four days later, Resolution 661 froze Iraqi assets and imposed 
economic sanctions on Iraq, with exceptions for food and medicine.31   
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The United States also forged a military and political response to the invasion, starting 
with the deployment on August 8 of naval, air, and ground forces to the Gulf to protect Saudi 
Arabia from Iraqi forces menacing their border. In a speech announcing the deployment, Bush 
outlined the principles that would guide U.S. policy in the Gulf. He called for the “immediate, 
unconditional, and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait” and the restoration of 
the Kuwait government. He committed the United States, “as has been the case with every 
President from President Roosevelt to President Reagan,” to the “security and stability of the 
Gulf.” He framed the deployment of U.S. forces as a measure to defend Saudi Arabia and 
enforce the sanctions but emphasized that the United States would not settle for less than the full 
implementation of the U.N. demands.32 
Although Bush received broad support for his post-invasion policy, both parties seized 
upon the invasion itself to criticize constructive engagement. They claimed that Bush’s 
“appeasement” merely convinced Saddam he could get away with seizing Kuwait.33 Pell and 
Helms claimed that the United States might have stopped Saddam by imposing sanctions on Iraq 
prior to the invasion.34 The fact that Bush was now doing what these critics had wanted before 
the invasion limited their criticism, as did their basic agreement with the administration’s new 
strategy.35 The time for hashing out these battles would come after the war as most Democrats 
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during Desert Shield wanted to avoid criticizing the President too harshly as the country stood on 
the brink of war. Nonetheless, after the war, anger and recrimination about engagement and the 
failure to stop Saddam from invading Kuwait would tarnish the implementation of containment 
and delegitimize any policy that offered positive incentives to Iraq. 
By the end of August, Bush had established the basic policy of using sanctions and 
diplomatic isolation to coerce Saddam into leaving Kuwait. In making the case for action, he 
identified several core interests and values at stake. The importance of the free flow of oil from 
the region featured prominently in his justification for opposing Saddam. Maintaining access to 
the energy resources of the Gulf had been a declared policy goal since the Second World War. 
By seizing Kuwait, Saddam gained control of about one-fifth of global oil reserves,  and he could 
compel the Gulf States to obey his commands on oil prices.36 Defense Secretary Richard Cheney 
warned that this situation “gave him a strangle hold on our economy and on that of most of the 
other nations of the world as well.”37 A surge in oil prices could lead to a global recession that 
might threaten recent trends towards democracy in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and 
Southeast Asia. Moreover, Saddam would use these gains to feed his military machine and 
aggressive ambitions.  
Another major part of Bush’s argument for action was the possibility of bolstering 
collective security, international law, and the United Nations as the primary mechanisms for 
stopping aggression in the post-Cold War world. Bush labeled this vision the “new world order,” 
which he defined as the “community of nations” cooperating “to condemn and repel lawless 
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aggression.”38 To the White House, the world in 1990 was in “a critical juncture” between the 
Cold War and some as yet undetermined order. James Baker called the Gulf Crisis “a political 
test of how the post-Cold War world will work.”39 In Bush’s words, Saddam had launched “a 
ruthless assault on the very essence of international order and civilized ideals.”40 Allowing 
Saddam to keep Kuwait would signal that the international community was willing to accept 
aggression and the eradication of a U.N. member, encouraging more criminality around the 
world. If, however, the United States and its allies thwarted Saddam, it could be the first step in 
creating a more peaceful, lawful, and cooperative epoch in international politics. 
The USSR’s support for early U.S. actions against Iraq further raised the administration’s 
hopes of bolstering collective security in the post-Cold War world. The Cold War rivalry often 
had prevented the Security Council from enforcing international law. But the Cold War had 
faded by the time Saddam invaded Kuwait, which the Soviets promptly denounced, accusing 
their former clients of acting like “feudal lords.”41 If the United States and USSR could 
demonstrate cooperation in foiling Iraq, Bush believed this would open new options for the 
cooperative management of international affairs. As he told Gorbachev in early September: “I 
want to go to the American people tomorrow night to close the book on the Cold War and offer 
them the vision of this new world order in which we will cooperate.”42  
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The Bush administration believed the broad goal of setting precedents for a new world 
order made it vital to maintain multilateral consensus throughout the crisis. In pragmatic terms, 
the United States needed wide participation in the embargo from Iraq’s neighbors and major 
trading partners to give the it any teeth. Allied forces needed bases in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and 
elsewhere. In addition, the participation of many Arab states in the coalition undermined 
Saddam’s rhetoric that this was a Western crusade against Arabs or Muslims. Bush also aimed to 
set a precedent for cooperative responses to aggression in which coalitions would build legal 
justification for action at the United Nations and use force only after pursuing non-violent 
solutions. Getting Iraq out of Kuwait by any means was not adequate. The United States had to 
achieve this goal in a way that demonstrated the effectiveness of cooperative security. One 
crucial element of this effort to create a “model for the use of force” was that Saddam must gain 
nothing from his crimes: no concessions, no incentives, no deals.43 Only a full denial of any 
gains for Saddam would firmly establish the principle that aggression does not pay. The 
administration believed that if it could hold the coalition together in demanding the aggressor’s 
full compliance with the U.N. resolutions, they would set a powerful precedent that would deter 
future conquerors and offer a model for responding to aggression. 
The fall of 1990 brought a whirlwind of diplomatic, political, and military action that 
inhibited long-term thinking in the Bush administration about how to address Saddam Hussein as 
a threat to stability in the Middle East beyond the Kuwait crisis. Key officials, including U.S. 
Ambassador to the U.N. Thomas Pickering and CIA Director William Webster, identified an 
important dilemma in the stated policy: If sanctions and military pressure convinced Saddam to 
leave Kuwait voluntarily, he would escape with his military machine and WMD programs intact. 
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The Kuwait problem would be solved for the moment, but the United States would have done 
little to solve the Saddam problem. He would retain his ability, and most likely his intention, to 
bully his neighbors once again. On August 2, Pickering argued that the U.S. needed “to find a 
broader basis to ensure that Iraq does not return to the status quo ante in a position where its 
considerable military muscle can be a source of intimidation and threat to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan, or other states in the region.”44 In October, Webster warned that the region would not be 
secure unless Saddam was overthrown, “some countervailing force” in the area contained him, or 
his WMD programs and military strength were decimated.45 
The Bush administration consequently aimed to weaken Saddam during this crisis and/or 
impose a set of strictures on him after the crisis to prevent him from keeping or reconstituting his 
military strength. In effect, from the beginning the United States had committed itself to a new, 
higher standard of success, one that the Security Council had not endorsed nor had the 
administration publicly stated as a goal. In addition to Pickering and Webster, both of whom 
argued from this position as early as August 1990, Richard Haass, also in August, argued that: “it 
is not clear that an outcome that leaves Saddam in power and Iraq’s industrial and war-making 
capability intact constitutes a viable much less optimal outcome from our perspective.” Haass 
noted that if the situation in the Gulf returned to the status quo ante, Saddam would return to 
aggression in a few years, but this time he would have nuclear and biological weapons. In this 
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case, coping with Saddam 2.0 would require at the minimum a full containment strategy and a 
permanent military presence in the region.46 
Haass’ reasoning suggests that some kind of containment strategy was already 
percolating through the administration’s thinking as it dealt with the Gulf Crisis. Bush and his 
top policy advisors came into the crisis believing that the containment of the Soviet Union had 
been “extraordinarily successful.” A February 1989 National Security Review signed by Bush 
declared: “Containment is being vindicated as the peoples of the world reject the outmoded 
dogma of Marxism-Leninism in a search for prosperity and freedom.”47  
Haass and other top officials envisioned a basic containment strategy as requiring a 
peacekeeping force on the border, a U.S. naval presence, the prepositioning of military 
equipment, regular exercises in the region, the elimination of Iraq’s ballistic missile and nuclear 
weapons programs, and “covert efforts designed to keep the regime in Baghdad on the 
defensive.”48 Bush suggested this kind of post-crisis structure to British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher on October 18, saying: “we are talking about containing Iraq.”49 The goal was to put 
Saddam “in a box,” although it remained unspecified whether he would stay in the box 
indefinitely. The Bush administration believed that the new factors in the post-Cold War world 
would make multilateral containment feasible. They particularly pointed to the new confluence 
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of interests between the United States and the USSR in the Middle East and the international 
community’s recognition of Iraq as a threat to the global economy.50 
In an odd twist, although forcible regime change was deemed unnecessary, the need for a 
future containment strategy led many U.S. officials to see war as preferable to a diplomatic 
solution. In Haass’ words, a punishing war “would greatly ease the post-war challenge of 
containing Iraq and maintaining security in the Gulf” by allowing the United States to degrade 
Saddam’s military and WMD programs.51 Scowcroft concurred, saying that if the United States 
had to use force to eject Saddam from Kuwait it should “reduce the Iraqi military as much as 
possible” in order to “reduce the threat Saddam posed to his neighbors.”52 The administration 
anticipated that many European and Arab allies might see this policy as “moving the goalpost” 
on Iraq, but they nevertheless believed they had to pursue this goal while preserving the 
sanctioning coalition after the crisis, knowing that any unilateral containment regime would fail. 
This exploration of the Saddam problem led the Bush administration to consider a new 
question: Would the Middle East ever be stable as long as Saddam Hussein remained in power? 
The administration was usually pessimistic on this question, but they did not definitively decide 
if Saddam had to be removed for the United States to achieve its objectives beyond the current 
crisis.53 There were hints that top U.S. officials thought that United States might not be able to 
achieve its goals while Saddam was still around. In an August 4 NSC meeting, Baker said “Our 
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strategy is three-fold: to keep Saddam out, to make him a pariah, and to topple him through 
sanctions and covert actions.” In an August 6 NSC meeting, Bush said “all will not be tranquil 
until Saddam Hussein is history.54 The NSC agreed with this long-term goal but stated that 
getting Saddam out of Kuwait was the first priority.55  
The Bush administration believed the removal of Saddam Hussein would probably make 
Iraq easier to control after the crisis but never identified regime change as a policy goal. They 
framed it as a hope rather than an objective even though they expected that at some point 
Saddam would have to be removed for the region to return to stability. For example, when 
Senator Al Gore asked Cheney if the removal of Saddam was a U.S. goal, Cheney said no but 
added “I think it would be fair to say, Senator, we probably would not have any objection were 
that to occur.”56 As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell said after the war: “We 
hoped that Saddam would not survive the coming fury. But his elimination was not a stated 
objective. What we hoped for, frankly, in a postwar Gulf region was an Iraq still standing, with 
Saddam overthrown.”57 Instead of regime change, the administration focused on enforcing the 
Security Council resolutions and weakening Iraqi military capabilities in the process. Following 
this logic, Ambassador Pickering reasoned in the fall of 1990: “the continuation of Saddam as 
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president should not be a major issue for us…it is his military strength, power, and his economic 
potential that are concerning to us, not his personality (others might be worse).”58 
The administration decided early in the crisis that the United States would not directly 
pursue regime change as a policy goal. These and other statements, however, do show that the 
United States would have welcomed the toppling of Saddam as byproduct of the campaign to 
oust him from Kuwait. The NSC Deputies Committee, which reviewed the regime change option 
in the fall of 1990, also suggested that the United States might be able to create the conditions in 
which regime change could happen.59 A military coup would be the main mechanism for regime 
change. They reasoned that if the coalition pounded Iraqi forces, destroyed key pillars of the 
regime like the Republican Guard, and crippled the Iraqi communications system that these 
actions, combined with sanctions, might prompt top generals to remove Saddam. Robert Gates 
described this approach as such: “We wanted to create circumstances that would encourage the 
Iraqi military to take Saddam out.”60 A more pragmatic successor might concede to U.N. 
demands in order to avoid further destruction and to shore up his domestic position. The 
administration also developed a covert component to the coup option. Immediately after the 
invasion of Kuwait, Bush ordered the CIA to look for sources of discontent with Saddam that 
could be cultivated. The administration was pessimistic about locating a viable internal 
resistance in a totalitarian state like Iraq, but they still wanted to make preliminary contacts.61 
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The plans for the U.S. ground and air campaigns against Iraq offered some insight into 
the Bush administration’s early desire to use this crisis to weaken Saddam Hussein in the long 
run. On August 8, 1990, CENTCOM Commander Norman Schwarzkopf ordered the air staff at 
CENTCOM to start developing a strategic air plan that would go beyond tactical air support and 
strike directly at the Iraqi state.62 The responsibility for this planning fell to Colonel John 
Warden and his team, known as Checkmate. Warden was an air power theorist who believed the 
primary purpose of air power should not be tactical support for ground operations but the 
destruction of a state’s ability to absorb information, issue orders, and resupply its forces, an end 
point they called “strategic paralysis.”63 The Checkmate plan for the air assault on Iraq, titled 
Instant Thunder, sought to cut off Iraqi forces in Kuwaiti theater of operations (KTO), which 
included Kuwait and Southern Iraq, from the command and control system in Baghdad in order 
to facilitate their destruction or force their surrender. Rather than just bombing Iraqi units in the 
KTO, the Checkmate team aimed to strike a host of targets in Iraq that would blind the state and 
prevent it from resupplying its forces: command and communications facilities, supply lines to 
Iraqi forces, WMD and missile production sites, the electricity grid, the civilian telephone and 
water systems, oil production sites, and more symbolic targets like Saddam’s palaces.64  
                                                        
62 John Olsen, John Warden and the Renaissance of American Air Power (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007), 
146-147. 
 
63 Warden was one of several air power theorists who developed this doctrine in the 1980’s and 1990’s. A 
particularly important concept in Warden’s thinking was the Five Rings Model, which viewed a modern state as five 
concentric rings with power and direction emanating from the inside outwards. The innermost ring was the 
leadership, then essential industries, infrastructure and transportation, the population, and lastly military forces in the 
field. Warden sought to attack the innermost rings first, paralyzing and blinding the state while cutting off military 
forces from information, direction, and supplies. For an examination of the development of this doctrine and its 
application in the Gulf Crisis, see Olsen, Renaissance of American Air Power, 108-112; Edward Mann, Thunder and 
Lightning: Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1995), 35-
42; Richard Reynolds, Heart of the Storm: The Genesis of the Air Campaign Against Iraq (Maxwell Air Force Base, 
AL: Air University Press, 1995), 16-19. 
 
64 Norman Friedman, Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1992), 180-183. 
 
 49 
Warden and his team understood, with little explicit direction from military or civilian 
authorities, that Bush’s main goal was to force Iraqi troops out of Kuwait but that in the longer 
term it also wanted to weaken Iraq as a threat to regional stability.65 They therefore oriented the 
bombing campaign around these objectives. Their primary goal in extending the bombing 
beyond the KTO was to facilitate the liberation of Kuwait, but the campaign would also reduce 
Iraqi forces, industrial capacity, and WMD production in order to diminish the threat Saddam 
would pose to his neighbors after the crisis.66  
Moreover, CENTCOM treated Saddam himself as a legitimate target for air strikes 
because he was the core of the Iraqi command and control system.67 Many in the Air Force, 
including Chief of CENTCOM Air Operations Buster Glosson, believed that the planned air 
campaign against Iraq could decapitate the regime or provoke a coup.68 Indeed, the Gulf War Air 
Power Survey later stated: “Despite somewhat ambiguous policy guidance, the chief architects of 
the air campaign targeted Saddam Hussein and planned air operations meant to create conditions 
conducive to his overthrow.”69 Although the civilians in the Bush administration played a 
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minimal role in the air plan’s formation, the expansive direction it took reflected their desire to 
strike a major strategic blow against Saddam that might engender his overthrow.  
The final version of the ground campaign plan emerged in December 1990 under the 
guidance of CENTCOM Commander Norman Schwarzkopf. The ground plan treated the 
Republican Guard as the Iraqi strategic center of gravity. Destroying as much of the Guard as 
possible would ensure the Kuwait’s liberation and cripple one of the Baathist regime’s key tools 
for maintaining internal security and projecting power in the region.70 The ground assault would 
start with the First and Second Marine Divisions, along with some British units, attacking 
directly into Kuwait from Saudi Arabia as other Marine elements launched a feint towards an 
amphibious landing along the Kuwaiti coastline. These initial moves would hopefully draw 
Republican Guard units in Southern Iraq into Kuwait to meet these advances, fixing them in 
place for a flanking attack. The coup de grace would come with a massive left hook of the U.S. 
VIIth and XVIIIth Corps, which would enter the Iraqi desert to the west of Kuwait, move east 
while sweeping Iraqi units towards the KTO, and ultimately trap and annihilate the Republican 
Guard divisions already engaged with Marine forces in Kuwait.71 
Although the Bush administration was thinking about how to weaken or indirectly topple 
Saddam in the long run, they tried to minimize open discussion of these secondary goals. They 
wanted to avoid scaring the public, the Democrats, and the international coalition into thinking 
the administration planned to expand U.S. objectives beyond those of the Security Council 
resolutions. In the fall of 1990, Bush had not convinced the American people, Congress, or the 
coalition that a war to liberate Kuwait was necessary, much less a war to cripple Saddam 
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Hussein. The sanctions-based strategy was popular among Democrats and Republicans, although 
Democratic leaders like Sam Nunn (D-GA) and George Mitchell (D-ME) warned Bush that they 
opposed offensive military action for the time being.72  
 General Michael Dugan, the Air Force Chief of Staff, found out the hard way that Bush 
would not tolerate open advocacy of expanding the coalition’s objectives. In early September, 
Dugan publicly advocated directly targeting Saddam and his personal entourage in order to 
decapitate the regime and force an Iraqi surrender. Although these comments did not stray far 
from Instant Thunder’s objectives, the Bush administration was outraged that Dugan made these 
comments without permission. They dreaded that he would signal that the United States was 
pursuing a more expansive set of goals. On September 18th, Cheney fired Dugan, and Scowcroft 
told reporters that Dugan “does not speak for the administration.”73 
Despite these efforts at controlling the message, as the fall of 1990 dragged on, the Bush 
administration could not avoid addressing the longer-term problem of Iraq as a threat to regional 
security. When pressed by Congressman Stephen Solarz (D-MA) in a September hearing, Baker 
stated that any settlement of the crisis had to address Iraq’s “capacity for future aggression.”74 
Cheney also told Congress that the removal of Iraq’s nascent nuclear capability was a 
longstanding U.S. policy goal.75 Nevertheless, the Bush administration concluded that talk of the 
broader goals inherent in the Saddam problem jeopardized the greater priority of maintaining an 
effective international coalition that could resolve the Kuwait problem.76  
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By the late fall of 1990, the basic structure of U.S. policy on the Saddam problem had 
been established. If Saddam relented without violence, the United States would install a 
containment regime to ensure that he could not rebuild his conventional and unconventional 
arsenals. If war became necessary to oust him from Kuwait, the United States would strike hard 
at Iraqi forces and WMD programs in order to force him out of Kuwait and weaken him in the 
long run. If sanctions and/or war led to his overthrow, the Bush administration would welcome 
this outcome, but they did not see it as necessary for achieving their short or long-term goals. 
The Debate Heats Up: November 1990-January 1991 
By late October 1990, the Bush administration had started to doubt that sanctions alone 
would compel Saddam to leave Kuwait. President Bush held a Cabinet meeting on October 30th 
to decide whether to stay with the sanctions-based policy or start building an offensive military 
option. The Cabinet noted that sanctions had been in place for almost three months and appeared 
to be having little effect on Saddam’s decision-making despite inflicting significant economic 
damage. The CIA had reported in late September that sanctions would not force Iraq from 
Kuwait nor cause the shutdown of vital industries “in the short or medium term.”77 Most of the 
Cabinet agreed that sanctions might force Saddam’s hand eventually, but not within an 
acceptable time frame. The United States could not sustain hundreds of thousands of troops in 
the desert indefinitely, and the best time period for offensive ground operations would end 
around March of 1991 when the heat started to increase.78 The political climate in the Middle 
East posed an equally difficult problem. Recent fighting between Israelis and Palestinians 
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opened the possibility that Saddam might use this crisis to divide the coalition. The haj was set to 
begin in the spring, and the mere presence of U.S. troops posed political dangers for Saudi 
Arabia.79 All of these factors militated against a strategy of sanctions and attrition. 
One noteworthy skeptic of the push away from sanctions was Colin Powell, the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Powell was a combat veteran of the Vietnam War and a believer in 
using force only as a last resort and only in defense of precisely defined national interests. He 
was not opposed to the use of force against Iraq, but he feared that Bush might not be hearing the 
full case for sticking with sanctions from advisors like Cheney and Scowcroft, who had 
expressed their skepticism of this route early in the crisis. Powell later explained: “My thinking 
was that it would be great if sanctions would do the job because then we would avoid a war with 
unknown consequences and therefore we should give sanctions as much of a ride as was 
politically possible.”80 State Department personnel remembered Powell as “a very reluctant 
warrior” who advocated the sanctions strategy to Bush and other top civilian officials.81 Powell 
told Bush in late September, “There is a case here for the containment or strangulation policy…It 
may take a year, it may take two years, but it will work some day.”82 In October, Powell told 
Britain’s air chief marshal that he would be willing to wait twelve to fifteen months for sanctions 
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to work.83 Bush, Cheney, and Scowcroft all disagreed, saying that there were too many risks in 
waiting that long. Once Bush decided to augment troop numbers in Saudi Arabia in late October, 
Powell fell in line behind this approach. 
The Cabinet in late October agreed to pursue a new Security Council resolution that 
would authorize the use of all necessary means to force Saddam out of Kuwait by a certain date. 
They also decided to double the number of soldiers in the region to enable an offensive to 
liberate Kuwait. They hoped that the creation of a viable offensive force would convince Saddam 
of the coalition’s resolve and get him to back down.84 If he did not yield, the United States would 
have the military strength in place to force him out. On November 8, Bush gave a speech 
announcing the addition of another 200,000 troops to the Desert Shield force “to ensure that the 
coalition has an adequate offensive military option.”85  
The administration then went to the United Nations to acquire a new resolution that 
would authorize the use of force against Iraq. The result was Resolution 678, passed on 
November 29, 1990. This resolution noted that Iraq had refused to comply with the Security 
Council’s previous demands and offered Iraq “one final opportunity” to do so. If by January 15 
1991, Iraq did not begin the full implementation of the these demands, the coalition would be 
authorized to use “all necessary means” to force Iraq from Kuwait. This resolution also called for 
the restoration of “international peace and security” in the region, a general enough goal to 
justify the broader goal of weakening of Iraq through military action.86 
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In late 1990 and early 1991, administration officials accelerated a campaign to convince 
Congress and the public that the United States could not wait indefinitely for sanctions to work 
and had to use force if Saddam did not relent. They sought Congressional authorization for the 
use of force before the January 15 deadline. James Baker told a Congressional hearing that 
sanctions were not having the desired political effect: “so far, all available evidence suggest they 
have had little, if any, effect on his inclination to withdraw from Kuwait.”87 Cheney and Webster 
noted that Saddam could endure the sanctions for years by directing resources to key power 
bases like the Sunni population and the military while starving the rest of the population.88 
Adding to this urgency was the sense that, as the world waited for sanctions, Iraq was 
dismantling the nation of Kuwait to the point where there might be no country left to save. 
The Bush administration also argued that waiting for sanctions to work posed great risks 
to the coalition’s unity. They emphasized that sanctions hurt countries like Jordan, Turkey, and 
Eastern European nations that relied on trade with Iraq. The longer the sanctions regime lasted, 
the more likely cheating became. Moreover, many Arab members of the coalition felt growing 
pressure from large segments of their population that sympathized with Saddam’s challenge to 
the West and the wealthy Gulf States.89 The contingency of Israel being dragged into the 
conflict, possibly by Saddam’s own actions, would make it politically impossible for these states 
to stay in the coalition. The United States also feared that the longer the standoff lasted the more 
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likely that the Soviets, Arabs, or Europeans would offer Saddam some kind of incentive or 
partial reward for complying with the United Nations.90  
In late 1990, the Bush administration increasingly stressed the long-term threat of 
Saddam as a nuclear power to defend the shift to an offensive strategy. Speaking to coalition 
forces in Saudi Arabia on Thanksgiving, Bush claimed, “Those who would measure the 
timetable for Saddam’s atomic program in years may be seriously underestimating the reality of 
that situation and the gravity of the threat. Every day that passes brings Saddam one step closer 
to realizing his goal of a nuclear weapons arsenal.” Bush then said that no one knew exactly 
when Saddam would acquire nuclear weapons but warned, “He has never possessed a weapon 
that he didn’t use.”91 U.S. officials emphasized that the United States could either defeat Saddam 
now without nuclear weapons or fight him later when he had a nuclear arsenal.  
These claims advanced a much more alarmist view of the Iraqi nuclear program than the 
intelligence community’s assessments. An interagency review estimated in the fall of 1990 that 
Iraq was 5-10 years from a large nuclear weapons program and that it could build a small nuclear 
weapon at some point between few months and a few years.92 Nevertheless, the growing 
emphasis on nuclear weapons bolstered the case for war in Congress and among the public. A 
CBS News Poll on November 19th found that 54% of Americans thought that preventing Saddam 
from building nuclear weapons was a good reason to go to war. In contrast, 56% found restoring 
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the Kuwaiti government and defending Saudi Arabia an inadequate reason, and 62% thought 
protecting the source of much of the world’s oil also did not justify the use of force.93  
The cultural memory of the 1938 Munich Conference and Adolf Hitler played a major 
role in the administration’s case for setting a deadline for the use of force rather than relying on 
sanctions. Bush was a World War II veteran and, like many of his generation, he believed that 
war could have been averted if the allies had confronted Hitler earlier than 1939. Bush contended 
soon after the invasion: “A half century ago, our nation and the world paid dearly for appeasing 
an aggressor who should, and could, have been stopped. We are not going to make that mistake 
again.”94 American leaders applied this lesson to Saddam Hussein, arguing that if the United 
States did not reverse his aggression he would commit worse transgressions and build nuclear 
weapons. Bush, for instance, wrote to his children on January 15th: “How many lives might have 
been saved if appeasement had given way to force earlier on in the late ‘30s or earliest ‘40s? I 
look at today’s crisis as ‘good’ vs. ‘evil’-yes, it is that clear.”95  
The Munich metaphor added moral urgency to the administration’s case for war and 
helped build public support. One New York Times poll in August 1990 reported that 61% of 
Americans agreed that Saddam was like Hitler and the United States needed to stop him.96 
Nevertheless, some top officials felt that it raised expectations beyond the defined set of 
objectives. After all, the United States fought the war against Hitler with total means and for total 
ends, in marked contrast to the planned war against Iraq. Richard Haass, for one, believed that 
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“making the comparison would add pressure on us to go beyond our mission and remove the 
regime.”97 Moreover, Colin Powell later recalled his unease with comparing Saddam to Hitler 
because “in so demonizing him…you raised expectations that you would do something about 
him at the end of the day.”98 Powell and others feared that the mismatch between rhetoric and 
policy might tarnish whatever the United States achieved in the conflict.  
The massive troop surge in November 1990 intensified domestic opposition to Bush’s 
Iraq policy. Democrats in Congress had backed the sanctions-based strategy, but they believed 
this shift, combined with the January 15 deadline, altered U.S. strategy in perilous ways. Led by 
Sam Nunn and Claiborne Pell, Democrats invited prominent foreign policy figures to speak in a 
series of Congressional hearings on behalf of the sanctions strategy and against a shift to the use 
of force.99 Democrats and their allies contended that war against Iraq was premature and that the 
United States should give sanctions more time to influence Iraq. This public debate centered on 
means rather than ends. Democrats agreed with Bush that Saddam should receive no rewards or 
incentives for withdrawing from Kuwait in order to reaffirm the principle that aggression does 
not pay. They also acknowledged the importance of establishing precedents of effective 
collective security, countering his bid to dominate oil resources, defending human rights and 
state sovereignty, weakening Saddam, and stripping him of his WMD programs.  
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Democrats argued, however, that sanctions were still the best means of achieving those 
ends. They believed the massive economic damage the sanctions wrought on the Iraqi economy 
would eventually affect Saddam’s military machine.100 The sanctions would deny spare parts to 
the military, shut down key industries, drain Iraq’s cash reserves, and force the rationing of food. 
Saddam could only shuffle resources around so much before he became unable to pay off the key 
constituent groups that sustained his regime. At that point, projected by sanctions advocates to be 
between six months and a year, Saddam would have to choose between withdrawing from 
Kuwait and facing overthrow from within.101 If the embargo failed and the United States had to 
use force, Iraq would be even weaker due to this extended economic isolation.102 Democrats 
believed the coalition had time on its side and a chance to defeat Saddam without a risky 
conflict. Some Democrats pointed to the containment of the USSR as a model for how to deal 
with Iraq, claiming that if the United States outlasted this superpower they could also wear down 
Iraq.103  
Democrats and their allies also condemned what they saw as Bush’s rush to war. They 
contended that a war would cause thousands of American casualties, break up the international 
coalition, and turn Arab public opinion against the United States. In addition, Vietnam loomed 
large over the Democrats’ hesitance to use force against Iraq. Many Democrats had personal 
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connections to Vietnam, either as veterans or as politicians who opposed the war. As Senator 
Richard Durbin (D-IL) put it, “We are products of the Vietnam experience…We are really 
touched by the possibility that we may be repeating that experience.”104 Vietnam veterans like 
John Kerry and Robert Kerrey cited their experiences as a warning against rushing into wars, 
particularly when the United States seemed to be fighting for countries that would not protect 
themselves.105 Furthermore, many Democrats feared that the United States would become 
bogged down in a bloody war with Iraq, poisoning domestic politics as Vietnam did.106  
In legal terms, Democrats claimed that Bush had exceeded his constitutional authority by 
doubling the number of troops and signing Security Council Resolution 678 because these steps 
effectively put the country on a course for war before Congress had authorized the use of force. 
They demanded that Bush seek Congressional approval before launching a war to liberate 
Kuwait.107 Democrats also argued that in spite of the broad international support for Bush’s 
policies, the United States would end up bearing a disproportionate share of the fighting and the 
casualties given the small military contributions of most coalition partners. Senator Joseph Biden 
(D-DE), for instance, argued that this burden-sharing problem undermined Bush’s push for 
collective security, saying: “A New World Order in the United Nations and collective security 
adds up to ‘We will hold your coat, United States. You go get them; we give you the authority to 
                                                        
104 E.J. Dionne, “Gulf Crisis Rekindles Democrats’ Old Debate but with New Focus,” Washington Post, January 3, 
1991, A16. 
 
105 See testimony of Senators Robert Kerrey and John Kerry, Cong., Rec. 101st Cong., 2nd sess., October 24, 1990, 
33377; Cong. Rec., 102nd Cong., 1nd sess., January 11, 1991 846-849. 
 
106 Brands, “Neither Munich nor Vietnam,” 83-86. 
 
107 Ruth Marcus, “Congress and the President Clash Over Who Decides on Going to War,” Washington Post, 
December 14, 1990, A46. 
 
 61 
do it.’”108 Other Democrats said that the American soldiers were serving as “mercenaries” or 
“cannon fodder” for Gulf regimes that would not fight for themselves.109  
As for the New World Order, most Democrats contended that ousting Saddam from 
Kuwait through sanctions would establish a more replicable approach to stopping aggression 
than the use of force. The United States could not deploy legions of troops for months at a time, 
much less fight a war, to counter every international act of aggression. As Senator Paul Sarbanes 
(D-MD) asked: “Isn’t it arguable that we have a special interest actually in trying to make the 
economic sanctions work in order to establish a precedent of collective action by the U.N. which 
could fairly readily be invoked…where we sought to deter aggression in the future?”110  
On the issue of WMD, Democrats emphasized that the United States could keep 
sanctions on Iraq after the withdrawal from Kuwait to compel Saddam to undo these programs. 
They and other critics of Bush’s policy also objected to his portrayal of Saddam’s nuclear 
program as an imminent threat to the United States. The United States had to be concerned with 
Iraq’s WMD, but this was not an immediate casus belli. For instance, former National Security 
Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski contended that even if Iraq built a small nuclear weapons program 
in spite of sanctions, the United States could deter them just as they had deterred far more 
powerful nuclear states. Furthermore, nuclear experts noted that Saddam would still be five to 
ten years away from a large nuclear arsenal even if the sanctions were not in place.111  
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In the meantime, Saddam could create a crude, Hiroshima-sized device, but experts 
emphasized that he could neither test this device nor deliver it with ballistic missiles. These 
specialists also doubted that Saddam Hussein was irrational enough to use a nuclear weapon and 
bring destruction down upon his head.112 They and experts on Iraq such as Phebe Marr and 
Efraim Karsh portrayed Saddam as a power-hungry, ruthless, but mostly rational survivor who 
lacked a “Masada complex.”113 Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait was a gamble, they argued, but it 
was not irrational because the conciliatory U.S. engagement policy gave Saddam good reason to 
think he could get away with the invasion. Saddam’s life was “a ceaseless struggle for survival” 
in which he always prioritized domestic power. Even if he could acquire nuclear weapons, the 
odds were exceedingly small that he would throw his lifelong struggle away by using them.114 
A large minority of Democrats, however, broke with their party and supported Bush’s 
case for war. Most of these legislators were more hawkish, conservative, and pro-Israel than 
average in their party, including Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), Albert Gore (D-TN), and Les Aspin 
(D-WI). Aspin shifted many Democrats towards the administration’s side through his position as 
the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, which published several reports 
declaring the low likelihood that sanctions would force Saddam out of Kuwait. Aspin thought 
that the United States would have to contain Iraq for years to come and that this task would be 
easier if the Kuwait crisis was resolved through force rather than diplomacy.115 Since Democrats 
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controlled both houses of Congress, these defections were crucial to the passage of the 
authorization to use force in January 1991. In the Senate, the vote was 52-47 in favor of 
authorization, with ten Democrats crossing the aisle. Eighty-six Democrats voted for the 
authorization in the House, enabling that resolution to pass by a more comfortable 250-183.116 
Possibly the most significant Democrat who supported the war was Representative 
Stephen Solarz of New York. Solarz was a staunch supporter of Israel who saw Saddam as an 
irrational tyrant on the brink of attaining nuclear weapons. He viewed the conflict in stark moral 
terms, drawing on Munich metaphor to conclude that “the great lesson of our time” is that “evil 
exists and when evil is on the march, it must be confronted.”117 He had advocated a policy of 
containing Iraq since the chemical weapons attacks on the Kurds in 1988. He also warned 
Democrats against looking like the weak party, writing: “The Democrats must ponder the 
political consequences of a reflexive refusal even to consider the use of force.”118  
Solarz and the neoconservative Richard Perle led the formation of the Committee for 
Peace and Security in the Gulf in the fall of 1990 to secure endorsements from people who might 
help convince the public and Democrats to support Bush’s policy. This organization received the 
support of a diverse mix of politicians and intellectuals, all united in support of the pending war 
against Iraq and the destruction of Iraq’s WMD programs. They particularly emphasized the 
need to destroy Saddam’s ability to threaten Israel.119 Janet Mullins, James Baker’s assistant for 
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legislative affairs, later declared that Solarz and this committee were “The single greatest force 
to gather up the conservative Democrats who ended up voting with us in the House.”120  
The political debate throughout the Gulf Crisis centered on whether the United States 
should give sanctions more time to drive Saddam from Kuwait or shift to the use of force. The 
Democrats and other critics put forth a policy of sanctions and isolation to address both the short-
term Kuwait problem and the long-term Iraqi threat. The Bush administration and the 
Republicans countered that the United States could not indefinitely wait for sanctions to work 
and had to shift to the use of force. As the debate about the Kuwait problem raged, the parties 
shared similar views on the Saddam problem in that they agreed that Saddam needed to be 
weakened over the course of this conflict and then vigilantly contained in the aftermath. 
Rejecting Regime Change, Planning for Containment: December to February 1991 
The Bush administration made one last-ditch effort to avert war by sending James Baker 
to meet with Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz on January 8, 1991. Baker delivered a letter to 
Saddam through Aziz that communicated the coalition’s resolve to accept nothing less than full 
Iraqi compliance with the Security Council’s demands and its insistence that there would be no 
negotiation on any terms. The letter clarified that the coalition would use force to expel Iraq from 
Kuwait if the withdrawal did not start before January 15. Aziz called the letter an insult to a 
sovereign nation and refused to even take it back to Saddam.121 On January 12, both houses of 
Congress voted to authorize the use of force for the fulfillment of the Security Council 
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resolutions. On January 15th, the deadline set by Resolution 678 expired. The next day, 
Operation Desert Storm commenced with a massive bombing campaign against Iraq.  
As the use of force became a reality in the winter of 1991, the Bush administration 
expanded its thinking and planning for long-term policy on Iraq. In January 1991, the 
administration issued National Security Directive 54 (NSD-54), which set out objectives for the 
war and its aftermath. It identified the goals of the conflict as pushing Iraqi troops out of Kuwait, 
restoring Kuwait’s government, and promoting “the security and the stability of the Persian 
Gulf.”122 The administration derived legal sanction for this last objective from Security Council 
Resolution 678’s call for the restoring of “international peace and security in the area.”123 
 NSD-54 then stated that “to achieve the above purposes” the United States would seek 
the destruction of Iraq’s WMD programs, its “command, control, and communications 
capabilities,” and the Republican Guard as “an effective fighting force.”124 The assault on these 
pillars of the Iraqi state aimed to liberate Kuwait and seek the postwar goal of weakening and 
containing Iraq. In addition, NSD-54 defined the conditions under which the United States would 
pursue regime change. It would “become an explicit objective of the United States to replace the 
current leadership of Iraq” if Iraq used WMD, supported terrorist attacks on United States or 
coalition partners “anywhere in the world,” or destroyed Kuwait’s oil fields.125 
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 As the United States planned for the aftermath of the war, top administration officials 
discussed how to build a containment regime under the legally sanctioned goal of restoring 
international peace and stability in the region. This goal would require eliminating Iraq’s WMD 
programs and restraining its military strength. Richard Haass and Assistant Secretary of State 
Richard Clarke wrote that if the war did not destroy Iraq’s WMD facilities, the United States had 
to demand access to those facilities to render them inoperable.126 Because this goal was not 
explicitly covered by the U.N. resolutions that authorized Desert Storm, the administration 
planned to seek a new resolution that would maintain sanctions until Iraq was disarmed. 
Moreover, U.S. officials saw recreating the balance of power and preventing the emergence of a 
regional hegemon as a key way of containing Iraq and ensuring stability. In fact, they viewed the 
collapse of the regional balance of power at the end of the Iran-Iraq War as a condition that made 
Saddam’s bid for regional supremacy feasible.127  
To achieve this regional balance, the United States would have to foster cooperation 
among the Gulf States and strengthen their militaries so that the United States would not have to 
play such a direct security role.128 In addition, the United States needed to maintain the military 
capability to intervene rapidly in case of renewed aggression by Iran or Iraq. The Bush 
administration preferred to minimize the U.S. presence in the postwar security system because of 
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expense and the political pitfalls, both at home and in the region, of maintaining ground forces in 
the Gulf.129 The pre-positioning of equipment, stationing of naval and air forces, and occasional 
joint exercises with the Gulf states would maintain the ability to respond to emergencies while 
limiting an obvious foreign presence. Nevertheless, they acknowledged the need for an increased 
level of U.S. involvement, or as Haass put it, “As the current crisis makes painfully clear, the era 
of keeping the Gulf at arm’s length or managing its security on the cheap is over.”130 
 As early as December, the United States had announced that it would keep sanctions in 
place to enforce Iraqi disarmament after the resolution of the Kuwait crisis, whether it ended 
through war or voluntary withdrawal.131 Policy staff in the State Department and NSC 
envisioned that the United States would seek a new Security Council resolution that would link 
the lifting of sanctions to progress in the disarmament of Iraq. Scowcroft and Richard 
recommended this approach throughout the winter of 1990-1991.132 Haass spelled out the 
conditions for lifting sanctions in detail: 
We could also make clear what would be required from Iraq-Iraqi payment of reparations and 
signing of an Iraqi-Kuwait peace treaty, reductions in its conventional arms, pull-back of 
remaining arms away from the Kuwait border, elimination of chemical and biological arms, 
inspections of all nuclear facilities, and so on-in order for sanctions to be phased out.133 
 
 Richard Clarke echoed this thinking in counseling that the United States “develop a plan 
for a phased lifting of sanctions in response to Iraqi steps toward dismantlement of these 
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programs.”134 Policy planners thus envisioned a flexible postwar policy in which Iraq, whether or 
not Saddam remained in charge, could earn the “gradual phase-out of sanctions” by 
demonstrating commitment to disarming and cooperating with the United Nations.135 The United 
States would also have to convince the coalition that the destruction of Iraq’s WMD and the 
limitation of its conventional strength were necessary for achieving postwar stability. Planners 
predicted that many members of the coalition would see this shift as “moving the goalposts” on 
victory in Iraq, which might cause difficulties in sustaining the coalition.136 They argued that 
Bush administration should therefore avoid imposing a “Versailles” style peace on Iraq because 
the more they demanded the harder it would be to preserve the coalition.137 
As the Bush administration planned for the aftermath of the war, they reaffirmed the 
decision to not seek regime change directly. Top U.S. officials recall no significant dissension on 
this point.138 Their basic position on regime change was that Saddam’s demise might be 
desirable if it made dealing with postwar Iraq easier but that it was too risky to pursue this goal 
directly. Officials repeatedly said the United States “would not weep” if Saddam fell from power 
but that this was not an objective.139 The only way to guarantee this outcome seemed to be an 
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occupation of some or all of Iraq, and Bush officials overwhelmingly rejected this option, which 
they viewed as fraught with dangers. The United States would likely face guerrilla resistance 
from Baathist elements, what Robert Gates called “the Vietnam scenario.”140 Scowcroft 
summoned the ghost of another intractable war, Korea, to highlight the dangers of expanding 
objectives once the original set of goals had been achieved.141 The military leadership echoed 
this concern, preferring the pursuit of limited, well-defined war aims over the nightmare of 
occupying Iraq.142 Furthermore, there was no guarantee that the United States could actually 
capture Saddam Hussein, who could hide out in his labyrinthine security system. Scowcroft and 
Powell, for instance, recalled how difficult it was to capture Manuel Noriega in Panama during 
the previous winter, a leader of a far smaller country with a much weaker security apparatus.143  
In addition, if the United States occupied Iraq they would face the complex task of nation 
building in a devastated society that that Americans knew little about. In the meantime, the 
administration predicted that Arab public opinion would turn against the United States as 
imperial occupiers, fueling instability and extremism in the region.144 Moreover, the 
administration had not prepared Congress, the public, or the coalition for such a vast expansion 
of war aims. The administration believed an invasion of Iraq would shatter the coalition and the 
                                                        
140 Alfonsi, Circle in the Sand, 145. 
 
141 Bartholomew Sparrow, The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft and the Call of National Security (New York: Public 
Affairs, 2015), 415. 
 
142 Atkinson, Crusade, 299. 
 
143 Powell, interview by Frontline, 1995. 
 
144 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 433, 464. 
 
 70 
domestic consensus around the conflict, undermining the goals of bolstering multilateralism and 
the United Nations as problem-solving mechanisms of the post-Cold War world. 145  
Chas Freeman, the U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, recalled that the administration so 
prioritized consensus at home and within the international alliance that it often avoided defining 
postwar goals clearly, even to itself. According to Freeman, top officials feared that this 
information would leak and jeopardize the domestic and international coalitions they had 
painstakingly constructed since August 1990. He later said that the administration has “a well-
founded fear of clarity” because of “the concern about leaks and the danger that any clear 
definition of war objectives would have been picked apart by members of Congress, made 
public, and then dismantled the coalition.”146 Key administration figures valued these alliances, 
especially the international coalition, for reasons that transcended liberating Kuwait, including 
containing Iraq after the current crisis, cementing a positive relationship with the Soviet Union, 
and building a stronger international system based on collective security and international law. 
Freeman suggests that that these goals drove the administration’s thinking towards the “lowest 
common denominator” of the goals set by the Security Council resolutions while inhibiting more 
serious thinking about the Saddam problem, especially questions like how much Iraq needed to 
be weakened to make sure Saddam or his successor would be manageable in the aftermath... 147 
 Another reason for the Bush administration’s rejection of regime change was concern 
about the territorial integrity of Iraq and its place in the regional balance of power. The 
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administration believed that a debilitated Saddam who remained in power had two uses for the 
United States. First, he could preserve the political unity and territorial integrity of Iraq, albeit by 
terrifying means. Many in the administration feared that if Saddam fell from power his 
successors might not be able to keep the country intact, especially if restive Kurds and Shia 
launched rebellions. Scowcroft and Haass voiced this concern from the start of the crisis, saying 
that Iraq could collapse without Saddam at the helm because no one else had his cult of 
personality.148 An NSC planning document from January 1991 stated that the Baath Party was 
the only force in Iraq capable of sustaining civil order.149 The administration knew it would be 
hard to extract U.S. forces from an Iraq mired in chaos, which made them doubt whether the 
demise of Saddam would really serve U.S. interests. 
The second way that a weakened Saddam would be useful was his ability to preserve 
enough Iraqi strength to balance Iranian power. If Iraq collapsed into civil war, it would be 
unable to check Iranian expansion. In addition, Iran would be poised to interfere in the conflict 
by backing Shia forces. As an NSC memo warned in January of 1991: “Political and military 
collapse could make Iraq vulnerable to the predatory ambitions of its immediate neighbors.”150 
This contingency could bring about the ascension of a pro-Iranian Shia government in Iraq that 
would upend the balance of power, forcing the United States to protect its regional allies from a 
powerful and hostile Shia bloc. The CIA repeatedly warned that the Shia had threatened the 
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stability of Iraq since the tribal revolts in the 1920s and that a Shia Iraqi government would 
probably align with Iranian policies.151  
Moreover, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other regional allies preferred a defanged Sunni 
regime, even one under Saddam, to the rise of a Shia-dominated Iraq. They wanted the Sunni to 
remain in charge of Iraq in order to stifle Shia political forces that might empower Iran and 
destabilize the Gulf States domestically. They encouraged Bush’s tendency towards restraint on 
the regime change question.152 The administration wanted Iraq to emerge from the crisis with 
enough strength to defend itself but not enough to threaten its neighbors, a balancing act they 
referred to as “Goldilocks outcome.”153 A cable from Chas Freeman to Baker captured this 
approach, saying the United States should: “preserve its [Iraq’s] capacity to defend itself in the 
post-crisis environment and thereby avoid the destabilizing vacuum of power in Iraq.”154 
Pessimism about political and social change in the Middle East also contributed to the 
dread of becoming bogged down in Iraqi politics. Like most Americans, the Bush administration 
viewed Iraq and the entire Middle East as awash with religious and secular radicalism, ancient 
ethnic and religious conflicts, anti-Americanism, and political violence. All sides of the debate 
before Desert Storm shared the sense that the Middle East was a hostile, unstable place that the 
United States did not understand. James Schlesinger, an opponent of the war, told Congress that 
Saddam’s overthrow would not address the deeper problem of the region: “The Middle East is 
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quite unstable inherently. If Saddam Hussein were to be removed lock, stock, and barrel, the 
Middle East will not be stable.”155 Another opponent of the war, Arthur Schlesinger, portrayed 
the region as: “characterized from time immemorial by artificial borders, tribal antagonisms, 
religious fanaticisms, and desperate inequalities.”156 Martin Indyk, a supporter of Desert Storm 
who later served in the Clinton administration, reasoned that United States should shape its 
policy with minimal regard for Arab public opinion because: “They all hate us anyhow. I mean, 
they always did, they always will.”157 Most players in the Iraq debate concurred that the United 
States should keep its distance from this strange, violent region, deterring even the strongest 
regime change advocates from calling for an occupation of Iraq. 
This skepticism toward the Arab world’s potential for democratization enhanced the 
Bush administration’s desire to avoid the nation-building project that regime change might 
require. A CIA handbook published just after Desert Storm described Iraqis as having a 
reputation among Arabs for being “self-confident and proud,” “stubborn,” “loath to change their 
opinion,” “suspicious,” “conspiratorial,” “brutal,” and “persistent.”158 Back in February 1991, 
Haass wrote that while the United States should push for the gradual opening Arab politics, “The 
prospects for democratization in the Arab world must be assessed as bleak.”159 To support this 
assessment, he later cited: “the lack of civil society, the lack of experience with democracy, the 
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sectarian divisions, none of that suggested to me that Iraq was poised to become democratic if 
the lid was taken off.”160 U.S. diplomat Edward Djerejian also described the chances of 
democracy in Iraq as “very improbable,” pointing to obstacles like “the brutal repression of the 
regime” and “the lack of civil society.”161 Iraq historian Phebe Marr supported the 
administration’s hesitance to consider expansive goals in Iraq, telling Congress, “Our knowledge 
to undertake social or political engineering-such as ‘replacing Saddam’-is really extremely 
difficult…The fact that we would have a finger in a pie such as this is disturbing to me.”162 
These perceptions of Arab political culture dampened the Bush administration’s 
enthusiasm for the demise of Saddam in one additional sense. U.S. officials reasoned that any 
heir, most likely a general, who seized power would have emerged from the same debased 
political culture as Saddam. Thus, he would most likely share Saddam’s hatred of the West, his 
Baathist ideology, and his expansionist goals for Iraq. For instance, a DIA report suggested that 
any successor “would resume pursuit of weapons of mass destruction to support its ambitions” 
and be hostile to the United States, Israel, and the Gulf States.163 As a high official in the 
Baathist system, he would also have a long record of human rights abuses.  
Working with this kind of leader would create problems in domestic politics and lend an 
unsavory taste to the war’s end. Powell and Scowcroft both doubted that any of Saddam’s likely 
successors would be a more reasonable character, although they expected him to be weaker, 
which posed problems for Iraq’s territorial integrity and the regional balance of power.164 Powell 
                                                        
160 Richard Haass, interview by Joseph Stieb, October 4, 2017. 
 
161 Edward Djerejian, interview by Joseph Stieb, October 20, 2017. 
 
162 Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S. Policy Options and Implications, November 29, 1990, 346. 
 
163 Alfonsi, Circle in the Sand, 156. 
 
164 Alfonsi, Circle in the Sand, 68. 
 75 
mocked the idea that if Saddam fell “he would have necessarily been replaced by a Jeffersonian 
in some sort of desert democracy where people read The Federalist Papers along with the 
Koran.”165 The United States would demand that any successor to Saddam adhere to the Security 
Council resolutions, but they had reason to doubt that Saddam’s overthrow would ease the 
postwar management of Iraq enough to justify the risks of directly seeking regime change. 
The expectation that Saddam Hussein would fall from power soon after the war further 
dissuaded the Bush administration from seeking regime change directly. They struggled to 
imagine how Saddam could an overwhelming military catastrophe on top of sanctions and the 
recent costs of war with Iran. For instance, Bush wrote in his diary on January 31:  
Seeing their troops and equipment getting destroyed-they’ve got to do something about it…It 
seems to me that the more suffering the people of Iraq go through, the more likely it is that 
somebody will stand up and do that which should have been done a long time ago-take the guy 
out of there.166 
 
A DIA report from January 1991 likewise anticipated that military defeat of Iraqi forces 
would probably “lead to the fall of Saddam Hussein.”167 The expectation of Saddam’s imminent 
demise also bolstered the administration’s view that containment would suffice to fulfill U.S. 
goals after the conflict. If Saddam was likely to be toppled, the United States could deal with a 
weaker successor who would need to end Iraq’s isolation in order to survive at home, making 
him more likely to comply with the U.N. demands. 
Nevertheless, most of the predictions that Saddam Hussein would be overthrown after the 
war were based not on hard evidence but on incredulity at the idea that Saddam could put his 
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country through these catastrophes and not be overthrown. There was, in fact, little evidence 
from August 1990 to February 1991 that Saddam’s grip on power was in jeopardy. Intelligence 
agencies and the State Department repeatedly noted that the opposition was weak and 
fragmented by ethnicity and ideology. Opposition groups also lacked a real presence in Iraq 
because of Saddam’s effective security apparatus.168 Over the previous two decades, Saddam had 
weeded out potential rivals with incredible severity, surrounding himself with lackeys who relied 
on him for patronage and survival.169 Moreover, the CIA reported in January that despite the 
damage inflicted by bombing and sanctions, “the regime appears fully in control. There have 
been no credible reports of unrest since the war began.” This report noted that Saddam had put 
only his most loyal forces in Baghdad, mostly from the Republican Guard, to reduce the chances 
of a coup or rebellion.170  
 The Bush administration steeled themselves for a messy, less than satisfying ending to 
Desert Storm. As Haass told Bush in January: “I don’t think we’re going to get our battleship 
Missouri here.” On February 20, Bush expressed the central dilemma of the aftermath of the 
conflict: “Our goal is not the elimination of Saddam Hussein, yet in many ways it’s the only 
answer in order to get a new start for Iraq in the family of nations.”171 The possibility that 
Saddam Hussein would comply with U.N. demands appeared so unlikely to the administration 
that he would probably have to be removed for regional stability to be restored. Nevertheless, 
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Bush dreaded the consequences of this removal occurring too precipitously and lacked 
acceptable means of pursuing this goal. The ousting of Saddam thus remained a vague hope 
rather than a policy objective. The policy was to prepare a multilateral containment regime that 
would keep Iraq from threatening its neighbors and compel Saddam or his successor to comply 
with the United Nations, especially on the destruction of his unconventional weapons programs.  
Regime Change Advocates during the Gulf Crisis 
Most politicians, journalists, and foreign policy intellectuals agreed with Bush that the 
best way to deal with Iraq beyond the crisis over Kuwait was to focus on enforcing the Security 
Council resolutions and weakening Saddam in the process. There were, however, some 
prominent figures, mostly conservatives and neoconservatives, who argued from the start of the 
crisis for the pursuit of regime change as a direct objective. Most major newspapers had at least 
one prominent writer who called for regime change, including A.M. Rosenthal and William 
Safire of the New York Times, Jim Hoagland and Charles Krauthammer of the Washington Post, 
and the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal.172 The editors of the National Review called 
for regime change as an explicit policy goal, as did several prominent neoconservative 
intellectuals such as Richard Perle, Joshua Muravchik, Frank Gaffney, Laurie Mylroie, and 
Norman Podhoretz.173 A fair number of Congressmen and Senators called for regime change as 
well, including Alphonse D’Amato, Richard Lugar, William Dickinson, and Mark Sanford.174 
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Regime change advocates identified the same basic Saddam problem as the Bush 
administration, but they believed that in order for the United States to achieve its goals in the 
region Saddam absolutely had to be toppled. This position contrasted sharply with the 
administration’s position of preferring but not requiring regime change. As Congressman 
William Dickinson (R-AL) put it, “Achieving long-term stability in the region ultimately means 
removing Saddam Hussein and his power base, because Saddam Hussein is not a man capable of 
making fundamental changes in himself or his national policy goals.”175 This definition of 
victory meant that regime change should be a specific objective in the Gulf Crisis, not merely a 
byproduct of the effort to liberate Kuwait.  
The main reasons why Saddam could not be left in power after this crisis were his WMD 
and ballistic missile programs as well as his proven record of aggression. Regime change 
advocates believed that even if this crisis ended with the liberation of Kuwait and the degrading 
of the Iraqi military, Saddam would eventually return to regional prominence with nuclear 
weapons, making his next act of aggression far harder to stop. Imagine, they argued, if Israel had 
not destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1981: the United States would be facing a 
nuclear-armed Iraq in the current crisis, maybe making the liberation of Kuwait impossible.176 
The world got lucky that Saddam foolishly invaded his neighbor before he finished his nuclear 
arsenal, but they could not count on luck in the future. The only way to prevent a nuclear-armed 
Saddam from dominating the Gulf in a few years was to make sure that he did not survive the 
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current crisis.177 As William Safire concluded: “We must rid ourselves of Saddam Hussein 
before he achieves the means to rid himself of us.”178   
Another important difference between regime change advocates and the Bush 
administration centered on what kind of regime change each side would accept. Bush preferred a 
coup that would put a more pliable authoritarian in charge. They feared that pursuing anything 
beyond that would entrap the United States in Iraq, break up the coalition, and threaten Iraq’s 
territorial integrity. In contrast, most regime change advocates wanted not just to topple Saddam 
but also to root out the entire Baathist system and replace it with a democracy. The concept of 
“the regime” played a crucial role in this maximalist desire, especially among neoconservatives. 
Neoconservatives had long argued that the root source of a state’s external behavior was the 
nature of its political system and ideology, or its regime. Democratic regimes that possessed 
mechanisms of accountability for their leaders and embraced liberal values were highly unlikely 
to act aggressively. In contrast, totalitarian regimes almost inevitably acted belligerently because 
their leaders embraced messianic, Manichean worldviews and were not accountable to the people 
or other branches of government. In addition, neoconservatives argued that undemocratic 
regimes often started wars to justify or distract from oppression at home.179  
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One key intellectual foundation for this line of thinking came from Cold War 
neoconservative discourses about authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. The political thinker 
Jeane Kirkpatrick wrote an influential essay on this topic for Commentary magazine in 1979. She 
believed that President Carter had foolishly pressured friendly governments like Iran and 
Nicaragua into premature reforms and then refused to back them up as revolutions started to gain 
momentum. These errors led to their overthrow by radical, anti-American revolutionaries who 
even more brutal than their predecessors. She claimed that the myopia of Carter and other 
liberals emerged in part from their failure to recognize the distinction between authoritarian and 
totalitarian regimes.180  
Authoritarian regimes, like Iran under the Shah, featured unelected leaders who 
possessed centralized power, the toleration of limited opposition, the imprisonment, exile, and 
torture of political opponents, and the secret police. However, they also generally respected 
“habitual” ways of life, family relations, and religion, and they used violence mainly to stay in 
power rather than to revolutionize society. Pointing to countries like Spain and Portugal, 
Kirkpatrick claimed that “right-wing autocracies do sometimes evolve into democracies-given 
time, propitious economic, social, and political circumstances, talented leaders, and a strong 
indigenous demand for representative government.”181  
Totalitarian states, which she labelled “revolutionary autocracies,” could be Marxist 
states like the Soviet Union or religious reactionaries like Ayatollah Khomeini. These regimes 
sought to bring about utopian transformations of politics, society, and ordinary life, and they 
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were willing to use mass terror to pursue these ends. Rather than allowing individuals to live 
their lives if they stayed out of politics, like most authoritarian states did, totalitarian states 
sought to “cure the false consciousness” of their citizens and convert them into atomized, loyal 
ideologues. According to Kirkpatrick, they were also incapable of transforming themselves into 
more liberal, democratic states; they had to either collapse from within or be defeated from 
without.182 Kirkpatrick’s practical message was that the United States should tolerate “traditional 
authoritarian governments” because they “are less repressive than revolutionary 
autocracies…more susceptible of liberalization…and more compatible with U.S. interests.” In 
turn, the United States should be absolutely ruthless in opposing Marxist and other revolutionary 
groups who were certain to build totalitarian regimes if they overthrew U.S. allies.183  
This essay epitomized a deeper discourse among neoconservatives and many liberals in 
the 1970s and 1980s about regime type as a determinant of foreign policy behavior. Writers like 
Nathan Glazer, Walter Laqueur, and Norman Podhoretz all explored and promulgated the 
authoritarian/totalitarian distinction. They believed that authoritarian and totalitarian regimes 
generally acted aggressively abroad, but they saw totalitarian states as uniquely, pathologically 
aggressive. In particular, they employed these concepts in their criticism of détente, arguing that 
no modus vivendi was possible with the totalitarian Soviet Union.184 This discourse carried over 
into the Iraq debate. For Iraq to be labelled as totalitarian meant that it was ideologically 
fanatical and incapable of internally generated change. For many regime change advocates, this 
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meant that more hands-off strategies like containment that sought to create the conditions for 
internal change could not solve the problem. 
Furthermore, regime change advocates drew heavily on the work of Arab intellectuals 
like Kanan Makiya and Fouad Ajami about Arab political culture to support their case. Makiya 
and Ajami argued that the core cause of Iraq’s aggression was “the enormous, uncontrolled 
capacity for violence of the modern police state of Iraq,” which they called “the warfare state.” 
Iraqi politics, in Ajami’s words, were defined by a swollen, totalitarian state at home, a cult of 
personality, self-delusion, utopian dreams, and extreme violence. Saddam was both a product 
and a producer of this milieu. The sickness of Iraqi politics reflected the “rotten” nature of a 
Middle Eastern politics still under the sway of the false, dying hopes of Arab nationalism. In this 
political culture, force had become the ultima ratio of politics and the totalitarian ideologies had 
swallowed the rights of the minority and the individual. Ajami and Makiya pointed to the 
popularity of Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait among many Arabs as evidence both of the sickness 
of Arab politics, the enduring appeal of the strongman figure, and the desperation of the 
impoverished, humiliated Arab masses. Although they later changed this argument, they claimed 
during the Gulf Crisis that no “foreign savior” could pull the Arabs or the Iraqis from this 
morass. Nevertheless, they hoped that Saddam’s fall might yield an improvement in Iraqi politics 
that would act, in Makiya’s phrasing, as a “the fragile, razor-thin wedge of freedom” that could 
upend the authoritarian Arab order and empower democratic forces in the region.185 
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Within the frame of mind set by these ideas about regime type and political culture, the 
best and possibly sole way of eliminating the Iraqi threat was to transform their regime, which 
could not happen with Saddam or any other Baathist still in power. Regime change advocates in 
the United States echoed Ajami and Makiya’s arguments to make the case that until Iraq’s 
regime was transformed, it would remain a source of trouble. Laurie Mylroie argued that Iraq 
needed push around its neighbors in order to justify domestic oppression and steal the wealth 
required to sustain his authority at home.186 The New Republic editors, major boosters of the war 
and regime change, saw Iraqi aggression as part of a deeper rot in Middle Eastern politics: “The 
distinctive aggression against Kuwait is an expression of deep resentments in an Arab body 
politic that has never found a way to channel resentments into realistic hopes and reasonable 
programs.”187 Regime change advocates reasoned that a coup was a poor solution because the 
most likely successor would be, in Richard Perle’s words, one of the “little Saddams” that Iraqi 
politics tended to produce.188  
Regime change boosters identified democracy as the solution to this problem, which 
meant that the United States should seek to remove Saddam and the Baathist system. For 
example, columnist Flora Lewis argued that “a prerequisite for achieving the longer-range goal 
of a security balance in the region” entailed “ousting the regime and opening a chance for 
victims of one of the world’s nastiest dictatorships to develop democratically.”189 A.M. 
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Rosenthal reasoned that the United States should break the cycle of Arab violence and tyranny 
by implanting democracy in Iraq.190 Many politicians and commentators recommended that Bush 
expand contacts with the Iraqi opposition. Democratic Senator Mark Sanford, for instance called 
for the United States to help install the Iraqi National Congress, a newly formed opposition 
group, as a new government that would oversee elections.191  
Furthermore, many regime change advocates believed the United States had to pursue 
regime change now because any attempt to contain Saddam after the crisis would be doomed 
from the start. Charles Krauthammer contended that the states surrounding Iraq were too weak 
and quarrelsome to rely on as part of a containment policy. The United States would have to take 
the lead in watching Saddam, which would require leaving a large force in the region.192 Senator 
D’Amato and others argued that the United States could never get Saddam, an inveterate deal-
breaker, to commit to an arrangement that would destroy his WMD and limit his military.193 
Furthermore, regime change advocates noted that containment would rely on deterring Saddam 
from aggression, but they doubted that Saddam was rational enough to be deterred. For instance, 
William Safire argued: “A threat from us of massive retaliation is meaningless; a deterrent to a 
rational leader is an incentive to a martyr.”194 In keeping with the regime concept, advocates of 
this approach concluded that the United States could not devise a policy of constraints, threats, or 
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incentives that would change Iraqi behavior. Iraq’s actions stemmed inexorably from the nature 
of the Baathist regime, and only uprooting that regime could address that core problem.  
Regime change advocates set out highly ambitious goals, but during the Gulf Crisis they 
rarely spelled out how the United States would achieve these ends. Among major media outlets, 
only the Wall Street Journal editorial board recommended that the United States “take Baghdad 
and install a MacArthur regency.”195 Frank Gaffney also went far beyond the norm in calling for 
the United States to start arming Shiites, Kurds, and disaffected military personnel in order to 
start an internal rebellion against the Baathists.196 Although regime change advocates pushed for 
much broader goals than the administration, few offered a strategy to achieve this objective 
beyond what the United States was already doing.197  
Nonetheless, most regime change advocates shared the Bush’s reservations about 
involvement in internal Iraqi affairs. Few of the writers who called for regime change as a policy 
goal recommended anything close to occupying of Iraq. Richard Perle did not even like the idea 
of a ground war at all, preferring the less risky use of air power to degrade and destabilize the 
regime.198 Like these regime change advocates, the U.S. public wanted to pursue grand aims in 
Iraq but did not identify clear ways of achieving these goals. A Gallup poll in August 1990 found 
that 73% of respondents thought that removing Saddam’s government from power should be a 
coalition goal.199 This outlook held steady throughout the crisis, as two polls in February 1991 
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found that 90% thought Saddam should be brought to trial at the conflict’s end and 70% favored 
assassinating Saddam. Nevertheless, polling data also suggests that Americans did not want to 
occupy Iraq after the conflict.200 Not until after Desert Storm, when Saddam appeared to be 
teetering on the brink of overthrow, did regime change advocates start to level a more effective 
argument against the Bush’s policy in terms of how regime change could be achieved. 
Conclusion 
Regime change advocates during the Gulf Crisis wanted to reframe Iraq policy as a 
struggle to address the Saddam problem first and the Kuwait problem second. They contended 
that the real imperative in this crisis was preventing a nuclear Iraq from dominating this vital 
region. Saddam’s gamble of invading Kuwait gave the United States the opportunity to eliminate 
this threat once and for all; that was the priority, not the liberation of Kuwait. As Krauthammer 
phrased it: “Liberating Kuwait is the means. Defeating Saddam is the end.”201  
The casus belli of regime change advocates inverted the thinking of the Bush 
administration. Bush fought the war primarily to liberate Kuwait, prevent Saddam from 
controlling energy resources, and shape the post-Cold War international system in a positive 
manner. Bush also sought to degrade Saddam’s strength in order to make him or his successor 
easier to contain in the aftermath of the war. However, the Bush administration was wary of 
pursuing this ancillary goal too openly or directly lest it jeopardize more important priorities, 
such as bolstering a multilateral approach to countering aggression or staying out of Middle 
Eastern politics. Unlike with regime change advocates, weakening Saddam was not the priority 
but one of many goals that had to be balanced. Rather than seeking Saddam’s overthrow, Bush 
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prepared to contain Iraq and enforce the writ of the United Nations regardless of who held the 
reins of power in Baghdad. The focus was, in Haass’ words, on “external behavior” of the Iraqi 
state rather than the “domestic trajectory” of Iraqi politics.202  
The argument for regime change during the Gulf Crisis is nevertheless important to the 
broader story of Iraq policy in the later 1990s. Regime change advocates put forth the problem of 
the regime as a powerful argument against the administration’s pursuit of limited ends during the 
conflict as well as their budding containment strategy. The Bush administration had not yet 
answered to itself or the nation whether Saddam, much less the Baathist system, had to be 
removed to satisfy U.S. goals in the region. It had a strategy for managing the problem, but it had 
not spelled out an endgame for U.S. policy towards Iraq.  
In a sense, this uncertainty inhered in the administration’s realist approach to global 
politics. They aimed not to transform the politics of a region or a state but to restore balance and 
stability in the region, pursue internationalist goals, and minimize the expenditure of lives and 
resources. While they acknowledged the brutal nature of Iraq’s regime, the enormous task of 
reconstituting a nation’s political system, especially by force, was anathema in this worldview.203 
Nevertheless, to Bush’s chagrin, the war itself and its aftermath would only bolster the suspicion 
that the root of Iraq’s misbehavior was the regime itself, a problem that neither the toppling of 
any given leader nor a containment policy could resolve. The regime problem would form the 
heart of the argument against containment in the coming years.  
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 In early March 1991, an elderly woman named Daisy Lucas from Martinsburg, West 
Virginia wrote to her senators, Robert Byrd (D) and Jay Rockefeller (D), with a message for 
President Bush about the recently concluded war in the Persian Gulf. The senators promptly 
passed the letter to the President. Lucas praised Bush’s handling of the crisis but lamented that 
Bush had not toppled Saddam, saying: “In fact, he should not be in power at all, kick his butt out. 
Let him suffer like the Kuwaitis have suffered.”1 Representative Stephen Solarz (D-MA), a 
staunch supporter of Desert Storm, had a similar experience, which he also relayed to the 
President. Solarz had taught his four-year-old granddaughter Leah the name of Saddam Hussein, 
and during a visit he asked her “And what did Grandpa do to Saddam Hussein?” She replied, 
“You gave him a spanking, but you should have thrown him in the trash can.”2 Bush himself 
shared this feeling of an anti-climax, telling a press conference on March 1: “I haven’t yet felt 
this wonderfully euphoric feeling that many of the American people feel…I feel much better 
about it today than I did yesterday. But I think it’s that I want to see an end.”3 
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 Americans across the political spectrum shared the mixed emotions of Mrs. Lucas, Leah, 
and the President about a stunning military victory followed by a messy political outcome. 
Saddam Hussein’s survival and the crushing of Kurdish and Shia revolts in the spring of 1991 
further contributed to a sense that Desert Storm was a missed opportunity to definitively solve 
the Saddam problem, or the threat he posed to U.S. interests in the region beyond the war for 
Kuwait. By April, polls showed that 55% of Americans thought that the United States should not 
have ended with war with Saddam still in power, a number that surged to 69% by June and 82% 
by January 1992.4 Strong majorities in the spring of 1991 recommended greater intervention on 
behalf of the rebels than Bush was willing to undertake, including 78% favoring attacking Iraqi 
helicopters that were fighting the rebels.5   
The events of the spring of 1991 seemingly tarnished the success of the Gulf War and 
added new converts to those who believed the United States should directly pursue regime 
change, undo the Baathist regime, and foster democracy in Iraq. During the Gulf Crisis, these 
critics held that Iraq would threaten regional stability as long as Saddam and the Baathists 
remained in power. However, they had failed to articulate an acceptable strategy for achieving 
this end beyond Bush’s existing policy of devastating the Iraqi economy and military. 
 In contrast, the last stages of Desert Storm and the rebellions that followed offered these 
critics numerous opportunities to press the administration to take bolder action toward regime 
change or disparage it for missing such opportunities. These opportunities included the 
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administration’s ending of hostilities before coalition troops had fully surrounded Republican 
Guard units in Kuwait, the charitable ceasefire terms offered to the Iraqi military at the March 3 
Safwan meeting, and the general lack of support for the postwar rebellions. Bush’s failure to 
seize these opportunities led to the breaking of the political coalition that had united around the 
war to liberate Kuwait. By the early summer of 1991, Democrats and neoconservatives, along 
with by some Republicans, led the criticism of Bush’s handling of the end of the war and his new 
policy of containment, which was installed under a pall of disappointment and anger in domestic 
politics.6 In a broader sense, the war’s tragic ending offended the belief in U.S. politics that the 
world was shifting towards democracy and human rights as the Cold War wanted. In 
combination with partisan recrimination about Iraq policy before the war, this firestorm of 
criticism influenced both parties and the president to seek tougher policies on Iraq and narrowed 
the acceptable options, biasing U.S. politics against restrained and flexible approaches. 
As this political maelstrom raged, the Bush administration and the international coalition 
established a postwar policy on Iraq through a series of Security Council resolutions in March 
1991. These resolutions established the central mechanism of containment for the next decade. In 
resolution 687, the Security Council stated that the sanctions on Iraq established in August 1990 
would remain in place until Iraq completely destroyed all chemical, biological, and nuclear 
weapons, equipment, and materials as well as all ballistic missiles with ranges over 150 km. 
Once Iraq had fulfilled these and several other obligations, the sanctions would be lifted.7 The 
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intention at the United Nations was that sanctions would enforce Iraq’s compliance with a series 
of demands that would defang Iraq, commit it to normal relations with its neighbors, and permit 
a progressive normalization of relations. 
The Bush administration, however, took a decidedly different route than the text of the 
Security Council resolutions by declaring, starting in March 1991, that sanctions would remain 
in place until Saddam was out of power and Iraq had complied with the United Nations’ 
demands. After August 1990, Bush established several goals that the Security Council 
resolutions did not explicitly endorse, including the weakening of Iraqi military power and the 
containing of Iraq in after the war. It had not, however, clearly decided whether Saddam Hussein 
absolutely had to be removed for the United States to achieve its goals in the region. Shortly after 
Desert Storm, key Bush officials came to believe that the possibility of Saddam fully complying 
with the United and becoming a non-threatening state was so unlikely that eventually his 
removal would be necessary for establishing regional stability. The atmosphere of criticism and 
anger at home about the end of the war also contributed to this policy shift. 
For the remainder of Bush’s presidency, containment was suspended between conflicting 
goals. The United States sought to maintain pressure on the Iraqi government in order to contain 
it and compel its compliance with the United Nations. Bush also hoped that combining pressure 
on the Iraqi state and the declaration that this punishment would remain until Saddam was 
removed would motivate Iraqi military officers to remove Saddam. However, the several factors 
restrained the aggressive pursuit of regime change: the desire to avoid direct involvement in Iraqi 
politics, the anxiety that too much pressure on the Iraqi state or support for splinter groups would 
cause the ethnic fragmentation of Iraq, and the goal of maintaining the international coalition’s 
unity in order to enforce the Security Council resolutions. Bush’s policy was stuck between 
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domestic political demands to intensify action against Saddam and the consistent calls of key 
allies for restraint and focus on compliance rather than regime change. The long-term effect of 
this tension was to open fissures within the international coalition. 
As his domestic critics lamented, Bush never prioritized regime change within this web 
of conflicting goals. His administration focused primarily on containing Saddam and enforcing 
the Security Council resolutions, in large part because they considered him to be defanged for the 
time being. They only sought regime change insofar as they maintained the conditions and 
pressures that might foment a coup. As Saddam issued repeated challenges to the weapons 
inspections and other Security Council demands in 1991 and 1992, Bush focused on preserving 
coalition unity and forcing Saddam into compliance rather than, as critics demanded, using those 
confrontations to destabilize the Baathist regime. Bush continued to try to manage the Saddam 
problem, but numerous camps in American politics were shifting towards the consensus that this 
problem could not be managed indefinitely and that the United States needed to find a solution 
that started with the removal of Saddam. 
Ending Desert Storm 
The wave of regret and second-guessing that followed Desert Storm gave rise to an 
enduring school of criticism of Bush’s handling of the end of the conflict. These critics contend 
that Bush had established regime change as an unstated goal of the Gulf War but never 
developed a plan for how to, in scholar Thomas Mahnken’s words, “translate a lopsided 
battlefield victory into a durable postwar settlement” with Saddam out of power.8 Bernard 
Trainor and Michael Gordon similarly argue that there was an “absence of a clear political 
                                                        
8 Thomas Mahnken, “A Squandered Opportunity,” in The Gulf War of 1991 Reconsidered, ed. Andrew Bacevich 
and Efraim Inbar, (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003), 122. 
 
 93 
strategy for postwar Iraq.”9 These scholars argue that excessive caution and a lack of planning 
led the administration to miss opportunities to weaken, humiliate, or topple Saddam. They add 
that once it became clear that Saddam would survive the end of the war, Bush cobbled together a 
flawed containment policy.10 This school of thought can be described as the “Triumph without 
Victory” thesis, after a book that U.S. News and World Report published on conflict in 1992. 
There are two major problems with this argument. First, its proponents mistakenly 
attribute a policy objective to the Bush administration that it did not endorse during the crisis. 
Since August 1990, key officials had said that they would welcome the overthrow of Saddam 
because it would make the postwar handling of Iraq easier. However, U.S. policy had always 
been focused on enforcing the Security Council resolutions, keeping the coalition intact, and 
weakening the Iraqi military. Far from being an unstated aim, regime change, as Chapter 1 
demonstrated, was a hope but not a policy during the crisis in large part because the direct 
pursuit of regime change would jeopardize these other goals 
The second problem with the Triumph without Victory thesis is that the Bush 
administration in fact had a plan for how to move from the ending of hostilities to an acceptable 
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postwar settlement. The plan was to install a containment system on an enfeebled Iraq that would 
remove its WMD capabilities and maintain its military and economic weakness. The 
assumptions embedded in that policy show that the lapses highlighted by critics actually flowed 
from a coherent strategy. The administration simply was not in the mindset to maximize every 
feasible way of exerting pressure on the Iraqi state, such as destroying as many military units as 
possible or supporting the rebellions. The United States planned to impose containment on Iraq 
after the war regardless of who was in power, so they perceived no need take these risky, 
maximalist actions. Triumph without Victory proponents could argue that the Bush 
administration had the wrong plan in their neglect of regime change opportunities, but they are 
off base in claiming there was no plan to transition from hostilities to a postwar policy. 
The United States launched the Desert Storm ground campaign on February 24, 1991. 
The Marine thrust into Kuwait from the south succeeded almost instantly against Iraqi forces, 
demoralized after weeks of aerial bombardment. Iraqi troops fled Kuwait City on February 26, 
and Saddam ordered a retreat from Kuwait the next day. Nevertheless, the rapid success of the 
initial assault into Kuwait created a problem for the coalition’s plan to encircle and destroy the 
Republican Guard units in the Kuwaiti theater of operations (KTO). Although they suffered 
heavy damage, the allied assault had pushed these units into Iraq rather than fixing them in place 
for the flanking strike of the U.S. VIIth and XVIIIth Corps.11 At 2100 hours in Riyadh, 
Schwarzkopf announced at a press conference that the United States had achieved its mission of 
liberating Kuwait. Nevertheless, it was still uncertain whether the United States had demolished 
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these Republican Guard forces, which were crucial pillars of the Baathist regime’s ability to 
maintain power at home.12   
After Schwarzkopf’s announcement, President Bush held a Cabinet meeting to determine 
whether to end hostilities in Iraq. Powell told the Cabinet that at this point the United States had 
achieved its objectives by liberating Kuwait and striking a harsh blow to Iraqi military power. He 
emphasized that there were virtually no coherent Iraqi units left in the KTO. Bush, Cheney, and 
Scowcroft agreed, but Bush asked Powell to call Schwarzkopf and confirm that hostilities could 
be ended. In a phone call on February 27, Schwarzkopf confirmed that the Republican Guard 
was surrounded and asked for another day to finish off these units. Powell relayed this request 
back to Bush, but the Bush Cabinet decided to end the war at the 100-hour mark on February 28, 
almost a full day short of Schwarzkopf’s request.13  
Bush did this because of concerns that coalition forces were slaughtering too many Iraqis 
and because the coalition had achieved its main objectives. Powell called Schwarzkopf back to 
relay this decision and see if he had any reservations. Despite some of his later comments, 
Schwarzkopf agreed that they had achieved their objectives, including the degrading of Iraqi 
military capabilities.14 However, soon after the unilateral ceasefire declaration on February 28, it 
became clear that the U.S. military had overestimated the level of damage to the Republican 
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Guard. About half of the Republican Guard troops and armor in the KTO had escaped to Iraq, 
including roughly 800 tanks and 1,400 armored personnel carriers.15 
Since Desert Storm, there has been much debate about the communications between 
Powell, Schwarzkopf, and the field commanders from February 27-28. Numerous critics of the 
“early end” to the war have argued that Schwarzkopf lacked the situational awareness to 
recognize that the gates were not closed around Iraqi forces.16 For example, General John 
Yeosock, the commander of the Third U.S. Army, had already asked Schwarzkopf for 24 
additional hours to complete the destruction of the Republican Guard, which, Yeosock 
emphasized, was not totally surrounded.17 Schwarzkopf later said that when Powell called him 
on February 27, it seemed that Powell was trying to get his consent for a decision to stop the war 
that had already been made, or a “fait accompli” in Schwarzkopf’s words.18 This perception 
possibly explains why Schwarzkopf did not relay the concerns of his ground commanders to 
Powell and thereby the President. After the war, Powell claimed that if Schwarzkopf had told 
him that not enough damage had been inflicted on the Republican Guard that Powell would have 
recommended to Bush that U.S. forces be allowed more time.19 
Despite these disputes about the failure to completely enclose the Republican Guard, it is 
unclear whether this encirclement mattered much to Bush’s strategy for ending the war and 
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containing Iraq. The Bush administration did aim to destroy the Republican Guard units in the 
KTO along with as much of the Iraqi military as possible. However, they were increasingly 
aware that American forces were inflicting massive losses on the retreating Iraqis, especially on 
the so-called Highway of Death between Kuwait City and Basra. Top Bush officials felt that 
continuing this carnage was unethical and ignoble. Moreover, it would tarnish the public’s view 
of the victory and upset the coalition, especially the Arab allies. Bush was facing direct pressure 
from states like Saudi Arabia and Egypt to end the fighting as soon as possible because of the 
war’s unpopularity with these states’ populations.20 As Scowcroft later said, “I think it was 
stopped when it was stopped because we believed that we had achieved our objectives and that to 
continue the war would have been an unnecessary slaughter.”21 Moreover, as Powell pointed out 
at the time, Saddam still held twenty divisions, including several Republican Guard divisions, 
safely within Iraqi territory. Consequently, the Bush administration believed that destroying a 
few more units in the KTO would not significantly influence whether or not Saddam survived 
this defeat.22 The broadly shared belief that Saddam would fall from power after the war 
bolstered this perception.23 
 Once the fighting ended on February 28, the United States needed a ceasefire agreement 
with the Iraqi government to manage the transition to a postwar settlement. On March 1, 
Schwarzkopf met with two Iraqi generals at Safwan, a town in southeastern Iraq near the Kuwaiti 
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border. He had received little instruction from the Bush administration about what to achieve in 
this meeting beyond strictly military issues such as the separation of Iraqi and coalition forces 
and the exchange of prisoners. Throughout Desert Storm, Bush had tried to avoid micro-
managing the generals’ conduct of the war, and he viewed the ceasefire negotiations as the 
military’s domain. Schwarzkopf therefore offered terms so lenient they surprised the Iraqi 
generals. After agreeing on a buffer zone between their forces, Schwarzkopf demanded that Iraq 
ground all planes in order to avoid further conflict or confusion in the air. The Iraqi generals then 
requested the United States allow them to fly helicopters to ferry officials from place to place 
given the extensive damage to Iraq’s roads and bridges. Schwarzkopf, in a spirit of chivalrous 
magnanimity, agreed to this request, even allowing Iraqi officials to fly armed helicopters for this 
purpose. Lastly, Schwarzkopf reassured the Iraqi generals that the United States had no intention 
of occupying southern Iraq and would withdraw its soldiers as quickly as possible.24 
 Since Desert Storm, many critics of Bush’s handling of the war’s ending point to Safwan 
as another missed opportunity to humiliate the Iraqi government and destabilize its control over 
the country.25 U.S. forces at the time occupied large parts of southern Iraq, including key oil 
fields. Some critics have suggested that Bush should have demanded that Saddam himself appear 
at Safwan to accept the surrender terms in order to debase the dictator and inspire a coup.26 
Others have suggested that even if Saddam did not fall to a coup, demanding abject surrender at 
Safwan would have driven home to Saddam that he was defeated and possibly made him more 
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compliant with the United Nations’ demands.27 Still more critics have argued that the United 
States should have preserved strategic uncertainty about its willingness to march to Baghdad or 
occupy Iraqi territory in the hope that this ambiguity might prompt Iraqi generals to move 
against Saddam. Indeed, many within the Bush administration and the military reacted uneasily 
to Schwarzkopf’s leniency. Scowcroft, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz, 
and CENTCOM Air Operations Chief Buster Glosson thought that the concession on helicopters 
was too indulgent and would allow the Baathist regime to remain in power.28  
 Detractors of the Safwan agreement saw the lack of instructions from the civilians to 
Schwarzkopf and his subsequent leniency as evidence that Bush lacked a plan to translate 
military victory into political success, including the “unstated aim” of toppling Saddam. 
However, this criticism misreads the administration’s priorities and its approach to the end of the 
war. The Bush Cabinet did discuss whether to demand that Saddam appear at Safwan to 
surrender, but they determined that if Saddam refused the United States would face the 
unpleasant choice of backing down and empowering Saddam or resuming fighting. Such a 
resumption of hostilities, however, would expand the coalition’s war aims from liberating 
Kuwait to forcing Saddam into a symbolic surrender at the cost of more loss of life on both sides. 
The administration further reasoned that the renewal of hostilities would sink U.S. forces deeper 
into Iraq while alienating the coalition, which viewed the conflict as successfully concluded.29  
On a deeper level, the Bush administration’s failure to push for harsher terms at Safwan 
cohered with its plan to install a containment regime on Iraq that would prioritize disarmament, 
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coalition unity, and the withdrawal of U.S. forces. Bush had only ever sought regime change as a 
byproduct of the actions taken to liberate Kuwait and weaken the Iraqi military. Any direct 
moves toward regime change would be far too hazardous, possibly leading to a U.S. occupation, 
the splintering of the country, and the collapse of the coalition.30 Moreover, because they did not 
believe Saddam’s immediate ouster was necessary for the United States to achieve its goals in 
the region, the administration did not seize every opportunity to maximize the likelihood that 
Saddam would fall, such as grounding Iraqi helicopters. Far from lacking a plan to terminate the 
war, the administration planned to quickly extract U.S. forces from Iraq, preserve the territorial 
integrity of Iraq, and maintain the coalition. Thus, the inexact, hands-off approach to the 
ceasefire declaration and Safwan flowed from a distinct strategy and set of assumptions. 
Installing Containment: March-June 1991 
 The spring and early summer of 1991 changed the political and strategic dimensions of 
U.S. policy toward Iraq in pivotal ways. The Bush administration installed a containment regime 
through a series of Security Council resolutions that imposed demands on Iraq while using 
sanctions to ensure compliance. At the same time, they tried to establish a policy of indirect 
regime change through economic pressure and signals to the Iraqi military that Saddam’s 
removal would lead to the easing of sanctions. This restrained policy, however, was challenged 
by the unexpected Kurdish and Shia rebellions of March 1991. The Bush administration decided 
to not support these rebellions, but growing domestic criticism and the near-genocidal Iraqi 
assault on Kurdish civilians that followed the crushing of the revolt led the United States and its 
allies to establish an NFZ and a humanitarian effort in Northern Iraq. As the administration 
                                                        
30 Haass, “Post-Crisis Security Arrangements in the Gulf,” December 28, 1990, 3; Memorandum, Richard Haass to 
NSC Deputies, January 19, 1991, 2. 
 101 
struggled to contain Iraq, avoid more entanglements, and placate domestic critics, they gravitated 
to the position that Saddam would have to be removed to achieve stability in the region. 
 After the Safwan accords, top Bush administration officials examined how to move from 
the ceasefire terms to a postwar settlement that would contain Iraq and remove its WMD 
programs. Richard Haass, the NSC’s director of Near East and South Asian Affairs, wrote that 
the United States should demand the destruction of Iraqi WMD and ballistic missile programs, 
Iraqi recognition of the border with Kuwait, a system for compensating Kuwaitis and returning 
stolen property, and Iraqi acceptance of peacekeepers on the border. In Haass’ formulation, 
sanctions would remain in place until Saddam or another Iraqi leader fulfilled these terms. 
However, he noted that this approach would “remove much of our leverage to see that Saddam is 
removed.” He therefore proposed a strategy in which the United States would state that certain 
sanctions, such as the ban on oil exports, would be lifted only when Saddam was out of power. 
He also suggested communicating to Iraqi generals that “we would be willing to waive some 
compensation claims or be more relaxed toward prosecuting war crimes if there were a 
leadership change.”31 Undersecretary of State Robert Kimmitt echoed this approach, writing on 
February 24 that if Saddam survived the war, “we would be much slower in lifting the oil export 
limitations in the trade embargo, because we want to deny Saddam the means to rearm.”32  
This strategy targeted the Baathist and military elites with a mix of pressures and 
incentives to encourage a coup against Saddam, although Haass and Kimmitt warned against 
direct measures to take Saddam down. Bush communicated this concept in a press conference in 
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July 1991: “If the military talked him into stepping aside and getting out of there, I’d give them a 
real break as far as U.S. policy goes.”33 This approach of “turning the screw,” as Haass later 
described it, formed a baseline approach of indirect regime change on which the administration 
would theoretically add new pressures and incentives throughout the next two years.34  
 The United States and its allies established a postwar settlement on April 3, 1991 with the 
passage of Security Council Resolution 687. This resolution issued demands that Iraq had to 
satisfy to have the sanctions removed. They included the revelation and destruction of all WMD 
and ballistic missile programs, reparations payments for Kuwait, the recognition of the Kuwaiti 
border, peacekeepers along the border, and the return of Kuwaiti nationals. To supervise the 
destruction of WMD, Resolution 687 established the United Nations Special Commission 
(UNSCOM), an international team of weapons experts given unconditional authority for the 
“immediate on-site inspection” of Iraqi weapons programs.35 The International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), in turn, would supervise the destruction of Iraqi nuclear sites. Resolution 687 
put the impetus on Iraq to reveal all of its weapons programs, which the inspectors would 
document and destroy. Once the inspectors were satisfied, Resolution 687 permitted the lifting of 
sanctions after a Security Council vote. To make sure Iraq did not rebuild its WMD programs, 
this resolution established UNSCOM as a long-term monitoring and verification agency.36   
 Immediately following the end of Desert Storm, Bush administration officials made a 
series of statements that the United States would neither lift sanctions nor normalize relations 
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with Iraq while Saddam was still in power. On March 13, 1991, Bush told reporters it would be 
“impossible to have normalized relations with Iraq while Saddam is in there…it is hard to see 
how an Iraq with him at the helm can rejoin the family of peace-loving nations.”37 Bush repeated 
this policy again on April 26 as he discussed how to address the Kurdish humanitarian disaster, 
saying: “there will not be normal relations with this man as long as I’m President of the United 
States.”38 Again in May he said: “My view is we don’t want to lift these sanctions as long as 
Saddam Hussein is in power.”39 This became a common refrain from administration officials for 
the remainder of his presidency.40 This policy, of course, assumed that Saddam was not likely to 
survive for long under economic and diplomatic isolation.41 
This stance against normalization contrasted with the administration’s plans during the 
Gulf Crisis to permit the reintegration of Iraq, whether Saddam remained in power or not, into 
the family of nations once it complied with the U.N. demands. However, throughout this period 
many Bush officials, including the President, doubted that Saddam would ever cease his crusade 
to dominate the Gulf and cooperate with U.S. demands.42 Saddam’s actions during Desert Storm 
and its aftermath, including the lobbing of missiles at Israel, the destruction of oil wells in 
Kuwait and the resultant environmental damage, and his brutal crushing of the postwar 
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rebellions, pushed the administration toward the position that normalization with a Saddam-led 
Iraq would be impossible. Bush made this point to German foreign minister Hans Dietrich 
Genscher on March 1: “How can we negotiate with Iraq as long as he is there? With all of the 
atrocities and the damage he has done to the environment, it will be impossible for us to do 
anything constructive with Iraq as long as he is there.”43 This growing consensus within the 
administration also reflected increasing political criticism at home, as this chapter will explore. 
Despite the administration’s declarations against normalization, containment remained 
their priority in the spring and summer of 1991. The Bush team recognized the tension between 
opposing normalization, creating conditions for a coup, and ensuring Iraqi weakness and 
compliance with the United Nations. Bush, Baker, and others reasoned that sanctions and 
inspections were the best way to “put Saddam Hussein in that cage” where he could not rebuild 
his military power and threaten regional stability.44 Neither of these tools of containment would 
be feasible without the full cooperation of the allies, who needed to eschew trade with Iraq while 
backing weapons inspections against Iraqi defiance. Many members of the sanctioning coalition, 
including France, Russia, and China, saw the purpose of sanctions strictly in terms of compelling 
Iraqi compliance and intended to normalize relations with Saddam if he acquiesced to the United 
Nations’ terms.45 Overall, the Bush administration’s approach to Iraq changed little in conceptual 
terms from the Gulf Crisis period, where they sought to maximize military and economic 
damage to the Iraqi state in order to make regime change by coup more likely.  
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Top U.S. officials emphasized that there was no international support for a policy that 
prioritized regime change, although most countries would accept a coup that removed Saddam. 
For example, Javier Perez de Cuellar, the UN Secretary-General, said in March 1991: “If the 
objective of pursuing sanctions is to topple the Iraqi regime, then I do not agree.”46 U.S. officials 
repeatedly stressed that the primary function of sanctions was to compel Iraq to satisfy 
Resolution 687.47 Keeping the focus on containment also bolstered the broader goal of sustaining 
a New World Order where challenges to international security were addressed through 
multilateral institutions.48 Baker probably came closest to clearly delineating U.S. priorities on 
April 17, 1991: “We must do all we can to continue to quarantine and ostracize the Saddam 
regime. That means we must never normalize relations with an Iraqi government controlled by 
Saddam. And it means that UN sanctions must not be relaxed so long as Saddam is in power.”49  
Despite its plans for containment, the Bush administration was blindsided by the eruption 
of Shia and Kurdish rebellions in March 1991. These uprisings stemmed from deep resentment 
of Sunni Baathist oppression of the Shia and Kurds as well as the humiliation and devastation of 
the war and sanctions. Returning soldiers sparked the revolt in the south by attacking 
government forces and buildings in Basra. Although Iranian-aligned groups contributed to the 
revolt, most rebels lacked meaningful connection to foreign nations. The southern rebellion was 
concentrated in the cities and featured brutal street fighting and terrible atrocities by both sides.50  
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Bush came under heavy criticism in the spring of 1991 and afterwards for failing to help 
the rebels even after making several calls for the Iraqi people to revolt against Saddam. The 
clearest exhortation came during Desert Storm on February 15 when Bush told an audience of 
workers at a Raytheon plant in Massachusetts: “And there’s another way for the bloodshed to 
stop, and that is for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands 
and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside, and then comply with the United Nations 
resolution and rejoin the family of peace-loving nations.”51 Bush later said that he made this 
statement “impulsively” and that he did not intend to encourage the Iraqi people to revolt. 
Rather, he aimed to signal to the Iraqi military that if they overthrew Saddam and complied with 
the United Nations’ demands the war would be halted and the sanctions eventually removed.52  
As controversial as this call for rebellion later became, it largely aligned with 
administration policy before and after February 1991. On August 11, 1991, Bush said to 
reporters: “I hope that the Iraqi people do something about it so that their leader will live by the 
norms of international behavior that will be acceptable to other nations.”53 When Baker saw a 
transcript of Bush’s remarks at Raytheon, he simply noted in the text: “Statement of fact.”54 
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Baker meant that since August 1990, U.S. policy had always treated the Saddam’s overthrow by 
a coup as a way to resolve the crisis. That did not mean, in the administration’s view, that the 
United States was encouraging a massive revolt or promising direct aid to coup plotters or rebels. 
The disjunction occurred in their public language rather than in their strategic thinking. 
For a brief period in March, it appeared that Saddam’s regime was in severe jeopardy. 
Historian Phebe Marr estimates that the rebels may have controlled large parts of fourteen of 
Iraq’s eighteen provinces.55 The rebellions created a major dilemma for the Bush team, which 
wanted Saddam to fall but intended to remain out of Iraqi politics. The administration decided 
against supporting the rebels for several reasons. First, the top officials did not think that the 
rebels would succeed. A CIA report in mid-March concluded that unless uprisings occurred in 
the Sunni-dominated core of the country around Baghdad or in the military Saddam would be 
able to use the Republican Guard and the security agencies to beat down the rebels.56 The report 
noted that Saddam had thoroughly cultivated the loyalty of the top brass of the security forces 
through a mix of perks and punishments, making the defection of entire units unlikely. Saddam 
had also surrounded the capital with fiercely loyal Republican Guard units with leaders drawn 
from the Tikriti elite that controlled the Baath Party.57 
Second, the administration believed that any step toward helping the rebels would likely 
embroil U.S. troops in fighting and/or an occupation of Iraqi territory. They held that the U.S. 
military had achieved its objectives in the Gulf and that backing the rebels would expand 
objectives unnecessarily, breaking up a coalition that had no interest in overthrowing Saddam. 
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Many in the media and Congress called for the United States to reverse the agreement at Safwan 
to allow Iraqi helicopters to fly now that Saddam was using armed helicopters against the rebels. 
Top Bush officials, however, saw shooting down the helicopters as the first step towards 
intractable involvement in the Iraqi civil war. State Department spokeswoman Margaret 
Tutweiler spelled out the slippery slope dilemma of grounding Iraqi helicopters:  
Once you make that decision [shooting down helicopters], then why aren’t you taking on  
tanks? Why aren’t you taking on artillery? How are you going to determine who is going to  
lead this country? Why would you be putting American lives at risk to interject yourself in  
something that was never a stated goal or objective either militarily or politically, to  
somehow change the Iraqi leadership?”58 
 
In sum, the administration, especially Powell, thought that direct military intervention would 
transform a successful war for clear goals into a desert version of Vietnam, draining U.S. 
resources, lives, and credibility for uncertain purposes.59 
The third reason that Bush decided against helping the rebels was the fear that a victory 
by the Shia rebels would transform Iraq into an Iranian client, creating a powerful Shia bloc that 
would challenge U.S. allies like Saudi Arabia and Egypt for preeminence in the Gulf. Iran voiced 
its support for the Shia rebels and sent some militia forces to fight in southern Iraq. Many rebels 
carried portraits of Ayatollah Khomeini and used Iranian revolutionary slogans. Iranian 
involvement was too moderate to tip the balance against Saddam, but it was sufficient to frighten 
the Bush administration into suspecting that a victorious Shia rebellion would benefit Iran.60 The 
administration recognized that most Shia rebels were not literal agents of Iran, but they 
                                                        
58 Ann Devroy and Al Kamen, “Bush, Aides Keep Quiet on Rebels: Defense of Policy Viewed as Risky,” April 3, 
1991, A1. 
 
59 “‘Wait and See’ on Iraq: Bush Views Aiding Rebels as Potential Morass,” Washington Post, March 29, 1991, A1; 
Atkinson, Crusade, 490-91. Alfonsi, Circle in the Sand, 218. Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 440. 
 
60 Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 246. 
 
 109 
nonetheless anticipated that a Shia-dominated Iraq would follow pro-Iranian policies and 
possibly emulate its theocratic style of government. This Shia bloc could then try to subvert the 
Gulf States and empower religious fundamentalism throughout the region.61 The Gulf States, 
including Saudi Arabia, told the United States that they opposed any aid to the Shia rebels, 
preferring a weakened Sunni leadership in Iraq that could still balance against Iran.62  
Lastly, the Bush administration avoided helping the rebels because they thought a 
prolonged civil war might cause a “Lebanon-style power vacuum” in Iraq. The war might break 
the country into warring ethnic fragments or provoke interventions from regional powers like 
Iran, Turkey, and Syria. The CIA cautioned that Iran, for instance, might step in to bolster the 
Shia rebels, while Turkey might intervene to quash the formation of an independent Kurdish 
state.63 Military support for the rebels would only help them last longer against the government, 
magnifying the danger of ethnic division. Furthermore, a sense that this civil war was a 
resumption of timeless sectarian blood feuds in Iraqi history fed the sense that the United States 
should stay out of this morass. For example, one senior Bush official told a reporter: “The Kurds 
and Shi’ites were fighting the Sunnis for years before we got there, and they’ll continue killing 
each other long after we’ve gone.”64 
In fact, the Bush administration believed that the rebellions saved Saddam rather than 
bringing about his downfall. The expectation in U.S. policy was that once the war ended a 
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faction of the military or Baath party would move against Saddam after realizing how much his 
gamble had cost the country. The revolts, however, pinned the military down in fighting against 
the rebels and gave them common cause with Saddam in protecting the Sunni core and their own 
positions of power.65 Siding with Saddam became their path to survival, giving Saddam, in 
Baker’s words, “a pretty solid basis to argue to his army ‘stick with me or we’ll all be out.’”66 
One Bush official later said: “The uprisings made it inevitable that there would not be a coup.”67  
The Baathist regime had crushed both rebellions by early April. In the south, the Iraqi 
government executed thousands in retribution. In the North, terrified Kurds, expecting a 
massacre, fled by the millions toward the Turkish and Iranian borders. They suffered Iraqi air 
attacks and insufficient food, clothing, and shelter as they moved into mountains. Soon these 
refugees were dying at a rate of 500-1000 per day while receiving little help from Turkey.68 
The administration hesitated to intervene to help the Kurds, viewing them as another 
nasty, feuding set of factions within the unpleasant scene of Iraqi politics.69 One State 
Department official reflected this perspective in saying: “They’re nice people, and they’re cute, 
but they’re really just bandits. They spend as much time fighting each other as central authority. 
They’re losers.”70 John Kelly, the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, later said that 
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while the media latched onto the Kurds for “feel good articles,” his office tried to limit contact 
with them because “many have a lot of blood on their hands and are certainly no great defenders 
of human rights.”71 Powell and other senior military officers disliked the idea of an indefinite 
presence in Iraqi territory.72  
Several factors nonetheless prevailed upon Bush to help the Kurds. In early April, James 
Baker visited the refugee camps on the Turkish border, witnessing a “human nightmare.” An 
emotionally stirred Baker called Bush on the plane out of Turkey and told him “There’s a true 
disaster in the making if we don’t move fast…We’ve got to do something and we’ve got to do it 
now. If we don’t, literally thousands of people are going to die.”73 Baker pressed for a massive 
humanitarian effort and the use of U.S. forces to create safe havens for the refugees.74 Great 
Britain, France, and Turkey called for aid for the Kurds, as did many in Congress and large 
portions of the American public.75 The crisis was especially destabilizing for Turkey, which did 
not want desperate Kurds setting up camp in an area awash in Kurdish separatism.76  
For these reasons, on April 16 Bush started Operation Provide Comfort, a massive 
humanitarian effort in which U.S. troops deployed to northern Iraq as coalition air power created 
a safe zone for the refugees. The United States and the United Nations funneled immense 
quantities of aid to the refugees, and by the end of June they had facilitated the return of most of 
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these refugees to their homes. At this point, the coalition troops withdrew from northern Iraq 
while the NFZ remained in place to deter Iraqi military incursions into Kurdish territory and to 
safeguard U.N. aid activities.77 The United States, Great Britain, and France also formed a legal 
basis for protecting the Kurds by passing Security Council Resolution 688 on April 5, 1991. This 
resolution condemned the atrocities against the Kurds, required that Iraq permit humanitarian 
agencies to operate in Kurdish areas, and insisted that: “the human and political rights of all 
Iraqis are respected.”78 This last statement created a mandate for the continuation of the NFZ 
beyond the current crisis to guarantee the safety of the Kurds. It also provided a legal foundation 
for military intervention in Iraq in the coming years.79 
President Bush stressed that this intervention was for humanitarian purposes only and that 
no U.S. forces would take part in Iraq’s civil war. He said in mid-April, “I do not want one single 
soldier or airman shoved into a civil war in Iraq that’s been going on for ages.”80 The 
administration also aimed to avoid being dragged into intra-Kurdish politics, fearing that the 
Kurds might try to bait the Iraqi military into a fight to force the United States to choose between 
attacking the Iraqi forces and letting the Kurds be slaughtered.81 A central part of U.S. strategy 
throughout the crisis had been to preserve Iraqi territorial integrity and avoid a prolonged 
presence there. By mid-April, despite every attempt to avoid intervention, the United States now 
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had ground and air units devoted to protecting a large swath of sovereign Iraqi territory, all 
without a clear sense of when that protective cover could be lifted. 
By May 1991, it had become clear that Saddam would most likely survive these postwar 
domestic challenges. While Bush still anticipated that Saddam would fall to a coup within a year, 
this realization prompted the United States to seek more ways to “turn the screw” and incentivize 
the generals and political elites to move against Saddam.82 Aside from keeping the sanctions 
intact while Saddam remained in power, Richard Haass wrote that the United States should 
encourage all members of the coalition to cut off ties to the regime to increase their diplomatic 
isolation.83 The Iraqi people, Haass wrote, needed to absorb “the message that only Saddam’s 
removal will lead to substantial improvement in their lives and livelihoods.”84 Haass further 
projected that deliberate infringements on Iraq’s sovereignty, including inspections, reparations, 
and the presence of coalition forces in northern Iraq, created “a grinding irritant to the highly 
developed nationalism of Iraq’s educated classes and the Baathist military leadership.”85  
Visa restrictions, the denial of aid from global financial organizations, and the freezing of 
Iraqi assets would compound the Iraqi elite’s deprivation and humiliation. In meetings with Iraqi 
officials, the United States and its allies reinforced the fact that “relations are not normal because 
of Saddam’s continued role” while promising aid and the easing of sanctions in exchange for 
Saddam’s removal.86 The Bush administration hoped that the combination of these pressures 
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with the chance to see them relaxed once Saddam was gone would drive the Iraqi elite to 
decapitate the regime. In early May, Bush accelerated a covert action program to make contacts 
in the Iraqi military. This program involved funneling aid to exile groups like the Iraqi National 
Accord (INA), composed of generals who had fled Iraq. The CIA also provided money to a 
public relations firm called the Rendon group to produce anti-Saddam propaganda that the 
opposition could use.87 
The Fallout from Victory: Political Backlash at Home, March-June 1991 
By the summer of 1991, in spite of the messy ending to the war, President Bush held that 
its policy toward Iraq since Desert Storm had largely succeeded. The war and its aftermath had 
degraded the Iraqi military and ejected it from Kuwait. A CIA report calculated that “Iraq’s 
ground forces do not constitute a regional threat” and would not recover prewar strength until the 
late 1990s at the earliest.88 A separate report concluded that “Iraq has not abandoned its regional 
ambitions, but the immediate need to devote its resources to reconstruction, reestablishing 
domestic stability, securing its borders, and repairing severed political and economic ties to the 
international community restricts its policy options.”89 At the same time, the CIA judged that the 
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Iraqi military could defend Iraq against one regional opponent, suggesting that the United States 
had achieved the “Goldilocks outcome” of a weakened Iraq that could balance Iranian power.90  
Furthermore, the administration had struck a serious blow against Saddam’s WMD 
ambitions, destroying much of his capacity during the war and compelling him to let weapons 
inspectors into Iraq, the first of which arrived in June 1991. While U.S. forces remained engaged 
in Operation Provide Comfort, they had avoided becoming embroiled in the postwar rebellions 
and had saved countless Kurdish lives. The coalition continued to support inspections and 
sanctions, although the Bush administration differed from its allies about the conditions for the 
lifting of sanctions. Bush defended these achievements in an interview in June: “Don’t change 
the goalposts, I tell my critics. The goalposts were, aggression will not stand. And aggression 
didn’t stand. And it was an enormous victory.”91 
The domestic political reaction to the events of the spring of 1991, however, challenged 
Bush’s assertions that the United States had won a great victory in Iraq. During the spring of 
1991, Americans from across the political and ideological spectrum believed there was a window 
of opportunity to solve the Saddam problem by removing him from power. He appeared to be 
teetering on the edge of oblivion, and advocates of a tougher line in both parties, the press, and 
intellectual circles wanted Bush to give him a final push. These “simple solutionists,” as Colin 
Powell derisively labeled them, identified many ways this could be done: backing the rebels by 
attacking Iraqi helicopters and tanks, keeping troops in southern Iraq until Saddam was removed, 
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holding on to oil fields in southern Iraq, passing a Security Council resolution declaring 
Saddam’s ouster as a coalition goal, and material support for rebels or the opposition in exile.92  
Two convictions united the diverse critics of Bush’s handling of the end of the Gulf War. 
First, they pointed to the nature of the Iraqi regime to bolster the argument that Saddam needed 
to be removed from power now while the opportunity lasted. The core of their argument was that 
the Baathist regime and ideology, as well as Saddam personally, were immutable in their 
brutality, hostility, and desire to dominate the Gulf. Solving the Saddam problem completely 
required seizing the opportunity while he and his regime were weak. New York Times columnist 
A.M. Rosenthal wrote in March: “As long as the man who brought about war is still in power, 
the peace will not be secure. It was precisely Iraq’s most intimate internal affair-the character of 
its Government-that forced us into war.”93 In April, Senator Joseph Liebermann (D-CT) called 
for the pursuit of “final victory” over Saddam using “all reasonable diplomatic, economic, and 
military means to achieve his removal from power. He reasoned: “Until that end is realized, the 
peace and stability of the region will not have been fully accomplished.”94  
The United States, these critics argued, needed to go beyond hoping for a coup and 
declare a democratic Iraq as a primary goal. Otherwise, there would be persistent aggression and 
human rights abuses from Iraq, even if another Baathist replaced Saddam. Senator Al Gore (D-
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TN) reflected this logic in a letter to Scowcroft on April 3 calling for an NFZ against Iraqi 
helicopters: “Saddam’s external behavior is of a piece with the internal character of his 
regime.”95 Democratic Senators Robert Kerrey (NE), Claiborne Pell (RI), Lee Hamilton (IN), 
and Ted Kennedy (MA) all advocated openly making democracy a goal in Iraq, citing “history’s 
sweep toward democracy.” Kerrey couched his argument in grandly universal terms, claiming 
that “Yearning for democratic processes is a natural and universal human characteristic-that is 
what our Founders taught. It is a fundamental aspect of human dignity which cuts across all 
national, religious, ethnic, and economic barriers.”96 Many Republican politicians shared these 
views, although they voiced these criticisms less loudly out of loyalty to Bush.97 
The second conviction uniting these critics was a sense of responsibility for inspiring the 
rebels who were being slaughtered as coalition forces stood by. An influential Congressional 
Staff Report prepared by Peter Galbraith, an aide to Claiborne Pell, accused Bush of being 
unprepared for the postwar rebellions and then exacerbating the situation by calling for an 
uprising. Galbraith, who had traveled to Kurdistan in March 1991, concluded that the United 
States had “lost an opportunity to overthrow Saddam Hussein in mid-March” by failing to 
cultivate ties with opposition groups during the crisis or to offer any military support for the 
rebels.98 Galbraith later promised that “had the United States continued on to Baghdad, we would 
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have been received with kisses and as liberators every step of the way.”99 Other calls proliferated 
for aid to the rebels, or at least to the refugees. Stephen Solarz declared it “morally and 
politically unacceptable to stand by and do nothing while Saddam brutally crushes a revolt we 
helped inspire.”100 Numerous prominent Congressmen and senators, including many who had 
opposed the war, demanded that Bush take action to stop the killing and the refugee crisis, 
especially in Kurdistan.101 They emphasized that the Shia rebels were not Iranian pawns, even 
arguing that the Iraqi Shia tradition “opposes all religious involvement in politics.”102 In this 
view, the United States was throwing away a chance to build a better Iraq by betraying pro-
democracy forces out of sheer myopia, cynicism, and an outsized fear of becoming enmeshed in 
Iraqi affairs.103 
Bush also came under fire for his management of the ending of hostilities, especially the 
Safwan accords. Conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer accused Bush of a naïve mercy 
in halting the war before the Republican Guard was crushed, saying: “He spared the lives of 
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soldiers who went on to massacre civilians.”104 Others called for the United States to renege on 
the Safwan accords, reproaching Schwarzkopf for letting himself be hoodwinked.105 Numerous 
military figures piled on to this condemnation of the “early end” to the war. In March 1991, 
Schwarzkopf gave an interview where he claimed to have recommended that the Bush 
administration “continue the march,” asserting that if the civilians had not ended the war the 
military could have achieved “a battle of annihilation” against the Republican Guard. 
Schwarzkopf also questioned Bush’s fear of killing too many Iraqis as a good reason to stop the 
war, even quoting General William Tecumseh Sherman’s line that “war is the remedy our enemy 
has chosen; therefore let them have as much of it as they want.” The Bush administration 
responded by issuing a statement clarifying that Schwarzkopf had been consulted and had not 
objected to the ending of the war at the 100-hour mark.106 Schwarzkopf quickly recanted and told 
Congress that ending the war and staying out of the rebellions was a smart decision.107  
Despite this surge of criticism, many politicians and media figures continued to support 
Bush’s avoidance of postwar involvement in Iraq beyond Operation Provide Comfort. These 
skeptics of regime change repeatedly asked what the United States would do if the first step 
toward involvement, such as shooting down helicopters, failed to tip balance in the rebels’ favor. 
Columnist Leslie Gelb argued that “the logic of intervention leads on, inevitably, to capturing 
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Baghdad” and governing Iraq, something outside of U.S. interests and abilities. He and other 
skeptics highlighted the risk of Iraq fragmenting if the United States prolonged the civil strife by 
joining sides.108 Few in Congress actually called for massive intervention in the civil war, 
especially if it involved U.S. ground forces or an occupation.109 Although most Americans 
regretted that Saddam had not fallen in the aftermath of the war, they generally agreed that 
avoiding involvement in Iraqi affairs was wise, with only 29% in the spring of 1991 favoring the 
resumption of ground operations to help the rebels.110  
Some supporters of intervention and regime change accused these skeptics of treating 
Middle Eastern peoples as too mentally or culturally backwards to embrace democracy and 
pluralism. The Iraqi opposition leader Ahmed Chalabi, for instance, claimed: “These realists 
dismiss people in our part of the world as savages who have been killing each other for 
centuries.”111 Skeptics of intervention retorted that it would be foolish to assume that the United 
States knew how to re-engineer Iraqi politics and society or that a post-Baathist Iraq would 
blossom into a liberal democracy. One of these skeptics, the conservative writer George Will, 
pointed out the inconsistency of other conservatives who opposed “social engineering” at home 
but would take that task on in a foreign country that Americans did not understand. He also 
argued that there was no evidence that the Iraqis possessed “the social, institutional, and moral 
preconditions” for constitutional democracy. He and other skeptics of intervention lambasted 
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these “imperial conservatives” as naive do-gooders who would get the United States stuck in a 
quagmire.112 Scholar Daniel Pipes advised: “That region is a politically sick place; outsiders 
would do well to keep a prudent moral distance.”113 Phebe Marr likewise argued that the entire 
region had no history of democracy and suffered from vast social and economic problems. She 
recommended that the United States focus on its containing Iraq and creating the conditions for 
Saddam’s downfall rather than transformative crusades.114  
Another casualty of the postwar fallout from victory was the credibility of Bush’s New 
World Order. Bush officials had employed high-minded rhetoric about human rights, 
international law, and morality in arguing for the war, and their moral outrage at Saddam was 
genuine. After Desert Storm, however, the public watched the administration stand by as 
Saddam, whom Bush had compared to Hitler, recovered from defeat and massacred thousands of 
civilians. For the Bush administration, letting the Iraqis settle their own affairs after the war did 
not contradict the justification for the war, which was to counter aggression rather than address 
other states’ internal problems. As Bush said in early April: “The United States and these other 
countries with us in this coalition did not go there to settle all the internal affairs of Iraq.”115 
Critics now saw clearly, and with disappointment, that the New World Order would not prioritize 
democracy or human rights, with the exception of Operation Provide Comfort.116 Bush’s 
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reluctance to intervene in the former Yugoslavia, where fighting broke out soon after Desert 
Storm, added to this disillusionment about the New World Order.117 As the editors of The New 
Republic lamented: “In his new world, states may be gently criticized for brutalizing people 
within their borders, but no decisive action can be taken against them for doing so.”118   
For many of these critics, especially neoconservatives and liberal hawks, Bush’s Iraq 
policy following Desert Storm represented everything wrong with the realist school of foreign 
policy. Underlying this dissatisfaction was a conviction that U.S. power and values could topple 
tyrants and transform nations if only political leaders had the foresight and courage to exercise 
that power. Joshua Muravchik and other neoconservatives pointed to the examples of Japan and 
Germany as nations where the United States had transformed hostile nations into friendly, 
prosperous democracies. They argued further that there was global momentum behind 
democratization in the post-Cold War world that the United States should capitalize on.119  
The “murky, fantasy realpolitik” of restoring a weakened but still dictatorial Iraq to 
balance the equally autocratic Iran and Syria would only cause more instability. The region 
needed democracy rather than a balance of power because democracies do not act aggressively 
or terrorize their own people.120 If U.S. allies did not support a foreign policy based on exporting 
democracy and toppling tyrants, so be it: U.S. power would suffice. In fact, most 
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neoconservatives blamed the failure to remove Saddam on Bush’s focus on coalition-building 
and international institutions, which they saw as pointless restraints on U.S. might.121 
Like many neoconservatives, Krauthammer believed that the United States should use its 
post-Cold War primacy, what he termed the “Unipolar Moment,” to “shape a world order 
congenial to our interests and values.”122 One way to do this was by toppling tyrants and 
spreading democracy. He accused Bush of failing to seize opportunities to reshape rogue nations 
like Iraq, which thereby undermined the moral credibility the United States needed for the 
benign exercise of hegemony.123 In addition, neoconservatives and liberal hawks accused Bush 
of a Kissinger-like willingness to tolerate dictators rather than press for democracy. 
Krauthammer called this trend the “Tiananmen Mode,” referring to the Bush’s discreet response 
to the massacre in Beijing and his toleration of Mikhail Gorbachev’s rough handling of 
independence movements in the Baltic states.124 
The aftermath of the war witnessed the re-emergence of partisan politics from their 
wartime hibernation. This trend intensified criticism of Bush’s handling of the postwar period 
and accelerated calls for tougher action against Saddam. Both parties recognized political 
weaknesses in the other’s approach to Iraq. Democrats seized on Saddam’s invasion to lambaste 
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the failure of the engagement policy, which many of them had critiqued for years. They claimed 
that Bush’s “appeasement” merely convinced Saddam he could get away with seizing Kuwait 
and that imposing sanctions beforehand might have convinced Saddam to stay his hand. If Bush 
had taken a tougher stand with Iraq, these critics argued, the war might have been prevented.125 
When former U.S. ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie appeared before Congressional hearings in 
March 1991, Democrats blasted her for failing to communicate to Saddam that the United States 
would oppose an invasion of Kuwait. When Glaspie told a House panel that she had given 
Saddam “repeated and crystal warnings,” Congressman Tom Lantos (D-CA) responded: “I am 
appalled by the frighteningly flawed judgment you displayed…To say in retrospect that Saddam 
Hussein absolutely knew that we would move in a military way is simply absurd.”126  
The Democrats also seized on the “Iraqgate” controversy of 1991 and 1992 to undermine 
Bush’s political position on Iraq. This scandal had actually emerged before the Gulf War. In 
1989, federal prosecutors found that the Atlanta branch of the Italian Banca Nazionale del 
Lavoro (BNL) had issued $5 billion in illegal credits to Iraq. The branch’s manager, Christopher 
Drogoul, had made some of these loans through a U.S. export credit program for Iraq, the 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), which had been a key plank of the engagement strategy. 
These loans vastly exceeded the limits set by the CCC program, and Drogoul received roughly 
$2.5 million in kickbacks from Iraq for his services. After the Gulf War, evidence started to 
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trickle out that Iraq had abused virtually every U.S. aid program, adding to the sense that the 
Bush administration had erred in sticking to engagement for so long.127 
Congressional Democrats launched extensive investigations and held numerous hearings 
about this scandal. Henry Gonzalez (D-TX) and Sam Gejdenson (D-CT) accused top Bush 
officials of knowing about the abuses of aid programs, including Iraqi purchases of weapons 
with CCC-derived funds and Iraqi imports of materials and equipment with potential use in 
WMD programs. They argued that the administration allowed these activities to continue in 
order to woo Iraq into the U.S. orbit. They also claimed that Bush had established a team to 
cover up their knowledge of these abuses.128 Gejdenson was uncompromising in his accusations, 
saying in May 1992: “This administration used every vehicle within the government to make 
sure that Saddam Hussein got what he wanted. It clearly emboldened Saddam Hussein.”129 These 
investigations ginned up little evidence of legal or ethical wrongdoing in the administration, but 
the public airing of just how far the engagement strategy had gone to appeal to Saddam, along 
with Drogoul’s trial, became a significant headache for Bush.130 
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The Republicans in turn defended themselves against these charges that the Gulf Crisis 
was partially their fault. They argued that engagement was a sensible policy at the time and 
accused the Democrats of trying to criminalize and politicize a policy error.131 They seized on 
the overwhelming Democratic skepticism about the war to blast the Democrats as weak on 
defense. Only ten Democrats in the Senate and eighty-six in the House had voted to authorize the 
use of force against Iraq, and they had frequently predicted that the war would cause thousands 
of U.S. casualties. Afterwards, Democrats had to defend their skepticism about a war that proved 
a massive, low-cost success.132  
The Republicans determined to make the Democrats pay for their votes on the war. 
Shortly after the vote to authorize the use of force in January 1991, Clayton Yeutter, the then 
Agriculture Secretary who soon became chairman of the Republican National Committee warned 
that the Republicans would make the vote a “very significant factor” in the 1992 election. Some 
Republicans began wearing buttons declaring “I Voted With the President.”133 Moreover, the 
National Republican Senatorial Committee sent out a fundraising letter labeling Democratic 
opponents of the war as “appeasement-before-country liberals.134 Senator Phil Gramm (R-TX), 
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the chairman of this committee, said on March 1 that the Democratic vote against the war fit “the 
pattern of Jimmy Carter, Walter Mondale, and Michael Dukakis. It says to the nation once again 
that the Democrats cannot be trusted to define the destiny of America.”135  
Democrats like John Kerry (MA) and Lee Hamilton retorted that their party’s votes 
emerged from the exercise of conscience and judgment rather than political calculation.136 
Stephen Solarz, moreover, added that most living secretaries of defense had also been skeptical 
of the war and that the Republicans should be careful about using the war for partisan gain given 
their support for the failed engagement policy.137 In sum, both parties were unclean on Iraq 
policy, but each tried to exploit the other side’s errors, creating an escalatory political dynamic 
that biased the public discourse on Iraq toward harsher policies. Both sides sought to distance 
themselves from the shortcomings of engagement, reinforcing for the remainder of the decade 
the “lesson” that any attempts to incentivize Saddam to behave were doomed. This “lesson” 
became an important part of the regime change consensus. 
By the early summer of 1991, once it was clear that Saddam had survived the postwar 
challenges, Bush’s critics derided his failure to bring down the Iraqi leader. In July, The New 
Republic editors asserted: “What’s happened in Iraq since our grand ‘victory’ isn’t a bit of rain at 
a Fourth of July picnic; it’s a deluge, washing the guests, the food, and the marching band out to 
sea.”138 Saddam was only 54 years old, critics noted, and had proven himself a dogged survivor. 
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The question suffusing political debates was whether Desert Storm had positively changed the 
struggle with Saddam or whether it had merely postponed a day of reckoning. The conversation 
now shifted to containment. Those who criticized Bush’s restrained approach to the end of the 
war would now demand a hardline approach to Iraqi compliance, oppose any normalization, and 
push for ever tougher measures in order to bring down Saddam and his regime. 
Enforcing Containment: June 1991-November 1992 
Starting in June 1991, the United States set out to enforce a containment policy based on 
sanctions, inspections, the NFZ in Northern Iraq, and pressuring Saddam in order to spark a 
coup. They continued to prioritize containing Saddam and compelling him to comply with the 
U.N. resolutions, especially on WMD disarmament. Saddam countered U.S. efforts to contain 
and overthrow him with a two-part strategy. In the short term, he sought to prevent the sanctions 
from destabilizing his regime and to convince the inspectors that he was complying in order to 
get the sanctions lifted. In the long term, he tried to break up the sanctioning coalition by 
provoking confrontations and encouraging defections, which he hoped would lead to the end of 
sanctions and inspections. Saddam even established a committee under Tariq Aziz to harass the 
inspectors and conceal the materials and information that Iraq wanted to keep hidden.139  
The IAEA and UNSCOM began inspections in June 1991. The IAEA quickly unmasked 
Iraq’s undeclared uranium enrichment program, followed by the discovery in July of several 
kilograms of highly enriched uranium and stores of uranium ore.140 The IAEA concluded that 
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Saddam had been much closer to an advanced nuclear weapons capacity than most experts 
estimated before Desert Storm. Hans Blix, the head of the IAEA, said that Iraq might have been 
two to three years from producing enriched uranium by centrifuge, which would have enabled it 
to make several nuclear weapons per year.141 David Kay of the IAEA described the Iraqi 
program as one with “technical vision and direction that, if it had proceeded unhindered by the 
Gulf War, would have resulted in Iraq, in a relatively short period of time, joining the ranks of 
the nuclear weapons states.”142 U.S. intelligence had drastically underestimated the extent of this 
program. In the meantime, UNSCOM uncovered and oversaw the destruction of massive 
quantities of ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, and, after its revelation in 1992, implements of 
a biological warfare program.143 
These successes in uncovering and destroying Iraqi WMD programs did not come easily. 
The United States and the coalition faced off against Saddam in a series of confrontations in 
which Iraq refused to comply with the inspectors. Bush officials read each of these episodes as a 
test, thinking that if Saddam received some slack he would lose respect for the coalition and 
continue to push.144 The first of these challenges occurred in the summer of 1991 when Saddam 
repeatedly refused to let U.N. personnel into suspected nuclear facilities and inspectors caught 
Iraqi agents smuggling nuclear equipment out of a facility they were examining.145 Bush 
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threatened air strikes against Iraq in order to induce cooperation. In the midst of this crisis, Bush 
reiterated his call for the Iraqi military to take action against Saddam, promising leniency if they 
succeeded: “Before the war started I made very clear…that our argument was not with the 
people of Iraq-it wasn’t even with the regime in Iraq-it was with Saddam Hussein.”146 Colin 
Powell and the Joint Chiefs of Staff cautioned Bush against coercive strikes because they feared 
they would achieve little and lead the military into deeper involvement.147 Moreover, key 
members of the coalition vacillated over the use of force, including France, Egypt, and 
Turkey.148 The Iraqi government reversed itself in July and allowed the inspectors into the 
suspected sites, which by this point had been cleaned of illegal materials. 
It did not take long for the Iraqi government to obstruct inspections once again. In 
September 1991, Saddam detained 40 inspectors for about 12 hours after they discovered hidden 
Iraqi documents on nuclear weapons. He also protested the inspectors’ use of helicopters to 
move freely around Iraq. Bush again accused Iraq of failing to comply with the United Nations 
and of secretly trying to reconstruct its nuclear weapons program.149 The administration 
determined that Saddam was not a current threat, but they stressed the need to discipline him and 
show that the United States and the coalition would not bend on its commitment to 
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disarmament.150 The inspectors themselves resolved this showdown through a compromise that 
allowed them to make copies of documents from these buildings. 
On January 28, 1992, UNSCOM director Rolf Ekeus reported that Iraq was in material 
breach of Security Council Resolution 687 because of its persistent obstruction of inspections. 
Iraqi agents had destroyed large quantities of missiles and chemical weapons, but the inspectors 
still had not received documentation showing what weapons and equipment the Iraqis actually 
had possessed. This situation left uncertainty as to what the Iraqis had unilaterally destroyed and 
what they still possessed.151 The Iraqi government by this point had issued six “Full, Final, and 
Complete Declarations” of its weapons programs, draining the patience of the inspectors.152 
Once again, the Bush administration drew up plans to strike suspected WMD sites and 
coerce Iraq into compliance. Powell, however, argued against these strikes, saying that they 
would do little to change Saddam’s behavior while creating significant military risks. Powell 
considered these types of limited and “surgical” strikes to be politicians’ ways of convincing 
critics they were addressing the problem without having a clear strategic aim for the use of force. 
Baker and Scowcroft disagreed, saying that the United States needed to strike Iraq to 
demonstrate resolve and end the cycle of confrontation.153 Baker later expressed his frustration to 
Bush about Powell’s opposition to the use of force: “You know well that Saddam respects force, 
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not exhortations. But there is a profound allergy at JCS to back-up that entails the use of 
force.”154 Cheney emphasized that the administration still focused on compliance and did not 
want to run risks to overthrow Saddam, saying in January: “It’s an irritant that he’s still in power 
in Baghdad, but I don’t think it’s the kind of thing that merits, for example, risking additional 
military casualties-American casualties-to get him out of there.”155 Saddam backed down in late 
March and promised to cooperate with the inspections, but this promise again did not last. 
In July 1992, UNSCOM personnel sought to enter the Ministry of Agriculture to locate 
hidden documents on ballistic missile development. The Iraqi government refused to let them in, 
leading to a 17-day standoff in the parking lot in which government agents threatened the 
inspectors and mobs pelted them with rocks and rotten vegetables.156 Scowcroft and Haass 
reasoned that the United States had to show Saddam that he could not “defy the U.N. with 
impunity” or he would continue his intransigence.157 The lack of international enthusiasm for 
military action, however, balanced against the this desire to punish Saddam.158 Bush dreaded that 
a punitive attack would further weaken the coalition without definitively changing Iraqi 
willingness to cooperate.159 On July 26, Iraq backed down and agreed to allow U.N. personnel 
into the Agriculture Ministry. He did so, however, largely because of a deal made with Rolf 
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Ekeus that allowed the Iraqi government to remove U.S. and British personnel from the team that 
would inspect this ministry. The Bush administration was displeased with Ekeus for 
compromising on UNSCOM’s right to determine the national composition of the inspectors, but 
they accepted this deal as international backing for a strike crumpled once Saddam conceded.160  
Hardly had this crisis settled when a new one erupted over Saddam’s continued assaults 
on the Shia population of southern Iraq. In response to this and other provocations, the United 
States, Great Britain, and France imposed an NFZ over a large portion of southern Iraq in August 
1992. The Southern zone was not a “safe haven” like the northern zone because the United States 
only denied air access to government aircraft, allowing Saddam to retain an administrative and 
security presence on the ground.161 The United States also hoped that the denial of Saddam’s 
aircraft in the southern zone would further undermine his legitimacy at home and possibly spark 
a coup.162 Scowcroft told Bush that one of the strengths of the NFZ was that it “communicated a 
sense of momentum moving away from Saddam.”163 The new NFZ established in Operation 
Southern Watch, however, garnered even less international support than the NFZ in the north. 
This policy lacked specific Security Council approval, and many countries began to suspect the 
United States was stretching existing resolutions beyond their original meaning in order to topple 
Saddam. Moreover, countries like China, India, and Russia did not want to sponsor a policy that 
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involved the violation of sovereignty to protect oppressed minorities.164 Great Britain and France 
were the only two major allies who participated in Operation Southern Watch.165  
In the meantime, the economic sanctions and embargo of Iraq were devastating the Iraqi 
economy but having less of an impact on Saddam and his regime. Iraq lost billions of dollars in 
export revenue because of the severing of oil sales, and its industrial output declined by 50%. 
Inflation surged to more than 5,000% as per capita income plummeted.166 Unemployment also 
increased as the Iraqi state laid off hundreds of thousands of workers and soldiers to save 
money.167 This economic decline, combined with the massive damage done to infrastructure 
during the war, ravaged public health. The sanctions technically did not prohibit food imports, 
but bureaucratic delays, corruption, and the Baathist regime’s deliberate denial of resources to 
rebellious populations drastically lowered ordinary Iraqis’ access to basic staples, causing a 
surge in malnutrition.168  
At the United Nations, the committee responsible for determining what Iraq would be 
permitted to import allowed any Security Council member to veto any trade item. The United 
States and Great Britain used this veto to stop Iraq from importing goods that were important for 
agriculture and public health, including insecticides, refrigeration equipment, and chlorine, 
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because of possible applications in WMD research or production.169 The damage to Iraq’s 
electric, water, and sanitation systems increased childhood mortality, mainly from diarrhea, 
hunger, and respiratory diseases. Crime, black markets, prostitution, and other social ills also 
surged.170 The Bush administration acknowledged that this situation threatened the sanctions 
regime by creating a humanitarian imperative to ease sanctions. For instance, Baker wrote in 
early 1992: “It will be harder to maintain sanctions as Arab and regional opinion increasingly 
objects to the perceived hardships inflicted on ordinary Iraqis.”171 
In response to growing outrage about this situation, the United States led the passage of 
Security Council Resolutions 706 and 712 in August and September of 1991. These resolutions 
allowed Iraq to sell $1.6 billion in oil over a renewable six-month period for the import of food, 
medicine, and other humanitarian goods. The United Nations would control this money in an 
escrow account so that the Iraqi government could not access it directly. These resolutions 
formed the basis of the oil-for-food plan of the mid-late 1990s, but in 1991 Saddam Hussein 
rejected these proposals, calling them an infringement on Iraqi sovereignty.172 Citing these 
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resolutions, the Bush administration argued that Saddam was responsible for this suffering and 
that the sanctions should not be lifted.173 
Although Iraqi citizens suffered immensely, Saddam managed to insulate his key political 
supporters in the army, security services, and the Sunni minority from the impact of sanctions 
through smuggling, the use of goods stolen from Kuwait, and other means.174 In historian 
Charles Tripp’s phrasing, he continued to convince these groups with a mixture of threats and 
rewards that “his leadership was better for their interests than that of any imaginable alternative 
and that they would lose everything if he were to be overthrown and a new dispensation of 
power established in Baghdad.”175 In September 1991, a CIA report concluded: “the odds are 
that Saddam will still be ruling over Iraq one year from now. Only significant erosion of support 
from key groups would alter this judgment.”176 A National Intelligence Estimate in June 1992 
reported that Saddam was much stronger than last spring and would likely survive another year, 
although it noted that he relied on a shrinking set of loyalists and family members.177  
As it maneuvered through these crises, the Bush administration frequently revisited the 
basic tenets of its Iraq policy. Each time, however, it found no better strategy than what it was 
already doing. Issues like the Middle East Peace Process and the Bosnian Crisis seized the 
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administration’s attention, and they largely felt that the Iraq problem should not monopolize time 
and resources. Richard Haass later recalled: “It was a continuing problem, but a problem within 
bounds. We weren’t solving the problem, we were at best managing it.”178 Moreover, Bush had 
ordered the CIA to seek out contacts in the Iraqi military to foment a coup, but these efforts 
amounted to little in Bush’s last two years.179  
A major part of the administration’s unwillingness to go beyond the current policy was 
that it perceived the exiled Iraqi opposition to be weak, disunited, and untrustworthy.180 The two 
major external opposition groups were the Iraqi National Congress (INC) under Ahmed Chalabi 
and the Iraqi National Accord (INA) under Ayad Allawi. The INC formed as a political umbrella 
group in June 1992 to coordinate the major opposition groups, build a presence in Iraq, and 
ultimately challenge the regime. It managed to unite various opposition groups behind an agenda 
of replacing the Baathists with a federal democratic government, although the INC leadership 
exerted minimal authority over the disparate groups.181  The INA, in contrast, was composed of 
former regime officials and military officers who aimed to use contacts in the Iraqi government 
to launch a coup. Within Iraq, the main opposition groups were the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
(PUK) under Jalal Talabani, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) under Massoud Barzani, and 
am Iran-backed Shia group called the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq 
(SCIRI).  
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The Bush administration generally viewed the opposition as fractious and unreliable. Of 
these groups, the U.S. intelligence worked most closely with the INA by providing money and 
CIA agents in order to foster contacts in the Iraqi elite.182 It encouraged INC efforts to unite the 
opposition, and Baker even met with INC leaders in July 1992 to voice support for its efforts. 
Still, the administration supplied the INC with only about $20 million in its first year.183 The CIA 
in particular saw the INC as liability because of its squabbling members and its inability to 
project power into Iraq.184 U.S. officials doubted Chalabi because he often exaggerated his 
influence inside Iraq, and he was on the run from bank fraud charges in Jordan.185 State 
Department analyst Wayne White called Chalabi and his entourage “political dilettantes” who 
reminded him of a “used car salesman.”186 Haass wrote to Dennis Ross that in principle it would 
be desirable to give a higher profile to the opposition, but “our efforts to encourage opposition 
unity continue to undermined by the weaknesses and rivalries of the opposition.”187 The constant 
feuding between Barzani and Talabani, the only opposition groups with any meaningful military 
forces, further dampened enthusiasm for the opposition.188 Any regime change strategy that 
centered on these groups, the administration concluded, would have little chance of succeeding 
and might drag the United States into fighting inside Iraq. 
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Richard Haass noted that in this period, U.S. Iraq policy closely resembled “classic 
containment in its emphasis on limiting Iraq’s capability and reach and in its secondary interest 
in fostering regime change.”189 The administration increasingly felt, in Baker’s words, that “the 
tide is running against us” in the struggle to maintain sanctions and inspections, leaving few 
officials eager to prioritize the even tougher effort to overthrow Saddam.190 As Scowcroft wrote 
in July 1992, the United States needed to distinguish between “the objective (full compliance) 
and the desirable outcome (Saddam’s ouster).”191 Bush’s Iraq policy never strayed from that 
hierarchy of goals. Their stance against normalization of relations with a Saddam-led Iraq, 
moreover, persisted from 1991-1992. If anything, the frustration of dealing with Iraqi 
intransigence hardened this position, as did mounting political pressure at home.192  
Early Critics of Containment: 1991-1992 
 Once containment had settled in, Bush’s struggle to make Saddam comply with the 
Security Council resolutions took place in an atmosphere of intense scrutiny from the media and 
Congress. The schools of thought of containment clustered into three schools. I call the first 
school the conditional approach because their views for the policy depended on how it developed 
and whether it could plausibly lead to regime change. They could be described as both critics and 
defenders of containment, depending upon its effectiveness and likely future prospects. 
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Consisting mostly of centrist, hawkish Democrats and defense intellectuals, they argued that the 
policy could work as long as the United States maintained significant pressure on the regime, 
worked to preserve the coalition, and adjusted the policy as circumstances changed.193  
Most members of this school agreed with Bush’s stance against normalization but saw 
problems with the regime change by coup policy. They generally believed that replacing Saddam 
with a bloodstained general would not address the roots of Iraqi misbehavior, namely the 
Baathist regime and ideology. However, many members of this school thought that reforming 
and rebuilding the Iraqi political system was beyond U.S. means or knowledge. They believed 
containment might lead to Saddam’s ouster if the United States enforced it strictly, but they often 
saw Bush as insufficiently devoted to the rigorously enforcing containment and unwilling to seek 
new ways to pressure the Baathist regime.  
 Senator Al Gore best represents the thinking of the conditional school of thought on 
containment. He was a potential candidate for president and member of the Democratic 
Leadership Council, a group of centrist Democrats including Les Aspin (WI) and Charles Robb 
(VA), who were also hawks on Iraq.194 Gore, who voted in favor of Desert Storm, argued 
afterwards that the United States must not normalize relations with Saddam and use the tools of 
containment,  sanctions, inspections, air power, and support for the opposition, to overthrow 
him.195  Gore took the political concept of the regime seriously. Even if Saddam fell in a coup, he 
argued, the United States had to keep pressing his successor for a transition to democracy. He 
                                                        
193 New York Times editorials provide a great example of consistent urging for Bush to prioritize containment and 
compliance but demand full Iraqi cooperation. For example, see: Editorial, “Time to Punish Hussein-Again,” New 
York Times, July 24, 1992, A24. 
 
194 Julian Zelizer, Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security from World War II to the War on  
Terrorism (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 378. 
 
195 Cong. Rec., 102nd Cong., 1st sess., April 18, 1991, 8646. Gore fleshed this position out in a letter to George Bush 
on April 3, 1991. See Alfonsi, Circle in the Sand, 214. 
 141 
reasoned: “Until Saddam Hussein is gone, until his government is gone, and until the Iraqi state 
is reestablished on a new footing, there can be no solution on an enduring basis for the hundreds 
of thousands of refugees, no durable basis for regional security and stability.”196  
Gore spoke extensively on Iraq from 1991-1992, supporting the administration when it 
demanded full compliance from Iraq and excoriating it for hesitation and compromise. In 
November 1991, for example, he led every member of the House Select Committee on 
Intelligence in sending a letter to Bush that declared: “In our judgment, the current policy 
towards Iraq does not seem to be working.” The letter called for greater willingness to use force 
to punish Saddam as well as a stronger effort to delegitimize the Baathist regime, including war 
crimes trials.197 Like many critics of containment, Gore suspected, not without reason, that Bush 
still saw Saddam as useful for preserving a balance of power in the region and preventing Iraq 
from disintegrating on ethnic lines. He accused Bush of holding the “persistent view of Saddam 
Hussein as an acceptable part of the landscape, if and when we finally get him down to size.” He 
stressed that it was not enough to say the United States would not normalize relations with 
Saddam; one could no sooner have a constructive relationship with Saddam than one could 
“housebreak a cobra.”198 Rather, Bush needed to maximize operations short of war that would 
topple him in the short term. For Gore and others in the conditional approach to containment was 
tolerable as long as it remained a firm base upon which the United States pursued regime change.  
The reaction of members of this conditional approach to the confrontation at the 
Agriculture Ministry in July 1992 captures their thinking well.  Gore, Aspin, and others 
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portrayed this case as an Iraqi victory that “made the non-negotiable, negotiable” by giving Iraq 
a say in the national composition of the inspections teams and “opened the door for Iraq to 
negotiate many of the more onerous elements of the U.N. resolutions.”199 In Aspin’s colorful 
phrasing, Iraq was winning “the war of nerves and inches” because of Bush’s feckless policy of 
“threat and forget.”200 If Bush did not stand strong on the minor points, Saddam would continue 
to chip away at the coalition’s resolve. Still, the United States could restore this policy by 
launching airstrikes to demonstrate resolve and by demanding full compliance with the 
inspectors.201 The conditional school’s support for the use of force against Iraq had broad 
popular backing. One Gallup poll in July 1992 showed that 67% of Americans supported 
resuming military action to enforce U.N. resolutions and force Saddam from power.202  
 A second, tougher set of actors took a categorical approach to containment, defining it 
from the outset as a policy that could not work against regimes like Baathist Iraq and individuals 
like Saddam. I call this the “inevitable decline” school because, unlike the conditional approach, 
members of this approach believed containment was doomed to fail from the outset. They mostly 
came from neoconservative circles, although it included some liberal hawks and conservatives. 
Whereas containment focused on limiting Iraqi capabilities, these critics argued that the real 
problem was not the regime’s capabilities at any given time but its unchanging intent to develop 
and use those capabilities. Moreover, containment could not last because it relied on a fickle 
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international coalition that did not share the American stance against normalization. Whereas 
members of the conditional school believed that containment could form a baseline from which 
regime change could be achieved, members of the inevitable decline school saw containment and 
regime change as incompatible strategies from the beginning. Because Bush would not take the 
aggressive actions needed to topple Saddam for fear of harming the coalition needed for 
sanctions and inspections, containment actually precluded the pursuit of regime change.  
Critics in the inevitable decline school further claimed that the current policy could not 
remove Saddam because its main regime change mechanism was sanctions, which could not 
even force Saddam out of Kuwait. Once the inspectors left and the sanctions were lifted Saddam 
or his Baathist successor would return to building WMD.203 Any policy that did not address the 
fundamental problem of the regime and its intentions was therefore dangerously inadequate. For 
example, The Wall Street Journal editors wrote in July 1991: “The real problem here is less the 
weapons than the regime sitting in power in Baghdad…The weapons are dangerous because the 
Baath Party is incorrigibly dangerous. So long as these people are in control, no amount of 
inspecting can ever guarantee that we have found it all.”204 Charles Krauthammer stressed the 
same set of problems: “The Iraqi bomb is today a problem of intent, not capability. The 
capability is there, and it is extremely difficult to destroy piece by piece. It can only be taken care 
of by going after intent: by producing a leadership in Baghdad willing to give it over to us.”205  
These critics pointed to Iraqi non-compliance with the inspections as evidence that under 
the current regime Iraq would never comply and would inevitably hide some WMD capabilities. 
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They also mocked UNSCOM and the IAEA as bumbling “Inspector Clouseaus” and claimed that 
the inspections created a false sense of security.206  In contrast to the conditional critics, they 
contended that containment was too dangerous and feckless to be given a chance to work. With 
each confrontation, they pressed Bush to launch sustained air strikes on the Iraqi military, 
security services, and infrastructure in order to truly break his regime.207 Later in the decade, 
they developed a strategy for regime change called rollback, which will be discussed in a later 
chapter.208 Without more concerted action, Saddam would simply keep up this “Baghdad 
Shuffle” until the coalition became exhausted and withdrew the inspectors.209  
Another major issue for both of these schools was war crimes trials for top Baathists. 
Numerous Congressmen from both parties wrote to Bush and passed resolutions requesting that 
he form an international tribunal to gather information on the crimes of the Iraqi leadership and 
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issue indictments.210 House Democrats held several hearings on this topic.211 The calls for war 
crimes trials stemmed from the desire to go beyond the removal of Saddam to the dismantling 
and discrediting of the entire Baathist system. They hoped that war crimes trials would further 
delegitimize Saddam in global politics and inhibit attempts by any nation to normalize relations 
with Iraq. In contrast, the Bush administration opposed the formation of war crimes trials in 
absentia because without the actual criminals in hand, these tribunals would make the United 
States look weak.212 They would also work against the hope for a coup because they directly 
threatened the Baathist and military elite, the exact people to whom the United States was trying 
to assure leniency if they overthrew Saddam.213 
The third school of thought on containment was the humanitarian school. Most of them 
came from the political and academic left, religious organizations, and humanitarian activism. 
Although they generally agreed that Iraq should be contained, they prioritized lifting sanctions to 
relieve the Iraqi health crisis, noting that sanctions affected ordinary Iraqis far more than 
Saddam’s regime. They frequently pointed out that most Iraqis had become dependent on 
government ration cards, allowing the state to control them further.214 David Bonior (D-MI) 
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argued that an enfeebled Iraqi people stood no chance against the Baathist security system, 
saying, “Saddam Hussein will not be brought down by starving the Iraqi people.”215  
In the House Select Committee on Hunger, Democratic Congressmen Byron Dorgan 
(ND), Timothy Penny (MN), and Jim McDermott (WA) heard dozens of testimonies about the 
suffering in Iraq and urged Bush to allow for normal commerce with the exception of military 
goods. At the minimum, they called for Iraq to be permitted to use its frozen assets to purchase 
essential goods abroad.216 McDermott questioned the basic morality of the “turn the screw” 
policy: “We have to ask ourselves: at what point does the starvation of 18 million people take 
precedence over our attempts to remove one person from power?”217 The humanitarian critics 
argued that this suffering largely stemmed from the Desert Storm bombing campaign, which 
devastated crucial Iraqi infrastructure like power plants and water treatment facilities.218 
Furthermore, they argued that waiting for Saddam to accept Security Council Resolutions 706 
and 712 was insufficient given the gravity of the humanitarian situation. Instead, the United 
States had to take the initiative in alleviating this suffering even if it meant weakening a 
cornerstone of containment.219 Congressman Henry Gonzalez, for instance, wrote to Bush in 
May 1991 calling for an “immediate and massive international effort” to provide relief for the 
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Iraqi people.220 Of these three schools of thought, the humanitarian argument was the most 
distant from centers of power in politics and the media. The leadership of both major parties did 
little to support this criticism as they were both.221 Nevertheless, this argument would gain 
traction over time as Saddam remained in power and the Iraqi people’s suffering continued.222  
Conclusion 
For the remainder of the decade, the key figures of the Bush administration continued to 
defend the limited victory of Desert Storm and argue that containment was working by managing 
and minimizing the Iraqi threat. Colin Powell best spelled out this defense in September 1991:  
There is also this romantic view that all we had to do was sail up the river valley to Baghdad 
and Saddam Hussein would be waiting at the gate, that all we had to do was snatch him, and 
that there was some Jeffersonian democrat waiting in the Baath Party to take over. I think the 
President showed great wisdom in not getting himself mired down in a Mesopotamian mess. 
I am confident that regional stability is intact. Saddam Hussein is threatening none of his 
neighbors.”223 
 
In an interview in 1996, Brent Scowcroft backed up this view: “As long as we are alert 
and observant Saddam Hussein is not a threat to his neighbors. He’s a nuisance, he’s an 
annoyance, but he’s not a threat.”224 Indeed, many parts of containment worked well in the early 
1990s. The multinational coalition behind the Security Council resolutions remained intact. The 
sanctions continued to prevent Saddam from rebuilding his military and economic strength. The 
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NFZs limited his ability to oppress vulnerable populations and project force against his 
neighbors. Lastly, the inspections had uncovered and destroyed most of his WMD capabilities.225 
The Bush administration may have won the policy battle over Iraq after the Gulf War, but 
it lost the political war to defend that policy. Few figures in politics and the media accepted the 
idea that the Saddam problem was being contained and would continue to be in the future. Most 
politicians and commentators accepted Bush’s stance against normalization of relations with 
Saddam without concurring with the Bush team’s sense that containment sufficed long as it 
postponed the resurrection of Saddam’s military and WMD programs. Many political figures 
supported the no-normalization stance because they thought Saddam had proven himself 
incapable of change and impervious to positive incentives like those offered in the prewar 
engagement policy. He had rejected trade and aid in order to annex and brutalize Kuwait, 
developed WMD, attacked Israel, caused immense environmental damage, and massacred tens of 
thousands of his own people in order to hold on to power.226  
This line of thinking about Iraq drew conceptual strength from the problem of the regime, 
or the belief that the nature of totalitarian regimes like the Baathist state drove them to be 
aggressive, anti-American, and incapable of change. Congressman Mel Levine (D-CA), a 
staunch supporter of the war, summarized this moral outrage about Saddam’s survival and the 
impossibility of normalization in saying: “It is just exasperating that having shed the blood and 
treasure that we did for what was clearly an appropriate purpose that we still have this barbarian 
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in power exercising the type of discretion that he does and in the duplicitous manner that he 
appears to be unable to change.”227  
The impossibility of redemption was the bitter “lesson” of Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait. 
This lesson was then calcified by the anguish and disappointment of an incomplete victory and 
one and a half subsequent years of frustration in trying to contain Saddam and compel his 
cooperation with the United Nations. The principle of no-normalization formed an absolute 
baseline of U.S. political discourse for the rest of the decade, with few dissensions. Debates 
would rage over whether containment was working or not, whether the United States needed to 
seek democracy or could accept a more pliable strongman, or how much and what kind of direct 
action the United States should take to topple Saddam. All of these conversations nonetheless 
occurred on this calcified bedrock. For the remainder of the decade, as Saddam remained in 
power and key pillars of containment were undermined, more Americans shifted from the 
conditional idea that containment might work to the inevitable decline perspective. 
 One additional concept started to harden into a political consensus during the second half 
of Bush’s term. This position was that containment was at best a temporary way of managing the 
Saddam problem and postponing his resurrection. This argument followed from the no-
normalization principle. If relations with Saddam could not be normalized, the only path out of 
this dilemma was his removal. Defenders of containment, particularly the Bush administration, 
did not credibly explain how containment would bring about Saddam’s downfall. Like Powell 
and Scowcroft, they could say only that Saddam appeared muzzled and that he might be 
overthrown in a coup. The strength of the Bush administration’s case was that the United States 
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lacked a low-risk means of toppling Saddam, much less handling the aftermath of his ouster. 
This, however, was a defensive position with an indefinite but inexorable political expiration 
date. The Bush administration had trapped themselves in this dilemma by ruling out any form of 
normalization, and domestic politics hemmed them in even further. With Bush’s defeat in 1992, 




















 Sergeant Gary Jordan of the U.S. Army’s 24th Infantry Division returned to Kuwait in 
October 1994 as part of the effort to deter Iraq from invading its tiny neighbor after Saddam 
positioned combat units on the border. A veteran of Desert Storm, Jordan could not help but 
voice frustration over his redeployment: “If we’d taken care of the problem the first time, we 
wouldn’t have had a problem this time.”1 In Iraq at the same time, an anonymous waiter slipped 
a note to two reporters that read: “Dear sir, sorry to trouble you. I know you are very kind and 
therefore, when you leave the country, could you give me whatever medication you have. I’m 
poor and I have a big family... Any antibiotics would be a great help.”2 In Baghdad’s hotels, 
French, Russian, and Chinese businessmen prepared huge oil contracts with the Iraqi government 
that awaited the end of sanctions. In the United States, congressmen, columnists, and other critics 
grumbled that containment looked endless while Saddam Hussein never seemed to change.  
 In sum, the containment of Iraq pleased no one involved, but in its first term the Clinton 
administration enforced and defended this policy as a way of managing the Saddam problem at 
reasonable cost. Clinton largely continued Bush’ approach of using sanctions to compel 
Saddam’s compliance with the United Nations, keep him weak, and create the conditions to 
spark a coup. Clinton’s strategy for managing Saddam was to maintain the coalition, support 
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weapons inspectors, preserve sanctions, enforce the no-fly-zones (NFZ), and occasionally use or 
threaten to use force when Saddam challenged his confinement. The administration hoped that 
this approach would allow it to focus on other international priorities. In the Clinton’s first term, 
it basically succeeded in these goals. The coalition beat back Saddam’s threats to his neighbors, 
unveiled and destroyed most of his weapons of mass destruction (WMD), inhibited military 
recovery, and forced Saddam to focus on survival at home.  
U.S. policy toward Iraq was suspended between two contradictory principles in Clinton’s 
first term. The first principle was the regime change consensus, or the belief that any true 
solution to the Saddam problem required his removal at the minimum and the transformation of 
his regime into a democracy at the maximum. This belief was solidified in political and policy 
circles under Bush and remained almost unassailable under Clinton. The second principle was 
that there was no realistic strategic alternative to containment for the foreseeable future because 
direct attempts at regime change would be ineffective or too costly while breaking up the 
coalition. The Bush administration had endorsed this view, and Clinton officials did not seriously 
consider deviating from it in his first term. 
Two approaches to the containment Iraq defined political and intellectual debates in 
Clinton’s first term. Members of the conditional school viewed containment as a reasonable 
policy in the absence of realistic alternatives but argued that Clinton should maximize pressure 
on Saddam to deter him from aggression, ensure his disarmament, and heighten the chances of 
his overthrow. Members of the inevitable decline school, in contrast, saw every crisis or Iraqi act 
of non-compliance as more evidence that the Iraqi threat would not recede until Saddam and his 
regime were uprooted entirely. Clinton officials responded that occasionally deterring or using 
force against Saddam was a tolerable cost for containing him and facilitating inspections.  
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Clinton also had to wrestle with increasingly incompatible demands by international and 
domestic audiences, both of which Clinton needed to maintain containment. At home, the 
dominance of the regime change consensus meant that Clinton would pay a price retreating from 
Bush’s demand that sanctions would not be eased until Saddam was out of power. However, the 
coalition would not countenance an indefinite policy of containment, much less any sign that the 
real intention of U.S. policy was regime change. Leaning too far to one side of this divide 
jeopardized the other. If Clinton told the coalition that the United States would accept the easing 
of sanctions in response to Saddam’s cooperation, he would become politically vulnerable to 
domestic critics. However, the more the coalition, especially France, Russia, and China, 
suspected that the United States wanted to maintain sanctions regardless of Iraqi compliance, the 
more they pushed to end sanctions and inspections and normalize relations with Iraq.  
In order to deal with irreconcilable domestic and foreign audiences, the administration 
developed what I call the “Clinton fudge.”3 Clinton officials intentionally avoided tying the 
lifting of sanctions to Saddam’s removal from power, as Bush had done following Desert Storm. 
However, they demanded that Saddam Hussein comply with all Security Council resolutions 
passed after Desert Storm, including Resolution 688, which called for the Iraqi government to 
“ensure that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected.”4 The 
administration argued that it was unlikely that Saddam would fully comply with these demands 
and that if he did he would fall from power because his totalitarian system hinged on terror and 
violence. Clinton officials justified this high bar of compliance by arguing for the need to be  
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reassured of Saddam’s changed intentions, not just his literal compliance, in order to safely lift 
sanctions. Thus, the Clinton fudge provided a formula to signal to domestic audiences that it was 
almost inconceivable that sanctions would be lifted with Saddam in power while telling the 
coalition that it was open to easing sanctions if Saddam met these high standards. 
The Clinton administration thus sought to maintain two balancing acts in his Iraq policy. 
First, it told domestic critics that it wanted regime change and even pursued indirect means of 
toppling Saddam while firmly prioritizing containment and enforcement of the Security Council 
resolutions. Second, with the intentional ambiguity of the Clinton fudge, it signaled a hard line to 
domestic audiences while stressing flexibility to the coalition.  
Clinton’s policy and these two balancing acts held together as long as several conditions 
prevailed. First, the administration needed to maintain the possibility that Saddam Hussein might 
be overthrown in a coup in order to protect Clinton’s political flank. The hope for a coup 
preserved the possibility that containment itself could generate sufficient pressures to solve the 
Saddam problem without massive U.S. intervention. If containment lacked this outlet and 
Saddam appeared firmly in power, the policy would seem indefinite, forcing the United States to 
choose between accepting Saddam’s survival and actively pursuing regime change. Second, the 
United States needed to maintain coalition support for sanctions and inspections because without 
this cooperation Saddam could export oil and rebuild his WMD and conventional forces. 
This chapter argues that by the end of Clinton’s first term the conditions necessary for 
preserving containment had become increasingly tenuous. Between 1992 and 1996, Saddam 
faced coups, family betrayals, rebellions, and economic scarcity, but he survived through a 
strategy of brutality and patronage. By the end of 1996, Saddam had crushed the U.S.-backed 
Iraqi opposition and made his regime virtually immune to coups or rebellions. In addition, the 
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coalition grew shakier as France, Russia, China, and U.S. partners in the Middle East pressed to 
end inspections, renew trade with Iraq, and provide relief from the sanctions. These two shifts 
started the process of moving key policy-makers, politicians, and commentators from the 
conditional position to the inevitable declinist view that containment cannot work and must be 
replaced with an open regime change policy. The central tension of Clinton’s first term Iraq 
policy was that containment achieved many goals at a tolerable cost but became less tenable in 
the long term. 
New President, Old Policy: Clinton Takes Over Containment 
 Iraq policy did not play a central role in the 1992 election, but it had a more important 
place than many scholars have acknowledged. The Clinton campaign focused on economic 
issues while seeking to neutralize Bush’s experience and accomplishments in foreign affairs. 
They acknowledged that Desert Storm counted as a victory in the public eye but tried to tarnish 
Bush’s victory by arguing that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait resulted from his coddling of Saddam 
beforehand. Al Gore, Clinton’s running mate, cited Bush’s support for export credit aid to Iraq 
and his muted reaction to Iraqi threats and atrocities as reasons why Saddam thought he could get 
away with the invasion. In one speech, Gore stated: “His poor judgment, moral blindness, and 
bungling policies led directly to a war that never should have taken place.”5 Clinton and Gore 
further attacked Bush’s Iraq record by accusing him of betraying the Iraqi rebels after promising 
assistance against Saddam, adding that the United States missed an opportunity to bring Saddam 
down after the war.6 One Democratic bumper sticker linked Bush’s failure to topple Saddam 
with the faltering U.S. economy by asking: “Saddam still has his job. What about you?”7  
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 The Bush campaign retorted that Clinton lacked foreign policy experience and that Bush 
had dealt with Saddam successfully and prudently. They objected to the Clinton’s moral 
reproaches of Bush’s handling of authoritarian regimes, arguing: “The objective is to change 
behavior, not make yourself feel good. Sometimes you isolate. Sometimes you must engage to 
change behavior.”8 They also deflected Clinton’s Iraqgate accusations onto the Democrats by 
saying that most Democrats had supported aid to Iraq before 1990 but then voted against the use 
of force authorization for Desert Storm.9  
Clinton’s criticism of Bush’s Iraq record fit into a larger strategy of depicting Bush as 
both too focused on foreign affairs and too uncertain about democracy and human rights abroad. 
Clinton accused Bush of “ambivalence about supporting democracy” and a willingness to partner 
with dictators like Saddam, Hosni Mubarak, and the Chinese communists.10 He pledged that his 
foreign policy would prioritize multilateral institutions, expand free trade, and promote 
democracy and peaceful globalization.11  
This vision appealed to many intellectuals who were frustrated with Bush’s pragmatic but 
uninspiring foreign policy. Many liberals, conservatives, and neoconservatives had long 
criticized Bush for not prioritizing the spread of democracy in an age when it seemed the 
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inevitable course of history.12 The Clinton campaign, in turn, tried to cultivate these groups, 
especially neoconservatives, in order to undermine a key element of the Republican coalition.13 
The editors of The New Republic backed Clinton because they saw him as a new type of 
Democrat who believed in strong defense and the global assertion of U.S. values. They accused 
Bush of failing to recognize the unique historical opportunities created by communism’s 
collapse, writing: “Instead of embracing the democratic revolutions of the late 1980’s and using 
them to formulate a clearly pro-democratic foreign policy, Bush lapsed into an incoherent 
realism.”14 Bush’s policy of supporting a coup in Iraq instead of promoting democracy lent 
weight to this criticism. These accusations had some public appeal. One November 1992 poll 
found that 55% of respondents were unsatisfied with Bush’s explanation of his handling of 
prewar aid to Iraq.15 70% in a September poll said Bush spent too much time on foreign policy, 
although his approval ratings for foreign policy as a whole remained solid.16  
 Despite its attacks on Bush’s performance, the Clinton campaign was vague about how it 
would change Iraq policy. Campaign officials discussed plans to support the opposition more 
concretely but did not promise significant changes to containment.17 Clinton said in January 
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1992 that he probably would have voted for the authorization to use force against Iraq, although 
his record at that time was ambiguous.18 Gore had voted for the war, and during the campaign he 
went further than Clinton in calling for tough action against Saddam. He told the Senate in 
March 1992 that the main obstacle to removing Saddam was Bush’s mistaken belief that: 
“Saddam Hussein is somehow essential to the stability of the region and that we must take care 
to deal with him only within carefully weighted limits.”19 
 After Clinton won the 1992 election, he began building a foreign policy team and 
weighing how to handle challenges like Iraq. On January 5, 1993, Secretary of State Lawrence 
Eagleburger sent a memo to his successor Warren Christopher that outlined the Iraqi threat  
Saddam is anxious to break out of the system of postwar constraints imposed by the U.N. He 
will test you early in the new Administration, perhaps first with charm, and when that fails, 
with defiance…If you are not moving forward to keep the pressure on Saddam, you will find 
yourself sliding backward.20 
 
Eagleburger thus portrayed Iraq as a maintenance problem that required active attention and 
pressure to prevent Saddam from chipping away at containment.  
In fact, the pattern Eagleburger described manifested itself before Clinton even took 
office when in early January Iraq started challenging the southern NFZ. Iraq moved surface-to-
air missiles (SAMs) into the southern zone, activated preexisting anti-aircraft batteries, and sent 
aircraft into the NFZ, leading to U.S. forces shooting down one Iraqi fighter.21 On January 8, 
Iraqi officials announced that Iraq would have to fly into Iraq on chartered Iraqi aircraft rather 
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than the normal procedure of using U.N. planes.22 After Saddam moved SAMs into the northern 
NFZ on January 11, Bush ordered airstrikes on Iraqi SAM sites and other air defenses.23 U.S. 
officials made clear that the strike was intended to force Saddam’s compliance rather than 
overthrow him. One official called the strikes “a spanking, not a beating.”24 The strike was 
broadly popular in the United States, with one poll showing 82% of respondents in support.25 
 Some of Clinton’s comments shortly after this confrontation muddled what his Iraq 
policy would be upon taking office. He told an interviewer that he backed the strikes and added:  
The people of Iraq would be better off if they had a different leader. But my job is not to pick 
their rulers for them. I always tell everybody, ‘I’m a Baptist; I believe in deathbed 
conversions.’ If he wants a different relationship with the United States and the United 
Nations all he has to do is change his behavior.26 
 
Clinton had never hinted that he would accept any normalization with Iraq during the campaign, 
but now he was suggesting that relations with Saddam could improve if he complied with the 
U.N.’s demands. His advisers were surprised and quickly urged him to withdraw this comment.27 
In the face of media and Congressional criticism, Clinton backtracked a days later and reaffirmed 
that he had “no intention of normalizing relations” and that “there is no difference between my 
policy and the policy of the present administration.” Clinton officials later said that he feared 
looking weak on Iraq going into his presidency but also saw a hardline policy as risky.28  
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 The confrontation with Saddam continued on January 17 when Iraqi officials said they 
would not guarantee the safety of U.N. aircraft that flew into Iraqi airspace. Bush responded by 
launching 40 cruise missiles against a military complex outside of Baghdad and promising more 
strikes if Saddam continued his obstruction.29 On January 19, the day before Clinton’s 
inauguration, the Iraqis relented and promised to stop firing on coalition planes and allow 
inspectors to fly into Baghdad. They portrayed this move as a gesture of good will to a new 
president they hoped might take a softer approach.30 Nevertheless, Iraqi anti-aircraft sites 
continued to target U.S. planes, and on January 22 Clinton retaliated with air strikes on anti-
aircraft installations near the northern NFZ. Soon thereafter the Iraqis resumed compliance with 
the inspectors.31 Eagleburger’s prediction that Saddam would try to woo Clinton with hollow 
cooperation first and defiance second came true immediately, and the administration’s first 
response demonstrated a willingness to use force to deter Iraqi misbehavior. 
 Clinton entered office without much experience in foreign affairs or a clear conception of 
U.S. grand strategy. In terms of domestic politics, he was part of a wave of centrist Democrats 
who wanted to distance themselves from the left wing of the party and hew more closely to what 
they saw as a rising conservative tide in U.S. politics. Led by the political strategist Will 
Marshall, these self-described “New Democrats” wanted the party to escape the shadow of the 
Vietnam War and Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy fiascoes. The New Democrats believed most 
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Americans thought that the Republicans were tougher and more reliable on foreign affairs. For 
Clinton, Gore, and other centrist Democrats, changing this perception would require more 
willingness to use U.S. power to spread democracy and liberal values and defend the national 
interest.32 
At the White House, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake led an effort throughout 
1993 to develop an overarching foreign policy framework that would also satisfy these political 
objectives. He and other Clinton advisors wanted to devise a more transformative vision than 
Bush’s New World Order, which mainly sought to restore cooperation among the great powers 
in order to maintain international stability. Clinton and Lake believed that Bush had focused too 
much on stability and had not recognized the opportunities created by globalization and the end 
of the Cold War. At the same time, the incoming administration believed their political mandate 
was for domestic issues, and they did not want any foreign policy issue dominating the agenda.33  
 Lake delivered an address at Johns Hopkins on September 21, 1993 to lay out Clinton’s 
conception of the U.S. global role. He defined democracy, human rights, and market economics 
as the “core concepts” of U.S. foreign policy and argued that in recent years these ideas were 
“more broadly accepted than ever.” He made a case that these values had “universal appeal” and 
that in the wake of the Soviet defeat the United States had an unprecedented opportunity to 
spread their reach. In a Wilsonian fusion of interests and ideology, he claimed: “To the extent 
democracy and market economics hold sway in other nations, our own nation will be more 
secure, prosperous, and influential, while the broader world will be more humane and 
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peaceful.”34 This statement reflected the deep belief of key figures in the Clinton administration 
in the democratic peace, or the idea that democracies generally acted less aggressively, did not 
go to war with each other, and cooperated more with other states. To explain this behavior, 
democratic peace theorists cited institutions and mechanisms like popular control of government, 
the separation of powers, and more liberal values. Clinton officials connected the democratic 
peace to free trade, reasoning that as nations built economic interdependence, they would have 
fewer reasons to fight and would mutually gain in prosperity.35 
 For Lake, the end of the Cold War meant that the United States should shift from 
containing the threat to capitalist democracies to enlarging this community. The United States 
would pursue this goal by example, exhortation, and material support for democratic and market 
forces. It would also pursue these ends in partnership with allies and multilateral institutions in 
order to bolster democratic collective security and international law. Lake labeled this approach 
the “strategy of enlargement.”36 He identified “backlash states” such as Iraq, Iran, Libya, Cuba, 
and North Korea as one major category of threat to enlargement. Lake defined backlash states as 
dictatorial regimes that oppressed their own people, fomented ethnic hatred, backed terrorist 
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groups, and pursued WMD. These countries lacked superpower resources but acted aggressively 
in their regions and defied international norms.37 
According to Lake, these states faced a dilemma in a globalizing, post-Cold War world. 
If they opened their societies to the forces that enabled economic dynamism they would 
jeopardize their hold on power by enabling internal resistance. Thus, backlash states severed or 
limited their people’s access to information and trade, which stunted economic growth and 
increased their isolation. The U.S. role in dealing with these states was: “as the only 
superpower…to neutralize, contain, and through selective pressure possibly transform these 
backlash states into responsible members of the international community.”38 The tools of this 
approach were deterrence, non-proliferation, sanctions, isolation, and military force, if needed. 
The backlash states, if contained, would either succumb to global trends or remain pariahs.39 
 Within this framework, the Clinton administration defined U.S. goals in the Middle East 
as fostering a community of “like-minded states that share our goals of free markets, broad 
democratic values, and controls on proliferation.”40 Crucial U.S. interests were preserving access 
to oil, achieving an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal, and countering Islamic extremism.41 They 
particularly emphasized the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) as the best way to ease tensions 
and encourage political reform.42 The main threat to these objectives was the region’s backlash 
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states, especially Iraq and Iran. These states sought nuclear weapons, sponsored terrorist groups, 
opposed democratization and the MEPP, and threatened U.S. allies and trade interests. 
To deal with these threats, the Clinton administration developed a policy called dual 
containment. The architect of this policy was Martin Indyk, the NSC’s Director of Near Eastern 
and South Asian Affairs. Indyk founded the policy on the premise that “we do not accept the 
argument that we should continue the old balance of power game, building up one to balance the 
other,” as the United States had done in the Gulf during the Cold War. He argued that this 
strategy had set the stage for Iraqi aggression because the United States was mistakenly trying to 
build up Saddam as a bulwark of stability in the region. The solution under dual containment was 
for the United States to provide stability in the Gulf by containing both Iran and Iraq. Indyk 
reasoned that this strategy was feasible in the USSR’s absence because Iran or Iraq could not 
look to another superpower for help.43 Iran and Iraq would also be easier to contain after a 
decade of war and economic decline. Under dual containment, the United States would have to 
retain military forces in the region to counter Iranian or Iraqi aggression.44 
The new administration nevertheless deviated minimally from Bush’s version of 
containment. Clinton officials agreed that Saddam would probably never fully comply with the 
U.N.’s demands and that the United States could probably never normalize relations with a 
Saddam-led Iraq.45 They saw him as inflexibly committed to rebuilding his conventional and 
unconventional arsenals, escaping sanctions, and seeking regional domination. One intelligence 
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estimate backed up this statement in saying: “Whether the sanctions remain in effect or not, 
Baghdad will pursue the following goals, objectives, and policies as long as Saddam remains in 
power.”46 Indyk reasoned further that: “Saddam Hussein will continue to probe for daylight 
between the positions of President Clinton and his predecessor.” Making him comply with the 
United Nations would require constant parrying of his threats and provocations as well as patient 
“hand-holding” of a divided coalition. There was a broad sense that the policy of using sanctions 
to enforce compliance and possibly oust Saddam would not work indefinitely because: “Saddam 
Hussein is still in control, the sanctions are eroding, and international support is dissipating.”47  
The Clinton administration was somewhat split on how to compel Saddam’s compliance 
while preserving the coalition. Officials like Indyk, Gore, Defense Secretary Les Aspin, and 
U.N. Ambassador Madeleine Albright recommended a tougher policy of “low tolerance” for 
non-compliance. In this approach, the United States would respond immediately to Iraqi 
misbehavior with escalatory strikes on military targets or the expansion of the NFZs.48 The 
prevailing view within the administration, however, was that Saddam was more of a nuisance 
than a serious military threat. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Colin Powell, Lake, 
and Christopher saw containment as a cost-effective strategy for managing Saddam while they 
pursued other priorities.49 They referred to Saddam as a “rash,” a “migraine,” or a “toothache,” 
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all periodic problems that are not life-threatening.50 Lake recalled that Clinton did not see Iraq as 
a top issue and that: “Iraq, it seemed to us, was not going to be soluble at any reasonable cost any 
point soon. I recall describing it…as a dull toothache that you just have to keep dealing with and 
make sure it doesn’t get worse. But you can’t fix it.”51 
Furthermore, Clinton had seen Bush’s intractable struggle of wills with Saddam and 
wanted to avoid this draining contest.52 Clinton officials stressed “de-personalizing” the conflict 
with Iraq by focusing on compliance rather than ousting Saddam, which they viewed as unlikely 
and risky for several reasons.53 Like the Bush administration, they feared that Saddam’s removal 
might lead to massive revenge attacks by the Shia and Kurds against the Sunni and general chaos 
that would enable Iran to expand its influence in the region.54 The bloodshed that followed 
Yugoslavia’s collapse in 1991 and the subsequent Balkans Crisis reinforced this dread about the 
dissolution of multi-ethnic states.55  
The Clinton approach to regime change remained roughly the same as Bush’s: maintain 
isolation and economic pressure and hope that a disgruntled general or Baathist launches a coup. 
Iraqi society, according to one intelligence report, was portrayed as “cowed…making a popular 
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revolt an unlikely means of regime change.”56 The United States have to dangle promises of 
sanctions relief to elite Iraqis as incentives to act.57 The administration generally believed that 
Saddam would not remain in power much longer under these pressures. One 1993 intelligence 
report, for instance, claimed: “If enforcement of the sanctions continues unabated, there is a 
better than even chance that Saddam will be ousted during the next three years.”58 In the 
meantime, containment and compliance would remain the priorities. As then CIA Iraq analyst 
Kenneth Pollack put it: “They were much more committed to containment as an end in itself. 
They embraced it consciously.”59 
One key question on Iraq that the administration had to answer in its first months was, as 
one NSC memo put it: “What are the precise terms under which the United States will agree to 
lift economic sanctions against Iraq, and must these terms include a change of regime in 
Baghdad?”60 In keeping with the regime change consensus and the broader strategy of 
enlargement, Clinton officials contended that “the ultimate political solution for all of Iraq is the 
formation of a democratic government in Baghdad that can both be representative of the Iraqi 
people and maintain peaceful relations with its neighbors.”61 Nevertheless, voicing this 
viewpoint at the United Nations or openly stressing regime change efforts jeopardized the 
coalition. Key partners like France, Germany, and Russia saw sanctions as a way to compel 
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cooperation with WMD disarmament with the ultimate goal of returning Iraq to its normal status 
in the world with or without regime change.62 However, at home, Congress, most foreign policy 
commenters, and the public generally opposed normalization. In fact, the public backed tougher 
regime change efforts. One poll from January 1993 found that 65% of respondents would 
support renewed U.S. military action to force Saddam from power.63 
To balance these contradictory forces, the Clinton administration developed a rhetorical 
strategy I call the Clinton fudge. This term describes a deliberate non-answer to the questions of 
what terms Iraq had to meet for the United States to support any easing of sanctions and whether 
Saddam’s removal was one of those terms. Bush had declared that the United States would not 
lift sanctions as long as Saddam remained in power, but the Clinton administration saw that these 
statements created problems with the coalition. One example of the Clinton fudge came from 
White House spokeswoman Dee Dee Myers, who was asked in March 1993 if Clinton would 
deviate from Bush’s position on the lifting of sanctions. She replied:  
Our position is that Iraq has to comply with all U.N. resolutions, including those of giving up 
weapons of mass destruction and stopping violence against his own people…We don’t 
believe that can be achieved with Hussein, with Saddam in power. And therefore there’s no 
practical difference.64 
 
The administration argued, in Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs 
Robert Pelletreau’s words, that “repression and terrorism are the only pillars of Saddam’s 
regime” to support the claim that he would inevitably fall from power if he complied with all 
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U.N. resolutions, especially those regarding human rights.65 This view ignored intelligence 
assessments arguing that Saddam stayed in power also because of patronage and clan networks 
as well as the Sunni fear of Shia and Kurdish retaliation if the regime collapsed.66 One National 
Intelligence Estimate from December 1993, for instance, asserted that “Saddam Husayn 
currently has sufficient economic and security resources, along with the skill to marshal and 
deploy them, to maintain his hold on power.”67 
Within this rhetorical strategy, Clinton officials signaled willingness to lift sanctions 
without regime change in the event of Saddam’s full compliance. In October 1994, for example, 
Clinton said “I think that the Iraqis are quite well aware of what the United Nations expected 
them to do to lift the sanctions. And if they do it, then no one will stand in the way of lifting the 
sanctions.”68 Mark Parris, an official at State’s Near East office, explained that this approach was 
designed to keep the sanctions intact while signaling to the coalition an openness to lifting them 
in order to create time for sanctions and covert action to overthrow Saddam.69 Anthony Lake 
later admitted that the Clinton fudge was a “roundabout way” of saying that sanctions would not 
be lifted until Saddam was gone without making regime change the explicit or primary goal.70  
Clinton’s continuation of Bush’s approach to Iraq was bolstered by the view that Iraq 
remained economically and militarily feeble. Intelligence reports judged Iraq’s military to be 
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weaker than before 1991 because of the draining effects of sanctions, a morale crisis, and its 
inability to import high-tech equipment and spare parts. Edward Djerejian, the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs until the end of 1993, argued that the sanctions kept 
Saddam focused on survival by raising his people’s anger and reducing his ability to pay off key 
supporters.71 One CIA report in 1994 judged: “The weaknesses of the postwar Iraqi military far 
outweigh its strengths, and Baghdad’s military power will decline-or at least not increase-as long 
as UN sanctions remain in effect.”72 These conditions seemed likely to hold for the near future, 
so Clinton tried to push Iraq to the side and focus on his major goals in the region.  
The policy toward Iraq under dual containment differed in revealing ways from the 
approach to Iran. The Clinton administration saw Iran as a backlash state and a threat to U.S. 
regional interests. Aside from being an oppressive theocracy, Iran sponsored terrorist groups like 
Hezbollah, threatened Israel and Saudi Arabia, opposed the MEPP, and pursued WMD. 
Nevertheless, several key factors differentiated Iran from Iraq in U.S. thinking. First, the Iranian 
government possessed domestic legitimacy that Saddam lacked. While revolutionary fervor had 
declined from years of war, stagnation, and repression, the government had real credibility 
among the Iranian people, who would not accept foreign regime change efforts. The Iranian 
people had a deep and coherent collective identity, unlike the relatively new, multiethnic Iraqi 
state.73 Second, Iran had countervailing political institutions, some of which were partially 
democratic, that distributed political power rather than concentrating it in a single dictator. Third, 
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the United States had no significant Iranian opposition groups to support, and the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards kept the regime secure from internal and external challenges.74 Finally, 
unlike Iraq, Iran was not openly aggressive, which reduced the urgency of the Iranian threat and 
made it harder for the United States to rally international action against Iran.75 
These factors ruled out covert attempts to remove the Iranian regime. Instead, the 
administration had to treat the regime as a given and try to modify its behavior while preventing 
it from destabilizing or dominating the region. Still, Clinton opposed the European Union’s 
policy of “critical dialogue” that tried to build trade and diplomatic relations with Iran to 
incentivize better behavior. Clinton officials believed this approach rewarded Iranian 
misbehavior and strengthened the regime.76 Instead, the administration would punish Iran with 
sanctions and diplomatic isolation until its ceased objectionable behavior like the pursuit of 
WMD. Clinton preserved unilateral sanctions on Iran and pressured allies to cease commercial 
dealings with Iran, especially those that advanced its proliferation efforts. The United States told 
Iran that it did not seek the regime’s overthrow and would ease sanctions and seek better 
relations once Iran halted its negative behavior.77  
In contrast to the Iran policy, Indyk stated in his 1993 speech introducing dual 
containment that the United States would not “seek or expect a reconciliation with Saddam 
Hussein’s regime…the current regime in Iraq is a criminal regime, beyond the pale of 
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international society and, in our judgment, irredeemable.”78 In contrast to his views on Iraq, 
Indyk stated about Iran: “We are not opposed to the Islamic government in Iran but to these 
specific aspects of its behavior…we will not normalize relations with Iran until and unless Iran’s 
policies change, across the board.”79 Because of the domestic legitimacy of Iran’s regime and the 
greater possibility of outside pressures creating internal change in a less centralized authoritarian 
state, the administration could envision a “way out” of containing Iran based on behavior change 
rather than regime change. In Iraq, however, it viewed the only likely outlet as a coup or 
assassination because Saddam was so deeply entrenched and the Iraqi people so weak, 
impoverished, and divided. 
 By the end of 1993, Clinton officials had advanced the interlocking strategic concepts of 
enlargement, backlash states, and dual containment. Their approach to Iraq mostly continued that 
of George H.W. Bush, although it stressed compliance with U.N. resolutions and avoided 
divisive statements about regime change. Like Bush, Clinton believed that Saddam Hussein had 
to be removed for the United States to achieve its regional goals and eventually restore relations 
with Iraq. Nevertheless, the administration did not clearly answer whether Saddam had to be 
removed soon or whether the United States needed to take risks to achieve that goal. It carried 
this ambiguous strategy into a series of confrontations with Iraq during the first term. 
A Chronic Migraine: Crisis after Crisis, 1993-1996 
 The first major crisis Clinton faced on Iraq came in June 1993 when U.S. and Kuwaiti 
intelligence found evidence that Iraqi agents had plotted an assassination attempt against former 
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President Bush during his visit to Kuwait in April 1993. Kuwaiti intelligence foiled the plan, but 
Clinton was nonetheless outraged by Saddam’s attempt to kill his predecessor. He responded by 
launching cruise missiles at the Iraqi secret police headquarters in Baghdad on June 26 as 
punishment for the assassination attempt and to deter future Iraqi support for terrorism.80 The 
administration legally justified this attack not in terms of Security Council authorization to use 
force in order to compel Iraqi compliance but with Article 51 of the U.N. charter, which grants 
each state the right to self-defense.81 This approach enabled Clinton to avoid a Security Council 
vote on the use of force, which would have been troublesome because some coalition members 
were skeptical about the evidence on the Iraqi plot. He described the strikes as a “firm and 
commensurate response” and used the plot to bolster the idea that “Saddam Hussein has 
demonstrated repeatedly that he will resort to terrorism and aggression if left unchecked.”82 A 
Newsweek poll found that 71% of Americans supported Clinton’s actions.83 In addition, the 
administration hoped that the strikes might push Iraqi elites toward rebellion by convincing 
them, in Aspin’s words, that “following this man is not good for your health.”84  
 Containment faced a challenge of a different nature as the U.N. weapons inspectors made 
significant progress in locating and destroying proscribed Iraqi weapons programs in 1993 and 
early 1994. In November 1993, UNSCOM achieved a major victory when Iraq agreed to 
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Security Council Resolution 715’s requirement that inspectors be allowed to establish long-term 
monitoring of sites linked to WMD or ballistic missile production.85 The monitoring system 
included remote cameras at research facilities, the sealing of equipment, chemical sensors, aerial 
surveillance, and unannounced inspections. It also included procedures for inspecting Iraqi 
imports and exports that might have WMD applications.86 UNSCOM reported increased Iraqi 
cooperation on WMD and the rapid destruction or sealing of weapons sites, equipment, and 
materials. Rolf Ekeus, the chief of UNSCOM, said that once he felt comfortable reporting that 
Iraq was in full compliance, the Security Council should vote to lift the ban on oil exports as 
required by Resolution 687. This move would allow billions of dollars to flow into Iraqi coffers 
even though the trade embargo would remain for everything except food and medicine.87 
 Ekeus’ interpretation of when to lift the oil export embargo reflected the consensus view 
of the Security Council. France, Russia, and China, and others pointed to Paragraph 22 of 
Resolution 687, which stated that once the inspectors verified compliance with the disarmament 
requirements of the same resolution, the “prohibitions against the import of commodities and 
products originating in Iraq…shall have no further force or effect.”88 These countries’ reading of 
the conditions for lifting the export ban reflected their view that the point of sanctions was to 
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change Iraq’s behavior on WMD and then allow the renewal of normal relations. They did not 
accept the U.S. use of sanctions to try to force Saddam from power or contain him indefinitely.89   
France, Russia, China, and other countries further claimed that the United Nations needed 
to send an “encouraging gesture from the international community” by sticking to the text of 
Resolution 687.90 They feared that if the Security Council refused to recognize or partially 
reward Iraq for cooperation, Iraq would simply cease compliance. As the inspectors made 
progress, these nations repeatedly introduced text into U.N. sanctions reviews praising Iraqi 
cooperation. The United States and Great Britain blocked these amendments, arguing that they 
would “only confirm to the Iraqi regime that its policy of defiance was working.”91 On a more 
fundamental level, France, Russia, and China viewed the U.S. hard line on Iraq as evidence of its 
unilateral and hegemonic behavior in the aftermath of the Cold War.92 Furthermore, they saw the 
U.S. requirement that Iraq comply with Resolution 688’s call for human rights protections as 
evidence of domineering behavior and improper interference in Iraq’s internal affairs. China 
particularly opposed this resolution because it did not want to set a precedent of U.N. 
punishment for human rights abuses.93  
These countries also had strong economic interests in the resumption of Iraqi oil exports. 
France and Russia hoped to restore their lucrative trade connections with Iraq. In the short term, 
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they believed the restoration of Iraqi oil income would enable the repayment of billions in Iraqi 
debt. Turkey, which started calling for the phased lifting of sanctions in 1993, lost around $27.3 
billion in trade with Iraq between 1991 and 1996, especially from pipeline closures.94 Moreover, 
China’s rapid industrialization required immense quantities of oil, and they hoped to make Iraq 
into a major source. Oil companies from all three nations had already started to negotiate 
contracts with Iraq, although they could not sign anything until the lifting of the embargo.95  
 The United States and Great Britain, however, applied a much higher standard to Iraq 
before they would consider lifting the oil export ban. Even after Ekeus verified Iraqi cooperation, 
U.S. officials called for “a demonstrable track record of compliance” before they would consider 
acting on the embargo.96 Clinton officials also argued that Iraq had to clear up “longstanding 
gaps and inconsistencies” in its reports to inspectors, including its foreign procurement network 
for WMD-related materials, its biological weapons programs, and missing ballistic missile 
equipment.97 The administration further insisted that Iraq comply with all of the Security Council 
resolutions, including recognizing Kuwaiti sovereignty and respecting human rights.  
The Clinton administration demanded this high level of compliance even though this 
demand violated the letter of Resolution 687’s terms for lifting the embargo. Clinton did so for 
several reasons. For one, Clinton officials believed that the United States needed evidence of 
Saddam’s changing intentions, not just his literal compliance. Because it had taken so much 
effort to get Saddam to cooperate even partially, the administration felt justified in demanding 
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evidence that he would not start building WMD and threatening his neighbors once he had oil 
revenue. Resolution 687 supplied some justification for this focus on intentions because it called 
for “the need to be assured of Iraq’s peaceful intentions in the light of its unlawful invasion and 
occupation of Iraq.”98 One U.S. official stated that even if Iraq complied with the WMD 
provisions of Resolution 687, “the overall pattern of Iraq’s behavior…is still one of generalized 
non-compliance,” making it “difficult to believe Baghdad is sincere.”99  
The Clinton administration interpreted Saddam’s intentions from his behavior. It saw 
Iraq’s grudging, inconsistent, and opportunistic cooperation as evidence of unchanged intentions, 
meaning that Iraq merely desired to escape sanctions and return to its old ways.100 Aside from 
demanding compliance with all U.N. resolutions, the United States also requested a 6-12 month 
period of Iraqi cooperation with U.N. monitoring to test its intentions before lifting the export 
ban. Albright described this period as a test of Iraq’s “readiness to rejoin society.”101 Iraqi 
improvement on human rights would be another sign of changed intentions. Albright and other 
officials noted that Iraq was regressing in this area, noting that it had started punishing deserters 
and petty criminals with branding, blinding, and amputation.102 Moreover, Clinton officials 
feared that once the export ban was lifted, France, Russia, and China would block any effort to 
re-install the ban because they would be importing oil and receiving debt repayment.103  
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The conflict over lifting the embargo accelerated in the summer of 1994 when Ekeus 
announced that the monitoring system was ready and that he was close to verifying Iraqi 
compliance on WMD.104 France, Russia, and China began to push for a timetable for lifting 
sanctions and threatened to call for a Security Council vote on the matter. In September, 
however, Ekeus reported that he could not yet verify compliance, citing missing information and 
materials. Saddam tried to bully his way out of this impasse by mobilizing Republican Guard 
divisions totaling 64,000 troops on the Kuwaiti border in October 1994. He threatened to invade 
if the Security Council did not lift sanctions immediately.105  
Clinton responded swiftly to this threat by surging U.S. ground forces in Kuwait up to 
about 50,000 and sending hundreds of combat aircraft and a second aircraft carrier to the Gulf.106 
On October 10, the NSC met at the White House to discuss the crisis. Defense Secretary William 
Perry and Martin Indyk recommended demanding not only Iraqi withdrawal from the border but 
the creation of a no-drive-zone (NDZ) for Iraqi military vehicles below the 32nd parallel. This 
option, he contended, would intensify pressure on Saddam, contain him more effectively, and 
inhibit assaults on the Shia populations. However, Albright and JCS Chairman John 
Shalikashvili argued that an NDZ would put an immense burden on the military because it would 
have to respond to any vehicle the Iraqis sent to this area, giving Saddam the ability to provoke 
the United States at will. Moreover, they argued that the coalition would oppose this idea as an 
overreach into Iraqi territory. They claimed that containment was basically working and that 
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there was no good reason to experiment with dangerous innovations.107 Clinton concurred with 
the more limited approach, in large part because he wanted to put Saddam back in the box and 
switch his attention to the MEPP.108  
In public, Clinton officials sternly warned Saddam not to set foot into Kuwait and 
implied that the United States would use force to stop him.109 Perry said quite bluntly “We’re 
talking about military action” to prevent Saddam from underestimating U.S. willpower as he did 
in 1990.110 Clinton viewed the threat as another test of the United Nations’ resolve to enforce the 
resolutions and keep Saddam in the box. He said shortly after the crisis: “I guess he figured that 
if he mounted a provocation, I would send Jimmy Carter over there to make a deal, and he could 
wheedle something out of us.”111  
Saddam’s actions backfired in the international arena, even among nations like France, 
Russia, China that wanted sanctions relief.112 Swift U.S. diplomacy plus the overt nature of 
Saddam’s threat left him isolated, and the Security Council unanimously voted on October 15 to 
condemn Iraq’s actions and demand the withdrawal of its forces from the border.113 The next 
day, Iraq started to recall its forces. Iraq also announced it would formally recognize Kuwaiti 
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sovereignty and its current borders, fulfilling one major obligation of the Security Council 
resolutions.114 The United States and Great Britain tried to deter Saddam from further threats like 
this by sending him demarches on October 20 warning that they would “use military force to 
stop any new buildup of Iraqi troops south of the 32nd parallel.”115 Clinton received widespread 
praise at home for resolving this crisis. 74% of respondents in one poll supported the troop 
deployment, and his overall approval rating for Iraq policy increased to 69% in another 
survey.116 
Saddam’s reckless threat saved the Clinton administration from having to confront 
significant problems in the containment policy. His blatant troop movements allowed for a 
deterrent response with conventional forces that briefly reunited the coalition. If Saddam had not 
threatened Kuwait, the United States may have had to veto an attempt by France, Russia, and 
China to lift the oil embargo. A veto would have preserved the sanctions but may have 
endangered the coalition by confirming the suspicion that the United States intended to punish 
Iraq indefinitely.  
 Unfortunately, containment had other implications, especially the massive economic and 
humanitarian damage caused by sanctions. By 1996, Iraq’s GDP had fallen to $10.6 billion 
compared to $66.2 billion in 1989. The health crisis in Iraq had only worsened by the mid-1990s, 
particularly when the Iraqi state cut food rations by a third.117 The United Nations estimated that 
                                                        
114 Youssef Ibrahim, “Iraq Signals Acceptance of U.N. Move,” New York Times, October 17, 1994, A10. 
 
115 Herr, “Operation Vigilant Warrior,” 33. 
 
116 74% is from Gallup Telephone Survey, October 19, 1994. 69% is from NBC Telephone Survey, October 1994. 
Both surveys accessed in Polling the Nations, accessed November 25, 2017, 
http://poll.orspub.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/search.php?action. 
 
117 Joy Gordon, Invisible War: The United States and the Iraq Sanctions (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2010), 21, 36. 
 181 
by 1996, in the worst-hit areas of Iraq in the south, as many as 34% of all children were 
underweight and at least 10% were wasting.118 While Congress remained supportive of 
sanctions, U.S. partners on the Security Council and in the Middle East were growing restive 
over this unpopular policy. Sanctions were especially unpopular among the populations of U.S. 
allies in the Middle East, who largely blamed the United States for the health crisis in Iraq.119 
Like the Bush administration, Clinton officials assigned responsibility for this crisis to Saddam 
for his failure to import adequate food and medicine and his denial of basic goods and services to 
disloyal populations. Saddam technically had the money to provide these items to his people but 
chose to spend it on his security services and key clients he needed to preserve his power. 
Nevertheless, Iraq’s inability to export oil and obtain hard currency inhibited the importing of 
basic goods.120  
 Keeping the coalition intact required the United States to find a way to allow more 
essential goods to be imported into Iraq without permitting cash to flow to the Iraqi government. 
The solution came with the passage of Security Council Resolution 986 in April 1995. This plan 
expanded the oil-for-food offerings of Resolutions 706 and 712 by permitting Iraq to sell $2 
billion of oil every six months. The proceeds went to an escrow account controlled by the 
Security. Iraq could then submit requests to a Security Council-appointed panel to release funds 
to pay for imports of essential goods. Resolution 986 further mandated surveillance over the 
distribution of these goods inside Iraq to ensure that they reached the neediest populations as 
well as full control over distribution in the Kurdish areas. Some of the money in the escrow 
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account would also be funneled to Kurdish relief, Kuwaiti reparations, and the inspectors’ 
operating costs.121 Iraq dismissed Resolution 986 as an insulting violation of its sovereignty at 
first, but it expanded talks on the plan a year later as its economic situation deteriorated. The 
U.N. and Iraq finally reached an agreement in May 1996 in which the Iraqis caved to U.S. terms, 
but the implementation of this plan would be further stalled by events in 1996.122 
Oil-for-food came to play several important roles in sustaining containment. It deflected 
criticism about sanctions’ effects, enabling the United States to continue demanding a high 
standard of compliance. Oil-for-food also put the burden of guilt for Iraqis’ suffering on Saddam 
because at any point he could accept this resolution and import vital goods. Albright, for 
example, quipped that it prevented Saddam from shedding “crocodile tears” for his people while 
using their suffering to undermine sanctions.123 Rather than a precursor to lifting sanctions, oil-
for-food would allow them to be maintained. Robert Pelletreau clarified this point to Congress in 
1996: “Implementation of this resolution is not a precursor to lifting sanctions. It is a 
humanitarian exception that preserves and even reinforces the sanctions regime.”124  
 The question of Iraqi compliance with inspections took an odd turn in August 1995 with 
the defection to Jordan of Saddam’s son-in-law Hussein Kamel, who was one of the most 
powerful members of Saddam’s inner circle. He and his brother’s marriages to Raghad and Rana, 
respectively, formed key links between Saddam and the powerful al-Majid clan that had been a 
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pillar of his regime for decades. Kamel worked his way up through the security service, and by 
the 1990s he had become the director of the Iraqi military industrialization agency and the team 
dedicated to concealing information from inspectors.125 Kamel had a long-standing dispute with 
Saddam’s erratic son Uday, who felt threatened by Kamel’s political ascension. Uday attacked 
Kamel in the state media and tried to take control of several of his economic and bureaucratic 
holdings. Saddam appeared to be siding with his son, so on August 7, 1995, Kamel, his brother, 
and their wives fled in the night to Jordan. Once in Amman, he pledged to work to overthrow 
Saddam and offered inside information about Iraqi WMD programs to the United Nations. 
Kamel eventually returned to Baghdad on a promise of clemency from Saddam, but Iraqi 
security killed him days after his return.126  
Before Kamel’s defection, Rolf Ekeus suspected Iraq of retaining a major biological 
weapons program, and he resisted calls to certify compliance until Iraq came clean.127 Iraq had 
denied the existence of this program since 1991, but thanks to persistent scrutiny from 
UNSCOM, the Iraqi government confessed in July 1995 to possessing an offensive biological 
weapons program before the Gulf War that included botulism and anthrax.128 Now that Kamel 
appeared poised to spill the beans, Saddam decided to pre-empt his revelations and show 
UNSCOM its full biological weapons program.129 Iraqi officials led inspectors to a chicken 
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shack outside Baghdad that featured millions of pages of information about a massive biological 
weapons program. Iraq had tried to preserve from inspectors by hiding infrastructure, selectively 
destroying materials and equipment, and covertly continuing research. These unprecedented 
revelations included the fact that Iraq had created Scud warheads that could deliver biological 
weapons. Iraq had also possessed ten times the amount of anthrax than it had previously claimed 
as well as an undisclosed crash nuclear weapons program started after the invasion of Kuwait.130 
Lastly, this trove divulged the existence of Kamel’s official concealment team.131 The chicken 
shack documents now gave UNSCOM a huge quantity of data that had to be painstakingly 
accounted for. This task was made even harder by Iraq’s claims that it had unilaterally destroyed 
all of its biological weapons materials after the Gulf War.132  
 The Clinton administration portrayed Hussein Kamel’s defection as a sign of 
containment’s effectiveness in dividing the Iraqi elite and keeping Saddam occupied. A CIA 
Report from earlier in 1995 noted that members of the Iraqi elite, including the Republican 
Guard, were feeling the impact of sanctions and selling personal possessions to buy basic 
goods.133 Mark Parris, Indyk’s successor as special assistant on the NSC for the Near East and 
South Asia, argued after the defection: “We have seen over the past several years a steady 
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deterioration in the coherence of the Iraqi power structure.”134 While the role of containment in 
causing Kamel’s defection was uncertain at best, his and other high-level defections did show 
significant dissension within the Iraqi elite. Kamel’s actions validated UNSCOM’s suspicions 
that Iraq was hiding more information and material and eased pressure for sanctions relief at the 
United Nations.135  
Nevertheless, while the Kamel episode demonstrated that containment was imposing 
pressure on the regime, it also showed that the coalition was further than ever from a solution. 
Kamel’s actions exposed the depths of Iraqi cheating on WMD and its masking of a deadly 
biological weapons program. As Clinton put it to Congress in 1996:  
The August 1995 revelations virtually erased what little credibility Saddam Hussein may have 
had left…Saddam clearly planned to hide this weapons information until he could use it to 
facilitate the reconstruction of his WMD programs. Saddam’s intentions are hardly peaceful. 
There is every reason to believe that they are as aggressive and expansionist as they were in 
1990.136 
 
However, the Hussein Kamel crisis ironically boosted the regime change consensus run by 
bolstering the impression that Saddam’s intentions had not changed and that no matter how 
thoroughly the inspectors searched Saddam would always be hiding something. 
 Support of Iraqi opposition groups formed another significant aspect of Clinton’s Iraq 
policy. Vice President Gore had called for greater support for the Iraqi National Congress (INC) 
during the 1992 campaign. Gore preferred the INC because it called for democracy whereas the 
CIA’s preferred group, the Iraqi National Accord (INA), promised a new strongman. He and 
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Warren Christopher met with the INC in April 1993, praised its commitment to human rights and 
democracy, and announced that the United States would seek to establish war crimes trials for 
Iraq. However, the administration and the CIA doubted that the INC could unify the various 
opposition groups enough to challenge Saddam. They put more trust in the INA, which they saw 
as more likely to remove Saddam through the “silver bullet solution.”137 Nevertheless, the basic 
problem with the opposition was that groups like the INA that had access to the center of the 
Iraqi regime did not share U.S. hopes for democratic rule in Iraq. On the other hand, the 
organizations on the periphery, like the INC and Shia and Kurdish groups, supported more 
democratic goals but lacked access to the power centers of the state. Moreover, the 
administration suspected Shia opposition groups of connections to Iran and believed that Turkey 
would oppose support for Kurdish groups for fear of encouraging Kurdish separatism.138  
  The Iraqi opposition launched several attempts to remove Saddam in Clinton’s first term. 
Since 1991, CIA teams had assisted the INA, which was mostly based in Jordan, in making 
contacts in the military and Baath party. Saddam faced several coup plots and minor rebellions 
but managed to unravel and crush them all.139 The largest INA coup, which received CIA 
backing, was planned for June 1996, but Iraqi intelligence infiltrated it and executed hundreds of 
the conspirators. After this failure, the despairing CIA team in Amman returned to the United 
States, giving up on a coup for the time being.140 One CIA official lamented the regime’s tight 
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security and the incompetence of the coup plotters: “There are two great realities that govern 
here. First, if we know about it, Saddam does. Second if someone comes to us needing help [to 
mount a coup], they are probably incapable of pulling it off.”141 
 Rather than seeking a coup that would put a new strongman in power, the INC under 
Ahmed Chalabi wanted to spark a rebellion from its base in the Kurdish zone of Northern Iraq. 
The INC had built up a presence of several thousand personnel in Salahuddin.142 The Clinton 
administration intended for the INC to unite the opposition groups and show the media and 
Congress that Clinton was actively aiding the opposition. However, Chalabi quickly started 
forming his own scheme to topple Saddam.143 His plan, which he called “End Game,” was to 
attack Iraqi forces from the Kurdish zone to encourage defections and possibly spark a revolt 
from the disaffected regular army.144 The INC reconciled disputes between the KDP and PUK in 
1994, creating the possibility that they could provide ground forces against Saddam. The 
defection of a high-level general named Wafiq al-Samarrai to the INC in 1994 bolstered the 
INC’s optimism that the regime could be toppled. The INC hoped to use Samarrai’s contacts 
inside the regime to foment a military uprising while INC forces attacked government troops.145  
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 Confusion was the order of the day when the INC launched its campaign against Iraqi 
forces in March 1995. Chalabi expected U.S. assistance in this rebellion because of an August 
1993 letter from Gore to the INC that issued vague statements of support, including: “I can 
assure you that the U.S. intends to live up to these commitments…and give whatever additional 
support we can reasonably provide to encourage you in your struggle for a democratic Iraq.”146 
The chief of the CIA mission in Iraq, Robert Baer, promised support for this plan, further 
convincing Chalabi that United States would help him with force if necessary.147  
However, when the Clinton administration found that the INC, with Baer’s support, was 
about to launch a coup attempt and ground offensive, it quickly tried to stop the risky plot. Lake 
had told the CIA that it must request the White House’s approval before supporting any 
rebellion. Now the administration had discovered the INC plan, by intercepting an Iranian 
transmission no less, just as it was about to be launched. Moreover, U.S. intelligence had 
reported that Iraqi security knew the attack was coming.148 A furious Lake warned all opposition 
groups that the plan was compromised and “any decision to proceed will be on your own.”149  
The administration feared that a failed rebellion might force the United States to 
intervene to save its clients from annihilation.150 Chalabi later made clear that he hoped for this 
exact situation: “I told them that if we attack, the United States will have to make a choice-
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whether or not to let us be slaughtered. I told them the Americans wouldn’t let us be 
slaughtered.”151 With U.S. support out of the question, Massoud Barzani pulled all KDP forces 
out of the offensive.152 Chalabi decided to launch the attack without U.S. support on March 6, 
claiming the coup plotters were already in motion. The INC offensive, composed mainly of PUK 
units, forced some Iraqi units into retreat and attracted several hundred defectors. However, no 
wider Iraqi military rebellion or coup ensued, and the offensive petered out.153 
 These failures soured relations between the administration and the opposition, especially 
the INC. The CIA came to see Chalabi and Samarrai as liars who provided faulty intelligence 
about Saddam’s regime, worked simultaneously with Iran, and wanted to draw the United States 
into direct fighting.154 CIA analyst Bruce Riedel summarized the problems with the opposition in 
September 1996: “I don’t know of any reputable analyst of the situation in Iraq who believes 
those opposition forces were on the verge of overthrowing the Saddam dictatorship. They have 
been weak since their inception…and they remain weak and very badly divided.”155 After the 
failed March 1995 uprising, the CIA drastically cut its budget for the INC and by the end of 1996 
it refused to communicate with Chalabi.156 One CIA agent involved with the opposition issued a 
more explicit threat to Chalabi: “If I see you on the streets here in London and get the chance, I’ll 
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fucking run you over.”157 With the opposition in tatters, the only hope for regime change now 
seemed to be a direct war against Saddam, which the administration would not consider. These 
fiascoes thus bolstered the argument of advisors like Warren Christopher, who wanted to eschew 
hazardous regime change efforts and focus on containing Iraq and compelling it to comply with 
the United Nations.158  
 The administration’s hopes that Saddam would be toppled from within took another 
devastating blow in August 1996 when Saddam took advantage of intra-Kurdish fighting to 
crush the INC in Northern Iraq. The KDP and the PUK had long feuded over control of 
smuggling routes into Turkey and Iran. The PUK used arms and advisors from Iran to launch an 
offensive against the KDP in August 1996. Barzani countered by asking Saddam for help. 
Sensing a golden opportunity, Saddam allied with Barzani and rushed 40,000 troops into the 
Kurdish zone to attack the PUK. Aside from striking a major blow against the PUK, Saddam 
seized Erbil and destroyed the INC’s headquarters in Iraq while executing hundreds of INC 
agents.159 The CIA team in northern Iraq hastily fled the country, leaving behind 
communications equipment and intelligence documents.160 Saddam reasserted control over a 
semi-autonomous region of Iraq, left security agents in some areas, gained access to valuable 
smuggling routes, and proved to potential challengers that he still ruled Iraq.161  
                                                        
157 Roston, Man Who Pushed, 120. 
 
158 Hurst, United States and Iraq, 130; Indyk, Innocent Abroad, 163. 
 
159 Pollack, The Threatening Storm, 81-84. 
 
160 Tim Weiner, “Iraqi Offensive Into Kurdish Zone Disrupts U.S. Plot to Oust Hussein,” New York Times, 
September 7, 1996, A1. 
 
161 John Lancaster, “Saddam Took Risk for Domestic Gain,” Washington Post, September 3, 1996, A11. 
 191 
The Clinton administration had been debating throughout the first half of 1996 whether to 
increase pressure on Iraq. Mark Parris and Bruce Riedel argued in an NSC meeting that 
conditions were ripe to press for regime change because Saddam was still weak at home and the 
coalition would not get any stronger. Christopher and Lake argued in response that containment 
was managing the problem and allowing the administration to focus on priorities like the MEPP 
and the Balkan crisis. The hard-liners failed to convince any of Clinton’s principal advisors, but 
Saddam’s northern incursion resurrected the conversation. The foreign policy team agreed that a 
military response was necessary for this major provocation, but it saw intervention in the north as 
a hopeless tangle. The administration did not want to take sides in the intra-Kurdish fighting, and 
the Defense Department warned that U.S. troops would be needed to expel Saddam’s forces from 
the north. Their intention to launch an airstrike, however, was stymied by Saudi Arabia and 
Turkey’s refusal to support strikes or grant access to bases. Saudi Arabia feared public backlash 
for supporting the United States, while Turkey was pleased see Saddam pound the PUK.162  
Instead of an air campaign, U.S. naval forces launched 44 cruise missiles on September 
3-4 against military targets in the south such as anti-aircraft batteries and command centers.163 
Clinton also extended the southern NFZ northward to the outskirts of Baghdad to punish Saddam 
and restrain his ability to threaten his neighbors. After these strikes and further U.S. threats, 
Saddam withdrew most of his forces from the north. Clinton framed this response as helping to 
“increase America’s ability to contain Iraq over the long run” while tightening the “strategic 
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straightjacket.”164 To address public confusion as to why the United States had retaliated in the 
south for actions in the north, officials argued that the most crucial U.S. interests were in 
blocking Iraqi aggression toward the Gulf rather than interceding in intractable Kurdish feuds.165 
Polls suggested public approval of this response, with 69% in one poll supporting the missile 
attacks and 66% agreeing that the United States should limit Saddam’s power inside Iraq.166  
 The crisis over Saddam’s Kurdish incursion further harmed containment by widening 
fissures in the international coalition. Great Britain, Japan, and Germany supported the strikes, 
but France, Russia, and China believed Saddam’s actions were part of a sovereign affair. These 
nations argued that neither Resolution 687 nor 688 automatically authorized this attack and 
criticized the United States for failing to seek Security Council authorization.167 The United 
States and Great Britain failed to convince their allies to pass a Security Council resolution 
merely rebuking Saddam’s actions.168 Russia’s ambassador to the United Nations, Sergei Lavrov, 
called the attacks “disproportionate” and accused Clinton of using force to prove his toughness 
for the 1996 election.169 Russian public opinion was also turning against the United States, as 
seen in a U.S. Information Agency survey that found that 63% of Russian respondents opposed 
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the U.S. strikes.170 Moreover, Jacques Chirac, who became president of France in 1995, 
criticized the U.S. attacks and withdrew from the southern NFZ in December 1996 in order to 
distance France from U.S. policy.171  
 Clinton defended his first-term Iraq policy as the effective management of a weak and 
contained threat. The inspectors had destroyed most of Saddam’s WMD and ballistic missile 
arsenals and sanctions had inhibited military reconstruction. Saddam had recognized Kuwaiti 
sovereignty and relented in most showdowns with the coalition.172 After the elimination of the 
coup and rebellion options in 1996, Clinton had to double down on this management paradigm as 
regime change looked increasingly improbable. One senior official described the U.S. role as: 
“We know he’s going to knock on that door from time to time to see if there’s anybody out there 
who still cares. He’s got to recognize we’re still here and we ain’t going away.”173  
Nevertheless, the Clinton administration ended its first term with a deep sense of 
frustration about Iraq. In a memorandum to incoming Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, 
Robert Pelletreau wrote “Our policy of containment is time-consuming, fraught with repeated 
crises, and costly to maintain in terms of our relationships,” leading to “containment fatigue 
within the international community.” Pelletreau predicted that the United States would have to 
devote “regular, high level attention” to containing Saddam and preserving the coalition.”174 
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Moreover, for Americans and the international coalition to believe that this costly management 
might end someday, the administration needed to show that there was a way out of containment, 
especially if virtually everyone in U.S. politics and foreign policy circles believed Saddam’s 
intentions would never change. For the domestic audience, the administration contended that 
sanctions and other pressures would force a coup or rebellion against Saddam. For the 
international coalition, it emphasized the potential for easing sanctions if Saddam adhered to 
incredibly high standards. The management paradigm of containment depended on these ways 
out, both of which suffered egregious blows by the end of Clinton’s first term. The steady 
disintegration of the coalition and the loss of the possibility of a coup or rebellion started to 
erode the domestic legitimacy of containment and empower its detractors. 
Debating Containment at Home, 1993-1996  
 Iraq garnered less public attention in this period than problems like the Balkan crisis or 
the MEPP. It mainly became a political issue during Saddam’s confrontations with the coalition 
or the inspectors. This section lays out two major positions in the domestic debate over Iraq 
policy in Clinton’s first term: the conditional and inevitable decline schools of thought. The 
conditionalists agreed with the basic framework of the policy established by Bush and continued 
by Clinton. However, they argued that Clinton needed to strictly enforce the Security Council 
resolutions and intensify pressures on the regime because containment might not last 
indefinitely. They also supported adjusting the policy to meet changing conditions. Most of them 
were realists or liberals in terms of foreign policy, including many Democrats.  
One important point for the conditional school was that Clinton should react to Saddam’s 
provocations with disproportionate punishments rather than proportional responses. They 
recognized that the coalition’s willingness to sanction Saddam would not last forever and 
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concluded that the United States should increase pressure on Saddam to facilitate his ouster. A 
mere slap on the wrist, such as a few dozen cruise missiles, inflicted no real damage to Saddam’s 
military or political power and did not deter him from aggression. Proportional responses also 
undermined deterrence by enabling Saddam to calculate just how far he could go and how much 
punishment he could receive.175 The strategic analyst Anthony Cordesman, for instance, argued 
“force is only effective when it is large enough to show that each new provocation or crisis will 
do Saddam far more harm than the provocation is worth.”176 Policy scholars like Cordesman, 
Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, and Zbigniew Brzezinski argued that the United States should 
have responded to provocations like the 1996 northern incursion with massive, multi-day 
airstrikes against the key elements of the regime, including Republican Guard units, 
communications networks, suspected WMD sites, and Saddam’s palaces.177 
Members of the conditional approach varied on whether Clinton should demand full 
compliance with all Security Council resolutions before considering sanctions relief. Most 
believed that the United States should not lift sanctions on Iraq until Saddam fell, just as Bush 
and Clinton did. A significant body of conditionalists nonetheless argued that the policy would 
be improved if Clinton clearly promised that the oil export ban would be lifted if UNSCOM 
certified Iraqi compliance on WMD. The New York Times editorial board held this position, 
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arguing: “He should make plain that by full compliance Iraq, even under Saddam Hussein, can 
have the embargo lifted and recover its sovereignty.”178  
This kind of statement implied that the United States might have to accept some level of 
normalization with Saddam if he complied with the Security Council. Advocates of this 
viewpoint believed that not “raising the goalposts” on the terms of lifting sanctions was 
necessary both to keep the coalition intact and induce Iraqi cooperation. Historian and Iraq 
expert Amatzia Baram warned that the United States should “expect the worst” if Saddam is 
convinced that he can do nothing to reduce the sanctions.179 These critics also accused Clinton of 
maintaining this hard line for short-term domestic political gain rather than sound strategy.180  
 Furthermore, conditionalists generally accepted containment as a reasonably effective 
and low-cost way to manage the Iraqi threat and compel compliance with the United Nations as 
long as Clinton enforced it rigorously. Richard Haass, for example, told Congress in September 
1996: “Saddam Hussein’s Iraq is significantly weaker today than it was at the start of this decade 
and is better understood as constituting a dangerous nuisance rather than an actual strategic 
threat.”181 Regime change would be desirable, but as the historian of Iraq Phebe Marr argued, it 
was “likely to prove difficult and costly and can only take place at the hand of Iraqis inside 
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Iraq.”182 60% of Americans, according to a 1996 poll, agreed that the United States should not 
put ground troops in Iraq to achieve regime change.183 
 Members of the conditional perspective concurred with Clinton’s multilateral approach 
to containment, saying that unilateral sanctions would not work and would make the United 
States look like a bully. They faulted Clinton mainly for not putting enough effort into preserving 
the coalition and for not pressing Middle Eastern allies to limit sanctions violations. 
Furthermore, they backed oil-for-food as a way of alleviating the Iraqi humanitarian crisis and 
justifying the maintenance of sanctions.184 They acknowledged that the limitation of U.S. goals 
on Iraq was deeply “unsatisfactory,” as Scowcroft put it, because the United States could do little 
about Iraq’s human rights abuses or Saddam’s odious presence. Nevertheless, they claimed there 
was no other short-term, low-risk way of ousting Saddam, which made containment the best 
approach until conditions changed. Making regime change an explicit goal just bolstered 
Saddam’s image in Iraq while disrupting the coalition.185  
 In contrast to the conditionalist approach, members of the inevitable decline school 
argued for a total revision of U.S. policy and the open declaration of regime change as a goal. 
This group included neoconservatives, liberal hawks, and, with a Democrat in office, more 
conservative Republicans.  These critics believed that the nature of Saddam’s totalitarian regime 
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and Saddam as a person precluded meaningful change in Iraqi behavior. Management was 
impossible with a totalitarian state, as the Wall Street Journal editors claimed: “We will never be 
able to fully supervise or control a relatively large totalitarian state.”186 Rather than arguing that 
Saddam might escape the box down the road, they claimed that he was not and could not be 
contained. Saddam was “setting the agenda” by whittling away at international unity and 
provoking the United States whenever he wanted.187 These critics pointed to each crisis between 
1993 and 1996 not as evidence of the stresses imposed on Saddam but as signs of the growing 
cracks in containment and Saddam’s belief that the coalition lacked the will to stop him.188  
Inevitable decline critics like Charles Krauthammer mocked Clinton’s missile strikes as 
“pinpricks” that conveyed “timidity” and encouraged Iraq to misbehave even more.189 To mount 
a serious campaign to bring down Saddam, they recommended extensive punitive strikes, 
military training for the INC, war crimes tribunals, the formation an NDZ in the south and an 
NFZ over the entire country, and the maintenance of permanent sanctions.190 This group also 
opposed relenting on sanctions until Saddam was gone, even if that broke up the coalition. In 
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fact, many inevitable decline critics, especially Republicans, denounced oil-for-food as a “foot in 
the door” for Saddam to destroy the entire sanctions regime.191 
 One key idea in the inevitable decline argument that emerged in Clinton’s first term was 
that Saddam was fixated on revenge against the United States for Desert Storm. They believed 
that Saddam was not a rational survivor but a maniac obsessed with vengeance. Laurie Mylroie, 
a scholar who worked at various neoconservative think tanks, promoted this idea with an 
argument that Saddam was ultimately responsible for the 1993 terrorist attacks on the World 
Trade Center. There were some potential links between Iraq and this attack, including the fact 
that one minor figure in the conspiracy had fled to Iraq after the attack.192 Mylroie, however, 
concocted a highly tendentious story that pinned responsibility on Saddam, including the 
unsubstantiated claim that the United States had not apprehended the real Ramzi Yousef, the al-
Qaeda affiliated orchestrator of the 1993 bombing, whom she asserted was an Iraqi agent who 
had stolen the identity of a Kuwaiti citizen.193  
Extensive investigations of this attack by the FBI, the State Department, and several U.S. 
intelligence agencies found no evidence for her claims, but she nonetheless became widely 
influential in neoconservative and Republican circles.194 Her conspiracy theory sustained the fear 
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that Saddam would do anything to get back at the United States, or in Mylroie’s words, “I am not 
sure now that I can say that there is anything that Saddam would not do.”195 The implication was 
that the United States could not contain or deter a madman with WMD and links to terrorist 
groups. 
These condemnations of Clinton’s Iraq policy fit within an overall Republican and 
neoconservative political agenda as well as their case against his foreign policy. They claimed 
Clinton had inherited an unprecedentedly peaceful world with no superpower rivalry and then 
wasted this opportunity by cutting military spending, focusing on “international social work” in 
places like Haiti and Somalia, and neglecting core strategic regions like the Gulf.196 In Iraq and 
elsewhere, these critics claimed that Clinton let himself be chained into inaction by U.N. 
procedures as well as irresolute or duplicitous partners rather than showing leadership and taking 
action.197 They believed Clinton’s weakness invited provocations from Saddam and other foes. 
For instance, Senator Robert Dole (R-KS), Clinton’s challenger in the 1996 election, claimed 
after the 1996 Kurdish crisis: “The fact is that in the last few months Saddam Hussein has been 
testing American leadership and finding it lacking.”198 In addition, many advocates of ballistic 
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missile defense, of which Clinton was skeptical, contended that Iraq was the exact type of rogue 
state that United States needed these systems for: irrational, vengeful, and risk-tolerant.199 
 Several events bolstered the arguments of the inevitable decline school during Clinton’s 
first term. They contended that the 1995 revelations about Iraqi biological weapons meant that 
the inspectors could not find everything in Saddam’s arsenal or change his desire to produce 
WMD. The discovery of the biological weapons program was largely dumb luck, they claimed, 
and if not for Hussein Kamel’s actions UNSCOM and the IAEA might have wrongly certified 
Iraqi compliance in 1996.200 The idea of Saddam coming clean on WMD thereafter lost any 
credibility, especially in Congress and the media. How could the United States know that future 
Iraqi WMD disclosures were not “self-serving selective glimpses?”201 Furthermore, inspectors 
like David Kay argued that virtually any modern industrial country could produce chemical and 
biological weapons from existing industrial and pharmaceutical infrastructure.202 They also noted 
that Iraq had not dispersed the teams of scientists that built these programs and its foreign 
procurement network remained obscure.203 These persistent problems with inspections reinforced 
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the idea that the true problem was, in Kay’s words, the “motivation and intentions” of the regime 
itself rather than their capacity to generate and hide these programs.204 
The crushing of the Iraqi opposition in 1996 further strengthened the inevitable decline 
case against containment. Few in the media or Congress doubted that Iraq had gained more in 
this showdown than it lost. Paul Wolfowitz called this crisis “Clinton’s Bay of Pigs” and claimed 
that it signaled the failure of “inept covert operations” and the “passive containment policy.”205 
Bob Dole and John McCain (R-AZ) said that Clinton’s “weak leadership” and “vacillation” 
prompted Saddam to strike at the opposition.206 These critics claimed the loss of the two main 
options for toppling Saddam meant that the United States should shift to a more open and 
aggressive regime change policy. Legislators like McCain, Trent Lott (R-MI), Robert Kerrey (D-
NE), and Richard Lugar (R-IN) said that with the fading of the coup possibility the United States 
should, as Kerrey put it, “do more than just contain” and declare regime change as “an open 
objective.”207 The editors of The New Republic likewise argued that after September 1996 “the 
only solution to the threat posed by Saddam is the overthrow of Saddam.”208 
The simmering policy debate between the conditional and inevitable decline approaches 
to containment was not just over different means for reaching the same end. Each camp had 
distinct views of what end point for Iraq and Saddam would be tolerable for U.S. security and 
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national interests. For conditionalists, a weak Saddam was acceptable for the moment, a 
compliant successor was vastly more preferable, and a democratic Iraq was a laudable goal but 
not necessarily one the United States could achieve. Analysts like Cordesman stressed the 
bounds of U.S. power and knowledge: “We cannot invade, occupy, or change the fundamental 
political character of either Iraq or Iran.”209  
For inevitable declinists, limiting U.S. goals to keeping Saddam weak and compliant 
made his return to power in the region inescapable. Only his removal and the transformation of 
Iraq from a totalitarian dictatorship to a democracy would eliminate the threat of Iraq’s WMD 
and military power as well as its human rights abuses. Because Iraq remained a secondary issue 
in Clinton’s first term, the conditionalist view won in the Clinton administration and the larger 
political debate. However, the tools and assumptions of containment were being eroded by the 
dwindling unity of the coalition, the collapse of hope for a coup or indigenous rebellion, and the 
persistent limits of inspections. This change set the ground for the inevitable decline critique to 
become the politically dominant view of containment in Clinton’s second term. 
Conclusion 
 Iraq played a minor role in the 1996 presidential election, which hinged on domestic 
politics. Dole and his running mate Jack Kemp went after Clinton for not maintaining the 
coalition and hitting back weakly against Saddam’s provocations.210 However, they faced the 
awkward position of supporting Clinton’s September 1996 missile strikes while critiquing the 
overall policy. Despite their criticism, Dole and Kemp did not make Iraq a central plank of their 
                                                        
209 Senate Committee on Armed Services, The Situation in Iraq, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., September 12, 1996, 39. 
See also: A.M. Rosenthal, “On Clinton’s Watch,” September 10, 1996, New York Times, A27; Zalmay Khalilzad, 
“The U.S. Failure in Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, September 10, 1996, A22. 
 
210 Dole, “Bob Dole on Iraq Sanctions Relief,” May 20, 1996. 
 
 204 
campaign or offer specific changes. Compared to the criticism of Bush’s handling of the end of 
Desert Storm, Congress was relatively quiet on Clinton’s Iraq policy. 
 While Iraq stayed on the political back burner between 1993 and 1996, these were highly 
consequential years for the long-term trajectory of containment. In his memoir, Martin Indyk 
illuminated the larger significance of this period:  
The policy of containment of the Soviet Union, first articulated by George Kennan, was 
based on the idea that the Soviet system was rotten to the core and would collapse of its own 
weight if the United States could only keep the pressure on it. Containment of Iraq was based 
on a similar calculation. But the Clinton administration’s critical assumption was that the 
combination of sanctions and covert operations would force the collapse of Saddam’s regime 
in five years, not the five decades that it took for the Soviet Union to collapse. And that 
would prove to be a fatally flawed judgment.211 
 
 Indyk’s analysis and the material covered in this chapter highlight the importance of 
having a theory of change in any containment policy. By nature containment does not directly 
seek the overthrow of the target state, so it must create an atmosphere conducive to the target 
changing either its behavior or its ruling government lest containment start to appear 
indefinite.212 The containment of the Soviet Union had a theory of change that resembled 
Clinton’s approach to Iran: maintain economic pressures and block expansion so that forces 
within each society would create either regime or behavioral change.213 In contrast, in the Iraq 
case behavioral change was considered virtually impossible while regime change by invasion or 
assassination were unacceptable. This impasse left regime change by coup or uprising as the only 
solutions. Containment remained stable in political and policy terms only while these outlets 
remained viable.  
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The loss of the coup option and the crushing of the opposition in 1996 discredited the 
idea that Saddam could be removed through these tools, both of which limited risk to the United 
States. Moreover, the steady dissolution of the coalition and Saddam’s ongoing attempts to mask 
his WMD programs fed the idea that containment could not hold for long nor solve the problem 
of Saddam’s regional ambitions and pursuit of deadly weapons. The domestic audience and the 
international coalition were heading in opposite directions, and Clinton’s rhetorical gymnastics-
the Clinton fudge-on the goals of U.S. policy toward Iraq could not bridge this gap forever.  
Clinton’s first term was therefore a deceptively quiet time for containment. The policy 
achieved many successes, and it was most viable when Saddam made obvious, conventional 
threats to his neighbors. Nevertheless, the containment’s foundations were being hollowed out 
from within, and frustration with the policy was mounting at home. This hollowing out would 
shift the domestic political momentum toward the inevitable decline critique of containment once 
these problems were exposed by renewed challenges from Saddam. In Clinton’s second term, the 
expanding inevitable decline group would try to wrest control of Iraq policy away from Clinton 





















CHAPTER 4: SADDAM HUSSEIN MUST GO: ENTRENCHING THE REGIME 




 On February 11, 1998, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger met with a group that his 
staff labelled the “Iraq Influentials.” They met during yet another standoff between the Iraqi 
government and UNSCOM, and Clinton had already threatened to use force against Iraq if it did 
not comply with inspections. The visitors included Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld, Richard 
Perle, William Kristol, and Francis Fukuyama, all critics of containment. According to his notes, 
Berger tried to convince his guests that containment “has kept Saddam under pressure and 
muzzled,” and that in each crisis sparked by Iraq, “we have consistently and firmly put Saddam 
back in his box.” “Remember Aideed,” his notes read, referring to the ill-fated U.S. special 
forces raid against the Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid in which 18 U.S. soldiers were 
killed in street fighting. He meant to warn his guests that even if the United States overthrew the 
Baathist regime there was no guarantee they could find Saddam or avoid heavy casualties.1 
 The “Influentials,” led by Wolfowitz, responded with an attack on containment. 
Wolfowitz argued that the United States should “back out of containment rhetoric” now that they 
had the “xth demonstration that we can’t live w. SH.” Perle and Wolfowitz put forth a regime 
change strategy that was gaining political momentum: declare Saddam’s regime to be 
illegitimate, build up U.S. forces in the region, and back the Iraqi opposition’s war against 
Saddam. Rumsfeld interjected that ground troops should be kept out of Iraq, citing the U.S. 
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intervention in Lebanon in the early 1980s as a warning about occupying Middle Eastern cities. 
The meeting was cordial, but neither side convinced the other to shift their views on Iraq.2 
 This meeting demonstrated the rising influence during Clinton’s second term of a group 
of intellectuals, Iraqi exiles, and politicians who sought to discredit and replace containment with 
an active regime change strategy. The most devoted members of this movement were 
neoconservatives like Perle and Wolfowitz, Republican legislators, and the Iraqi National 
Congress (INC) under Ahmed Chalabi. Numerous liberals and Democrats also backed a shift to 
regime change. The Clinton administration’s handling of repeated inspections crises in Iraq 
convinced its critics that it had no broader strategy beyond maintaining inspections and sanctions 
and mending the faltering international coalition. They believed Clinton was shifting toward a 
strategy of limited containment and deterrence that abandoned serious efforts to remove Saddam 
and accepted that he might develop some weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 
This strengthened political movement focused on convincing Congress and the public 
that containment must be replaced with a regime change strategy. Generally speaking, They 
argued that sanctions were collapsing, the international coalition was unworthy of trust, 
inspections had outlived their usefulness, and Saddam was still determined to build WMD and 
ballistic missiles. Moreover, they contended, as containment seemed on the verge of collapsing, 
that the United States had a narrow window of time to achieve regime change before Saddam 
reconstituted his WMD and military strength. Pursuing his ouster would require that the United 
States recognize regime change and containment as incompatible strategies, in contrast to the 
Bush and Clinton approach of sporadically pursuing regime change from a baseline containment 
policy. Containment required the maintenance of a coalition behind sanctions and inspections, 
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regime change advocates claimed, which precluded the bold steps that were needed to overthrow 
Saddam. Finally, the enhanced push to discredit containment drew on the assumption within the 
regime change consensus that any strategy that did not prioritize the removal of Saddam and the 
Baathist system was at best a temporary salve and, increasingly, a postponement of Saddam’s 
revival.   
The culmination of this movement’s efforts was the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA), which 
declared the removal of Saddam and his regime as an official U.S. foreign policy goal in October 
1998. Scholars have tended to ignore or downplay the ILA because it was a non-binding 
resolution that did not lead to a meaningful change in actual policy.3 In a wider historical frame, 
however, it is a deeply important signpost in the evolution of ideas about to deal with Saddam. 
The ILA reflected a growing bipartisan consensus that containment could not be rehabilitated 
because the coalition would always prefer a weaker policy, Saddam would always evade or 
obstruct inspectors, and the sanctions would continue to collapse. The bill conveyed the belief 
that only regime change and democratization in Iraq could definitively solve this problem. This 
rare assertion of Congressional power to shift foreign policy priorities suggested the extent to 
which Clinton had lost control of the conversation about Iraq. It signaled a willingness to alienate 
coalition partners by declaring that the United States would not accept the normalization with 
Iraq under Saddam regardless of whether he complied with U.N. resolutions. Finally, the debate 
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over the Iraq Liberation Act showed just how few people in the political and intellectual 
discourse were still willing to defend containment.  
In sum, the Iraq Liberation Act signified the entrenching of the regime change consensus 
in American political and intellectual life. It signaled the political victory of the inevitable 
decline critique to containment that stated that containment is not working and cannot work 
against a regime like Saddam’s. These principles became a sort of “common sense” in U.S. 
thinking about Iraq, a set of assumptions that became increasingly unquestionable, thereby 
narrowing the range of ideas for dealing with Iraq. The frustrating experiences of 1997-1998 
locked in this new conventional thinking. The outnumbered defenders of the conditionalist 
approach to containment were now limited mainly to ex-Bush administration officials, realist 
policy scholars, and military personnel. They tried to manage public expectations about what 
could be achieved in Iraq, emphasize the achievements of containment, and find ways to adjust 
the policy to make it more sustainable.  
 One reason why the pro-regime change argument was more effective in Clinton’s second 
term was that its advocates proffered rollback as a concrete strategy for regime change. This plan 
envisioned using U.S. military aid, training, and air power to back opposition groups in an 
uprising against Saddam. While this alternative strategy helped the regime change argument gain 
political traction, especially among Republicans, it was also a dividing factor in the political 
regime change movement. Many Congressmen, intellectuals, and military personnel saw 
rollback as a risky, foolish idea that risked drawing the United States into direct fighting in Iraq. 
The debate over rollback thus showed that while the U.S. discourse on Iraq was coalescing 
around the regime change consensus, the question of how to achieve that end was still in dispute. 
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By the end of 1998, the Clinton administration agreed with its critics that Iraq policy 
could not go on as it had since the Gulf War. The frustrating confrontations and Saddam’s 
seemingly endless intransigence deepened top Clinton’s officials’ sense that only regime change 
could solve this threat. Nonetheless, the basic containment paradigm still guided their handling 
of confrontations with Iraq in this period. They focused on maintaining inspections and 
sanctions, funneling food and medicine to the Iraqi people, and preserving the coalition. They 
continued to view containment and regime change as compatible, seeking ways to destabilize 
Saddam within the framework of multilateral sanctions and inspections. They resisted the Iraq 
Liberation Act and signed it reluctantly, vaguely endorsing its goals while doing the bare 
minimum to carry out this legislation. In the two years after Desert Fox, they worked to reform 
sanctions and get a new inspection program installed in Iraq after UNSCOM was thrown out for 
good in December of 1998. The result by 2000 was an anti-climactic impasse: a political 
discourse fixated on shifting from containment to regime change facing an administration that 
saw no responsible path to this end as it tried to keep containment alive. 
The Inspections Crises and the Road to Operation Desert Fox, 1997-1998 
 The period from October 1997 to December 1998 witnessed an unprecedented string of 
confrontations between Iraq and the coalition. Iraq sought to impose restrictions on UNSCOM 
while asserting that it had completed disarmament and that the sanctions should be lifted. 
UNSCOM resisted this obstruction, and the United States repeatedly threatened to use force to 
compel Iraq to comply. Last second agreements or temporary retreats by Iraq headed off U.S. 
strikes in November 1997, February 1998, and November 1998, but Iraq quickly returned to non-
cooperation after each reprieve. Clinton was torn between domestic political calls for toughness, 
the coalition’s unwillingness to back up the inspections with force, and some U.N. members’ 
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undermining of the inspections. This year of confrontations with Iraq culminated in U.S. and 
British air and missile strikes under Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 and the permanent 
ejection of UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from Iraq.  
In the first 10 months of 1997, Clinton held that Iraq was still a minor threat, but they 
remained concerned about the growing challenge to containment. An intelligence assessment 
from early 1997 reflected this delicate stasis in saying “Although U.N. sanctions alone probably 
are not sufficient to bring down the regime, their maintenance is key to keeping pressure on 
Saddam and frustrating his ambitions for regional hegemony.”4 However, the international 
coalition, especially Middle Eastern nations, increasingly criticized the humanitarian effects of 
sanctions. One cable from State’s Near Eastern Affairs Office (NEA) stated: “We are deeply 
concerned that the Iraqis appear to be gaining ground in influencing international perceptions of 
the sanctions regime.”5 A Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessment judged that Iraq had 
not abandoned its “regional hegemonistic political aspirations” and that it  “remains strongly 
committed to retaining and acquiring weapons of mass destruction and will try to rapidly rebuild 
these programs once U.N. sanctions are lifted and inspections are halted.”6  
Weapons inspections continued their steady progress in 1997. UNSCOM director Rolf 
Ekeus reported advances on biological and chemical disarmament, although Iraqi obstruction 
persisted throughout 1997. In April 1997, Ekeus reported that after six years of inspections “not 
much is unknown about Iraq’s retained proscribed weapons capabilities,” although “what is still 
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not accounted for cannot be neglected.”7 In June, he reported: “We have documentary evidence 
about orders from the leadership to preserve a strategic capability” on WMD.8 Gaps remained 
regarding chemical weapons like VX, biological weapons and precursors, and ballistic missiles.9  
The core problem was that in 1991 Iraq had unilaterally destroyed a great quantity of 
ballistic missiles, chemical and biological weapons and materials, and a variety of components 
and equipment. Iraqi officials wanted the inspectors to accept their assertions that these weapons 
were gone, but the inspectors demanded documentary and physical evidence that they had been 
destroyed because unaccounted weapons and materials could still be intact.10 For example, in the 
summer of 1998, UNSCOM found evidence of Iraqi development of the chemical weapon VX. 
They knew Iraq had imported 600,000 kilograms of VX precursor and had weaponized some of 
it, but Iraq never turned over the materials nor provided evidence of their destruction. Inspectors 
called this gap in the record the “material balance.”11  
In July 1997, Richard Butler, an Australian arms control expert, replaced Ekeus as head 
of UNSCOM. Butler soon enhanced UNSCOM’s emphasis on using aerial surveillance, listening 
devices, and surprise inspections to expose Iraq’s ongoing concealment activities.12 He hoped 
                                                        




8 Barbara Crossette, “Iraqis Still Defying Arms Ban, Departing U.N. Official Says,” New York Times, June 25, 1997, 
A1. 
 
9 United Nations Special Commission, “3rd Report Under UNSCR 1051,” April 11, 1997. 
 
10 See the timeline of UNSCOM inspections in: United Nations Special Commission, “Ambassador Richard Butler’s 
Presentation to the U.N. Security Council,” June 3, 1998, Accessed March 19, 2018, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20050314073650/http://www.iraqwatch.org:80/un/UNSCOM/s-1998-529.htm 
 
11 Jean Krasno and James Sutterlin, The United Nations and Iraq: Defanging the Viper (Westport, CT: Praeger, 
2003), 68; United Nations Special Commission, “6th Report Under UNSCR 1051,” October 6, 1998, accessed 




that these “counter-concealment operations” would expose the systematic Iraqi program to hide 
information and materials and harass the inspectors. He claimed that the revelations about Iraqi 
concealment and obstruction activities from the Hussein Kamel affair in 1995 made this more 
“forensic” approach necessary.13 Such evidence, Butler thought, would show skeptical Security 
Council members that Iraq was far from complying, thereby sustaining the international will to 
maintain sanctions.14 Verification of Iraqi compliance, he argued, was only possible if the Iraqi 
concealment strategy could be exposed to the point that the Iraqi agreed to stop.15 In contrast to 
UNSCOM’s struggles, the IAEA had achieved significant progress on nuclear disarmament. The 
IAEA concluded in October 1997 that nuclear inspections had “reached a point of diminishing 
returns” as there were “no indications that there remains in Iraq any physical capability for the 
production of amounts of weapon-usable nuclear material of any practical significance.”16 
 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright gave a major speech at Georgetown University in 
March 1997 to issue a “wake-up call” to Saddam that the United States would still enforce the 
Security Council resolutions.17 She listed Iraq’s violations of these resolutions and noted how 
much weaker Iraq was because of sanctions and inspections. Reaffirming containment, she 
asserted: “As long as the apparatus of sanctions, enforcement, inspections, and monitoring are in 
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place, Iraq will remain trapped within a strategic box.” She then restated the U.S. approach to 
lifting sanctions in stark terms: “We do not agree with nations that argue that if Iraq complies 
with its obligations concerning weapons of mass destruction, sanctions should be lifted. Our 
view, which is unshakeable, is that Iraq must prove its peaceful intentions” by complying with 
every U.N. resolution.18 The speech was less a policy shift than a reiteration of U.S. resolve to 
Saddam as well as international partners who wanted to end inspections and the oil embargo. 
In late 1997 Iraqi officials escalated their campaign to cripple inspections by creating a 
crisis that would further isolate the United States within the coalition. They also hoped to gain 
relief from Richard Butler’s intensified counter-concealment inspections.19 In early October, 
Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz blocked inspectors from visiting a list of “sensitive sites” he 
claimed were vital for Iraqi security services. In response, the United States and Great Britain led 
the passage of a Security Council resolution condemning these actions and suspending the next 
sanctions review as punishment. Clinton officials tried to get France, Russia, and China to agree 
to a travel ban on top Iraqi officials, but they would only agree to threaten a travel ban if 
UNSCOM judged that Iraq was not cooperating by April 1998.20 These nations also did not 
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agree to threaten Iraq with “serious consequences,” diplomatic code for military force.21 They 
also abstained on this resolution to avoid alienating Iraq, undermining its desired effect.22  
Aziz seized on this shaky response on October 29, 1997, by informing the Security 
Council that Iraq would only cooperate with UNSCOM if: “no individuals of American 
nationality shall participate in any activity of the Special Commission inside Iraq” and if all U.S. 
inspectors left Iraq within 24 hours.23 Iraq also threatened to shoot down U.S. U-2 spy planes 
participating in inspections.24 UNSCOM and Clinton saw these threats as an attempt to drive a 
wedge into the coalition and weaken the principle that Iraq had no say in the composition of the 
inspection teams.25 Butler rejected the demand to exclude U.S. inspectors, and a few days later 
he sent teams with U.S. personnel on inspection missions. When Iraqi officials again prevented 
them from accessing suspected sites, Butler and the IAEA withdrew all inspectors in early 
November to ensure their safety.26  
 The United States struggled to mobilize the coalition and compel Iraq to let inspectors 
back in with full rights. They strongly preferred a diplomatic solution, fearing that an air or 
missile strike would make the ejection of inspectors permanent.27 Furthermore, Clinton officials 
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believed that acting too unilaterally would only foment division in the coalition, which is what 
Saddam wanted.28 The United States rallied France, Russia, and China to pass a Security Council 
resolution condemning Iraq, imposing a travel ban on top Iraqi officials, and warning of “serious 
consequences” if it failed to readmit the inspectors.29 This stronger statement, combined with 
Russian diplomacy, convinced Iraq to let inspectors back in with full rights. In return, foreign 
minister Yevgeny Primakov told Iraq that Russia would push for “the speedy lifting of 
sanctions” while ensuring that future inspections respected “Iraq’s sovereignty and security.”30  
Although inspectors resumed work in December, this crisis disturbed the Clinton 
administration. They viewed such crises as part of the cost of containment, but they 
acknowledged that it had taken several Iraqi acts of defiance to spark a united Security Council 
response. Moreover, Russian officials openly communicated their desire to end inspections and 
lift sanctions without a full accounting of Iraqi WMD programs. Primakov, for instance, told 
Albright and Butler on separate occasions that the United States was exaggerating Iraqi non-
compliance, and he urged the United States to be “more flexible, more understanding” about 
inspections.31 The inspectors also had to account for materials that Iraq might have moved during 
the one-month hiatus and restore surveillance equipment that Iraqi officials had disabled.32 
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When the inspectors returned to Baghdad in mid-December, Iraqi personnel again 
obstructed their work. On January 13, 1998, Aziz introduced a new set of restrictions for the 
inspectors, including “presidential and sovereign sites” that were “of significance in terms of the 
security of the State.” These sites related to the personal security of Saddam and his entourage, 
including private homes, office buildings, resorts, and intelligence facilities. The presidential 
sites were not merely buildings but entire compounds and the land around them. UNSCOM 
estimated that these areas encompassed 70 square kilometers and 1,500 structures, plenty of 
space to hide proscribed weapons. Aziz demanded that these sites “not be allowed to be 
inspected or overflown under any circumstances” and reasserted that Iraq had given up all of its 
WMD programs.33 In mid-January, Butler reported that Iraq had again ceased cooperating with 
UNSCOM by blocking inspection teams from visiting presidential sites. On January 22, Aziz 
ordered a total freeze on inspections, and UNSCOM and the IAEA left Iraq soon thereafter.34  
Clinton responded by rushing troops and two aircraft carriers to the region and 
threatening to use force, alone if necessary, to compel compliance.35 The administration believed 
that the efficacy of the inspections as well as U.S. and U.N. credibility were at stake.36 Clinton 
officials thus weighed the use of force much more seriously in this crisis than the fall 1997 
showdown. Polls suggested that the U.S. public was willing to support the use of force if 
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coercive diplomacy failed, although strong majorities said it was necessary to have allied 
support.37 The military developed multi-day bombing plans that targeted central pillars of the 
regime like Republican Guard units and communications infrastructure.38  
However, the administration lacked a clear sense of how long they would have to bomb 
Iraq and doubted that a limited offensive would force Saddam back into line.39 One senior 
official stated: “We’d like to think we could start bombing and Saddam Hussein would throw his 
hands up and ask the United Nations inspectors back in, but no one believes it.”40 At one Cabinet 
meeting, Albright asked if the United States should openly declare that the purpose of a military 
strike would be regime change, but Berger and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Hugh 
Shelton opposed the idea, saying that the only sure means of regime change was a land 
invasion.41 The administration concluded that there was simply “no adequate substitute,” in 
Defense Secretary William Cohen’s words, for fully empowered inspections.42 They stressed that 
the policy was still containment and that the goal of any strike would be to diminish Iraqi WMD 
capabilities and ensure total access for inspectors.43  
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During the winter of 1998, the United States and Great Britain again struggled to gain 
international support for tough diplomacy backed by the threat of force. French Prime Minister 
Jacques Chirac helpfully warned of “grave consequences” for Iraq if it did not readmit the 
inspectors.44 In contrast, Russian and Chinese officials contradicted U.S. statements by saying 
that negotiations were just starting and calling for an end to sanctions and more respect for Iraqi 
sovereignty.45 Arab allies like Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia took ambiguous positions on the 
use of force and told U.S. officials that limited attacks bolstered Saddam’s credentials at home.46 
The Saudi government even denied U.S. forces permission to launch planes from Saudi bases.47 
The lack of solid international support, coupled with domestic criticism, pushed the United 
States further in the direction of diplomacy over force.48 Even though this situation frustrated the 
administration, Clinton believed it was worthwhile for the United States to accept some of the 
strictures of coalition diplomacy because the U.S. position as the sole superpower was a “luxury” 
that “won’t last forever.” This situation created a “moral responsibility to show restraint and seek 
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partnerships and alliances” that would bolster collective security even as the rest of the world 
caught up to U.S. power.”49 
On February 17, 1998, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan announced that he would 
travel to Iraq to try to resolve the impasse. The Clinton administration backed the trip and said 
they would accept a deal if it imposed no limits on the inspectors’ access rights.50 On February 
23, Annan and Aziz announced a “memorandum of understanding” (MOU) that allowed the 
inspectors to return with full rights. The MOU, however, also imposed burdens on the inspectors. 
Inspections would now be accompanied by senior U.N. diplomats appointed by Annan. The 
MOU also included “special considerations” for eight presidential sites, calling on inspectors to 
“take into consideration any observations the Iraqi representative may wish to make regarding 
entry into a particular structure.” Lastly, the MOU specified that “UNSCOM undertakes to 
respect the legitimate concerns of Iraq relating to national security, sovereignty, and dignity.”51 
Annan also called the inspectors “cowboys” after the MOU was signed and described as Saddam 
someone he “can do business with.”52  
The inspectors, especially Butler, accepted the MOU but objected to Annan acting as a 
mediator between Iraq and the inspectors, treating them as equally responsible for the crisis, 
rather than acting as an advocate for the inspectors’ mission and safety. Butler argued that this 
deal would politicize and weaken UNSCOM by giving Iraq further excuses to block 
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inspections.53 The Clinton administration agreed that Annan had gone too far in limiting the 
independence of the inspections, but they nonetheless accepted the pact to avoid military strikes 
and get inspectors back into Iraq.54 They kept U.S. forces in the region and cautioned that if 
Saddam reneged again “everyone would understand that then the United States and hopefully all 
of allies would have the unilateral right to respond.”55 Clinton wanted the deal tested as soon as 
possible to see if Iraq would comply, telling Tony Blair on February 23: “We have to test the 
agreement soon…show up at one of these sites and start looking around.”56 
During the inspections crises in late 1997 and early 1998, the administration stressed the 
WMD threat in new and frightening ways. In an interview with Jim Lehrer on January 21, 
Clinton said that the Iraqi threat was not just that they might fire WMD-armed ballistic missiles 
at nearby cities but that: “terrorists and drug runners and other bad actors…could just parade 
through Baghdad to pick up their stores if we don’t take the strongest possible action.”57 In a 
speech on February 17, Clinton argued that if the coalition caved to Saddam’s demands: “He will 
conclude that the international community has lost its will. He will then conclude that he can go 
right on and do more to rebuild an arsenal of devastating destruction. And some day, some way, I 
guarantee you, he’ll use the arsenal.” Standing firm against Saddam would also deter other 
potential proliferators.58 Back in November 1997, Clinton asked Americans to think of this crisis 
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not as a “replay” of the Gulf War but “in terms of the innocent Japanese people that died in the 
subway when the sarin gas was released,” referring to a 1995 terrorist attack on the Tokyo 
subway system that killed twelve people with sarin gas.59  
Clinton’s rhetoric raised the stakes of Iraq policy beyond the threat to U.S. regional 
interests to the danger of a volatile, vengeful dictator who must not be permitted to build WMD 
lest he use them or hand them to terrorists. He reframed Saddam as a threat to national security 
and the national interest, as the Tokyo reference suggested. This shift reflected the growing 
conviction among key members of the Clinton administration such as Albright and Cohen that 
the dangers of WMD proliferation, rogue states, and terrorism were merging into a new problem 
that made denying WMD to states like Iraq even more essential.60 This new threat seemed to 
resonate with the public, with one poll from February 1998 showing that 60% of respondents 
believed if the United States attacked Saddam he would use biological or chemical weapons on 
U.S. targets and 75% expecting a terrorist attack directed by Iraq against Americans.61 
From the signing of the MOU in February 1998 to the fall of 1998, the inspectors steadily 
uncovered more of Iraq’s WMD programs. The IAEA quickly resolved outstanding issues with 
Iraq and reported in April that “Iraq has satisfactorily completed its undertaking to produce a 
consolidated version of its full, final, and complete declaration of its clandestine nuclear 
program.”62 UNSCOM, however, had a great deal of rechecking to do because inspectors had 
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been unable to operate since October 1997.63 Butler reported in June that Iraq was cooperating 
and that UNSCOM had established a viable monitoring system over key sites. However, there 
were still gaps in the material balance of biological and chemical weapons programs. Despite 
Iraqi, Russian, and Chinese pleas, UNSCOM would not confirm that Iraq had fully disarmed.64 
After the February crisis, the Clinton administration found no clear alternative to 
containment even as its key pillars wavered. The administration wanted a way out of the 
exhausting cycle of Iraqi provocation, U.S. response, and a last-second deal. Openly shifting to a 
regime change strategy, though, did not seem to be the solution. Saddam was not an immediate 
threat, and sanctions still prevented the his military’s recovery.65 Martin Indyk, the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, reasoned that “there would be a cost to declaring 
such an objective because it could undermine the international support that we have for 
maintaining the sanctions regime.” The use of excessive or unilateral force against Iraq, Indyk 
judged, would have the same effect, and U.S. policy needed to work within those restrictions.66 
The intelligence agencies judged that a coup remained unlikely because, as one July 1998 study 
stated: “Saddam’s domestic position appears to be as strong as it has been at any point since the 
Gulf War.”67 An exasperated Clinton summarized the policy stalemate in September 1998, 
                                                        
http://web.archive.org/web/20050313225012/http://www.iraqwatch.org:80/un/IAEA/s-1998-312.htm 
 
63 Duelfer, Hide and Seek, 146. 
 
64 United Nations Special Commission, “Ambassador Richard Butler’s Presentation to the U.N. Security Council,” 
June 3, 1998. 
 
65 Anthony Zinni, interview by Daniel Pipes and Patrick Clawson, Middle East Quarterly, June 17, 1998, accessed 
February 7, 2018, https://www.meforum.org/articles/other/anthony-zinni-avoid-a-military-showdown-with-iraq. 
 
66 Martin Indyk, Hearing of House Committee on International Relations, Developments in the Middle East, 105th 
Congress, 2nd sess., March 10, 1998, 16, 22. 
 
67 National Intelligence Council Briefing Paper, “Iraq: Prospects for Confrontation,” July 17, 1998, Digital National 
Security Agency, Targeting Iraq, Part 1 Collection. 
 224 
saying that Iraq was “the most difficult of problems because it is devoid of a sensible policy 
response.”68 The administration nonetheless tried to modulate public expectations by saying that 
unless the United States was willing to ignore the Iraqi threat or invade, “Saddam will be with us 
for some time,” in Sandy Berger’s phrasing.69  
Iraq grew tired of UNSCOM’s refusal to verify disarmament, and in August 1998 Tariq 
Aziz told Butler that “he saw no utility in continuing working with the Commission on these 
issues.”70 This confrontation coincided with al-Qaeda’s bombings of the U.S. embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998. These attacks raised the Clinton’s administration’s 
awareness of al-Qaeda and its concerns about global terrorism in general. Clinton responded with 
missile strikes on suspected al-Qaeda targets in Sudan and Afghanistan later in August, calling 
the al-Qaeda: “most dangerous, non-state terrorist actor in the world today.”71  
During the fall, Iraqi cooperation declined precipitously, culminating on October 31 
when Iraq announced it was ending all cooperation with inspectors and demanded that they leave 
the country.72 The United States and Great Britain again moved forces to the region and called 
for Saddam to comply.73 Clinton told Blair on November 3 that the coalition had to be willing to 
act quickly and decisively to preserve the inspections: “I really think that we have to take 
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decisive action this time to respond to Saddam’s challenge. It is clear to me that Saddam really 
wants to force the Council to lift sanctions without giving up his weapons of mass destruction 
and missile programs.”74 Sandy Berger likewise argued that weak or delayed action would “risk 
making the Council irrelevant and emboldening Saddam to further challenge the sanctions 
regime.”75 In addition, Iraq now found itself isolated at the United Nations, as the Arab states, 
France, and even Russia condemned its actions, although they did not back the threat of force.76  
Clinton launched U.S. warplanes against Iraqi government and military installations on 
November 15, 1998, in what was supposed to be an intensive three-day campaign. However, 
with U.S. and British planes literally en route to their targets, Iraq announced that they would 
readmit the inspectors unconditionally.77 Cohen and Albright wanted Clinton to persist, but 
Berger and a call from Tony Blair persuaded Clinton that attacking would wreck the coalition 
and make the United States appear aggressive now that Iraq was conceding.78 One senior official 
said of this dilemma: “You can’t shoot a man who’s waving a white flag.”79 Clinton reluctantly 
recalled the strikes, and the inspectors soon returned to Baghdad with a mandate to report on 
Iraqi cooperation in a month. By showing restraint, the administration believed they had paved 
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the diplomatic course for a military attack once Saddam reneged on inspections.80 They agreed to 
“encourage UNSCOM and the IAEA to aggressively test Iraq’s unconditional commitment to 
full cooperation,” even though they expected him to renege on this pledge.81  
Saddam rapidly fulfilled Clinton’s expectations when Iraqi officials blocked inspectors 
from viewing suspected sites December 9. Many of the sites the Iraqis did allow UNSCOM to 
visit had been sanitized since November, with equipment and materials moved from buildings 
once under U.N. monitoring. Butler reported to the Security Council on December 14 that Iraq 
was not complying and that he planned to remove the inspectors from Iraq.82  
Clinton believed he needed to respond instantly to prevent Saddam from again escaping 
punishment via last-second diplomacy. He and his Cabinet uniformly wanted an immediate and 
major air campaign against Saddam. Iraq had evaded retaliation too many times, and it appeared 
that it would never cooperate with UNSCOM and that France, Russia, and China would continue 
to hamstring serious inspections. Thus, the administration did not make the readmission of 
inspectors a goal for the upcoming operation.83 Clinton spelled out his rationale for the attack to 
Saudi Crown Prince: “Baghdad has repeatedly violated that commitment and consistently 
refused to provide documents and information, barred access and harassed inspectors, lied 
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repeatedly, and destroyed documents. I hope you will agree that we can’t continue this cycle.”84 
Aside from punishing Iraq for these violations, Clinton hoped: “to degrade [Saddam’s] capacity 
to develop weapons of mass destruction and his ability to threaten his neighbors as much as 
possible.”85 They were not, as Cohen stated, “seeking to destabilize his regime” but to weaken 
him and uphold the credibility of the United States and the United Nations.86  
The ensuing Anglo-American air and missile campaign, titled Operation Desert Fox, 
lasted from December 16-19. It was the largest attack on Iraq since the Gulf War, including 415 
cruise missiles and 650 air sorties. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) developed a target list 
of about 100 sites or facilities, only 12 of which were WMD-related.87 Of these WMD sites, 
almost all targets related to ballistic missiles because the military planners believed these 
weapons were smaller and easier to store and because they wanted to avoid contaminating 
surrounding areas. Moreover, CENTCOM mostly omitted dual-use facilities potentially related 
to WMD because they were too easy to rebuild. Other targets included command centers, air 
defense installations, Saddam’s palaces, and Republican Guard sites.88  
                                                        
84 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, William Clinton and Crown Prince Abdullah, December 15, 1998, 
Clinton Digital Library, Declassified Documents Concerning Iraq, accessed March 29, 2018, 
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/16192. 
 
85 Douglas Little, Us Versus Them: The United States, Radical Islam, and the Rise of the Green Threat (Chapel Hill, 
NC: The University of North Carolina Press), 113. 
 
86 Remarks by Madeleine Albright, December 17, 1998, OAID 1481, National Security Council, Samuel Berger 
Files, William Clinton Presidential Library, 1; Steven Lee Myers, “Pentagon is Sticking to Timetable and Targets,” 
New York Times, December 19, 1998, A8. 
 
87 Mark Conversino, “Operation Desert Fox: Effectiveness with Unintended Effects,” Chronicles Online Journal, 
Air and Space Power Journal, (July 2005), accessed May 15, 2018; Anthony Cordesman, “The Military 




88 Conversino, “Operation Desert Fox,”; Steven Lee Myers, “U.S. and Britain End Raids on Iraq, Calling Mission a 
Success,” New York Times, December 20, 1998, A1. 
 228 
According to Pentagon assessments, the strikes hit 85% of the 100 targets on 
CENTCOM’s list and diminished much of Saddam’s missile development, Republican Guard, 
air defense, and communications facilities and equipment, much of which was hard to replace 
because of sanctions. The Pentagon estimated that Desert Fox set Iraqi missile development 
program back about two years.89 The operation also rattled Saddam Hussein, who responded 
with a purge of the military and intelligence agencies.90 Nonetheless, this operation did not 
fundamentally change Saddam’s strategic intentions.91 For instance, the Iraq Survey Group 
found in 2004 that after Desert Fox and the withdrawal of UNSCOM, “the pace of ongoing 
missile programs accelerated” as Iraq poured resources into developing longer range missiles.92 
Operation Desert Fox drew broad support from an international coalition fed up with 
Saddam’s intransigence, although Russia and China criticized the United States for “taking 
unprovoked military action,” in Boris Yeltsin’s words.93 At home, Clinton feared that the world 
and the public would see the strikes as a distraction from the pending impeachment vote against 
him in the Senate. His missile strike against al-Qaeda targets in August had also coincided with 
Clinton’s admission before a grand jury that he had had an inappropriate relationship with 
Monica Lewinsky. Republicans like Trent Lott insinuated that Clinton was using foreign policy 
to mask this scandal.94 Nonetheless, Clinton received high approval ratings for his handling of 
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Iraq policy, including Gallup poll that found 74% of respondents approved of the strikes.95 
Numerous polls also showed that between 60-70% of American believed that Clinton had 
launched Desert Fox for national security reasons rather than political ones.96 Still, the American 
public generally did not believe the strikes would have a positive long-term effect on the Iraq 
problem, with 60% in one poll saying that the strikes were a “temporary solution.”97 
Clinton’s Iraq policy stood on uncertain ground at the end of 1998. The inspectors had 
departed Iraq and the coalition was more divided than ever. UNSCOM reported massive, 
unresolved gaps in the record on VX gas, biological and chemical precursors, unconventional 
missile warheads, various chemical agents, specialized aerosol generators, and Scud missiles. 
Iraq also retained expert teams of scientists that could quickly revive these programs, likely 
using dual-use facilities at which WMD development could be masked unless inspectors were on 
the ground.98 The IAEA likewise had concerns about centrifuge and nuclear weapon designs and 
the Iraqi international procurement network for nuclear materials.99 Without inspections, the 
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administration believed, Saddam would surely start rebuilding his arsenal, and as sanctions 
weakened he would have more resources to do so. Moving forward, the Clinton administration 
would either have to develop a different version of containment or, as their increasingly powerful 
critics argued, shift to an open and concerted regime change strategy. 
The Political Revolt Against Containment and the Making of the Iraq Liberation Act 
Throughout the inspection crises of 1997-1998, the Clinton administration defined its 
objectives within the containment paradigm: preserve sanctions and inspections, maintain the 
coalition, and be ready to strike Iraq if it violates the Security Council resolutions or threatens its 
neighbors. This policy and its defense in earlier years often drew much criticism, as shown in the 
previous chapters. During the inspection crises from October 1997 to February 1998, however, 
three separate political strands coalesced into a coordinated movement large enough to rally 
Congressional and media support to discredit containment and pass the Iraq Liberation Act. 
These three strands were neoconservative intellectuals, Iraqi exiles in the INC, and a core of 
devoted Congressional staffers. The argument of this regime change movement was largely the 
same as in past years: the inevitable decline case that containment was not working and could not 
work against this type of regime. By 1998, however, events and trends had shifted to give their 
argument greater force. These changes included the confrontations with Iraq, the growing 
international isolation of the United States, and expanding apprehension in the United States 
about the threat of ballistic missiles and unconventional weapons wielded by rogue states. 
Skeptics of containment viewed the inspections crises from October 1997 to February 
1998 as evidence of the policy’s imminent collapse. Neoconservative writer David Wurmser 
complained that the United States had surrendered Iraq policy to “an amorphous, rudderless 
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international community” that was protecting Saddam from retaliation and driving U.N. policy to 
the lowest common denominator.100 Even containment’s defenders mocked the imposition of a 
travel ban as punishment for Iraq’s non-compliance in November 1997. The Washington Post 
editors, for example, wrote: “The world community, outraged, summons all of its courage and 
indignation and responds with…a travel ban on some Iraqi officials. No more shopping at 
Harrod’s for…Tariq Aziz, that’ll show ‘em.”101 Critics of containment also feared that as 
Saddam defied the United Nations and secured power at home, many countries would treat him 
as a permanent fixture and try to curry favor with him. Neoconservative commentators William 
Kristol and Robert Kagan described this inevitable demise as such: “Over time, containment of 
Saddam becomes ‘détente,’ and eventually détente becomes appeasement.”102  
This intractable cycle of crises intensified the sense that only Saddam’s removal would 
stop this draining dance. Paul Wolfowitz, for instance, argued in January 1998: “As long as he’s 
around he’s going to be back doing this, and we’re going to have to be back doing it over and 
over again. I think we have to develop a new political strategy that’s aimed at really liberating 
Iraq from this tyrannical monster.”103 Senator John McCain (R-AZ) put the point more starkly: 
“The nature of the regime of Saddam Hussein is impervious to any peaceful effort at resolution 
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of the ongoing conflict.”104 Kofi Annan’s MOU with Iraq further fueled the sense that the 
mendacity of the United Nations and France, Russia, and China was crippling Iraq policy. For 
example, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) told Clinton that Annan’s “appeasement” 
signaled the “beginning of the unraveling of the inspection process” by granting Saddam the 
“right to determine the scope of the inspections and the makeup of inspection teams.”105  
In this context, a political effort coalesced to shift U.S. policy from containment to 
regime change, building on Iraqi exile groups like the INC, a small group of Congressional 
staffers, and neoconservatives. Ahmed Chalabi’s INC changed its strategy after being run out of 
Northern Iraq by Saddam’s forces in 1996. From 1997 to 1998, Chalabi focused on convincing 
Congress and intellectual leaders to support regime change and back the INC.106 He built a small 
core of supporters, including Perle, Wurmser, Wolfowitz, and former Congressman Stephen 
Solarz (D-NY), who helped make political connections and raise funds. They set out to, in 
Perle’s words, create “a climate of opinion and a set of perceptions about Iraq” that would 
mobilize Congress and the public.107 Chalabi and the INC provided a Westernized, politically 
savvy opposition leader who could be backed as an alternative to containment and possibly to 
Saddam himself. Meyrav Wurmser, David Wurmser’s wife and a director of a conservative think 
tank on the Middle East, described Chalabi’s significance: “Ahmad came, and all of a sudden, 
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we had an angel…Here’s proof: Arabs can be Democrats.”108 As INC official Nabeel Musawi 
told ABC News: “We want real change, we want democratic change, we want elections, we want 
parliaments, we want to live the way you do.”109 
The second key source of this the political campaign against containment was a group of 
Congressional staffers for influential legislators. The main players were Stephen Rademaker, 
chief counsel to the House International Relations Committee, Danielle Pletka and Randy 
Scheunemann, foreign policy advisors to Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Trent Lott, respectively, and 
Chris Straub, an aide to Robert Kerrey (D-NE). They had long been dissatisfied with 
containment, and Clinton’s weak response to the inspections crises of 1997 and 1998 tipped 
them into action. Scheunemann later recalled that after the Annan deal with Iraq in February 
1998, “We Republicans…savaged Annan because it was clear…that Iraq was only going to do 
the minimum amount necessary, and that Clinton was looking for a way out.” As Clinton drifted 
into a weaker policy, it became critical, Scheunemann argued, to get an “on the record 
statement” of regime change.110 Many in this group knew and were impressed by Chalabi. In 
fact, Rademaker first drafted what became the Iraq Liberation Act on February 19, 1998 after 
meeting with Chalabi in Congress, although they decided to wait to introduce the bill.111 This 
group proved crucial for connecting the INC to powerful legislators who became vocal 
opponents of containment and eventually ushered the ILA through Congress. 
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Neoconservative intellectuals and activists formed the third main group in the political 
campaign against containment. Neoconservatives had long criticized containment, but in 1997 
and 1998 they organized far more effectively to influence the public debate and lobby Congress. 
In June 1997, William Kristol and Robert Kagan formed the Project for a New American 
Century (PNAC) with the goal of promoting an activist foreign policy against what they saw as 
Clinton’s weak multilateralism. Their founding statement of principles included high defense 
spending, global U.S. unipolarity, a more confrontational approach to geopolitical rivals, and the 
promotion of democracy and free markets.112 Prominent signers of PNAC’s founding statement 
included Richard Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Scooter Libby. PNAC rooted 
its worldview in the assumption that the main “present danger” facing the United States was not 
any specific threat but the risk that the United States would abandon its position of leadership in 
the liberal international system: 
The United States, the world’s dominant power on whom the maintenance of international  
peace and the support of liberal democratic principles depends, will shrink its responsibilities  
and-in a fit of absentmindedness, or parsimony, or indifference-allow the international order  
that it created and sustains to collapse.113 
 
PNAC was part of a web of neoconservative and conservative institutions that organized 
opposition to Clinton’s foreign policy and the containment of Iraq. These groups included the 
American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the Heritage Foundation, and the short-lived Committee for 
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Peace and Security in the Gulf (CPSG), founded by Stephen Solarz and Richard Perle.114 These 
organizations made connections to the INC and lobbied the Republican-controlled Congress to 
take tougher action on Iraq. 
During January and February 1998, PNAC and the CPSG wrote public letters to Clinton 
that laid out the inevitable decline case for replacing containment with regime change. The 
CPSG letter argued: “It is clear that this danger cannot be eliminated as long as our objective is 
simply ‘containment’” because “as the crises of recent weeks have demonstrated, these static 
policies are bound to erode, opening the way to Saddam’s eventual return to a position of 
power…in the region.”115 Both letters argued that allowing Saddam to possess WMD was 
unacceptable because he had used them before, he could employ them as a shield to enable 
aggressive actions, and his very possession of WMD would destabilize the region by 
encouraging other states to seek WMD. Because containment hinged on unreliable allies and 
Saddam’s own cooperation, the policy was “dangerously inadequate.”116 In line with the regime 
change consensus, the CPSG letter argued that “the problem is not only the specifics of 
Saddam’s actions, but the continued existence of the regime itself.”117 The PNAC letter drew 
many of the same signatories as the group’s founding statement, including Rumsfeld and 
Wolfowitz, while the CPSG letter drew supporters like Richard Armitage, Douglas Feith, 
Bernard Lewis, and Martin Peretz.   
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One key innovation in the inevitable decline case in this period was that containment and 
regime change had become incompatible strategies. Most of containment’s critics had supported 
Bush and Clinton’s covert regime change efforts and their attempts to maintain sanctions, 
inspections, and NFZs. By 1998, however, the chances of a coup were near zero and coalition 
partners were abandoning a tough line on Iraq. With inspections and sanctions jeopardized, the 
United States had an uncertain window of time to defeat Saddam before he gained WMD. Perle, 
for example, wrote: “If we do not develop a strategy for removing Saddam now, we may be 
unable to do so later. Once he is in possession of weapons of mass destruction, our options will 
have narrowed considerably.”118 Containment, with its emphasis on restraint and multilateralism, 
inhibited Clinton from taking the bold action needed to deal with the threat before it escalated. 
These critics also suspected that the Clinton administration was moving toward a posture of 
deterrence and limited containment that would accept Saddam developing some WMD and give 
up on overthrowing him. Congressman Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) called this ostensible shift “a 
silent U-turn” toward “bowing to the wishes of the French, the Russians, and the Chinese, who 
want to help Iraq lower the bar on UNSCOM inspections.”119 
 Regime change advocates believed they needed to arrest this drift, which meant openly 
declaring a regime change policy and backing the opposition with military training even if that 
alienated the coalition partners. In fact, regime change boosters believed that many U.S. partners 
did not support a tough policy on Iraq because they thought Clinton lacked the will to see it 
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through. Adopting a clear regime change policy and executing it boldly would rally the world 
behind the United States, as Wolfowitz argued: “A willingness to act unilaterally can be the most 
effective way of securing effective collective action.”120 Without such leadership, as another 
PNAC letter to Congressional leaders argued, “those nations living under the threat of Saddam’s 
weapons of mass destruction can be expected to adopt policies of accommodation.”121 
The interlocking threat of rogue states with WMD and ballistic missiles further 
intensified the urgency of regime change, especially among conservatives and neoconservatives. 
Missile defense activists lobbied Clinton to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, a 
1972 pact between the United States and the Soviet Union that limited the number of defensive 
anti-ballistic missiles each state could deploy. They argued that this treaty was a Cold War relic 
that inhibited the United States from protecting U.S. territory and bases from rogue states. They 
contended that these actors might not be deterrable and they would use those weapons to project 
power in strategic regions.122 House Majority Leader Newt Gingrich (R-GA), for instance, 
argued to Clinton: “Our nation’s policy of relying solely on offensive weapons to deter a nuclear 
missile attack from the Soviet Union has been overtaken by events. The Soviet Union no longer 
exists and our multiple adversaries…no longer play by the familiar Cold War rules.”123  
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In 1997, the Senate commissioned Donald Rumsfeld to lead a study of the ballistic 
missile threat. His team included Paul Wolfowitz and former CIA director R. James Woolsey. 
The report identified Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as active seekers of ballistic missiles who were 
within 5 years (10 for Iraq) of acquiring the ability to strike the United States. In a jab at the 
intelligence community, it concluded: “The threat to the U.S. posed by these emerging 
capabilities is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported…by the 
Intelligence Community.” The report warned that as these states developed stronger denial and 
deception techniques, the United States might have little warning before these missiles were 
deployed.124 On this interlocking threat, Clinton’s containment policy suffered from a deficit 
between its rhetoric and its policy. As Senator John Kerry argued,  
There is a disconnect between the depth of the threat Saddam Hussein presents to the world 
and what we are at the moment talking about doing. If he is as significant a threat as you 
heard him characterized by the president…then we have to be prepared to go the full 
distance, which is to do everything possible to disrupt his regime and to encourage the forces 
of democracy.125 
 
Furthermore, regime change advocates rooted their case in a specific understanding of the 
role of containment in the U.S. victory in the Cold War. Joshua Muravchik, a neoconservative 
working at AEI, wrote that contrary to the standard narrative, containment did not defeat the 
Soviets. In reality, communism was on the offensive in the 1970s until: “Ronald Reagan 
succeeded in reversing this momentum by adopting a policy of ‘containment-plus,’ the core of 
which was aid to anti-Communist insurgencies.126 Wolfowitz broadened this point: “The 
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communists, then, were defeated through our strong support of democracy, and by providing 
those willing to fight for their rights the means to win their freedom.”127 In this narrative, 
communism was destroyed “from outside the system” through Reagan’s intensification of the 
Cold War in areas like Latin America and Afghanistan. As crucial aspects of the Cold War 
triumph, regime change advocates also cited Reagan’s active human rights and democracy 
promotion, massive arms spending, moral rhetoric, support for anti-Communist insurgencies, as 
well as his refusal to treat the USSR as a permanent fixture in international politics.128  
Regime change boosters thus likened the containment of Iraq to détente in the Cold War. 
Many neoconservatives saw détente as an amoral reconciliation with a hostile, evil power that 
abused U.S. trust to catch up militarily and spread its global reach. As with Iraq in the 1990s, 
neoconservatives during the 1970s struggled against what they saw as the unprincipled realism 
of Kissinger, who sought to maintain a balance of power with the USSR while downplaying 
ideology. They also criticized the ostensibly feckless Mcgovernite liberals who opposed a strong 
military and an assertive foreign policy.129 Many of major critics of the containment of Iraq had 
fought against détente as Congressional aides in the 1970s, including Perle, Wolfowitz, and 
Feith, who all worked for the anti-détente Senator Henry Jackson (D-WA).130 The lesson of the 
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Cold War for Iraq was that the Baathists, like the Soviets, could not be moderated via indirect 
pressures and therefore needed to be removed with U.S. military and moral power.131  
A significant contingent of liberals and Democrats also turned against containment in the 
late 1990s. Powerful strains of liberal thought in this period focused on humanitarian 
intervention and R2P, or the right to protect.132 This doctrine held that a state’s right to 
sovereignty depended on how it treated its people, and if it committed or failed to stop genocide 
and other humanitarian disasters, external powers had the right to intervene.133 Liberals such as 
Senators Robert Kerrey and Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) were drawn to regime change by the goal 
of spreading democracy and protecting human rights, reflecting the broader liberal turn to 
humanitarian interventionism embodied by the emergence of R2P. For example, Kerrey argued 
in strongly moralistic terms that: “The existence of such a government is a daily affront to every 
freedom loving person, to everyone who is revolted by the degradation of our fellow human 
beings. I refuse to accept it.”134 Another reason many liberals backed regime change was the 
belief that Saddam’s brazen defiance of the Security Council undermined the credibility of the 
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United Nations, an institution they hoped would help foster a more peaceful and democratic 
global order.135 
Regime change advocates of all political stripes sought to seize the moral high ground by 
stressing the centrality of democracy and human rights to their strategy. Containment at best 
could bring about a coup and a new dictator, they claimed, but only the uprooting of the Baathist 
system and its replacement with a democracy could ensure the rights of the Iraqi people and 
remove the security threat. David Wurmser argued that the root of violence and tyranny in the 
Middle East was “the grip of centralized, totalitarian power and despotism.”136 A democratic 
Iraq, Kerrey argued, could “transform the Middle East” into a land of “security, prosperity, and 
creative diversity” by showing other Arab peoples that they did not have to tolerate despotism.137 
“The remaking of the Iraqi state,” claimed Middle Eastern scholar Fouad Ajami, was a matter of 
the U.S. national interest.138 
Regime change advocates frequently accused defenders of containment of believing that 
Arabs were unfit for democracy and undesiring of human rights.139 Ahmed Chalabi claimed that 
containment’s defenders held the “essentially racist view” that Arabs were “people who were 
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querulous and cannot reasonably govern themselves…that they deserve what they get.”140 This 
universalist argument had broad appeal in a post-Cold War era that had just witnessed waves of 
democratization in Europe, Latin America, and East Asia. The INC, moreover, bolstered this 
argument by portraying Iraqi society as bursting with democratic and economic potential. For 
instance, Chalabi told a neoconservative think tank in a 1997 speech: “Iraq is blessed with a 
talented and industrious population…it may fairly be described as the western world’s gateway 
to the non-Arab Muslim East.”141 INC leaders were living advertisements for this promise with 
their Western degrees, attire, and human rights language. They and their neoconservative allies 
developed a narrative of Iraqi history in which Iraq had once been guided by a civic-minded elite 
under the Hashemite monarchy and that ethnic conflict had not arisen until the Baathist era. They 
stressed that Iraq had a large population of well-educated, middle-class professionals who did not 
support Saddam and could be the core of a vibrant democracy and capitalist economy once the 
Baathists were eliminated.142  
Congressional Republicans, with the aid of hawkish Democrats, maintained the heat on 
Clinton’s Iraq policy throughout 1998. They wrote dozens of letters and held hearings on Iraq, 
most of which allowed prominent critics like Wolfowitz and Perle space to broadcast their 
arguments. In the fall of 1998, as Saddam renewed his open rebellion against the containment, 
the regime change movement rallied to pass the ILA. The bill passed 360-38 in the House on 
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October 5 and unanimously in the Senate on October 7. Its sponsors in the House were Benjamin 
Gilman and Christopher Cox (R-CA), while in the Senate its sponsors were Trent Lott, Robert 
Kerrey, Joseph Lieberman, John McCain, and several other Republicans.143  
 The ILA’s text reflected most of the main points of the case for regime change. It faulted 
Saddam for crimes against humanity, foreign aggression, and violations of his responsibilities 
under the U.N. resolutions. It declared an open regime change policy with a democratic Iraq as 
its goal: “It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime 
headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic 
government to replace that regime.” The ILA required that the President designate Iraqi 
opposition groups that would be eligible to receive aid as long as they represented a “broad 
spectrum” of Iraqi ethnic groups and committed to human rights, democracy, Iraq’s territorial 
integrity, and peaceful relations with neighbors. It then authorized but did not require him to 
provide up to $97 million per year in broadcasting assistance, humanitarian aid, the use of 
military equipment, and military training. The act also urged the president to establish an 
international criminal tribunal for the Baathist leadership.144 
 Stephen Rademaker later described the purpose of the ILA as “to declare a policy, and 
then it was to authorize, not require, a policy approach for the president that was basically the 
application of the Reagan Doctrine to Iraq.”145 Rademaker further argued that the ILA did not 
call: “for the U.S. to directly intervene in the of overthrow Saddam Hussein…It was not an 
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AUMF [authorization to use military force].”146 For that reason, the law included a caveat about 
the involvement of U.S. military forces in bringing about regime change: “Nothing in this Act 
shall be construed to authorize or otherwise speak to the use of United States Armed Forces…in 
carrying out this Act.”147 Randy Scheunemann later said that this rider was included to ensure “it 
was clear that we weren’t trying to create a back door to U.S. military intervention,” which 
would have been far more controversial.148 Thus, the ILA is best understood as an attempt to 
entrench certain principles about Iraq, such as the inadequacy of containment and the need for 
democracy, and to push Clinton toward a tougher approach. Its main sponsor in the House, 
Benjamin Gilman, described it as a way to “break this logjam” of repeated confrontations with 
no clear end point while establishing the principle that “Saddam is the problem, and there will be 
no permanent solution as long as his regime remains.”149 
 While Clinton did sign the ILA on October 31, 1998, he and most members of his 
administration opposed the open declaration of a regime change policy. Elizabeth Jones, the 
NEA’s Deputy Assistant Secretary at the time, recalled that the State Department:  
We did everything could to prevent that bill from being passed because we could not identify 
a way to assure that the people to whom that money was meant to go were legitimate and that 
the money would be properly used because the person who had talked the Congress into 
setting money aside for the Iraq Liberation Act was Chalabi, who we all thought to be a 
charlatan.150  
 
Jones claims that her office unsuccessfully argued to the NSC that Clinton should veto the bill 
but convinced Clinton that the United States should not hand cash to the INC but pay for its 
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legitimate, independently verified expenses.151 Furthermore, administration officials met 
privately with Congressional leaders to argue that openly declaring a regime change policy 
would make maintaining sanctions and inspections even harder because countries like France 
and Russia already believed the United States was acting too severely toward Iraq. The CIA and 
the Defense Department also objected to the ILA because they saw no feasible way of achieving 
regime change.152 Clinton issued a statement upon signing the ILA that endorsed its general 
principles but stressed that it was a non-binding resolution. He also distanced himself from 
regime change advocates’ call for massive aid to the INC, saying “U.S. support must be attuned 
to what the opposition can effectively make use of as it develops over time.”153 
The conditionalist approach to containment also went through important changes during 
the late 1990s. This school of thought had often criticized Bush and Clinton for the way that they 
pursued containment, but they agreed with the premises and broad structure of the policy. As the 
inevitable decline critics made their push for regime change in 1998, conditional thinkers 
increasingly became containment’s defenders in the public square. Like Clinton, they highlighted 
the successes of inspections and sanctions in destroying the majority of Saddam’s WMD and 
preventing Iraq’s military recovery.154 They believed that these tools would only remain viable if 
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the United States kept the international community on board and avoided unilateral moves.155 
Furthermore, they saw the Iraqi opposition as divided, ineffective, and lacking in influence in 
Iraq, which made them too risky to back in a real attempt at toppling Saddam.156 In addition, they 
argued that, in Richard Haass’ terms, the removal of Saddam would not be the “panacea that 
many people suggest. The problems of Iraq go beyond Saddam Hussein.”157 Years of 
deprivation, trauma from decades of authoritarianism, crumbling infrastructure, and growing 
ethno-sectarian conflict would persist, conditionalists argued, even if Saddam could be removed. 
They concluded that the risks of overthrowing Saddam and inheriting these problems outweighed 
the considerable yet known costs of containment.158  
Members of the conditionalist school, of course, knew they had to answer the charge that 
while Saddam may be somewhat restrained now, inevitably containment would collapse and 
unleash him. To counter this argument, they held that the United States should moderate its 
expectations about what could be achieved vis a vis Iraq. The United States needed a policy that 
could protect U.S. interests and security without requiring the risky and difficult task of toppling 
Saddam. Containment, Haass argued, fit this bill: “If all this leads to a change in Iraq’s 
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leadership, so much the better. But the advantage of containment over the alternatives is that it 
protects our core interests even if Saddam manages to hang on.”159  
Sticking with containment, moreover, meant that the United States might have to accept 
Saddam having some WMD capability. “Even the most unfettered and effective 
UNSCOM/IAEA effort cannot prevent Iraq from conducting important covert efforts and from 
retaining and/or developing some ‘break out’ capabilities,” argued defense analyst Anthony 
Cordesman.160 A key problem was that Iraq’s modern pharmaceutical and chemical 
infrastructure could be shifted to weapons production relatively easily and covertly, and the 
United Nations could not prevent Iraq from developing any capacity in these areas. Saddam was 
aggressive and brutal, but the historical record showed: “Saddam is unlikely to attack any 
country we are clearly committed to defend,” which “probably means he can be deterred,” as 
Michael O’Hanlon argued.161 For the conditionalist school, the best path was to accept some risk, 
restrain Iraq on more serious technologies like nuclear weapons and ICBMs, and take a clear 
deterrent stance against the deployment or use of WMD. 
Defenders of containment offered a number of ways that the policy might be adjusted to 
new conditions rather than abandoned. Kenneth Pollack, a scholar of Middle Eastern politics 
who was hired by the NSC in 1999, argued that the very toughness of containment had sparked 
France, Russia, China, and many Arab states to oppose the policy. Pollack contended: “If we are 
going to keep containment this strong and this comprehensive, we will have to…make very 
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significant sacrifices on other issues to hold it together.” The United States, Pollack argued, 
could shift to a policy of “narrow containment” that could get the coalition’s cooperation on 
inspections and military sanctions while conceding on non-military investment and trade and the 
flight bans on Iraqi citizens.162 If the inspectors could verify full Iraqi compliance on WMD, the 
United States should permit unlimited oil exports while maintaining U.N. control over the funds 
generated by those sales.163 Moreover, if the United States has to bomb Iraq, it should put no 
time limit on the campaign, forcing Iraqi generals, in Haass’ words, “to calculate that he better 
take the risk of taking on his own regime.”164 Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brzezinksi likewise 
suggested adjustments like easing of sanctions on non-military goods, repairing relations with 
Iran to maintain Iraq’s isolation, and greater humanitarian aid.165 
Conditionalist thinkers based their case on a view of the Cold War that stressed the role 
of containment’s firmness, flexibility, and restraint in the U.S. victory. If the United States could 
contain the massive, nuclear-armed Soviets for 45 years, they could certainly do so with the 
vastly weaker Iraqis. Over time, they argued, containment exacerbated fissures and flaws within 
the Communist bloc that eventually sparked the system’s collapse. Haass, for example, identified 
one lesson of the Cold War as: “Kennan’s original formulation teaches us something else. A 
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successful containment policy can set in motion forces that lead to the demise of the regime.”166 
Brent Scowcroft and James Baker recalled, moreover, that during the 1970s neoconservatives, 
like contemporary Iraq hawks, fretted that the Soviet Union would soon overtake the United 
States when it was actually was suffering crippling internal weaknesses.167 
This point about the Cold War hints at a persistent problem facing the conditionalist 
school in the late 1990s. How would Saddam Hussein be defeated? How and when would 
containment end? Conditionalist thinkers mainly offered the same answer as they had since the 
Gulf War: box Saddam in and create pressures that might lead the Iraqi elite to move against 
him.168 As Saddam recovered from the Gulf War and eroded his economic and diplomatic 
isolation, however, this outcome seemed less and less plausible, especially with no viable 
domestic opposition in Iraq. The essential problem with the conditionalist approach to 
containment was that its advocates increasingly operated within the regime change consensus. 
Just like the majority of policy-makers, politicians, and intellectuals, they generally believed that 
the only way out with Saddam was his removal from power. Henry Kissinger, for example, had 
long promoted a tough containment policy, but he concluded in November 1998: “The ultimate 
issue in the Persian Gulf is not inspections but the government in Baghdad,” which needed to be 
overthrown.169 The best that containment’s defenders could do in the public discourse was argue 
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that containment was acceptable for the foreseeable future and that no responsible means of 
regime change existed.  
One additional reason that the conditionalist approach to containment garnered less 
support in the late 1990s was that one of its main tools, sanctions, drew increasing criticism from 
the humanitarian school of thought. This group had argued since the Gulf War that sanctions 
were causing a health crisis in Iraq and that the United States should focus on alleviating this 
disaster. In the late 1990s, this movement gained momentum, particularly when Denis Halliday 
and Hans von Sponeck, successive U.N. Humanitarian Coordinators for Iraq, resigned in protest 
in 1998 and 2000. Halliday and von Sponeck objected in particular to the Anglo-American 
blocking of important health and infrastructure-related goods and materials for import into Iraq, 
which they viewed as caution bordering on cruelty.170 Oil-for-food led to a significant economic 
recovery in Iraq, including the doubling of the GDP from 1997-2000, the stabilization of food 
prices, and significant increases in daily calorie intake for the average Iraqi.171 These gains, 
however, were unequally distributed and the health crisis was not fully resolved.172 UNICEF 
reported in 1999 that maternal and child mortality remained high, with an average rate of 131 
deaths per 1000 live births from 1994-1999.173 Economic recovery remained a dream for the 
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majority of Iraqis who suffered from high inflation, the collapse of government services, and the 
absence of decent jobs.174  
The Clinton administration received dozens of letters from Arab-American, medical, 
religious, and charity groups calling for the lifting of sanctions.175 Although many politicians 
avoided criticizing sanctions for fear of looking soft on Iraq, more liberal Democrats declared 
that the sanctions should be eased because they allowed Saddam “to exploit the suffering of his 
people to his political advantage.”176 They held numerous Congressional hearings in the late 
1990s to give anti-sanctions activist a public platform. Some legislators from farm states, 
including Chuck Hagel (R-NE) who wanted to re-open the Iraqi market to exports also started to 
criticize the sanctions.177 Many critics pointed out that the sanctions were strengthening Saddam 
at home because he could use the rationing system to increase his control over civilian life and 
shift blame for domestic problems to outsiders.178 These critics argued that oil-for-food was 
inadequate because even though it enabled some relief, the United States still blocked equipment 
and materials needed to restore Iraq’s electric, sanitary, and medical infrastructures out of fear 
that those goods would might have WMD-related uses. They generally pressed for “de-linking,” 
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or the lifting of sanctions that hurt the civilian population and the maintenance of military and 
WMD-related restrictions.179 
The Clinton administration responded with a public relations campaign to defend 
sanctions and oil-for-food as crucial policy tools while pinning the blame for Iraq’s health crisis 
on the Baathists. A State/CIA report made public in 1998 charged Iraq with inflating mortality 
statistics and showed that Saddam had constructed eight new palace complexes since 1991 at a 
cost of $2 billion. Saddam had spent another $2 billion between 1992 and 1997 draining swamps 
in Southern Iraq to destroy what had become a sanctuary for Shia insurgents. The Iraqi elite was 
also smuggling in luxury cars, yachts, and top-shelf liquor. In a country suffering from a potable 
water crisis, this report observed that one of Saddam’s palaces had artificial lakes, moats, and a 
15-foot tall indoor waterfall.180 The administration further noted that Iraq by 1999 was exporting 
oil at a pre-Gulf War rates through oil-for-food but was not purchasing and distributing adequate 
resources to its people. It noted that in Northern Iraq, where U.N. and Kurdish agencies 
facilitated distribution, mortality rates had plummeted whereas they remained high in the 
Baathist-controlled center and south.181  
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In addition, U.S. officials cited U.N. reports that showed that Iraq had kept $200m worth 
of much-needed medicine in warehouses and had tried to re-export food and medicine for the 
state’s gain.182 The administration concluded: “Ultimately, Baghdad’s deliberate policy choices 
are responsible for any increase in mortality rates.”183 In general, most figures in the Iraq debate 
agreed that the Iraq government was responsible for this crisis. Nevertheless, by the late 1990s 
the sanctions policy, like containment as a whole, was increasingly squeezed between inevitable 
decline critics who saw it as ineffective and humanitarian critics who saw it as immoral. The 
conditionalist approach was losing supporters to both of these groups, leaving few in the public 
square who still argued that containment could be successfully adapted to new circumstances. 
The Rollback Alternative to Containment 
 Regime change supporters had suggested since the Gulf War that the United States 
should help Iraqi opposition groups foment an uprising against Saddam’s regime. This idea did 
not become a coherent strategy until the late 1990s when the INC and its neoconservative allies 
developed the rollback plan as a means of achieving regime change. Rollback became a central 
part of the campaign against containment because it provided an alternative strategy that 
promised, at low risk to the United States, Saddam’s downfall and a democratic Iraq. It 
countered Clinton’s argument that there was no intermediate strategy between containing 
Saddam and a complete invasion of the country. Critics of rollback, however, believed it would 
lead to a bloodbath in Iraq and the direct involvement of U.S. military forces.  
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The concept of rollback as a strategy originated in the perception during the Cold War 
that containment was a passive strategy that did not put sufficient pressure on Communist 
governments. The term comes from the early Cold War, when starting in 1948 the CIA sought to 
undermine Communist control of Eastern bloc countries by supporting “politico-psychological 
relations,” sabotage, and the creation of cadres of resistance fighters in Eastern Europe.184 This 
policy became popular among Republicans who wanted a tougher approach to the Cold War than 
containment. Future secretary of state John Foster Dulles endorsed the idea during the 1952 
campaign as a strategy of “liberation” of the “captive peoples” of Eastern Europe.185 Still, by the 
time Dwight Eisenhower took office in 1953, rollback had produced little more than the deaths 
of hundreds of exiles who had been smuggled into the Eastern Bloc. Eisenhower and Dulles 
quickly soured on this version of rollback and ceased operations by 1954.186  
Rollback was revived in the 1980s under the Reagan Doctrine, which pledged support to 
anti-communist insurgencies in places like Afghanistan and Nicaragua to challenge Soviet 
influence in the developing world and to destabilize governments allied with the Soviets.187 In 
keeping with their narrative of the Cold War, categorical critics of containment believed these 
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insurgencies had contributed to Soviet retrenchment in the mid-late 1980s.188 Congressman Dana 
Rohrabacher (R-CA), for instance, claimed in regard to the Cold War: “The Communists, then, 
were defeated through our strong support of democracy, and by providing those willing to fight 
for their rights the means to win their freedom.”189 They wanted to reapply the concept to Iraq, 
and when the INC started working on rollback in the early 1990s, they drew on the help of 
former military and intelligence personnel who had been involved with the Reagan Doctrine.190 
The rollback plan for Iraq would start with the United States recognizing the INC as the 
legitimate provisional government of Iraq. The next step was to create opposition bases in areas 
of northern and southern Iraq protected by the NFZ’s. The United States would lift sanctions in 
these areas and unfreeze Iraqi assets to help the opposition to build support and military strength. 
The United States would then provide money, military training, supplies, and weaponry, 
including anti-air and anti-tank weapons. U.S. military forces would defend these “safe havens” 
from Saddam as the opposition developed. The INC, in turn, would foster a broader resistance 
movement in Iraq, uniting the Kurdish parties of the north and Shia groups in the south who 
would provide most of the manpower for the fight against Saddam. The INC hoped to gather 
around 10,000 light infantry soldiers as the “nucleus” of this offensive as well as several elite 
units that would counter Iraqi tanks and special forces.191 
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Once the opposition had gained enough strength, they would take the offensive against 
the Baathist regime. Under what they called the “Afghan approach,” the INC envisioned 
insurgent attacks on military outposts and the steady expansion of enclaves of opposition control. 
This process, they argued, would draw defectors, delegitimize the Iraqi government, and possibly 
spark a coup or urban rebellion against Saddam. At some point, rollback supporters claimed the 
regime would collapse, although the specific mechanism for this outcome was often unclear.192  
One key assumption underlying this strategy was that Saddam’s regime held on to power 
through sheer terror alone and that morale in the army was abysmal. The plan also assumed that 
the Iraqi population’s seething hatred for the Saddam needed only direction and protection to 
overthrow the regime.193 Another variant of rollback envisioned a massive U.S. air offensive 
against the Iraqi military, security services, and communications infrastructure that would 
crippled the state and allow the insurgency to sweep toward the capital. Eliot Cohen, a prominent 
defender of this air-power approach, argued that the Gulf War air campaign had shown how 
vulnerable the Iraqi state was when its ability to communicate with its security forces was 
severed. With the more precise weaponry developed since the Gulf War, he argued, rollback was 
even more feasible by late 1990’s.194 
  Rollback’s most enthusiastic supporters in U.S. politics were neoconservatives and 
Republican Congressmen. The 1998 CPSG letter to Clinton endorsed rollback, calling for safe 
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havens inside Iraq, military aid to the opposition, “a systematic air campaign” against the Iraqi 
Republican Guard, and the positioning of U.S. ground forces to be ready to “protect and assist 
the anti-Saddam forces” as a “last resort.”195 This letter was one of dozens of articles, speeches, 
and Congressional hearings in which regime change advocates pushed rollback as a viable 
alternative to containment.196 The INC and many of its U.S. supporters made grandiose promises 
about rollback. For example, Ahmed Chalabi told a Senate hearing in March 1998: 
Give the Iraqi National Congress a base, protected from Saddam’s tanks, give us the  
temporary support we need to feed and house and care for the liberated population,  
and we will give you a free Iraq, an Iraq free of weapons of mass destruction, and a  
free market Iraq. Best of all the INC will do all this for free. The U.S. commitment to  
the security of the gulf is sufficient. The maintenance of the no-fly-zones and the air  
interdiction of Saddam’s armor by U.S. forces assumed in the INC plan is virtually in  
place.197 
 
Chalabi added that this plan would take “only a matter of months” and that Iraqi oil wealth 
would pay for reconstruction.198 
Despite these promises, rollback came under heavy criticism from supporters of the 
conditionalist approach to containment. These critics identified massive military problems with 
the strategy, including the difficulty of providing permanent air cover for small, weak ground 
forces and the challenge of providing close air support as opposition forces tried to seize cities. 
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The flat, open desert of southern Iraq was terrible terrain for starting an insurgency, and it 
favored the movement of Saddam’s tanks.199 Rollbacks’ detractors also feared that if the plan 
went poorly, the United States would have to choose between entering a wider war against 
Saddam and allowing the opposition to be crushed. U.S. CENTCOM Commander Anthony Zinni 
called this scenario the “Bay of Goats,” invoking an Iraqi version of the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco. 
He argued that rollback could lead to heavy U.S. losses, ethnic civil war or fragmentation, and 
U.S. occupation of parts or all of Iraq.200 A classified war game commissioned by Zinni in 1999, 
entitled “Desert Crossing,” concluded that even if Saddam was overthrown, the aftermath would 
probably be chaotic and bloody as various factions competed for power and carried out 
vendettas. The United States, this study stressed, would be better off distancing itself from this 
situation.201 Lastly, rollback’s opponents conceded that the regular Iraqi army might be weak, but 
they viewed the Republican Guard and other elite units as competent and motivated to fight for 
Saddam.202  
Critics also noted important political flaws in the rollback strategy. Richard Haass argued 
that the Sunni population, especially the elite, dreaded what might happen if Saddam fell to a 
mostly Shia and Kurdish rebellion. This segment of the population, he claimed, would probably 
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rally to Saddam against an insurgency or at best stay on the sidelines like they did in the post-
Desert Storm uprisings.203 Kenneth Pollack, who co-authored an influential Foreign Affairs 
article in 1999 against rollback, predicted that this strategy would lead to a “bloodbath” and that 
“it would be criminal for the U.S. to go ahead and back these people.”204 Furthermore, critics 
noted that rollback would need the equivalent of a Pakistan for the Afghan insurgency: a 
compliant ally bordering the target that could funnel supplies and personnel to the opposition.205 
Rollback would need Turkey to play this role in the north, but they would oppose any scheme 
that might strengthen Kurdish separatism on their border. Moreover, key states like Saudi Arabia 
and the Gulf monarchies would probably oppose a strategy designed to establish a Shia-
dominated government in Iraq that might align with Iran.206 Lastly, rollback’s critics, especially 
the Clinton administration, believed that this strategy would seriously damage the international 
coalition behind containment, undermining sanctions and inspections.207 
Numerous politicians and intellectuals, especially Democrats and liberals, who backed 
the ILA and the regime change consensus did not endorse rollback for many of these reasons. 
Legislators like Robert Kerrey, Charles Robb (D-VA), and Lee Hamilton (D-IN), for example, 
viewed rollback as unrealistic and risky.208 In sum, while the U.S. political world was ever more 
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convinced that only Saddam’s removal could end the threat from Iraq, the rollback debate 
showed the persistence of deep divisions on how to achieve that goal and how much to risk in the 
process. Rollback also marked the outside edge of what regime change proponents could call for 
in strategic terms. Even the plan’s most vehement supporters labored to show that it would be 
low-risk and low-cost to the United States. The idea of openly advocating the use of ground 
troops to achieve regime change was still a red line on both sides of the debate.209  
The Anti-Climax: Iraq Policy after Desert Fox, 1999-2000 
After reaching a fever pitch in 1998, the debate over Iraq policy entered an anti-climactic 
stage for Clinton’s last two years in office. With the ejection of inspectors in December 1998, 
containment needed adjustments to remain viable. The Clinton administration considered 
shifting to a more active regime change position after the exhausting year of confrontations with 
Iraq. Nevertheless, they found no reasonable, cost-effective way of reaching this goal. They 
ended up sticking with containment, calibrating the policy to new realities, and doing just enough 
for regime change to fend off domestic critics. 
Before Desert Fox in late 1998, the administration concluded that they must break the 
cycle of confrontations with Saddam. The old approach was not “sustainable in the long run,” 
Sandy Berger argued in December 1998, because “the longer the standoff, continues, the harder 
it will be to maintain international support.”210 The administration therefore adopted the position 
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that they would not push to get inspectors back into Iraq unless there was high assurance of Iraqi 
cooperation and robust international backing. For example, Clinton told Blair at the end of 
Desert Fox that the United States would only support readmission after “concrete, affirmative, 
and demonstrable action by Iraq showing that it will provide full cooperation.”211 Until a strong 
inspection regime could be reinstituted, the United States would pursue a policy based on three 
“red lines” that would trigger the use of force. The first line was threatening or attacking his 
neighbors. The second was attacking the Kurdish zone in Northern Iraq. The third line would be 
triggered if the United States found clear evidence of Iraq reconstituting or deploying WMD.212   
The year of confrontations with Iraq enhanced the administration’s hardening belief that 
only Saddam’s removal would end the threat and motivated them to explore new ways of 
achieving this end. Berger’s NSC staff and Martin Indyk’s Near East Office reviewed Iraq policy 
in early 1999 with the hope of finding better ways to pressure Iraq, but they found massive 
obstacles to a tougher strategy. The CIA did not want to try bold operations in Iraq after the 
fiascoes of the mid-1990s, and the military viewed invasion as the only way to defeat Saddam. 
Moreover, no one in the administration trusted the Iraqi opposition enough to make them the 
centerpiece of their strategy.213 When the Kosovo crisis erupted in March 1999, the Clinton 
administration turned their attention to this conflict, which eventually led to a three-month 
bombing campaign against Serbia. By the time they returned to Iraq later in the year, the 
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administration was not keen on another risky foreign policy adventure, especially as Clinton 
made the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) the focus of his remaining months in office.214 
Furthermore, many in the administration believed that the Iraqi threat was not serious enough to 
merit an effort at regime change. Intelligence reports stated that Iraqi conventional military 
strength had actually deteriorated since 1994. One report predicted that Iraq’s military 
capabilities would continue “a slow and steady decline as long as both economic sanctions and 
the arms embargo are maintained.” It also judged that “smuggling and other efforts to 
circumvent the embargo will be inadequate to halt the trend.”215  
As for WMD, the intelligence agencies assessed that Saddam’s intentions about building 
WMD had not changed, but he was still nearly a decade from having a nuclear weapon and a 
viable missile delivery system.216 One 1999 National Intelligence Council (NIC) report judged 
that with foreign assistance he could have an ICBM capacity within 15 years, but this report also 
viewed China, North Korea, and Iran as more immediate ballistic missile threats.217 Intelligence 
reports in the late 1990s did suggest that Iraq was “revitalizing its BW program” and maintaining 
a breakout capacity for chemical weapons, although these reports could not assess whether it had 
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actually produced biological or chemical weapons.218 In the administration’s view, Saddam’s 
overall weakness left little reason to make regime change an urgent priority.219 
 Some Clinton officials described the post-Desert Fox strategy as “containment-plus,” 
with the plus being enhanced covert efforts to topple Saddam.220 What actual policy changes 
emerged from this new label are hard to define, as many Clinton officials have admitted.221 The 
administration continued to defend containment from 1999 to 2000 even as they offered 
rhetorical homages to regime change. Walter Slocombe, the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Policy, claimed in March 1999: “What we are working to do is to help create the political and 
military conditions that will permit a successful change of the regime.”222 While the 
administration played up the novelty of this approach for political reasons, the idea of 
establishing conditions that might lead to Saddam’s ouster through the actions of Iraqis had been 
central to Bush and Clinton’s Iraq policies since the Gulf War. They mostly emphasized, as 
Albright did in early 2000, that containment was managing the problem well enough: “I think we 
have been successful in keeping him in his box in terms of the threat to the region.”223 
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One significant escalation in U.S. Iraq policy following Desert Fox was the 
intensification of the air war in the NFZs in Northern and Southern Iraq. In January 1999, Iraqi 
forces increased anti-air attacks and other provocations against U.S. and British forces. The 
United States and Great Britain responded by expanding the rules of engagement to allow planes 
to strike any air defense or related communications site, not just “the particular source of the 
violation or the source of the threat.”224 Coalition air forces were given wider latitude to respond 
aggressively to Iraq provocations such as anti-aircraft fire or radar lock-ons.225 The deployments 
required to maintain this “forgotten war,” as journalist Thomas Ricks called it, cost over $1 
billion per year, involving 200 aircraft, 19 warships, and 22,000 military personnel.226 The 
administration viewed this campaign as a way to keep Saddam weak and off-balance, but they 
adamantly disassociated it from regime change. As State Department spokesman Richard 
Boucher stated in 2000: “There is no relationship between enforcement of the no-fly-zones and 
the United States’ regime change policy for Iraq.”227 One major reason they did not want to 
further escalate the air war was the fear of a U.S. pilot being shot down and captured by Iraq. 
Saddam was offering $14,000 per person to any unit that captured a U.S. pilot, whom he would 
use to extort concessions from the United States.228 
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 The Clinton administration also believed that rollback was an unrealistic plan.229 The 
sight of General Zinni criticizing rollback was widely interpreted as a sign of the 
administration’s negative view of the strategy.230 As for the ILA, Pollack recalls that the 
administration: “did comply with the letter of the Iraq Liberation Act, but in spirit we ignored 
it.”231 In keeping with the ILA’s requirements, the State Department did designate nine 
opposition groups, including the INC, as eligible to receive U.S. military aid. They also 
appointed diplomat Frank Ricciardone as an official liaison to the opposition.232 Clinton officials 
argued that they might someday provide military aid to the opposition, but first they would focus 
on building the INC’s capacity to effectively use aid and lead the fractious opposition.233 The 
United States did provide legal and managerial training, aid for the INC’s work on Baathist 
crimes, computers and other office supplies, and diplomatic efforts to heal rifts among the 
opposition groups.234 The INC ultimately received about $2 million worth of aid of this nature 
but no weapons or military equipment and minimal military training.235 
The State Department and the CIA in particular were wary of offering money or military 
aid to the opposition. Elizabeth Jones, whose office at the State Department was responsible for 
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handling INC requests for funding, recalls that they staunchly refused to hand the INC cash and 
demanded of Chalabi: “If you can show us the soldiers you are training, we will pay them, not 
you.” Jones had worked with the Afghan mujahedin the 1980s, and she said that the INC never 
came up with a “muj equivalent” beyond about 25 men who showed up to be trained at a Polish 
base.236 The INC held a conference for the disparate opposition groups in October 1999, but it 
collapsed in internecine squabbling. By 2000 the opposition was in disarray and the 
administration had lost interest in organizing the opposition.237 
One persistent challenge for U.S. policy following Desert Fox was the continuing erosion 
of sanctions. Illicit trade between Iraq and its neighbors surged during and after 1999, including 
the opening of an oil pipeline between Iraq and Syria, which provided the Iraqi government with 
another $1-2 billion in 2000.238 Iraq tried to widen the split in the coalition by selectively signing 
oil-for-food contracts with countries who called for the end of sanctions. France, Russia, and 
China, for instance, received a third of all oil-for-food contracts.239 The State Department 
estimated that the Iraqi government took in at least $1 billion per year in revenue from 
smuggling, kickbacks, and other sources. However, they stressed that before sanctions were 
imposed in 1990 Iraq received an average of around $10 billion per year from the oil trade.240 All 
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major U.S. partners still accepted the withholding of revenues from Iraqi oil exports, which had 
been Saddam’s primary source of funds.  
 In contrast to the inevitable decline critics’ desire to scrap multilateral restraints and 
embrace regime change, the Clinton administration continued to treat containment and regime 
change as compatible goals. Thus, keeping the international coalition on board with sanctions 
and the re-insertion of inspectors was a crucial goal after Desert Fox. In contrast to their rhetoric 
in domestic politics, in international diplomacy the administration conveyed flexibility on 
sanctions. Clinton told Blair, for instance, in October 1999: “Now I am prepared to say that if he 
meets his disarmament obligations and puts a system in place where he's complying, I would be 
prepared to suspend sanctions and liberalize the oil-for-food program.” Clinton then said that in 
order to lift the oil export ban he would need a tough inspections and monitoring regime because: 
“our guys here in Congress, even the Democrats, are attacking me because I haven’t done 
enough to get rid of him. I think they will eat me alive if I agree to lift sanctions while he has his 
weapons program going on.”241 The administration also wanted to reduce import restrictions on 
Iraq for non-military or dual-use items in order to, in Elizabeth Jones’ words, “get rid of the 
argument that the U.S. was responsible for the deprivation in Iraq.”242 
The centerpiece of Clinton’s post-Desert Fox diplomacy was the push to pass a Security 
Council resolution to create a new inspection agency and specify what Iraq had to do to earn 
sanctions relief. The drafting process for this resolution dragged out during 1999. France, Russia, 
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and China believed that Saddam had virtually no proscribed weapons left and proposed that the 
oil export ban be lifted once Iraq simply accepted inspectors into their territory. These nations 
also proposed an inspection regime with far less independence than UNSCOM.243 The United 
States originally wanted to reinsert UNSCOM and demanded that sanctions only be eased if the 
inspectors verified full Iraqi compliance.244 This impasse was broken in the spring of 1999 when 
Great Britain and the Netherlands proposed that UNSCOM be completely replaced by a new 
agency. They also proposed that instead of lifting sanctions, the Security Council should abolish 
the cap on oil-for-food sales, hopefully allowing Iraq to import more food and medicine.245 
Further disputes at the United Nations delayed the passage of Security Council 
Resolution 1284 until December 17, 1999. This resolution removed the ceiling on oil-for-food 
sales and relaxed some import controls on medical, agricultural, and educational supplies for 
Iraq. It also created the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission 
(UNMOVIC), a new inspections agency empowered to verify Iraq compliance on WMD. If 
UNMOVIC verified compliance, the Security Council would then vote to suspend sanctions. 
This suspension would have to be renewed every 120 days, giving the United Nations a chance 
to punish Iraq if it reneged.246 U.S. hopes that this resolution would symbolize a new unity in the 
international coalition were dashed when France decided to abstain at the last minute after 
learning that Russia and China planned to abstain as well. France feared that voting for this 
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resolution would put them at a disadvantage in making economic deals with Iraq.247 The United 
States was further chagrined when France, Russia, and China vetoed Kofi Annan’s appointment 
of former UNSCOM chief Rolf Ekeus to lead UNMOVIC because he had a reputation for being 
too tough.248 Instead, Annan proposed IAEA director Hans Blix, whom the United States thought 
might be too lenient but voted for anyways to make sure UNMOVIC could function at all.249 
The aftermath of Resolution 1284’s passage was its own anti-climax because Iraq refused 
to accept the new inspection regime and the United States did not press it to do so. The result 
was policy drift and the continued atrophying of Iraq’s constraints. France, Russia, and China did 
their best throughout 2000 to weaken UNMOVIC, mandating that all UNMOVIC members be 
U.N. employees, which barred a number of non-U.N. experts with extensive experience.250 The 
United States continued to permit the loosening of restrictions on exports into Iraq, including 
$1.2 billion in oil industry equipment needed to revive Iraqi oil production.251 In the fall of 2000, 
France, Russia, and several other countries permitted civilian flights into Iraq, claiming that the 
air embargo was not meant to apply to civilians. Iraq’s economic re-integration continued, with 
one trade fair in November 2000 attracting 20 foreign economics ministers and over a thousand 
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firms.252 Although it did not control these revenues, licit Iraqi oil sales reached $16 billion in 
2000, four times more than 1997.253 
Boosters of regime change and rollback excoriated Clinton’s post-Desert Fox policy as a 
failure to follow through on the ILA. Trent Lott and a number of prominent legislators wrote to 
Clinton repeatedly to protest the “continued drift” and “reduced priority” of Iraq policy since 
Desert Fox. Lott further argued: “In providing authority for a military drawdown, it was our 
intention to train and equip a force dedicated to bringing democracy to Iraq.”254 Clinton had not 
taken concrete steps toward this goal, and regime change advocates mocked the provision of 
furniture, computers, and office supplies to the INC as evidence of an unserious policy.255 These 
critics also disliked Clinton’s support of Security Council Resolution 1284, which they saw as 
rewarding Iraq and demonstrating yet again Clinton’s caving to the lowest common denominator 
of the United Nations. They argued that the continual reforming of the sanctions simply watered 
them down and prevented them from imposing real restrains on the Iraqi regime.256 By the time 
the presidential election started to heat up in the summer of 2000, most critics of containment 
concluded that Clinton, in Senator Sam Brownback’s (R-KS) words, “had absolutely no intent of 
implementing the provisions” of the ILA.257 They reserved their hopes for a serious regime 
change strategy for the next administration. 
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Conclusion: Containment as of November 2000 
With the loss of the inspectors and the erosion of sanctions, the United States after Desert 
Fox faced a choice between modulating containment to fit new conditions or intensifying the 
effort for regime change. The Clinton administration essentially chose to modulate while, in an 
updated version of the Clinton fudge, it told domestic audiences that no normalization with Iraq 
would occur while Saddam remained in power. The inevitable decline critics of containment 
wanted a new and intensified focus on regime change, even at the expense of the pillars of 
containment, which they saw as confining and ineffective. These critics failed to change the 
actual policy, but they made massive gains in the political and public debate as events vis-à-vis 
Iraq played into their hands. The successive inspections crises from 1997-1998 bolstered their 
case that containment not working and could not work in terms of changing Saddam’s behavior 
or regime. This shift helped entrench the regime change consensus in U.S. politics, even among 
defenders of containment. Increasingly, the conditionalist case had shifted to moderating goals, 
downplaying the threat, adjusting the tools, and hoping for something to happen that would solve 
the Saddam problem. This argument depended heavily on a security atmosphere in which 
Saddam’s threat was still largely in the future and in which the U.S. people felt secure from a 
certain type of threat: rogue states that sought WMD and ballistic missiles, cultivated ties to 
terrorism, and viewed the United States as a major strategic enemy. 
Furthermore, in Clinton’s second term containment’s defenders were wedged between an 
increasingly powerful inevitable decline case against containment and the humanitarian critics 
who wanted to undo sanctions. As a result, the conditionalist school was reduced to an ever-
                                                        
257 Sam Brownback, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Liberation of Iraq: A Progress Report, June 28, 
2000, 1. For similar criticism, see: Frank Murkowski, “Our Toothless Policy on Iraq,” Washington Post, January 25, 
1999, A21; Jim Hoagland, “Virtual Policy,” Washington Post, March 7, 1999, B7; Richard Perle, Senate Armed 
Services Committee, U.S. Policy Toward Iraq, 77-78; Kerrey, Cong. Rec., March 2, 2000, 2053. 
 272 
shrinking range in U.S. political and intellectual life, consisting mainly of realists, some liberal 
internationalists, and members of the State, Defense, and intelligence establishments. They had 
to be willing to argue for a restrained, tough, and flexible policy that risked both Saddam’s return 
to regional power and humanitarian damage to the Iraqi people. They had to defend a policy that 
pleased no one and solved few problems; indeed, containment hardly claimed it could solve 
problems like Saddam. For Richard Haass, this point inhered in containment, which “is not 
meant to be a solution. It is a mechanism for management.”258 This pinching of the conditionalist 
approach left the policy exceedingly vulnerable in the public square. 
Even so, in the midst of a tense Senate committee meeting in 1998, Senator Charles Robb 
grilled Ahmed Chalabi on rollback and ultimately found the strategy unrealistic. He concluded 
“The Iraqi people would be far better off in a post-Saddam environment than they are today. I do 
not think anyone would question that. The means to accomplish that objective are disputed.”259 
This statement captures the state of policy and public debate on Iraq at the end of Clinton’s 
presidency. Containment was still the policy, but the hope that its pressures would cause 
Saddam’s ouster, much less a change in his strategic intentions, had never been more discredited. 
Nevertheless, the crucial questions of how important Saddam’s ouster was to U.S. national 
interests and security, how to best achieve that goal, and how much to sacrifice for that end 
remained uncertain.  
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CHAPTER 5: NOT WHETHER, BUT HOW AND WHEN: THE IRAQ DEBATE FROM 
9/11 TO THE INVASION 
 
Introduction 
 The September 11th attacks transformed both the deadlocked Iraq debate and the broader 
U.S. perception of the international security environment. They created a deep sense of 
vulnerability to mass-casualty, Islamist terrorism, intensified public fear and anger, and widened 
the range of acceptable actions for assuring U.S. security. Preventing another attack became an 
overwhelming priority for the George W. Bush administration and the nation. The imperative to 
“do something” was immense, and the leadership that held itself responsible for the security of 
the nation felt this urgency most profoundly. 
That this “something” would become an invasion of Iraq, however, was by no means 
inevitable or obvious. U.S. and allied intelligence agencies did not link Iraq to 9/11 or establish a 
sudden Iraqi effort to reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Nor was there 
significant public or international outcry for targeting Iraq. Despite these realities, Vice President 
Richard Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Undersecretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz, and other neoconservatives in the executive branch reoriented the response to 9/11 
away from the direct culprits and toward confrontation with Iraq. 9/11 served as both opening 
and impetus for this group to finally discredit containment and argue for an invasion of Iraq.  
The core of the administration’s argument for regime change was that removing Saddam 
in the short term had become necessary for preserving U.S. security and preventing future 
terrorist attacks. Intelligence about Iraq and other rogue states had to be reevaluated, they argued, 
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in the light of U.S. exposure to mass-casualty terrorism. The administration claimed that Saddam 
might hand WMD to terrorist groups like al-Qaeda to use against the United States or its allies. 
Building on the inevitable decline argument from the 1990s, they claimed that containment 
inherently could not address this “nexus” threat because Saddam could strike the United States 
by proxy and mask his responsibility. Thus, the Bush administration claimed a unilateral right to 
use preventive force against states like Iraq that posed this threat. Within this mindset, 
containment was dangerously inadequate because this nexus enabled Saddam to strike the United 
States by proxy and mask his responsibility, thus avoiding retaliation. This argument became 
known as the “Bush Doctrine.” 1 In order to make this nexus a credible plank of its case for war, 
the Bush administration had to believe and publicly show that Iraq had or was developing these 
weapons and that it would use them against the United States, either directly or through a 
terrorist third party. In making this argument, the administration systemically manipulated the 
intelligence process, treating ambiguous intelligence as clear proof of Saddam’s guilt and 
presenting exaggerated and selectively chosen evidence to the public. 
Thus far, this story will appear familiar to scholars of modern U.S. foreign policy. 
Indeed, the literature on the causal road from 9/11 to the Iraq War focuses on the importance of 
9/11 in creating an atmosphere of fear and emphasizes the role of neoconservatives in reorienting 
U.S. policy and manipulating intelligence.2 Still, after bringing about this reorientation, the 
neoconservatives still had to build a successful public and international case for invasion. As the 
Bush administration argued for regime change in the spring and summer of 2002, they not only 
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had to show the public and the broader political establishment that the nexus threat was real but 
that the main alternatives, especially containment, could not guarantee U.S. security.  
Existing work on the causes of the Iraq War stresses neoconservative thought and rarely 
examines the broader political and intellectual structures of debate. In 2002 and early 2003, the 
administration faced resistance to this case from numerous sources, including Democrats, some 
Republicans, Middle East policy experts, liberal intellectuals, major allies like Great Britain and 
France, and former policy-makers from both parties. Colin Powell and other officials at State 
represented this skepticism inside the administration. This broad group believed that the 
intelligence on Iraq’s WMD and links to al-Qaeda were less clear than the hawks asserted and 
that the administration did not take the challenges of occupying Iraq seriously. Most of all, they 
believed that before Bush rushed the country into war he needed to present the evidence against 
Saddam, earn Congressional approval and greater international support, and pass a resolution at 
the United Nations that would help build a broader coalition and exhaust peaceful means of 
disarmament. 
However, a closer look at the skeptics’ arguments demonstrates that they shared most of 
the major assumptions about Iraq held by the hawks. These assumptions were as follows: Iraq 
would remain a threat until Saddam was removed; the ultimate cause of Iraq’s aggression and 
brutality was the totalitarian Baathist regime; Saddam would never cease pursuing WMD; 
inspections and sanctions could not fully disarm him or change his strategic intentions; and only 
democratization could definitively solve the Iraq problem. These perceived lessons of 
containment in the 1990s delimited the terms of the Iraq debate from 9/11 to March 2003 and 
primed a wide swathe of Americans to believe Bush’s worst-case portrayal of the threat. The 
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climate of fear following 9/11 and the administration’s sunny predictions about the course of the 
war itself further bolstered the perception that war was necessary.3 
This chapter’s central point is that because the pre-war conversation about Iraq mostly 
operated within these assumptions rather than challenging them, these ostensible skeptics of the 
war failed to develop a robust alternative to the Bush position despite winning tactical and 
procedural victories in the lead-up to the war. Most skeptics followed what Congressman Brad 
Sherman (D-CA) called the Powell-Blair approach, which focused on influencing how and when 
the administration confronted Iraq but ceded to the administration the point that regime change 
was ultimately necessary, ethical, and prudent.4 They thereby broke with the conditionalist 
approach to containment, whose advocates had argued in the 1990s that containment could 
satisfy U.S. security needs vis-à-vis Iraq as long as it was enforced strictly and adjusted to new 
circumstances.  
Self-identified skeptics, especially Powell and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, slowed 
down the push to war in September 2002 by persuading Bush to seek a U.N. Security Council 
resolution that demanded the return of inspections to Iraq and threatened Iraq with “serious 
consequences” if it did not comply.5 They won another tactical victory in compelling Bush to 
seek a new Congressional authorization for war with Iraq, which passed in October. These 
tactical victories were less about rebuilding containment than they were about making sure Bush 
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pursued regime change “the right way.” In achieving these tactical gains, however, they granted 
their support to an administration that saw peaceful means of disarming Iraq as almost certainly 
doomed.  
The entrenchment of the regime change consensus in U.S. thinking was such that even 
these skeptics shared the core assumption that for the United States to achieve security and 
protect its interests vis-à-vis Iraq, Saddam must be removed. They did not believe this as 
fervently or uncritically as the Bush administration. However, they too believed inspections 
would probably falter and that any renewal of containment would relapse into the stasis of the 
1990s while failing to address the root of the problem: the regime. Former National Security 
Advisor Sandy Berger summarized the Powell-Blair approach in saying: “Saddam was, is, and 
continues to be a menace to his people, to the region, and to us. He cannot be accommodated. 
Our goal should be regime change. The question is not whether, but how and when.”6 
Two groups dissented from the regime change consensus and proposed clear alternatives 
to war. The first was the political left, which portrayed the Iraq War as imperialistic and 
capitalistic and called vaguely for normalization of relations with Iraq. The second was an ever-
diminishing set of Democrats, liberals, and realist scholars who disputed the factual basis of the 
nexus concept and believed, in keeping with the conditionalist approach, that containment had 
and could continue to manage the Iraqi threat. This was a minority view in the United States, but 
France, Russia, and China and other nations endorsed it as they opposed the march to war. This 
dynamic shows how comparatively narrow the spectrum of thought on Iraq in the United States 
had become by 2001. Unlike the Powell-Blair approach, these camps contested the Bush 
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administration on the ground of whether the United States should go to war with Iraq, not just 
how and when.  
Bush’s Case for War, Fall 2001-Fall 2002 
The Bush administration’s top foreign policy officials held competing ideas about how to 
deal with Iraq, but Bush did not force a major change in Iraq policy and neither side gained the 
upper hand in the nine months before 9/11. Bush entered office with little foreign policy 
experience or knowledge. During the campaign, he had argued that the United States should play 
an active role in the world but that it should avoid using the military in nation-building exercises 
that were not essential to the national interest. He claimed that he would refocus U.S. foreign 
policy on great power challengers and prevent multilateral institutions like the United Nations 
from shackling U.S. power. He promised to be tougher on Iraq than Clinton, but he did not 
recommend any major breaks from Clinton’s policy.7 Cheney and Rumsfeld agreed with this 
basic framework, but they entered office with far more hawkish views on Iraq and a deeper 
commitment to an assertive, unilateral foreign policy.8 They also filled their staffs with 
neoconservatives who had supported regime change throughout the 1990s, including Wolfowitz 
and Douglas Feith. 
In contrast to Cheney and Rumsfeld, Powell and his Deputy Secretary of State, Richard 
Armitage, prioritized alliances and institutions and showed more skepticism about the use of 
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force.9 Powell hired defenders of containment like Richard Haass, who became Director of 
Policy Planning at State. Powell and Haass viewed Saddam as a “mid-level threat,” and they held 
that reviving sanctions and inspections would keep Saddam bottled up.10 At his 2001 nomination 
hearing before the Senate, Powell described Iraq as “fundamentally a broken, weak country, one-
third the military force it had some ten years ago.”11 National Security Advisor Condoleezza 
Rice likewise recommended a moderate approach, arguing in 2000 that Iraq could be effectively 
deterred by the threat of “national obliteration” even if it built a WMD arsenal.12  
Upon taking office, the Bush administration initially sought to revive international 
sanctions on Iraq.13 The administration believed that the United Nations would not support a 
tough inspections regime, which left reviving sanctions as the main way to keep Saddam 
constrained.14  Intelligence reports in early 2001 warned that cheating on the embargo was 
rampant and that Iraq was also expanding diplomatic ties.15 Powell aimed to shore up this 
leaking system through his “smart sanctions” plan. He wanted to refocus sanctions on preventing 
the entry of military and possible dual-use goods and on maintaining U.N. control of Iraqi 
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revenues from Oil-For-Food sales.16 In turn, the United Nations would permit more normal 
travel and commerce with Iraq. Powell reasoned that if sanctions could be tapered, containment 
would be strengthened and Saddam could no longer credibly blame the sanctions for the Iraqi 
health crisis.17 Powell further hoped that this deal would discourage sanctions-busting by 
allowing foreign countries to trade with Iraq while preventing Saddam from importing military 
or WMD-related items and from accessing the proceeds of trade.18 
To Powell’s chagrin, he failed to garner sufficient support at the United Nations in the 
summer of 2001 to reform sanctions. Russia and France posed the main obstacles because they 
received billions in Oil-for-Food trade with Iraq and wanted to suspend sanctions as soon as 
inspectors were let back into Iraq - a position the United States rejected.19 Iraq’s neighbors also 
benefitted from cheap, illicit Iraqi oil and feared the public reaction if they granted support to 
renewed sanctions.20 Under the threat of a Russian veto, Powell abandoned the effort to reform 
sanctions, returning the coalition to the stalemate that had reigned since inspectors left Iraq in 
1998.21 
The administration’s hawks, meanwhile, did little to shift Iraq policy in these first nine 
months. Douglas Feith’s office drafted “A Strategy to Liberate Iraq” in the spring which called 
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for a serious effort at rollback under INC leadership. Arguing that containment was doomed to 
“inevitably weaken over time,” they called for the U.S. air power to protect a growing 
insurgency against Saddam.22 Just as in the late 1990s debates, rollback represented the outer 
limits of what policymakers could call for as a means of regime change. Wolfowitz also pushed 
for rollback and argued that Iraqi-sponsored terrorism was an immediate threat, but Powell and 
the CIA countered these ideas.23 Other crises and priorities held the administration’s attention, 
including the Hainan Island incident and Rumsfeld’s campaigns for military modernization and 
ballistic missile defense.24 Regime change advocates in political circles lamented Bush’s Iraq 
policy as a betrayal of the Iraq Liberation Act.25 Bush ordered an interagency review of Iraq 
policy, which was ongoing on 9/11.26 Rumsfeld fittingly summarized the Iraq policy drift in a 
note to Powell on September 5, 2001: “We simply must get a policy for Iraq settled fast.”27  
The September 11th terrorist attacks dramatically raised the nation’s sense of vulnerability 
and created a massive impetus to strike back at the perpetrators and prevent further attacks. It is 
worth considering how top policy-makers experienced these attacks in order to see why they 
pressed for a strong response. An anguished sense of guilt and responsibility set in after the 
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attacks, as Rice affirmed: “I could not have forgiven myself had there been another attack.”28 
They felt that their jobs had suddenly transformed and that other responsibilities had melted 
away. As they watched civilians jumping from skyscrapers, they felt deep grief and anger, as did 
the rest of country.29 Bush reportedly told Rumsfeld on 9/11: “I don’t care what the international 
lawyers say, we are going to kick some ass.”30 Bush adopted a morally unambiguous view of 
terrorism, once calling al-Qaeda “flat evil. That’s all they can think about, is evil.”31 
With the intelligence agencies now on high alert, the administration was bombarded with 
reports of possible follow-up attacks, including attempts to decapitate the government. As CIA 
Director George Tenet remembered, “It seemed inconceivable to us that Bin Laden had not 
already positioned people to conduct second, and possibly third and fourth waves of attacks.”32 
The Secret Service even rushed the President and Laura Bush from their beds to a bunker on the 
night of 9/11 because an F-16 fighter had activated the wrong transponder code, making it look 
like a hijacked plane.33 In October, anthrax attacks from an unknown source killed five people, 
adding to the climate of terror and reinforcing the fear that future terrorist attacks might use 
WMD. Though 9/11 led to a surge of popular support for the President, the administration 
judged that a second massive attack would doom Bush in political terms.34  
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The administration initially held that the reaction to 9/11 should center on al-Qaeda and 
its main sponsor, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. However, firsthand testimony and some 
documentary evidence shows that Iraq hawks argued that Iraq may have been involved in 9/11 
attacks and that it should be a major target in the U.S. response. Some scholars have accused 
these hawks of using 9/11 as a pretext to reorient U.S. policy toward their pre-existing fixation 
on Iraq regardless of the evidence.35 A more balanced view suggests that 9/11 added greater 
urgency for action against what they already viewed as a serious threat by lowering their 
willingness to tolerate this threat and changing their view of the entire international security 
environment.  
Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz led the effort to immediately focus on Iraq in the response to 
9/11. Rumsfeld’s notes from 9/11 read: “Best info fast. Judge whether good enough [to] hit SH 
[Saddam Hussein] at same time-not only UBL.”36 Wolfowitz wrote to Rumsfeld after the attacks: 
“If there is even a 10% chance that Saddam Hussein was behind Tuesday’s horrors, a maximum 
priority has to be put on eliminating that threat.”37 On multiple occasions in the week after 9/11, 
they suggested to Bush that Saddam may have been involved in 9/11. Even if he was not, they 
claimed that toppling Saddam would deter other rogue states with WMD.38 Hugh Shelton, the 
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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recalled: “Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz started pushing really 
hard on September 12, ’01 to attack Iraq. They even asked Shelton to raise Iraq as a possible 
target at the next Cabinet meeting.”39 Other neoconservatives in the administration, especially 
Douglas Feith, frequently advocated for striking Iraq immediately after 9/11.40 Bush appears to 
have been somewhat persuaded by this early push, as he asked counterterrorism expert Richard 
Clarke on September 12 to: “See if Saddam did this. See if he’s linked in any way.”41 He also 
told Tony Blair on September 13: “There might be a connection between Saddam Hussein and 
Osama bin Laden.”42 Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill recalled that just a few days after 9/11: 
“Getting Hussein was now the administration’s focus, that much was already clear.”43 
While the early advocates of an attack on Iraq were a minority in the Bush 
administration, their views were echoed by powerful advocates of regime change in political and 
intellectual circles. On September 20, PNAC published an open letter to the President that read: 
“even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication 
of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from 
power.”44 On December 6, Bush received a letter from nine prominent legislators, including 
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Trent Lott, Joseph Liebermann, and John McCain. They similarly argued: “the nexus of 
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction makes the removal of Saddam key to success in the 
overall war on terrorism.” They reassured Bush that “there will be bipartisan political support for 
the president when he moves on to the next crucial phase of the war.”45 There was also broad 
public suspicion of Saddam even before the administration began its public push for war, 
demonstrated by one poll from January 2002 that found that 76% of respondents believed that 
Saddam supported al-Qaeda and 72% who said it was very or somewhat likely that he was 
“personally involved in the September 11 attacks.”46 Still, no wave of public or international 
calls for Saddam’s removal emerged after 9/11, making the neoconservatives’ role in putting Iraq 
on the agenda essential for understanding the road to invasion. 
This early push to focus on Iraq failed to convince the rest of the Cabinet. Powell and 
Shelton opposed this move, arguing that Iraq was not connected to these attacks and that any 
shift to Iraq would undermine the international coalition for the fight against al Qaeda.47 Cheney 
agreed and argued that any move against Iraq should be postponed.48 Despite his query to 
Clarke, Bush saw al-Qaeda as the perpetrators and the proper first targets of the War on Terror. 
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He asked Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld to hold off on Iraq, although he told several people that he 
would soon return to Iraq.49 In the fall of 2001, Bush launched a war against the Taliban and al-
Qaeda in Afghanistan, which he conceived as the first phase of a broader War on Terrorism that 
would tackle the actors and structural forces that sustained global terrorism.50  
In the months after 9/11 Bush and his administration formed a new conception of how to 
combat mass terrorism that set the groundwork for a revived focus on Iraq. More passive, long-
term strategies of containment and deterrence appeared woefully inadequate against terrorists 
that hurtled themselves into buildings and aimed to maximize devastation.51 The administration, 
however, did not think that focusing just on terrorist groups would eliminate the threat. Terrorists 
did not operate in a vacuum, they reasoned, but in the territories of state sponsors. To truly 
eradicate this menace, as Rumsfeld argued, the United States would have to “support the creation 
of an international political environment hostile to terrorism to dissuade individuals, non-state 
actors, and states from entering into or initiating support for terrorism.”52 
The only contingency that could make a follow-up attack worse, Bush officials reasoned, 
was if al-Qaeda gained access to WMD. The anthrax attacks in October enhanced the fear that a 
rogue actor like Iraq might give biological or other unconventional weapons to terrorists.53 Thus, 
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the second phase of the War on Terror must focus not just on terrorist groups but the states that 
support them.54 While top officials disagreed about targeting Iraq early on, they concurred that 
tackling state sponsors of terrorism was necessary for preventing future attacks.55 In a press 
conference on September 13, Wolfowitz signaled this shift in saying “it’s not just simply a 
matter of capturing people and holding them accountable, but removing the sanctuaries, 
removing the support systems, ending states who sponsor terrorism.”56 
The formation of this state sponsor paradigm for the War on Terror served as the basis for 
the Bush administration’s shift back toward Iraq in late 2001 and early 2002. The administration 
formulated a case for war with Iraq that hinged on what they called the “nexus” between rogue 
states, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorists. Rice illustrated the core threat of this nexus in 
saying: “Terrorists allied with tyrants can acquire technologies allowing them to murder on an 
ever more massive scale. Each threat magnifies the danger of the other.”57 While al-Qaeda, the 
administration argued, would certainly use WMD on U.S. targets, they probably lacked the 
capacity to produce them. Moreover, rogue states by themselves could not strike the United 
States or act aggressively in their neighborhoods because of the certainty of massive retaliation. 
However, if a rogue state handed WMD to terrorists, each side would eliminate the 
other’s weaknesses and help the other achieve their goals. Terrorists would acquire the means to 
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inflict mass casualties while rogue states could inflict damage on their foes without leaving clear 
evidence of their culpability.58 The administration argued that through this behavior rogue states 
forfeited their sovereignty, justifying military action to remove the threat.59 Moreover, the 
administration argued that the margin of error with biological weapons was particularly low 
because a small, easily transportable vial of anthrax or smallpox could kill thousands. Even if the 
odds were low that rogue states and terrorist groups would collaborate in these ways, key 
administration figures like Cheney believed that after 9/11 the United States had to assume that 
such contingencies were real rather than leave the country exposed to another massive attack.60 
The Bush administration identified Iraq as the most dangerous state actor within this 
category of threat. Cheney later claimed “When we looked around the world in those first 
months after 9/11, there was no place more likely to be a nexus between terrorism and WMD 
capability than Saddam’s Iraq.”61 However, this shift rested on a deeper foundation of ideas and 
assumptions about Iraq held by key policy-makers before 9/11. Despite the more advanced 
nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea, there had been no equivalent for these states of the 
political movement that led to the Iraq Liberation Act, nor had United States recently fought a 
war with these states. Moreover, as Feith argued, the administration felt that all possible means 
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of ending the Iraqi threat had been “tried comprehensively, and without success, for a decade,” 
whereas the United States had not applied similar pressures to Iran and North Korea.”62 
Bush explained why Iraq in particular needed to be targeted in October 2002: “By its past 
and present actions, by its technological capabilities, by the merciless nature of its regime, Iraq is 
unique,” citing in particular the fact that Iraq had used chemical weapons in the 1980s and 
invaded two of his neighbors.63 The assertion that Iraq was a more advanced threat than Iran or 
North Korea flew in the face of the greater progress of these nations on WMD and ballistic 
missiles. However, the “lessons” about the containment policy had become entrenched in U.S. 
thinking about Iraq in ways that had not occurred with these states, which had received far less 
political attention throughout the decade. Iraq came to be broadly seen as uniquely uncontainable 
because of its totalitarian ideology, its unalterable desire to acquire WMD and dominate the 
region, and the particularly intransigent personality of its dictator. Key players in the pre-9/11 
movement against containment, especially Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, advanced these ideas 
within the administration and maintained a drumbeat against Iraq after 9/11.64  
When exactly Iraq returned to the forefront of the Bush administration’s focus is not 
entirely clear because of the limits on available sources and the apparent lack of an organized 
decision-making process in the administration.65 In November 2001, Bush asked Rumsfeld to 
start developing war plans for Iraq, and in February he asked CENTCOM Commander Tommy 
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Franks to start moving forces from Afghanistan to the Persian Gulf.66 The United States already 
had extensive military infrastructure in the region to facilitate an invasion as well as planes 
flying constantly over northern and southern Iraq.67 CENTCOM also had a preexisting war plan 
for Iraq, titled OPLAN 1003-98 that called for upwards of 500,000 troops to be used in an 
invasion, although Rumsfeld fought to reduce that number.68  
In public, Bush demanded that inspectors be allowed back into Iraq in November and 
then identified Iraq as part of the “Axis of Evil” in January 2002.69 He also told an interviewer 
“I’ve made up my mind that Saddam needs to go” in April 2002.70 By June, when Richard Haass 
approached Rice to express his concerns about a possible war, Rice replied: “You can save your 
breath, Richard. The president has already made up his mind on Iraq.”71 Most accounts suggest 
that by the spring of 2002 the administration had determined to press for a confrontation with 
Iraq, and by the early summer of 2002 they were publicly arguing for regime change.72 
This case for war depended on the idea that most likely alternative policies, containment 
and deterrence, could not handle the nexus category of threat. Deterrence, they argued, relied on 
the enemy’s rationality, desire to survive, and the certainty that any attack on the United States 
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would prompt massive retaliation. The United States succeeded in deterring Soviet use of WMD 
during the Cold War because the Soviets possessed these traits.73 Terrorist groups like al-Qaeda 
lacked both the desire to survive and territory or infrastructure to retaliate against. Bush officials 
also questioned Saddam’s rationality; at the minimum he was a reckless gambler cut off from 
reality, and at the maximum he was irrational. As Wolfowitz argued, “the containment case 
assumes that we understand the way his mind works and that he will always avoid actions that 
would endanger his survival, even though there is an enormous body of evidence that we do not 
understand the way his mind works.”74  
Bush officials believed, moreover, that terrorists and tyrants were provoked by weakness, 
and that the faltering U.S. response to attacks since the 1980’s had convinced al-Qaeda and 
Saddam that, in Scooter Libby’s words: “The Americans don’t have the stomach to defend 
themselves…They are morally weak.”75 Containment would only reinforce that perception of 
docility and encourage more attacks. According to political scientist Aaron Friedberg, who 
worked on Cheney’s foreign policy staff, Rumsfeld, Cheney, and others believed that the United 
States needed to take actions that would have a “demonstration effect” on other rogue actors that 
would “reestablish deterrence” and “make clear the costs to those who might have been 
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supporting…those who were contemplating those acts.”76 Containment was far too passive a 
strategy for an administration whose risk tolerance had been drastically lowered by 9/11.77 
Bush spelled out his argument that containment was steadily collapsing, that it had failed 
to compel Saddam to comply with the United Nations, and that it could not prevent Saddam from 
building WMD or covertly handing them to terrorists. Bush made this speech at a West Point 
address in June 2002:  
Deterrence-the promise of massive retaliation against nations-means nothing against  
shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not  
possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those  
weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies.78 
 
Even if Saddam did not hand WMD to terrorists, he could still use them to bully his neighbors 
and deter a U.S. response.79 Bush thus saw the containment of Iraq as both a broken policy and 
something that even if revived could not fulfill perceived U.S. security needs following 9/11. 
The administration also argued that in this environment the United States might need to 
launch “preemptive” attacks on WMD-armed state sponsors of terrorism. According to 
philosophical and legal tradition, preemption is justified when an enemy’s attack is imminent, 
revealed by active preparation, likely to be destructive, and unstoppable by non-violent means.80 
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A preventive war, in contrast, seeks to destroy a possible threat and/or prevent a shift in the 
balance of power between two states.81 While “imminence” is hard to prove, legitimate 
preemptive wars are generally accepted in international politics while preventive wars are 
considered unlawful aggression. 
The Bush administration, however, argued that the nexus threat demanded a rethinking of 
the concept of imminence. In past cases of preemption like the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the 
threatened state could see the enemy’s conventional military preparations and hear their bellicose 
rhetoric. Terrorists, in contrast, planned secretly and used “weapons that can be easily concealed, 
delivered covertly, and used without warning.”82 Clear, “smoking gun” evidence of collusion 
between rogue states and terrorists might come only in the form of a “mushroom cloud” from an 
attack, as the administration often repeated.83 The United States could not consistently preempt 
attacks it did not see coming, which means it had to stop state sponsors of terror from developing 
or possessing those weapons.84 This was effectively a doctrine of preventive war that the 
administration justified based on the need to “adapt the concept of ‘imminent threat’ to 
contemporary realities” and the enormous consequences of missing just one attack.85 As 
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Rumsfeld put it: “Any who insist on perfect evidence are back in the 20th century and still 
thinking in pre-September 11 terms.”86  
This reorientation toward Iraq also relied in large part on errors in the intelligence 
community’s assessments of Iraq’s WMD programs. The 2002 National Intelligence Estimate 
(NIE) assessed that Saddam possessed chemical and biological weapons as well as ballistic 
missiles beyond what the United Nations permitted.87 The intelligence community also judged 
that Saddam was pursuing nuclear weapons, although he was 5-7 years from possessing such a 
weapon.88 Most independent analysts and U.S. allies, including countries that were skeptical of 
the invasion, also thought that Iraq was developing WMD and ballistic missiles.89 These 
assessments were shown to be almost entirely inaccurate after the war.90 Several Congressional 
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reports have shown the flaws in the intelligence community’s analysis, which included 
inadequately explaining ambiguities to policymakers, relying too much on outdated or poorly 
vetted information, and relying on old assumptions to fill these gaps. Furthermore, many analysts 
recalled that the United States had severely underestimated the scope of the Iraqi WMD program 
before the Gulf War, and they wanted avoid that mistake in 2002-2003.91  
These postwar reports largely excused Bush administration officials from their 
manipulation and misrepresentation of intelligence about Iraq’s WMD and terrorist ties.92 This 
manipulation took several forms. For one, key Bush officials created alternative channels of 
intelligence gathering and analysis outside the normal intelligence agencies, which Cheney, 
Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz believed had systematically underestimated the Iraqi threat since the 
Gulf War. Channels such as Douglas Feith’s Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group 
(PCTEG) and the Office of Special Plans (OSP) were created to, among other things, amass 
intelligence that linked Iraq to al-Qaeda and disseminate it throughout the executive branch.93  
PCTEG and the OSP were staffed by neoconservatives with little intelligence experience 
but a clear political agenda. One staffer, David Wurmser, had written a book in the late 1990s 
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calling for regime change in Iraq.94 These offices filtered poorly vetted information from exile 
groups like the INC into the upper echelons of the administration.95 They also provided “red 
team” or “B-team” analyses that criticized the intelligence agencies for not drawing more 
strident conclusions about Iraq.96 Furthermore, numerous analysts have reported significant if not 
blatant pressure from Cheney, Rumsfeld, and others. This included repeated requests to look into 
pieces of evidence that would corroborate the case for war, unprecedented visits from Cheney 
and other top officials to individual analysts, and the creation of a pressurized atmosphere in 
which analysts knew what the policy-makers wanted and feared contradicting them.97 
In public, Bush officials frequently inflated the Iraqi threat beyond what the intelligence 
justified. They often presented a data point as unambiguous evidence of Iraq’s production of 
WMD even though different intelligence agencies disagreed about that data. For example, the 
Department of Energy, the State Department’s intelligence service, and the IAEA all argued that 
specialized aluminum tubes that Iraq had tried to import were probably designed for 
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conventional rockets rather than nuclear weapons production.98 The agencies that did believe the 
tubes were for nuclear enrichment worded their analysis in probabilistic terms.99 Yet, Bush 
officials claimed to know with “absolute certainty,” in Cheney’s words, that the tubes were for a 
nuclear program.100 Moreover, administration statements about the Iraq-al-Qaeda link contrasted 
sharply with the intelligence community’s highly parsed assessments. For example, the CIA 
judged that Iraq had “sporadic, wary contacts with al-Qaida since the mid-1990s” and possibly a 
sort of non-aggression pact rather than an operational relationship.101 Bush, however, claimed: 
“Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al Qaeda.”102 The effect of 
this threat inflation was to reframe the prewar debate from how to deal with a future threat to 
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how to stop an imminent threat. As Francis Fukuyama has argued, this shift “raised the stakes” 
of the confrontation with Iraq and lowered the threshold for intervention.”103  
Lastly, Bush officials frequently used information in the public case for war that the 
intelligence agencies had flagged as false or unreliable. For example, they often touted Iraq’s 
attempt to acquire “yellowcake” uranium ore from Niger as evidence on a current nuclear 
weapons program. The CIA, however, had repeatedly judged that this did not happen, removed 
the reference from other public statements, and stated that Iraq already had yellowcake that was 
in sealed containers subject to IAEA inspection.104 This manipulation of intelligence suggests 
that top Bush officials were so convinced that Saddam had major WMD programs and links to 
al-Qaeda that they made the policy decision to topple Saddam and then sought evidence to 
support that decision. Numerous observers have reported this dynamic, including an aide to 
British Foreign Secretary David Manning who wrote in July 2002: “Bush wanted to remove 
Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD…But the 
intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.”105 
One major problem the administration faced in making the nexus-based argument was 
that the intelligence community generally did not believe that Saddam would actually give 
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WMD to terrorists. They judged that Saddam wanted WMD for deterrent purposes and probably 
would not hand them to terrorists unless attacked by the United States.106 The evidence for an 
operational relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda was sparse, relying on circumstantial and 
poorly sourced information.107 Administration hawks, however, addressed this problem by 
appealing to the longstanding belief in U.S. thinking about Iraq that Saddam was hell-bent, to the 
point of irrational obsession, on revenge against the United States. This focus on revenge was not 
a perfunctory assertion of Saddam’s villainy but a specific claim rooted in the conspiratorial 
research of Laurie Mylroie, who worked as a fellow at AEI in the years before the Iraq War.  
Through a web of tendentious connections, Mylroie argued that Saddam had sponsored 
several terrorist attacks on the U.S., including the World Trade Center in 1993, Oklahoma City 
in 1995, the Khobar Towers in 196, and the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, as 
part of a campaign of vengeance for the Gulf War.108 Immediately after 9/11, she and several of 
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her adherents suggested that Saddam had a hand in the attacks, declaring it “merely another 
phase of the Gulf War.”109 She became a frequent media commentator and an advisor to the Iraqi 
National Congress (INC), promoting her theory and accusing the CIA of engaging in an 
“enormous cover-up” of Iraq’s role in 9/11.110  
While discounted by the intelligence agencies, Mylroie had gained significant influence 
in neoconservative and pro-regime change circles. Her book on Saddam’s purported 
responsibility for these terrorist attacks, published in 2000 by AEI Press, received fulsome praise 
from former CIA Director R. James Woolsey, Richard Perle, Scooter Libby, and Paul 
Wolfowitz. She thanked Wolfowitz and John Bolton by name in the acknowledgments section 
for their help on the book.111 Wolfowitz had defended her ideas throughout the 1990s, telling a 
Congressional hearing in 1998: “There are all kinds of reasons to suspect connections between 
the Iraqis and this Osama bin Laden fellow.”112 Counterterrorism expert Richard Clarke recalled 
that in a January 2001 NSC meeting Wolfowitz said the United States needed to focus more on 
“Iraqi terrorism” and told Clarke that Bin Laden “could not do all these things like the 1993 
attack on New York, not without a state sponsor. Just because the FBI and CIA have failed to 
find the linkages does not mean they don’t exist.”113 Wolfowitz mentioned Saddam’s ostensible 
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responsibility for the 1993 attacks to Rumsfeld on September 17, 2001, and in later in 2002, 
Wolfowitz described Saddam in a speech as having “an enormous thirst for revenge.”114 He 
pressed other officials on whether they had read Mylroie’s book, and he sent Woolsey to Great 
Britain to find data that would bolster this claim.115  
The influence of this revenge hypothesis bled into the administration’s thinking about 
Iraq. One Defense Department briefing stated: “For Saddam, Gulf War never ended.”116 One of 
Bush’s major speeches before the war argued that Iraq held “unrelenting hostility toward the 
United States” before explaining Iraq’s links to al-Qaeda.117 This hypothesis bolstered the 
plausibility of the Bush administration’s nexus case by appealing to the deeply embedded sense 
that Saddam was an irrational actor with a record of revenge-driven terrorist attacks. This belief 
legitimized the idea that he might strike again through his terrorist allies regardless of the risk of 
U.S. retaliation, in contrast to the intelligence community’s estimates. 
 The Bush administration’s exaggerated presentation of intelligence fostered broad public 
and political consensus that Saddam was making significant progress on his WMD programs and 
had meaningful links to al-Qaeda. A Harris Poll from before the invasion found that 80% of 
Americans believed Saddam had or was making nuclear weapons.118 Another survey from 
February 2003 found that 72% of Americans believed eliminating Saddam’s WMD was a “very 
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convincing” or “fairly convincing” reason for war.119 Furthermore, by mid-March of 2003, 80% 
of Americans had come to believe that without military action “Saddam Hussein would be 
instrumental in helping al-Qaeda terrorists carry out future attacks.”120  
The Bush administration viewed Iraq as a threat to national security, but it also saw the 
removal of Saddam as an opportunity to spark broader reforms in the Middle East that would 
address the causes of terrorism. Most importantly, after 9/11 spreading democracy in Iraq and the 
greater Middle East became not just an ideal but a strategic imperative for the administration. 
Regime change advocates like Paul Wolfowitz, Ahmed Chalabi, and Fouad Ajami had long 
argued that democratizing Iraq was essential for uprooting the violent Baathist political culture 
and making Iraq an unthreatening country.121 They interpreted the rise of terrorism in the Middle 
East as the product of deficits in democracy, development, and dignity.122 Tyrannical 
governments and extremist ideologies bred anti-Western and anti-Israeli terrorism throughout the 
region.123 Ajami, for instance, argued that 9/11 stemmed from the “deep structure” of Arab 
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politics, referring to “its repressed young people, its mix of belligerence and self-pity, [and] the 
terrible anti-Americanism.” He labelled Iraq the “citadel of Arab radicalism.”124 
Drawing on these ideas and the democratic peace concept, the administration argued that 
democratization would grant Middle Eastern peoples a chance to participate in their own 
governance so they would not succumb to despair and extremism. As Bush claimed in a 
February 2003 speech: “The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values because 
stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder.” Regime change in Iraq could 
empower liberal forces, intimidate other autocratic states like Iran, and possibly spark a broad 
democratic transformation that would inoculate the Middle East against terrorism.125  
 Bush officials adopted a universalistic rhetoric of human rights and democracy to bolster 
the argument that democracy could flourish in the Middle East. In the 2002 National Security 
Strategy, the administration declared that the great struggles of the 20th century had ended in a 
“decisive victory” for “a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and 
free enterprise.”126 In turn, they rejected, in Rice’s words, the “condescending view that freedom 
will not grow in the soil of the Middle East-or that Muslims somehow do not share in the desire 
to be free.”127 Building on a claim from the 1990s, the administration argued that as a passive 
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strategy containment could not bring about this type of change. Only a bold move in the heart of 
the Middle East could put the region on a more peaceful and humane track.  
In making the case that a war was less risky than containment, the Bush administration 
adopted an unrealistically optimistic view of the aftermath of the conflict, especially the 
difficulties of rebuilding the Iraqi economy, society, and government. Officials frequently cited 
Ajami and Kanan Makiya, who argued that Iraqis would joyously welcome U.S. soldiers and 
cooperate in rebuilding Iraq.128 Makiya, for one, wrote shortly after 9/11: “Iraq’s infrastructure, 
its middle class, its secular intelligentsia, its high levels of education…are all reason for thinking 
that a new kind of westward political order can, with help from the West, be set up in Iraq.”129 
On January 10, 2003, he met with Bush and Cheney and told them: “People will greet the troops 
with sweets and flowers.”130 Ajami boldly prophesied that: “We shall be mobbed when we go 
there by people who are eager for deliverance…from the great bit prison of Saddam Hussein.”131 
Overlooking the devastation of a decade of sanctions, Wolfowitz likewise contended: 
It is hard to believe that the liberation of the talented people of one of the most important  
Arab countries in the world from the grip of one of the world’s worst tyrants will not be an  
opportunity for Americans and Arabs…to begin to move forward in what the president had  
described as ‘building a just and peaceful world beyond the War on Terror.’132  
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Sectarian tensions were overblown, Ajami and Makiya promised, as in Iraqi society 
“virtually all constituent parts agree on the need for representative democracy, the rule of law, 
and a pluralist system of government and federalism.”133 Ajami, Makiya, and their ally Bernard 
Lewis met repeatedly with Cheney, Wolfowitz, and others following 9/11.134 The 
administration’s egregious lack of planning for the aftermath of invasion, including Rumsfeld’s 
tireless efforts to reduce troop numbers, resulted not just from incompetence but from 
longstanding ideological assumptions. Particularly important were beliefs about the universality 
of democracy and the Iraqi people as modern, educated, and pro-Western rather than tribalized, 
impoverished, and resentful of the United States.135  
The ideas that the United States would be “greeted as liberators” and that the war would 
benefit the region became additional reasons to embrace regime change.136 This hope, however, 
contradicted the warnings of the intelligence agencies and other area experts. Intelligence 
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assessments of Iraqi political culture as backward and illiberal had persisted throughout the 
1990s, including one 1993 report that stated: “Many of the nationalistic, xenophobic, and Pan-
Arab themes that pervade Saddam’s policies and propaganda resonate with the Iraqi public and 
probably would be used by likely Arab Sunni successors.”137  
In 2002, the CIA’s Near East and South Asian Office similarly judged that “A 
transformation of Iraq to a true democracy could require a U.S. role lasting a generation.”138 
These analysts noted the “lack of ingrained democratic traditions, innate distrust of other groups, 
and the tendency to substitute tribal, ethnic, or sectarian loyalties” as obstacles to democracy and 
pluralism in Iraq.139 They also doubted that overthrowing Saddam would foment regional 
political transformation, arguing that Arab societies still lacked “such important components of 
democracy as the concept of a loyal opposition, vibrant civil society institutions, respect for the 
rule of law, transparency, and a strong middle class.”140 Even if democracy took hold in the 
region, one State Department report warned, it “could well be subject to exploitation by anti-
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American elements.”141 CENTCOM planners throughout the 1990s had estimated that if the 
United States invaded Iraq, it could have soldiers there for up to ten years.142 
The Bush administration’s case for war with Iraq rested on more than preventing another 
terrorist attack and defeating a rival. Iraq served as the cornerstone in a grand strategy of global 
primacy, which has often been labelled the Bush Doctrine. The key tenets of this vision predated 
9/11, but 9/11 served as both impetus and opening for advocates of this vision to establish these 
ideas the guiding principles of U.S. foreign policy. Bush officials aimed to transform the 
international political order in a time of crisis.143 The United States would guarantee the security 
and openness of an increasingly interconnected world by using overwhelming military power to 
deter great power challengers and defeat the nexus of rogue states and terrorists.144 In contrast to 
the “realist” first Bush administration, U.S. global primacy would ensure “a balance of power 
that favored freedom” and enable the flourishing of democracies that would respect human rights 
and eschew aggression.145 In contrast to the anemic Clinton administration, the United States 
would possess the will to act unilaterally or with small coalitions, and it would not be restrained 
by international treaties and institutions.146 The administration’s case for war emerged from this 
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global vision, their interpretation of the post-9/11 security environment, and more deeply rooted 
discrediting of containment as the main alternative to regime change. 
“The Right Way to Change a Regime:” The Public Debate on Iraq and the Powell-Blair 
Approach 
 
Compared to the Bush administration’s case for war, the public debate on Iraq from 2002 
to 2003 has been relatively under-examined. This debate encompassed a narrow range of options 
and perspectives on Iraq, and only a small group still argued that containment should remain 
U.S. policy barring open Iraqi aggression. The largest camp of “skeptics” consisted of 
politicians, intellectuals, and policymakers who disagreed with many of the administration’s 
claims about Iraq and criticized its tactical and procedural actions. Nonetheless, proponents of 
this Powell-Blair approach did not dissent from the core assumptions undergirding Bush’s 
argument, and they offered no clear alternative besides requesting more time for inspections and 
coalition-building. To a significant degree, the regime change consensus shaped and restrained 
the thinking even of those who saw themselves as skeptics, thereby undermining the search for 
alternatives. The Iraq debate was much more about “the right way to change a regime,” in James 
Baker’s phrasing, than whether the United States should seek regime change or restore 
containment.147 
The Bush administration’s push for war benefitted from the support of an overlapping but 
significantly different liberal case for war promulgated by figures like Washington Post 
columnist Richard Cohen, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, and Kanan Makiya. 
Liberals usually argued that Bush was exaggerating Iraq’s WMD programs and objected to the 
Bush Doctrine as harmful to international law and U.S. alliances.148 Nonetheless, they believed 
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that removing Saddam’s regime with the blessing of the United Nations would reinforce the 
authority of international law, which Saddam had defied for years. Jonathan Chait argued, for 
example: “War with Iraq does not require trashing international law. Just the opposite: sustaining 
international law is central to its very rationale.”149  
Saddam did not pose an imminent threat, liberal hawks argued, but the totalitarian nature 
of the regime meant that it would continue to pursue WMD and abuse its people “the way 
junkies seek a fix,” as Cohen put it.150 They took this danger seriously, but the moral importance 
of liberating the Iraqi people from this “morally outrageous regime” motivated them at least as 
much.151 Pro-war liberals consistently referred to Baathist Iraq as a “penitentiary” or 
“concentration camp,” evoking a liberal narrative of an ongoing struggle against 
totalitarianism.152 Robert Kerrey, for instance, told Congress: “We want to have the same 
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experience we had when Kim Dae June, Nelson Mandela, Vaclev Havel, and Lech Walesa came 
to a joint session of Congress and said ‘thank you for liberating us.’”153  
These liberals wanted to position themselves “between Cheney and Chomsky,” in 
Michael Tomasky’s memorable phrasing.154 This meant that liberals should challenge both 
Cheney’s narrow, unilateral nationalism and Noam Chomsky’s evocation of moral equivalence 
between the United States and its enemies. They promoted a “vibrant, hard-headed” liberalism 
that was more cautious and self-critical than the imperialistic neoconservatives but still defended 
liberal values against the new totalitarians of al-Qaeda and the Baathists.155 
Containment, for many liberals, had not only failed to disarm Saddam, it tolerated an 
oppressive status quo in the Middle East that bred terrorism and permitted massive human 
suffering.156 They wanted regime change in Iraq to be part of a “transforming moment” in which 
the United States reoriented its priorities by developing alternative energy sources to reduce 
dependence on foreign oil, pressuring its allies for democratic change, and pursuing a 
progressive agenda at home.157 In the Middle East, the United States would have to further better 
governance, open economies, women’s empowerment, and a free press. The writer Paul Berman, 
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for instance, said that the real goal of the Iraq War should be “to begin a rollback of the 
several…political movements that add up to Muslim totalitarianism” and “foment a liberal 
revolution in the Middle East.”158 Without these larger changes, simply overthrowing Saddam 
would not defeat radicalism in the region.159 The liberal case for war demonstrated that the 
perceived bankruptcy of containment had spread beyond neoconservative circles, as did the 
belief that politically transforming the Middle East was both ethical and vital to U.S. security.  
Openly pro-war liberals were a minority compared with members of the Powell-Blair 
approach. These figures objected to the hawks’ rush to war, their unilateralism, and their reckless 
use of intelligence. Nevertheless, they focused on shaping how and when Bush confronted Iraq 
rather than questioning the necessity of regime change. Among those with intimate access to the 
President, Colin Powell and Tony Blair best represented this viewpoint. Blair and Powell did not 
approach foreign policy from the same perspective. For instance, Blair passionately defended the 
R2P doctrine and argued for intervention in the Balkans and Kosovo crises.160 In contrast, Powell 
opposed the Balkan intervention as the JCS Chairman because he believed U.S. forces should not 
be used for humanitarian crusades that were inessential to the national interest.161 Nevertheless, 
they both endorsed a multilateral foreign policy in which great powers should work with 
international institutions and eschew military force until peaceful strategies have been exhausted. 
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The Blair government became concerned in early 2002 that Bush had decided upon war 
without consulting U.S. allies.162 Cheney had even told several British officials that a coalition 
“would be nice” but was “not essential.”163 They also feared, in David Manning’s words: “There 
is a real risk that the Administration underestimates the difficulties” of occupying Iraq.164 While 
Blair did not see strong links between Iraq and al-Qaeda, he agreed with many of the 
assumptions of Bush’s case for war: “Getting rid of Saddam is the right thing to do. He is a 
potential threat. He could be contained. But containment, as we found with Al Qaida, is always 
risky. His departure would free up the region.”165 Nevertheless, Blair believed that any move 
against Saddam needed to be complemented by a diplomatic push to counter proliferation and 
resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which he saw as the main driver of radicalism in the 
region. Blair told Bush that the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) was “the huge undercurrent 
in this situation. It is the context in the Arab world.”166 Blair wanted to make Iraq “a problem for 
the international community as a whole, not just for the U.S.” by focusing on Saddam’s violation 
of U.N. resolutions rather than the controversial nexus and pre-emptive war concepts.167 
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The British started pressing U.S. officials on these points in the early spring of 2002. In 
deliberations with Bush, however, Blair said he supported Saddam’s removal and he did not 
defend containment as a viable strategy. At a meeting in Crawford, Texas in April 2002, Blair 
assured Bush that Britain would support military action against Iraq once certain conditions had 
been satisfied. A British Cabinet Office Memo detailed these terms: 
When the Prime Minister discussed Iraq with President Bush at Crawford in April he said 
that the UK would support military action to bring about regime change, provided that 
certain conditions were met: efforts had been made to construct a coalition/shape public 
opinion, the Israel-Palestine Crisis was quiescent, and the options for action to eliminate 
Iraq’s WMD through the UN weapons inspectors had been exhausted.168 
 
Christopher Meyer, the British ambassador to the United States, claimed in February 2002 that 
the British objective was “to persuade the U.S…that they must show that they are serious about 
implementing the resolutions-even if only to prepare the ground properly in the international 
community for action is Saddam fails to comply.”169 The Blair government decided to use its 
status as the United States’ closest ally to shape how the United States confronted Iraq, 
acknowledging that force would be an option if other means failed.170  
Blair and Powell helped convince Bush to seek a U.N. resolution to readmit inspectors to 
Iraq in late summer 2002. As Richard Armitage later confirmed, “Powell and I did not object to 
the prospect of taking out Saddam Hussein, but we had real questions about timing.”171 
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However, Powell had watched with concern as Cheney and Rumsfeld pressed Bush to shift focus 
to Iraq throughout early 2002.172 Powell held that Saddam could be disarmed if the United States 
rallied a large coalition and threatened him with force if he failed to comply.173 In a meeting on 
August 5, he conveyed to Bush the possible consequences of invading Iraq without a large 
coalition, including regional chaos, rising oil prices, and alienated allies.174 Without a coalition, 
the United States would face the massive challenges of rebuilding Iraq virtually by itself.175  
Blair likewise intervened with Bush in a meeting at Camp David, where he warned that 
he would not be able to rally domestic political support without the exhaustion of alternatives 
and a U.N. mandate.176 In a September 7 NSC meeting, Bush decided to follow Blair and 
Powell’s advice, despite Cheney and Rumsfeld’s pleas that Saddam already had enough chances 
and that the United States should give Iraq 30-60 days to comply and then invade.177 Rice says 
that Bush stated: “Either he will come clean about his weapons, or there will be war.”178 On 
September 12, Bush spoke before the U.N. General Assembly and called for a resolution that 
would readmit inspectors to Iraq and authorize the use of force if Iraq failed to comply.179 
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Blair and Powell envisioned that going the “U.N. route” might lead to the peaceful 
disarmament of Iraq. Powell, for instance, reportedly told Bush on August 5: “If you take it to 
the U.N., you’ve got to recognize that they might be able to solve it. In which case there’s no 
war.”180 In exchange for pursuing this strategy, however, Bush pressed Blair and Powell to 
promise that if diplomacy failed they would support the use of force.181 They made these pledges 
despite warnings that the hawks were fixated on war and would not make a good faith effort to 
back inspections and build multilateral support. Ambassador Meyer, for instance, warned Blair 
in September that Bush’s instincts were “with the hawks,” that the hawks saw the destruction of 
Iraq’s WMD as “inseparable from the elimination of Saddam himself,” that “inspections were a 
discredited instrument,” and that the United Nations was “not to be trusted.”182 
 This Powell-Blair approach was mirrored in public by intellectuals, politicians, and 
policy-makers who concurred with the regime change consensus and conceded that war with Iraq 
would be necessary once certain conditions were satisfied. They argued that Iraq policy should 
be to be more multilateral, to attempt non-violent means of disarming Iraq first, and to plan more 
realistically for the aftermath of invasion. While the public members of this approach spanned 
the ideological gamut, they clustered in the leadership of major political parties and institutions. 
They included leading Democrats like Joseph Biden, Al Gore, and John Kerry, former 
policymakers like Zbigniew Brzezinski, Sandy Berger, and James Baker, as well as Republicans 
such as Chuck Hagel and Richard Lugar.  
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 Adherents of this approach particularly disliked Bush’s unilateralism, arguing that the 
legitimacy of U.S. global power depended on working through partners and rules-based 
institutions. Bush needed to slow down and build a coalition just as his father had done during 
the Gulf War, which required a Security Council resolution demanding the return of 
inspectors.183 Gore noted, for instance, that the George H.W. Bush had patiently rallied “every 
Arab nation except Jordan” and our European and Asian allies “without exception” for a more 
limited undertaking, in stark contrast to the second Bush’s cavalier ambivalence toward his 
allies.184 These steps would, in Berger words, help with “isolating Saddam and gaining broader 
international support for what may be necessary if we fail.”185  
Backers of the Powell-Blair approach would not support a war until Bush had taken these 
steps.186 This approach would focus the case against Saddam on his repeated defiance of the 
United Nations, making war an “enforcement of a binding international legal commitment,” as 
Biden put it.187 They preferred this justification to the doctrine of preventive war, which these 
skeptics believed alienated allies and corroded international norms against the use of force.188 
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Brzezinksi captured this perspective in saying: “If it is to be war, it should be conducted in a 
manner that legitimizes U.S. global hegemony and, at the same time, contributes to a more 
responsible system of international security.”189  
One of the main reasons that members of the Powell-Blair school supported a more 
multilateral approach was that they believed that war with Iraq would be much harder than the 
Bush administration promised. As Hagel argued: “I can think of no historical case where the 
United States succeeded in an enterprise of such gravity and complexity as regime change in Iraq 
without the support of a regional and international coalition.”190 They anticipated a costly 
invasion and occupation as well the risk of a wider regional war if countries like Iran tried to 
gain influence in a weakened Iraq. If the United States hoped to leave behind a stable, 
democratic Iraq, it would need a multilateral, multi-year effort.191  
 Iraq was only part of a broader struggle for adherents to the Powell-Blair approach, and 
the United States should not jeopardize the coalition they needed to fight terrorism by rushing 
into Iraq.192 Gore, for one, claimed that Bush’s narrow obsession with Iraq had “disposed of the 
sympathy, good will, and solidarity compiled by America and transformed it into a sense of deep 
misgiving and even hostility.”193 These skeptics also believed, like Blair and Powell, in more 
concerted action on the MEPP as a means of countering extremism.194 Brzezinski, for instance, 
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argued that Bush viewed terrorists too simplistically, describing them as simple “evildoers” who 
emerged from an “historical void.” Rather, he said that to counter extremism the United States 
needed to address the many “political antecedent[s]” that fueled it, including colonial legacies, 
the treatment of Palestinians, and U.S.-backed dictators.195  
While members of the Powell-Blair approach criticized Bush’s case on many points and 
viewed themselves as skeptics, they nonetheless agreed with the underlying tenets of the regime 
change consensus. Chuck Hagel, for instance, stated: “I support regime change and a democratic 
transition in Iraq. That’s easy…the tough questions are when, how, with whom, and at what 
cost.”196 Al Gore, for instance, criticized almost every aspect of Bush’s foreign policy but still 
supported a multilateral military effort at regime change on the grounds of enforcing 
international law.197 For proponents of the Powell-Blair approach, the question was how to do 
regime change correctly, not whether to pursue it. If inspections failed, most of these skeptics 
conceded that war would be necessary and justified. Baker, for example, argued about Iraqi 
obstruction of inspectors: “The first time he resorts to those tactics, we should apply whatever 
means are necessary to change the regime.”198 In contrast to the conditionalist approach, they 
usually agreed with Bush that containment had already collapsed and that shifting back to this 
policy would only lead to more obstruction of inspections while Saddam built additional WMD.  
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A sampling of public opinion before the Iraq War shows that the Powell-Blair approach 
mirrored public views more closely than any other perspective. A Brookings Institution study 
aptly described U.S. public opinion as “permissive: it was willing to follow the White House to 
war but not demanding war.” According to their summary of polls, about 30% of Americans 
implacably believed the war was just and necessary, and another 30% opposed war under almost 
any circumstance. The other 40% wavered depending on a number of factors.199 For instance, in 
one poll from August 2002, backing for invasion dropped from 57% to 36% when respondents 
were asked if they would support a war that caused “significant” U.S. casualties.200 Americans 
were far more equivocal about invasion if Saddam had only the potential to produce WMD 
compared to the possession of actual weapons.201 Moreover, Americans consistently wanted 
Bush to build a broader coalition, try out inspections, and gain U.N. and Congressional 
authorization for the use of force.202 However, in keeping with the Powell-Blair approach’s 
pessimism about peaceful solutions, a December 2002 Gallup poll found that 81% of 
respondents believed that Iraq could only be disarmed if Saddam was overthrown.203 
                                                        
199 James Lindsay and Caroline Smith, “Rally Round the Flag: Opinion in the United States Before and After the 
Iraq War,” Brookings Review 21, no. 3 (Summer 2003), 21-22. 
 
200 Richard Morin and Claudia Deane, “Poll: Americans Cautiously Favored War in Iraq,” Washington Post, August 
13, 2002, A10. Another poll found that only 43% of Americans supported invasion if it led to “an expensive, long-
terms occupation by our troops. See: NBS/Wall Street Journal Telephone Survey, October 21, 2002, Polling the 
Nations, accessed September 20, 2018. 
 
201 A Pew survey from January 16, 2003 found that Americans were split 46-47%, yes to no, on the question about 
Iraqi potential to produce WMD, but in the second scenario support for war surged to 76%. Pew Telephone Survey, 
January 16, 2003, Polling the Nations, accessed September 20, 2018. 
 
202 An ABC News/Washington Post Survey from February 24, 2003 found that 56% of respondents wanted the 
United States to keep trying to “win support” from the United Nations rather than “move quickly” on Iraq. See ABC 
News/Washington Post Telephone Survey, February 24, 2003, Polling the Nations, accessed September 20, 2018.  
One poll from September 7, 2002 found that 62% of Americans believed Bush should gain Congressional approval 
before trying to remove Saddam. See: CBS News Telephone Survey, September 7, 2002, Polling the Nations, 
accessed September 20, 2018; 93% of respondents in a September 18, 2002 poll supported reinserting inspectors in 
Iraq under U.N. auspices before considering the use of force. See: Gallup Telephone Survey, September 18, 2002, 
Polling the Nations, accessed September 20, 2018. 
 
 320 
In contrast to the Powell-Blair approach, one much smaller school of thought defended 
containment as a superior option to war by attacking the foundations of the regime change 
consensus. They continued the conditionalist school of thought by arguing that containment 
could still be adjusted to new conditions and that without open Iraqi aggression, war was 
unnecessary. They believed that the Iraqi threat should be measured not by the seemingly fixed 
intentions of its regime but by its capability to do harm, which could be limited by U.S. actions. 
They wanted to use the urgency of the post-9/11 political moment to revive containment by 
tightening the sanctions, re-inserting even tougher inspections, and diplomatically isolating 
Saddam.204 Key supporters of this argument included policy scholars like Carnegie Endowment 
President Jessica Matthews and political scientist John Mearsheimer, Democrats like Senators 
Edward Kennedy and Robert Byrd, and some notable policymakers, including Brent Scowcroft 
and Richard Haass. Haass was one of the few high-ranking members of the Bush administration 
to argue for containment while in office.205 
 One of the key pillars of the pro-containment position was their alternative perspective on 
Saddam’s behavior and psychology. The Bush administration and other hawks believed either 
that Saddam was irrational and revenge-driven or prone to massive miscalculation. The 
defenders of containment claimed instead that Saddam mainly desired power and survival, and 
                                                        
203 Gallup Telephone Survey, December 12, 2002, Polling the Nations, accessed September 20, 2018. A January 27, 
2003 poll found that 20% of respondents thought “inspections alone” could disarm Iraq, whereas 71% said military 
action would be required. See Gallup Telephone Survey, January 27, 2003, Polling the Nations, accessed September 
20, 2018. A November 15, 2002 poll likewise found that 76% of respondents believed inspections would not 
eliminate the Iraqi threat. See: Time/CNN Telephone Survey, November 15, 2002, Polling the Nations, accessed 
September 20, 2018. 
 
204 Haass, War of Necessity, 211; Michael O’Hanlon, House Committee on Armed Services, United States Policy 
Toward Iraq, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., October 2, 2002, 349-352; Morton Halperin, “A Case for Containment,” 
Washington Post, February 11, 2003, A21; Michael Walzer, “The Right Way,” New York Times Book Review, 
March 13, 2003, 34. 
 
205 Haass, War of Necessity, 222-223, 233. Haass wrote a memo to Powell to this effect in early 2003, but he claims 
it did not change the policy direction.  
 321 
containment had kept him preoccupied with domestic security rather than external aggression.206 
Moreover, they argued that Saddam’s major acts of aggression, supposed signs of the uselessness 
of deterrence, actually had not been deterred by the United States. John Mearsheimer noted that 
Saddam’s invasion of Iran sought limited goals and responded in part to Iranian subversion.207 
The United States actually supported Saddam during this war, even when he used chemical 
weapons on the Kurds. This crime, however heinous, did not demonstrate that Saddam would 
use WMD on Americans because the Kurds, unlike the Americans, could not respond in kind. In 
1990, the United States also failed to signal to Saddam that he should not invade Kuwait. 
Mearsheimer claimed: “Deterrence did not fail in this case; it was never tried.”208 
Under containment, in contrast, Saddam had avoided open aggression and quickly 
withdrawn his own threats when the United States threatened him back, as he did in the 1994 
Kuwaiti border crisis. The lesson here for Mearsheimer and other defenders of containment was: 
“Iraq has never gone to war in the face of a clear deterrent threat.” There was no reason to think 
9/11 had changed this fact, especially when Saddam’s military still had not recovered from the 
Gulf War and sanctions.209 Even if inspections did not fully succeed and Saddam developed 
some WMD, the threat of massive U.S. retaliation would still deter him. Thus, Mearsheimer and 
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other defenders of containment contested a key idea shared by the Bush administration and the 
Powell-Blair approach: the claim that if inspections failed then war would become necessary.210  
 The pro-containment school also dissented from the widely held idea that 9/11 should 
change the way Americans viewed Iraq. They argued that 9/11 changed Americans’ psychology 
and worldview, while the Iraqi threat remained the same.211 The core of the nexus concept, Iraqi 
handoff of WMD to international terrorists, was as unrealistic now after 9/11 as it was 
beforehand. Scowcroft argued, for instance, that there was “scant evidence to tie Saddam to 
terrorist organizations,” that Iraq and al-Qaeda held disparate goals and ideals, and that Saddam 
was “unlikely to risk his investment in weapons of mass destruction, much less his country, by 
handing such weapons to terrorists who would use them for their own purposes.”212 Saddam 
mainly wanted these weapons to “deter us from intervening to block his aggressive designs” and 
to protect himself from domestic and regional challengers.213 The 98-year-old George Kennan 
echoed this assessment, calling the administration’s attempts to link Iraq and al-Qaeda 
“pathetically unsupportive and unreliable,” adding that the invasion “seems to me well out of 
proportion to the dangers involved.”214 
Defenders of containment further argued that a global consensus had arisen around 
stopping al-Qaeda, and the United States should keep its focus there rather than take on a 
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divisive and costly war with Iraq.215 They maintained that Iraq was not the most dangerous rogue 
state, often pointing to North Korea. North Korea possessed an active uranium enrichment 
program and in October 2002 announced it was restarting several reactors and withdrawing from 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework.216 While these 
actions far exceeded Saddam’s suspected activities, Bush claimed that this was a “diplomatic 
showdown” and that the United States had “no intention of invading” North Korea.217 Senator 
Russ Feingold noted that the discrepancy between U.S. policies toward Iraq and North Korea 
suggested a clear lesson for any rogue state: “Acquire weapons and then be free from the threat 
of military action, or do not acquire weapons and then perhaps be subject to invasion.” Thus, 
preventive war in Iraq would incentivize WMD proliferation rather than curb it.218  
 Many pro-containment figures also challenged the morality and legality of Bush’s case 
for war. Bush had not shown that Saddam could strike the United States, much less imminent 
plans to do so, making the war preventive rather than preemptive.219 The doctrine of preventive 
war could not become “an acceptable norm of international behavior” lest any state cite the mere 
possibility of being struck as justification for striking first.220 Preventive war would lower the bar 
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for violence from imminence and self-defense to suspicion and fear, possibly even excusing 
thinly veiled aggression.221 Other countries, as Robert Byrd argued, saw the United States as 
asserting “the right to turn its firepower on any corner of the globe which might be suspect in the 
war on terrorism. We assert that right without the sanction of any international body.”222 
Humanitarian intervention, moreover, did not justify an invasion because Saddam’s worst crimes 
occurred over a decade ago, and the regime was horrible but not uniquely immoral.223 
Lastly, like area experts in the U.S. government, defenders of containment cast doubt on 
the idea that the war would be easy and the Iraqi people would welcome Americans as liberators. 
Nicholas Kristof, for instance, had travelled to Iraq and encountered great hostility for the United 
States, which Iraqis saw as a new colonial power that had caused immense Iraqi suffering under 
sanctions. One university president waved a pencil in Kristof’s face and said angrily: “You see 
this? It took 15 months just to import pencils for our students.”224 Democratic transformation 
was a neoconservative fantasy, these critics argued, as neither the region nor Iraq had any 
preconditions for democracy or liberalism.225 They also excoriated the administration for 
inadequate preparation for occupying and rebuilding an economically devastated and socially 
divided country. The more probable outcome of invasion was retribution and civil war along 
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ethnic lines, interference from regional actors, and terrorist groups finding haven and recruits in 
the chaos.226  
While the pro-containment position occupied a thin slice on the U.S. spectrum of thought 
on Iraq, it was a mainstream viewpoint in countries like France and Germany. French President 
Jacques Chirac and German Prime Minister Gerhard Schroeder did not believe that Saddam 
represented a severe enough threat to justify war. They disputed the Americans’ dire assessment 
of Iraq’s WMD programs and claimed that the MEPP was the key to deflating radicalism in the 
region.227 Chirac warned Bush in February 2003 that “war will have catastrophic consequences, 
including on terrorism throughout the entire world.”228 Chirac, Schroeder, and other leaders 
feared that Bush was driving U.S. foreign policy in a unilateral and unethical direction, including 
violations of international law like indefinite detention and “enhanced” interrogation 
techniques.229 For France, Germany, China, and Russia, containment through inspections would 
control Saddam’s WMD programs and limit his menace to the region. Schroder ruled out 
German participation in a war completely, with or without a U.N. mandate, and France refused 
to consider the question until inspections had a chance to disarm Iraq peacefully. 230  
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The other significant group that opposed the Iraq War was the political and intellectual 
left. Unlike the pro-containment school, the left argued that both containment and war were 
immoral and unnecessary. A key underlying premise of the leftist approach was that the United 
States had little moral high ground in the struggle against extremism in the Middle East. As 
activists like Phyllis Bennis argued, the United States had bombed and starved the Iraqi people, 
supported dictators, and backed Israeli aggression.231 For the left, 9/11 was an unjustifiable but 
predictable manifestation of a justified subaltern rage at U.S. crimes and hypocrisy. As scholar 
Noam Chomsky put it: “We can think of the United States as an ‘innocent victim’ only if we 
adopt the convenient path of ignoring the record of its actions and those of its allies.”232 Leftists 
like historian Howard Zinn said that now that Americans had a taste of the suffering of “the 
victims of American military action-in Vietnam, in Latin America, in Iraq,” they should rethink 
their capitalistic and hegemonic foreign policy.233 From this vantage point, another U.S. war in 
the Middle East would only exacerbate terrorism and extremism. 
The anti-war left also argued that human rights, democracy, and the nexus threat were all 
pretexts for an aggressive, illegal war in the name of oil interests and a vision of “absolute 
military hegemony over the earth.”234 Containment was hardly better, given its dependence on 
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immoral sanctions. Left-wing Democrats like Dennis Kucinich argued that the United States 
should support inspections but lift economic sanctions and end the no-fly zones.235 They hoped 
that this strategy would enable a middle class to regrow in Iraq and possibly moderate the 
regime.236 Even the anti-war left did not support containment, which shows how narrow a slice 
of the political and intellectual spectrum the defenders of containment occupied. 
The pro-containment and leftist viewpoints failed to gain broad support because they did 
not appeal to the standard “lessons” embedded in the now-dominant regime change consensus. 
The shared Bush and Powell-Blair view that Saddam was developing a major WMD program 
and possibly supporting al-Qaeda fit with what had become ingrained perceptions of the dictator 
and his regime over the course of the 1990s. Moreover, the leftists possessed little institutional 
power, and neither school addressed the post-9/11 atmosphere of fear and vulnerability that 
primed the public to accepted the potent, if inflated, case for war. Again, defenders of 
containment could only spell out the end point of this policy in vague terms. The key, as former 
Clinton official Morton Halperin argued, was to avoid putting a time limit on a policy that was 
basically working.237 This seemingly indefinite toleration of a rogue actor like Saddam had 
always been a flaw in containment’s political viability, and it fit especially poorly with the post-
9/11 climate. 
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Congress, Inspections, and the Coming of the Iraq War, October 2002-March 2003 
In the months before the war began on March 20, 2003, skeptics of Bush’s case for war 
had two major chances to impede the rush to war or find alternative means for disarming Iraq. 
The first was the Congressional debate in September and October 2002 over authorizing the 
President to use force. The second was the process of inspections itself, which restarted in 
November 2002. Nevertheless, followers of the Powell-Blair approach continued to argue in 
procedural terms without challenging the Bush administration’s fundamental assumptions about 
the Iraqi threat, which they shared to a large degree. Congress, which was shaped by this line of 
thought, put no meaningful restrictions on Bush’s authority to use force against Iraq, focusing 
instead on ensuring that he put a real effort into diplomacy and inspections. The Congressional 
debates on Iraq and the broader public conversation about inspections in late 2002 and early 
2003 generally receive less scholarly attention than the ideas and internal deliberations of the 
Bush administration. However, these discourses reveal just how narrow and ineffective the 
Powell-Blair criticism of Bush’s Iraq policy was and how its shortcomings facilitated the coming 
of war in March 2003. 
Moreover, members of the Powell-Blair approach conceded to the Bush administration 
that the success of inspections would be measured by Saddam’s level of compliance rather than 
the degree to which inspections constrained his WMD programs or whether or not inspectors 
found anything substantial. Like the hawks, they believed in what might be called “inspections 
entropy,” a perceived lesson of the 1990s experience. Eventually, within this logic, the world 
would abandon tough inspections, Iraq would start obstructing, and the process would collapse, 
letting Saddam off the hook again.238 This section’s narratives of the Congressional debate and 
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the inspections process demonstrates that the Powell-Blair school’s arguments for proper 
Congressional authorization and a last chance for inspections were mostly procedural, designed 
for pursuing regime change “the right way” rather than exploring alternatives. 
 Congressional debate started when the Bush administration sent a draft authorization to 
Congress on September 13, 2002. Many Democrats and some Republicans objected to this draft, 
which carved out war powers that could be read as extending beyond Iraq.239 Joseph Biden and 
Richard Lugar, both skeptics of the Bush case who followed the Powell-Blair approach, drafted a 
bill that required Bush to receive Security Council authorization for the use of force after 
inspections had failed. Alternatively, under this version Bush could issue a presidential 
determination that the threat to the United States was “so grave” that he needed to strike without 
U.N. support.240 Whereas the White House resolution authorized the President to enforce all 
Security Council resolutions relevant to Iraq, the Biden-Lugar version authorized force only for 
U.N. resolutions relating to WMD disarmament.241  
Bush announced a deal with House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt on October 2 that 
sidelined the Biden-Lugar bill and added a few more conditions in exchange for broader 
Democratic support.242 The final resolution, House Joint Resolution 114 (H.J. Res. 114) required 
the President to issue a determination to Congress within 48 hours of launching any military 
action regarding why diplomatic measures could no longer protect national security or enforce 
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the Security Council’s resolutions. This resolution limited Bush’s authority specifically to Iraq, 
whereas the original White House resolution more broadly authorized Bush to use force to 
“restore international peace and security in the region.”243 Nonetheless, this resolution featured 
essentially the same authorization of force as the White House draft, empowering Bush to 
“defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq” 
and to “enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.”244 
On October 10, 2002, the House voted 296-133 for H.J. Res. 114, and the next day the 
Senate passed the same resolution by a vote of 77-23. Democrats voted against this bill 126-82 in 
the House 29-21 in favor in the Senate.245 Republicans echoed Bush’s case for war, and they 
voted overwhelmingly in favor of H.J. Res 114. The Senate was equally divided and the 
Republicans had a slim majority in the House, making Democratic votes vital for creating these 
large margins. In contrast to this vote, 179 out of 265 Democrats in the House and 45 of 55 in the 
Senate voted for the January 1991 authorization for the Gulf War.246 
Democrats and skeptical Republicans who supported the authorization argued that a 
united domestic front was the best way to convince the United Nations to support a tough 
resolution against Saddam, which was ultimately the best way to resolve the crisis without 
war.247 They also appeared to believe that Bush would thoroughly pursue the U.N. route. Chuck 
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Hagel, for example, recalled: “I was told by the president-we all were-that he would exhaust 
every diplomatic effort.”248 Every prospective candidate for the 2004 presidential election, 
including Kerry, Gephardt, Edwards, and Liebermann, voted for the resolution and mostly 
supported Bush’s arguments.249 They were also influenced by the post-9/11 mood, as one 
Congressman said that Democrats “have changed in the same way the American people have 
changed. We are acutely aware of how vulnerable the country is.”250   
The desire to look tough on foreign policy before the 2002 midterm elections also 
influenced Democrats, many of whom were still trying to shed the post-Vietnam impression that 
they were weak and irresponsible on foreign affairs. Bush still held high approval ratings, and he 
carried great political momentum from his seeming successes in Afghanistan. Indeed, many 
Republicans used Iraq and the War on Terror to assail Democrats’ patriotism. Bush himself 
argued on September 13 that Democrats could not “wait for the United Nations to make a 
decision” before they voted. He added: “If I were running for office, I’m not sure how I would 
explain to the American people…you know ‘Vote for me, and oh, by the way, on a matter of 
national security, I think I’m going to wait for somebody else to act.251 Democrats like Gephardt 
regretted that they had voted against the successful Persian Gulf War, and they feared further 
political fallout for not endorsing this war.252 The Republicans nevertheless picked up eight seats 
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in the House and regained control of the Senate in the midterms in November, using several 
Democrats’ votes against the Iraq resolution to great effect.253 
 Democrats who voted against the resolution saw it as a vast and unjustified grant of 
authority, in advance of diplomacy, to declare war against an exaggerated threat.254 Prominent 
Democrats who voted no included Carl Levin, Robert Byrd, and Edward Kennedy. Nevertheless, 
attempts by pro-containment Democrats to more substantially restrain the President’s authority 
were both limited in scope and unsuccessful. Levin introduced a resolution that authorized Bush 
to use force only if he received a U.N. mandate. Nonetheless, upon presenting his resolution, 
Levin said: “I don’t differ much from Bush in his detailing of the threat posed by Saddam.” 
Levin mainly sought to prevent the United States from taking unilateral action against Iraq and to 
bind Bush more tightly to diplomacy.255 
Furthermore, in the markup of H.J. Res. 114 in the House International Relations 
Committee, a group of Democrats proposed twelve alternative resolutions. Brad Sherman (D-
CA) introduced a resolution that struck every justification for the use of force from H.J. Res 114 
except those relating to WMD. This resolution treated WMD as the sole legitimate reason for 
invading Iraq, given other countries’ dismal human rights practices.256 His draft authorized force 
only if the President certified that Iraq had refused to readmit or cooperate with inspectors.257 
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Most resolutions from skeptical Congressmen like Sherman still authorized Bush to use force, 
merely requiring him to offer more elaborate determinations to Congress that other means had 
failed. Sherman framed his amendment, for example, as authorizing Bush to take the “Powell-
Blair approach,” justifying war once inspections had been tried and encouraging but not 
requiring a U.N. mandate. Under his resolution, if the United States does go to war, Sherman 
argued “We do so with considerably more international support and considerably more domestic 
support than we would have otherwise.”258  
Congresswoman Barbara Lee (D-CA) introduced a far more restrictive amendment that 
noted the success of inspections in the 1990s in dismantling most of Iraq’s WMD program. Her 
draft struck the entire war powers clause from H.J. 114 and called for the United States to pursue 
only diplomatic means at this time. Lee called for “an enhanced containment system,” tough 
military sanctions, and long-term inspections as an alternative to regime change.259 Her 
resolution was rare in mandating a second Congressional vote after diplomacy had been 
attempted and for arguing that containment had managed the Iraqi threat well. None of these 
resolutions, however, gained much steam. Levin’s amendment failed in the Senate 24-75, and 
Lee’s failed in the House 72-355. Sherman’s amendment failed 31-15 in committee, with most 
Democrats voting no in large part to avoid upsetting the Gephardt’s deal with the President.260  
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Robert Byrd was the only Senate Democrat who did not support the opening of debate on 
Iraq, and he eventually voted against the authorization.261 On October 10, he upbraided his peers 
for handing over vast war powers and failing to challenge a President who was “changing the 
conventional understanding of the term ‘self-defense’” and using the upcoming midterm election 
to silence dissent. In his eyes, Congress had abdicated its responsibility to conduct a substantive 
debate about the war. His words capture the narrow terms of the Congressional debate on Iraq: 
The debate that began in the Senate last week is centered not on the fundamental and  
monumental questions of whether and why the United States should go to war with Iraq, but 
rather on the mechanics of how to best wordsmith the president’s use of force resolution in  
order to give him virtually unchecked authority to commit the nation’s military to an  
unprovoked attack on a sovereign nation.262 
 
Most Democrats who voted for the authorization continued to criticize Bush’s Iraq policy, but in 
October 2002 they gave away their main opportunity to restrain the Bush administration. 
Following the passage of H.J. Res. 114, members of the Powell-Blair approach saw 
inspections and coercive diplomacy as the best opportunity to resolve the Iraq confrontation 
peacefully. Throughout the fall of 2002, Powell worked at the Security Council to draft such a 
resolution, which passed as Resolution 1441 on November 8. This resolution declared that Iraq 
“remains in material breach” of its obligation to disarm and afforded Iraq “a final opportunity to 
comply” with these demands by cooperating with new inspections. The inspections would be 
conducted by the IAEA under Mohammed el-Baradei, which would handle nuclear weapons, and 
UNMOVIC under Hans Blix, which would focus on chemical and biological weapons as well as 
ballistic missiles. Resolution 1441 mandated that Iraq provide these teams “immediate, 
unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access” to any site, equipment, or person, including 
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the so-called “presidential sites” that had caused tension in 1998.263 Ideally, the inspectors would 
destroy all of Iraq’s remaining WMD programs and verify disarmament to the Security Council. 
If Iraq did not cooperate, Resolution 1441 warned that “it will face serious consequences.”264 
Iraq accepted this resolution and readmitted inspectors at the end of November.  
This resolution, however, papered over serious disagreements between the United States 
and Great Britain on one side and France, Russia, and China on the other. The United States 
believed that the phrase “serious consequences” authorized force without further Security 
Council approval. In contrast, France, Russia, and China argued that before the Security Council 
authorized the use of force, the inspectors must report that Iraq was not complying and the 
Security Council must vote again on an explicit authorization.265 In contrast to the United States, 
Tony Blair supported this idea of a “second resolution” in order to augment international support 
for the war and to legitimize it to a doubtful audience at home.266 Resolution 1441 did not define 
how frequent or severe Iraqi non-compliance had to be to trigger the use of force, nor did it 
specify how long inspections should be allowed to continue. These ambiguities were necessary 
for passing Resolution 1441 given France, Russia, and China’s deep skepticism about war, and 
these disagreements would reemerge as inspections proceeded in the winter of 2002-2003.267 
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 The Bush administration and other hawks could hardly mask their distrust in inspections, 
which they had held since the 1990s. In early October, Christopher Meyer observed that within 
the Cabinet: “The points of disagreement were relatively narrow: no one doubts that inspections 
will fail, the argument is how hard to try for international support for the war.”268 Rumsfeld and 
Cheney feared that the United States would once again become mired in Saddam’s inspections 
games, undermining the momentum toward war and dividing the Security Council. Cheney 
openly disparaged inspections, claiming that in the 1990s they had “consistently underestimated 
or missed what it was Saddam Hussein was doing.”269 He added: “A return of the inspectors 
would provide no assurance whatsoever of his compliance…On the contrary, there is a great 
danger that it would provide false comfort that Saddam was somehow back in his box.”270 As 
inspections dragged on, as Rumsfeld warned: “Saddam’s preparations to use weapons of mass 
destruction can be expected to advance daily.”271  
 The Bush administration contended that the standard of evidence for inspections should 
be simple: Was Saddam fully complying and turning over all relevant materials or not? This 
standard emerged from the lessons the hawks derived from the 1990s. Rumsfeld wrote to Bush 
that UNMOVIC’s bureaucrats and scientists would be unable to “catch Saddam Hussein, as it 
were, with his pants down. The long history of weapons inspections in Iraq tells us that this is 
highly unlikely.”272 Without such a “flagrant obstruction” by the Iraqis, the process would 
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inevitably stall in “a protracted period of inconclusive inspections” that offered Saddam his “best 
hope of inflicting a strategic defeat on the U.S.”273 They contended instead that past inspections 
owed most of their success to defections from Iraqi personnel.274 As Rumsfeld argued, even 
tough inspections had been insufficient: “Even intrusive inspections over several years missed 
significant parts of the Iraq program and failed to detect an ongoing buildup.”275 Bush officials 
claimed: “inspections only work in a country that wants to cooperate with them,” pointing to the 
example of South Africa’s voluntary dismantling of its nuclear program in the early 1990s.276 If 
Iraq decided to hide its programs, as Powell argued, “they can inspect for 12 years and not get 
anywhere.”277 Several former inspectors, including David Kay, Richard Spertzel, and Charles 
Duelfer, supported this standard of evidence and predicted that inspections would fail.278 
The hawks concluded that inspectors should not be detectives but verifiers of Iraqi 
compliance. The hawks envisioned inspections as a test of “whether the Iraqi leadership has had 
a change of heart and is actually willing to give up the weapons.”279 If Iraq would “answer 
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questions without being asked” and disclose programs “fully and voluntarily,” it could 
demonstrate this change of heart.280 Rumsfeld even suggested that it should only require one or 
two inspectors to verify Iraq’s decision.281 Iraq was too large and the government was too 
“skilled at hiding and cheating” for inspections to anything besides measure changed strategic 
intentions “at the highest political level.”282 If Iraq issued a false declaration of its WMD, 
Rumsfeld argued in October, “The U.N. should not proceed with inspections, for it would be 
clear then that there is lacking the good faith and cooperative attitude necessary to make the 
inspections work.”283 The experience of the 1990s showed that if, as Bush claimed, “Iraq’s 
leaders stall inspections and impede their progress, it means they have something to hide.”284 
This was a crucial claim: even if the inspectors did not find illicit weapons programs, mere Iraqi 
obstruction or delay would demonstrate that these activities persisted. This standard freed the 
administration to invade Iraq even if the inspectors did not find major WMD programs.  
In a sort of intellectual cul-de-sac, the Bush administration and other hawks maintained 
that because of the nature of Saddam and his regime, there was almost no chance that he would 
meet this standard of compliance. When asked by a Congressman if the inspections might disarm 
Iraq and leave Saddam in power, Rumsfeld replied “Boy, that is a reach,” even though going the 
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U.N. route was predicated on the idea that if inspections succeeded war could be avoided.285 
Cheney, for example, said in a speech on August 27, 2002: “Intelligence is an uncertain business, 
even in the best of circumstances. This is especially the case when you are dealing with a 
totalitarian regime that has made a science out of deceiving the international community.”286 
When the inspectors failed to find an active nuclear program in Iraq by early 2003, Rice 
deployed a similar response: “We need to be careful about drawing these conclusions, 
particularly in a totalitarian state like Iraq.”287 Thus, the totalitarian Baathists’ mastery in 
subterfuge and fabrication would trump the inspectors, leaving regime change as the only option. 
The Bush administration’s skepticism of the inspections process reflected its suspicion of 
the United Nations as a body that sought to restrain U.S. power and coddle dictators. Many 
hawks distrusted officials like Hans Blix, whom they believed were so “eager to avoid a war” 
that they might prevaricate on Iraqi behavior or “declare Iraq in compliance when it is not.”288 
Cheney even confronted Blix, telling him that if his conclusions differed from the 
administration’s views, “we will not hesitate to discredit you.”289 France, Russia, and China, 
moreover, could be expected to undermine tough inspections and make sure their Iraqi trading 
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partner remained in power.290 Conservative and neoconservative writers openly mocked the 
United Nations, calling its leaders “timid” and its inspections a “farce” and a “trap.291 If the 
United States put too much faith in this institution, entropy would once again take effect, 
isolating the United States and allowing Saddam to slip the noose. 
 Defenders of containment contested the administration’s portrayal of the history of 
inspections and the proper standard of evidence. They argued that many of the major 
breakthroughs of the 1990s inspections came not just through defections but through a range of 
methods: environmental and chemical sampling, radiation detectors, ground penetrating radar 
inventories, physical surveys, computer searches, aerial and satellite surveillance, and 
interviews.292 Hawks touted the Hussein Kamel episode as evidence of the flaws in inspections.  
Former UNSCOM chief Rolf Ekeus retorted that in the months before Kamel’s defection the 
inspectors had compelled Iraq to acknowledge the existence of a biological weapons program 
and discovered key information about its anthrax, botulism, and aflatoxin research. They did this 
largely by questioning a foreign firm that exported an agricultural spray drying system to Iraq. 
The firm said that the Iraqis wanted a machine that would suspend particles in the atmosphere, 
which was more suited to the inhalation of biological agents then civilian agriculture. The 
inspectors had also pressed Iraq to explain why it had imported industrial quantities of biological 
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growth media before the Gulf War, far more than was necessary for civilian uses.293 By looking 
into these inconsistencies and searching hospitals, research labs, and health centers, UNSCOM 
pieced together an undeclared biological weapons program. Kamel then revealed the full extent 
of this program.294 
Defenders of inspections further contended that full Iraqi cooperation was not necessary 
for restraining Iraq’s programs because, as Blix argued, inspections and monitoring worked as “a 
form of containment” by inhibiting weapons development and providing early warnings of illicit 
activities.295 El Baradei made a similar case, claiming that the “presence of international 
inspectors in Iraq today continues to serve as an effective deterrent to and insurance against 
resumption of programs.”296 While they wanted Iraq to commit to permanent disarmament, 
advocates of inspections argued that they constrained Iraqi capabilities and, along with sanctions 
and the threat of force, made the resumption of significant WMD activities highly improbable. 
Nuclear weapons infrastructure could be detected because, as Michael O’Hanlon noted, it was 
“expensive, sophisticated, hard to hide, and even harder to move.”297 As containment advocates 
had long held, el Baradei and others argued that the world had to accept “some degree of risk” on 
Iraq’s WMD but that this risk must be weighed against the costs of invasion.298  
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 Many defenders of containment argued for a more militarized form of inspections that 
would enable the United States to quickly destroy any WMD program. Jessica Matthews of the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace composed a plan for “coercive inspections” that 
many advocates of containment supported.299 She sought to expand U.S. surveillance and destroy 
from the air any site being sanitized or blocked or suspected materials being moved on the 
ground. She also advocated a multinational military force to protect inspectors and to 
immediately destroy suspected sites.300 Matthews argued that this plan could “reduce Iraq’s 
WMD threat, if not to zero, to a negligible level.”301 The Bush administration, however, rejected 
this idea because if the United States had to use coercion to back inspections it meant that Iraq 
was still obstructing, which meant that Saddam had not decided to disarm.302 For this reason, 
Powell, Rumsfeld, and Rice stymied a Franco-German attempt to triple the number of inspectors 
and possibly insert U.N. peacekeepers into Iraq in a version of coercive inspections.303 
 The first step in the inspections was for Iraq to submit a complete declaration of its 
existing WMD programs, equipment, stockpiles, and related personnel. This declaration would 
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provide a baseline for the inspectors, who would verify that Iraq had closed or destroyed all 
materials and programs.304 Iraq provided this declaration in a 12,000-page report on December 7, 
2002. The United States and the inspectors judged it as inadequate because it did not clarify the 
status of unaccounted-for weapons, featured recycled material from previous declarations, and 
included no further evidence that Iraq had abandoned its nuclear weapons program.305  
 Inspectors returned to Iraq in late November 2002 and steadily ramped up their activities 
in the winter. Their reports to the Security Council, issued every two weeks, painted an 
ambiguous portrait of Iraq’s compliance and weapons programs that offered evidence to 
supporters and detractors of inspections. On the positive side, Blix and El Baradei reported that 
Iraqi cooperation was “prompt,” “expeditious,” and “without conditions,” in stark contrast to the 
1990s. Complying with the demands of Resolution 1441, Iraq even allowed inspectors into the 
presidential sites that had caused so much consternation in 1998.306  
Most importantly, the inspectors found few weapons or other evidence of ongoing WMD 
production. In December, UNMOVIC found around 12 artillery shells filled with mustard gas, 
which they destroyed. In February, they found and destroyed missile casting chambers and 70 
illegal ballistic missiles.307 Not only did the inspectors find few actual weapons, they repeatedly 
observed that Iraq’s industrial infrastructure had decayed considerably since the Gulf War, 
undercutting their ability to produce WMD.308 For Bush’s claims about Iraq’s nuclear program, 
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however, the inspectors found no evidence. The IAEA assessed on February 14: “We have to 
date found no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear related activities in Iraq,” 
although el-Baradei noted several outstanding issues.309 The IAEA also found that the U.S. 
claims about aluminum tubes and the importing of uranium from Niger were “unfounded.”310  
 On the other hand, Iraq failed to clear up questions about its WMD in several areas, 
offering the hawks some evidence of inspections’ flaws. Blix and el Baradei noted that Iraq still 
offered only “passive support, that is, responding as needed to inspectors’ requests” rather 
fulfilling Resolution 1441’s demand for “proactive support-that is, voluntarily assisting 
inspectors by providing documentation, people, and other evidence.”311 Interviewing Iraqi 
personnel remained a sticking point, as the Iraqis insisted on having minders in the room. The 
inspectors believed Iraqi officials were still coaching and coercing their personnel to 
dissemble.312 The Iraqis also resisted the use of U-2 spy planes for surveillance of suspected 
sites, even though Resolution 1441 specifically authorized these flights.313 Furthermore, 
inspectors found 3,000 pages of documents related to uranium enrichment in the home of an 
Iraqi scientist in January, making them suspect that Iraq was hiding other information. These 
problems led Blix to conclude in late January: “Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine 
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acceptance…of the disarmament which was demanded of it.”314 In early March, Blix judged that 
Iraq still needed to provide evidence of the location or destruction of key materials, including 
VX gas, anthrax, bacterial growth media, and chemical bombs.315 
 In January 2003, slightly over a month into inspections, Bush and other top U.S. officials 
privately determined that inspections would fail.316 Bush believed that “time is not on our side 
here” and that “the United States can’t stay in this position while Saddam plays games with the 
inspectors.”317 Cheney told the Saudi Ambassador on January 10 that Bush had already decided 
on invasion.318 On January 15, Bush told Powell, “I think I have to do this. I want you with me,” 
and Powell pledged his support.319 In late January, U.S. officials started to publicly declare that 
Saddam would not comply, and they excoriated France and Germany for not taking the Iraqi 
threat seriously.320 The administration opposed time extensions for inspections, arguing that 
offering more time “plays into the hands” of Saddam by enabling him to split the coalition.321  
 Although they expected Bush to give inspections a genuine chance, adherents of the 
Powell-Blair approach did not contest Bush’s standard of evidence, which virtually preordained 
the “failure” of inspections. This concession led them either to weakly defend inspections or to 
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support abandoning them. Tom Daschle, Chuck Hagel, Christopher Dodd, and others faulted 
Bush for “rushing to war” without giving inspections and diplomacy more time, but they never 
proposed an alternative course beyond a few more months for these measures.322 Joseph Biden 
argued that while “Saddam Hussein has to go,” the United States should continue to pursue a 
second resolution to provide political cover to allies like Blair, broaden the coalition, and “share 
the burden” of reconstruction.323 James Baker, who had called for restraint in the summer of 
2002, declared in February that containment had failed and the only reason the United States 
should not strike Iraq immediately was to build more international support.324  
The American public had supported continued efforts at inspections and diplomacy 
through the winter of 2002-2003.325 However, this support plummeted in March as diplomacy 
started to collapse. One March poll showed that 67% of respondents believed Bush had “tried 
hard at diplomacy.”326 A Pew survey from March showed 60% saying that the inspections have 
proven that Saddam “will not cooperate,” while another poll showed 75% saying that war was 
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“inevitable” even if inspectors received more time.327 Public support for war surged in March, 
with polls showing approval ratings well into the 70% range for the pending war.328 
Blair and Powell also did not defend inspections once they were under way. Blair wrote 
to Bush on January 24 that “If we delay, we risk Saddam messing us about, sucking us back into 
a game of hide and seek with the inspectors where…the thing drags on forever until we give up 
or get distracted.”329 Blair called for more time for inspections mainly to see if they would 
provide a clearer casus belli that might convince the Security Council to authorize force.330 
Powell labored to preserve the coalition, but he soon turned on inspections, declaring in late 
January: “The question isn’t how much longer do you need for inspections to work. Inspections 
will not work.”331 Blair and other members of this approach did not, however, endorse Blix’s 
argument that the inspections themselves acted as a form of containment. They also did not take 
seriously the fact that the inspectors had turned up little evidence of continuing WMD programs. 
Their arguments remained tactical and procedural, focusing on ensuring that the inspections box 
had been checked and as large a coalition as possible assembled. 
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 In late February and early March, Blix and el Baradei pleaded for more time as Bush 
openly abandoned inspections. The inspectors claimed that they were still inserting new teams 
and setting up new bases. Blix noted that since mid-February Iraq had increased its cooperation 
and accepted the inspectors’ demands for private interviews with Iraqi personnel and aerial 
surveillance.332 With this new “pro-active attitude” and the continued threat of war, Blix 
predicted that resolving outstanding issues “would not take years, nor weeks, but months.”333 
France, Germany, China, and Russia all supported the inspectors’ appeals and devised plans to 
strengthen inspections.334 The United States and Great Britain, however, introduced a Security 
Council resolution on February 24 stating that “Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity 
afforded it in Resolution 1441.”335 They accused Saddam of not cooperating and hiding weapons 
and information. Powell declared a few weeks later: “Nothing we have seen since the passage of 
1441 indicates that Saddam Hussein has taken a strategic and political decision to disarm.”336 
The United States delayed the start of war in March 2003 only to let Tony Blair try to 
pass a second resolution authorizing the use of force, which Blair wanted before Parliament 
voted the war.337 This was a futile task because France, Russia, China, and Germany all believed 
inspections were making progress, and they openly pledged to veto any resolution that endorsed 
war.338 Chirac in particular believed, with justification, that Bush supported inspections only to 
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legitimize what he saw as an inevitable war, and he refused to sanction this behavior with 
Security Council approval.339 Rather than worsen a diplomatic break with key allies, the United 
States and Great Britain decided to withdraw their resolution.340 On March 17, President Bush 
announced a 48-hour ultimatum for Saddam and his sons to leave Iraq or face war. On March 20, 
coalition forces launched the opening airstrikes of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
Conclusion: The Path to the Iraq War 
 The United States invaded Iraq because the Bush administration believed the threat of 
Saddam’s WMD programs and links to terrorist groups to be intolerable after 9/11. The decision 
to invade was shaped by manipulated intelligence, visions of democratic transformation, and the 
belief that U.S. power would lead to an easy war. For regime change advocates, containment had 
collapsed, but even if it could be restored to its earlier strength, it still could not address the 
nexus threat, or the hypothetical alliance between a WMD-armed dictator like Saddam and 
international terrorists like al-Qaeda. This assessment rested on a bedrock of ideas about Iraq that 
developed in the 1990s. It rested especially on the perceived lesson of the containment policy: no 
combination of incentives and pressures could either topple Saddam or force him to change his 
behavior given his individual psychology and the totalitarian nature of his regime. 
 The neoconservatives in the Bush administration played an indispensable role in bringing 
about the Iraq War.  They put Iraq on the agenda after 9/11, ensured that it became the 
centerpiece of U.S foreign policy, and articulated a case for war. It seems doubtful that members 
of the Powell-Blair approach, including the U.S. public, would have otherwise recommended an 
                                                        
338 “In Delegates’ Words: Hawks and Doves Debate at the Security Council,” New York Times, March 8, 2003, A9. 
 
339 Gordon and Shapiro, Allies at War, 120; Bozo, Iraq Crisis, 197-199. 
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invasion of Iraq, as their instincts directed them toward the struggle with al-Qaeda and the 
MEPP. Nevertheless, once the Bush administration put Iraq “on the table,” they found they were 
pushing on a half-open door with respect to the intellectual and political establishment and the 
public. Many proponents of the Powell-Blair approach tried to shape how Bush confronted Iraq, 
making sure he built a coalition and exhausted non-violent measures. To gain power to shape 
U.S. policy, they made major concessions to Bush in Congress and the United Nations. Once 
Bush had checked these boxes, however half-heartedly, they offered little significant opposition 
to the war. 
Journalist Thomas Ricks has called this failure to halt the march to war or propose 
meaningful alternatives the “silence of the lambs.”341 This phrase, however, ignores the deeper 
convictions that drove the behavior of those in the Powell-Blair approach. They believed that 
containment was discredited and mostly agreed with the necessity of regime change. In the post-
9/11 environment, they were far more willing to use drastic means to remove this threat. This 
combination of a passionate, highly-placed minority and a supportive if hardly enthusiastic 








                                                        





CONCLUSION: CONTAINMENT, LIBERALISM, AND THE SEARCH FOR LIMITS 
 
“It’s the regime, stupid.” R. James Woolsey, March 11, 1999.1 
By the time R. James Woolsey addressed the House Armed Services Committee in 1999, 
Americans had been debating for almost a decade whether Saddam Hussein’s Iraq could be 
successfully contained. Woolsey had been the Director of the CIA from 1993-1994, but he had 
little influence with Clinton and resigned in frustration.2 He then joined an ascendant chorus of 
policy-makers, politicians, and intellectuals who over the course of the 1990s built a consensus 
in U.S. politics that Saddam could not be contained. By 1999, such a statement had become 
unremarkable, a form of common sense about the nature of the enemy. Woolsey and the political 
movement he participated in established a dominant public interpretation of the Iraqi regime as 
totalitarian, fanatical, fixated on acquiring WMD and achieving regional dominance, and 
obsessed with revenge against the United States. 
Herein lies the double significance of the term regime change consensus: it suggests a 
widely shared belief that the Iraqi regime, or its system of government and ideology, was both 
the heart of the Iraqi problem and the core of the solution. By defining the Iraqi regime as 
uncontainable and the ultimate source of Iraq’s threatening behavior, supporters of the regime 
change consensus primed a wide range of Americans to believe that even a resuscitated 
containment policy could not prevent Saddam from acquiring nuclear weapons. This belief 
                                                        
1 R. James Woolsey, House Armed Services Committee, United States Policy Toward Iraq, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 
March 10, 1999, 4. 
 
2 For more on Woolsey’s brief and frustrating tenure at the CIA, see: David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: 
Bush, Clinton, and the Generals (New York: Scribner, 2001), 191-192, 233-234. 
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became an important precondition for two key phenomena of the Iraq debate from 2001-2003. 
First, it helps explain why Bush’s argument for regime change, rooted largely in the idea that 
containment could not handle the “nexus” threat, succeeded in creating political momentum for 
war. Second, it helps explain the actions and ideas of members of the Powell-Blair approach, 
who tried to alter the way Bush sought to remove Saddam, but who largely accepted that regime 
change was necessary, ethical, and prudent. 
Containment Strategies as Theories of Social and Political Change  
This study of the containment of Iraq as a policy and as a subject of political debate 
opens up new insights into containment strategies in general. When policy-makers and theorists 
describe a policy as containment, they usually mean that the United States will try to limit the 
geopolitical control, ideological influence, and power of a rival state. However, containment 
rarely means that United States will simply box in the target indefinitely. Because containment 
strategies do not directly seek the overthrow of the target state, they must create an atmosphere 
conducive to the target changing either its behavior or its ruling regime. Embedded within any 
containment strategy, therefore, is what I call a theory of change about that society. 
 The theory of change is a prediction of how the pressures, constraints, and incentives of 
containment will cause the target state to change its strategic behavior and/or its governing 
political system, either through reform or collapse. Strategists of containment try to give their 
policies an exit strategy, a theory that explains how containment will not go on forever. The 
theory of change addresses the question: “What is the nature of this leader, this political system, 
and this society, and how can the United States change them, within certain limits of action to 
further its foreign policy goals?” This suggests that containment strategies are useful historical 
lenses into evolving conversations about the forces that drive social and political change and the 
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capacity of other societies for change. Whenever we study containment, we are examining those 
conceptions and debates in a specific context. 
 For George Kennan, Paul Nitze, and other Cold War strategists, the basic theory of 
change was that the United States needed to limit Soviet expansion, isolate it economically, 
maintain the robustness of its own political system and economy, and build up the strength and 
autonomy of key allies. These steps would “increase enormously the strains under which Soviet 
policy must operate” by exacerbating pre-existing problems in the Soviet system, eventually 
compelling its accommodation to the U.S.-led international order.3 They also spelled specifically 
what these problems were and how containment would influence them, as I will explore 
momentarily. There was significant variation between different presidencies on how they 
pursued these ends, but these basic ideas about how containment might end successfully 
remained consistent throughout the Cold War.4 
                                                        
3 This quote is from Kennan’s essay, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” which was originally published in Foreign 
Affairs in July 1947 under a pseudonym. I accessed this document in: George Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet 
Conduct,” in American Diplomacy, 2nd edition, ed. George Kennan, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 
127. The Truman administration adopted a similar perspective in NSC 20/4 in November 1948, which declared that 
the United States sought “to create situations which will compel the Soviet Government to reconcile the practical 
undesirability of acting on the basis of its present concepts and the necessity of behaving in accordance with 
precepts of international conduct, as set forth in the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter.” This document 
was drafted by Kennan’s Policy Planning Office at the State Department. For more discussion of Kennan’s 
containment, especially the idea of straining the Soviet system, see: John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: 
A Critical Appraisal of American National Security during the Cold War, 2nd edition (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 35-40; John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, 
Reconsiderations, Provocations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 18-46; Walter LaFeber, America, 
Russia, and the Cold War 5th edition (New York: Knopf, 1985), 58-65; Glenn Anthony May, “Introduction: NSC-
68: The Theory and Politics of Strategy,” in American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC-68 (Boston: Bedford 
Books of St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 5-7; Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, The Truman 
Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 108-109, 179-181; Frederik 
Logevall, “A Critique of Containment,” Diplomatic History 28, no. 4 (Sept. 2004), 473-499. 
 
4 As an example of such variations in containment, Gaddis develops the concepts of symmetrical and asymmetrical 
containment, both of which sought to prevent Soviet advances and impose stress on the Soviet system. In the former, 
the United States tried to match the Soviet Union at all levels of geopolitical and military competition, including 
economic, technological, nuclear, conventional, and unconventional. An example of symmetrical containment was 
John F. Kennedy’s flexible response policy, which aimed to increase conventional military spending, close the 
fictional “missile gap,” and develop a counterinsurgency capacity to deal with communist and nationalist revolutions 
in the developing world. In asymmetrical containment, the United States aimed to apply “strengths against adversary 
weaknesses, rather than attempting to match the adversary in all of his capabilities.” Dwight Eisenhower’s massive 
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 Did Kennan, Nitze, and other Cold War strategists believe that the Soviet Union had to 
change its behavior or its regime in order for these nations to reach a modus vivendi? As the 
historian John Lewis Gaddis argues, Kennan viewed the goal of containment primarily as 
“behavior modification” that required countering Soviet aggression while responding positively 
to Soviet offers of negotiation.5 Kennan portrayed the Soviet Union as driven both by an 
ideological conviction that there could be no legitimate opposition to its creation of utopia as 
well as the need for “explaining away the maintenance of dictatorial authority at home” by 
conjuring foreign threats.6 These traits rested on a deeper historical bedrock of Russian 
despotism and suspicion of the outside world.7 Soviet ideology and behavior precluded any 
“permanent peaceful co-existence” or compromise with the United States.8 Rather, the Soviets 
believed it was “desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, 
our traditional way of life destroyed, and the international authority of our state be broken.”9 
However, because of the Soviet leadership’s conviction that the sweep of history 
remained in their favor, Kennan claimed they had no fixed plan for effecting capitalism’s 
demise.10 Where the Soviet Union met “unassailable barriers in its path,” it  usually backed 
                                                        
retaliation policy, for instance, aimed to restrain defense spending and rely on the U.S. strength in nuclear 
armaments to counter Soviet advantages such as the balance of conventional forces in Europe. See: Gaddis, 
Strategies of Containment, 60-61,125-161, 197-234, 342-343. 
 
5 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 71. 
 
6 Quote is from: Kennan, “Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 112-113. See also: George Kennan, “The Long Telegram,” 
February 22, 1946, National Security Archives, accessed January 22, 2019, 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm, 9-10; George Kennan, “America and the 
Russian Future,” in American Diplomacy, 2nd edition, ed. George Kennan, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1984), 138-139. 
 
7 Kennan, “Long Telegram,” 3-4; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 32-33.  
 
8 Kennan, “Long Telegram,” 1. 
 
9 Kennan, “Long Telegram,” 10. 
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down.11 The United States thus should impose “the vigilant application of counter-force at a 
series of constantly shifting geographical and political points.”12 Soviet flexibility created space 
for containment to frustrate their designs and exacerbate tensions in their system. Changing 
Soviet behavior would nonetheless require a paradigmatic change in “the internal nature of 
Soviet power” from which its behavior emanated.13 This did not necessarily mean that the Soviet 
regime had to collapse. The regime might suddenly “break-up,” or a “gradual mellowing” could 
occur wherein repeated frustrations drove the Soviets to moderate their ambitions.14  
Kennan further maintained that in order for the Soviet Union and the United States to 
coexist it was not necessary for the Soviet Union to become like the United States. Kennan held 
that “forms of government are forged mainly in the fire of practice, not in the vacuum of theory. 
They respond to national character and to national realities.”15 It was no use aiming for a 
capitalist or liberal democratic Russia. These traits were foreign to their historical experience 
before the rise of communism, and the Soviets stamped out any of their remnants.16 In 1951, he 
said plainly: “we could not expect to see the emergence of a liberal-democratic Russia along 
American patterns. This cannot be too strongly emphasized.”17 Moreover, the Soviet Union did 
not have to be capitalist or democratic for the United States to achieve its foreign policy 
                                                        
10 For variations on this argument in Kennan’s thought, see: Kennan, “Long Telegram,” 10; Kennan, “Sources of 
Soviet Conduct,” 116-118.” 
 
11 Quote is from: Kennan, “Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 118. See also: Kennan, “Long Telegram,” 10. 
 
12 Kennan, “Long Telegram,” 120. 
 
13 Kennan, “Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 115. 
 
14 Quote is from Kennan, “Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 127. See also: Kennan, “Russian Future,” 151. 
 
15 Kennan, “Russian Future,” 136. 
 
16 Kennan, “Russian Future,” 131, 135; Kennan, “Long Telegram,” 4. 
 
17 Kennan, “Russian Future,” 134. 
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objectives. To believe that U.S. security depended on all nations adopting American values and 
institutions would define U.S. interests far too broadly and exceed its resources.18 In fact, one of 
the core reasons why the Soviets were a threat was that they did not accept any “diversity” in 
global politics, or the legitimacy of non-Marxist political system.19 Part of the point of 
containment was to shift the Soviet view of foreign affairs from this “universalistic” approach to 
a “particularistic” outlook that tolerated diverse political systems in the international arena.20 
On most aspects of internal politics, Kennan instead prescribed: “Let them be 
Russians.”21 The Soviet outlook simply had to change enough for it to abandoned certain goals 
and perspectives: “imperialist expansion” and destruction of competing types of government, 
“paranoiac suspiciousness,” and the totalitarian control of the Russian people. Inversely, it would 
have to be “resocialized,” in political scientist Alexander George’s words, into basic norms of 
international relations: tolerance of alternative political systems, openness and honesty in its 
communications with other states, the “moderation” of policy objectives, and the release of the 
captive nations of Eastern Europe.22 
                                                        
18 Kennan called this the “universalistic” approach to foreign affairs. He defined it as the hope that geopolitical 
competition would fall away if “all countries could be induced to subscribe to certain standard rules of behavior.” 
For more discussion of this concept in Kennan’s thought, see: Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 26-27; John Lewis 
Gaddis, George F. Kennan: A Life (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), 298-299; Robert Frazier, “Kennan, 
Universalism, and the Truman Doctrine,” Journal of Cold War Studies 11, no. 2 (Spring 2009), 3-34. 
 
19 Kennan, “Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 110-112; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 41. 
 
20 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 46-47. 
 
21 Kennan, “Russian Future,” 136. 
 
22 Kennan, “Russian Future,” 132-143. For more theoretical treatments of the concepts of resocialization by 
behavior or regime change, see: Alexander George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 49; Robert Litwak, Rogue States and U.S. Foreign 
Policy: Containment after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000), 9, 91. 
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  Although Paul Nitze promulgated a far more militarized version of containment, he 
spelled out a similar theory of change in his influential 1950 policy paper, NSC-68.23 He agreed 
with Kennan that the Soviet Union under its present outlook could not tolerate the freedom and 
prosperity of the U.S. system and would try to destroy it.24 Compelling the Soviets to cease this 
quest would require a “fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system.”25 The Soviet 
Union depended on forward momentum in international politics to justify oppression at home. 
Thus, the imposition of “maximum strain” and the frustration of this “dynamism” abroad would 
force it to confront “the rot within its system.”26  
Like Kennan, Nitze was vague on whether United States needed the Soviet regime to 
collapse outright, although he doubted that coexistence was possible without “a genuine and 
drastic change in Soviet policies” and ideology.27 At the minimum, containment had to compel 
the regime toward “modifying its behavior to conform to generally accepted international 
standards.”28 The United States still needed to remain open to negotiation with the Soviets. 
Nonetheless, Nitze agreed with Kennan that no reliable settlement would be possible until the 
                                                        
23 Nitze believed that without a significant military buildup to enable the United States to counter the armed might of 
Communist forces throughout the world, containment was “no more than a policy of bluff.” Moreover, the allied 
centers of power and prosperity that were needed to counter Soviet penetration and offer a successful counter-model 
to the Soviet system could not develop without a viable “military shield.” Nitze, of course, wrote in a very different 
context from Kennan’s Long Telegram or Sources of Soviet Conduct. Mao Zedong’s Communist Party had finished 
its conquest of China in 1949, and in the same year the Soviets successfully tested an atomic bomb. The North 
Korean invasion of South Korea further legitimized Nitze’s claims that the Cold War had taken a militarized turn. 
See: Paul Nitze, “NSC-68,” American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC-68 (Boston: Bedford Books of St. 
Martin’s Press, 1993), 71; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 88-107. 
 
24 Nitze, “NSC-68,” 28-29, 52.  
 
25 Nitze, “NSC-68,” 36, 79. 
 
26 Nitze, “NSC-68,” 36, 79. 
 
27 Nitze, “NSC-68,” 60. 
 
28 Nitze, “NSC-68,” 41. 
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Soviets had been so repeatedly frustrated in their global ambitions and so delegitimized at home 
that essential aspects of the Soviet system and ideology were transformed.29  
The theories of change developed by Kennan, Nitze, and other early strategists of 
containment were sophisticated in that they specifically spelled out how the United States would 
“influence by its actions the internal developments” of the Soviet Union. They believed the 
Soviet system held “the seeds of its own decay” and that containment should identify and stress 
those pressure points.30  One seed was the Soviet people, which Kennan portrayed as “physically 
and spiritually tired…disillusioned, skeptical” after decades of brutal Soviet rule.31 By 
exacerbating economic disfunction within the Soviet system, the United States could help 
discredit the official ideology and turn the people against the regime, especially as new 
generations took the helm.32 Nitze echoed this assessment by claiming that the “Soviet monolith” 
was held together by force and fear, rather than any “natural cohesion” or legitimacy, making it 
vulnerable to stress and repeated frustration.33  
The health, freedom, and productivity of the American economic and political system 
relative to that of the Soviet Union formed another seed of decay. Kennan portrayed the Soviet 
system as fundamentally weaker than the United States. Communist ideology, moreover, was an 
illegitimate imposition on the Russian people.34 Kennan envisioned containment as “a test of the 
                                                        
29 Nitze, “NSC-68,” 41, 60-65. 
 
30 Kennan, “Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 125. Nitze used the same exact phrase, saying that the Soviet system has 
several inherent “seeds of decay.” See Nitze, “NSC-68,” 36. 
 
31 Kennan, “Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 121 
 
32 Kennan, “Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 121-124; Kennan, “Long Telegram,” 3, 10. Kennan particularly stressed 
that human beings inevitably tire of totalitarian governance as they seek to express themselves as individuals and 
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33 Nitze, “NSC 68,” 35. 
 
34 Kennan, “Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 126-127; Kennan, “Long Telegram,” 11. 
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overall worth of the United States as a nation among nations” in which the United States could 
defeat the Soviets in part by more effectively ensuring basic human needs and liberties.35 Nitze 
similarly envisioned that “developing the moral and material strength of the free world” would 
“hasten the decay of the Soviet system” by convincing the Soviets of the futility of global 
revolution.36 If the United States could offer a vibrant counter-example of a free and prosperous 
society, it could accelerate the Soviet people’s abandonment of the regime.  
A third seed was the desire of nations within the post-World War II Soviet sphere of 
influence in Eastern Europe to escape the communist yoke. The United States could facilitate 
these divisions by building up the strength and unity of Western Europe. Kennan reasoned: “the 
spectacle of a happier and more successful life just across the fence…would be bound in the end 
to have a disintegrating and eroding effect on the communist world.”37 In 1948, when Yugoslav 
leader Josip Broz Tito declared that he would follow an independent foreign policy from the 
Soviet Union, Kennan seized on this divide to assert that over time Eastern European nationalism 
and resentment at Soviet domination would break up the Eastern Bloc.38 Nitze also contended 
that nationalism was a more “potent emotional-political force” than communism and that the 
Soviets would have to expend resources and prestige to keep these states in their orbit.39 Nitze 
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identified a fourth seed of decay in the “problem of succession” in the Soviet system. In a 
government where “supreme power is acquired and held through violence and intimidation,” the 
transfer of power was a distinct moment of weakness that the United States could exploit.40 
Despite some variations, containment remained the basic U.S. policy toward the Soviet 
Union throughout the Cold War.41 Containment nonetheless faced several domestic political 
challenges. In the early 1950s, many Republicans embraced a strategy of rollback that 
recommended extensive covert operations in the Eastern Bloc to foment rebellions that would 
break off these states from Soviet control.42 In the 1970s and 1980s, neoconservatives advocated 
for a far more aggressive, militarized version of containment. They opposed strategic arms 
limitation talks, embraced the Reagan Doctrine, and called on the United States to more openly 
shame the Soviets on human rights issues.43 Many human rights activists similarly wanted more 
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41 The basic continuity of the containment framework is nicely demonstrated by a passage from a letter from 
Secretary of State George Shultz to Ronald Reagan in 1982: “While recognizing the adversarial nature of our 
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42 The Eisenhower administration quickly backed off the rollback rhetoric that figures like John Foster Dulles had 
embraced during the campaign. See: Grose, Rollback, 206-208, 214-218; Borhi, “Rollback, Liberation, 
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43 For more on neoconservatives during the Cold War, see: Jacob Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right: The Rise 
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moral pressure on the Soviet Union, in contrast to Kennan and Nitze’s emphasis on avoiding 
putting Soviet prestige on the line in a public manner.44 
Of course, the massive conventional and nuclear power of the Soviet Union made direct 
regime change strategies unrealistic and helped sustain political support for containment. 
Nonetheless, certain aspects of the early formulations of containment seem to have played an 
important role in maintaining the strategy’s legitimacy through four decades of political change. 
Kennan, Nitze, and others prepared Americans for a long-term struggle in which the unity and 
health of the U.S. system was the country’s greatest geopolitical asset. They carefully portrayed 
the Soviets as threatening and devious but mostly rational and amenable to pressures and 
counter-forces. They kept the door open for negotiation and avoided perspectives that would 
make war inevitable. Most importantly, they defined goals in a limited way. The Soviet 
government did not have to be overthrown to make a modus vivendi possible, but important 
aspects of its behavior and ideology had to change. This might require the collapse of the regime, 
but it might not: changes in leadership, frustration over time, or domestic political crisis might 
also lead to Soviet “behavioral modification.”. The enduring political legitimacy of the 
containment of Soviet Union remains understudied, but these aspects of the policy appeared to 
have played an important role. 
What then made the containment of Iraq different? Why did it become so widely 
discredited in American politics, despite Iraq’s relative weakness? I will offer four observations 
on these questions. First, the defenders of the containment of Iraq, especially the first Bush 
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administration, did not articulate a complex theory of change beyond the hope that the pressure 
of containment, especially sanctions, would compel the Iraqi elite to remove Saddam. This 
theory of change failed adapt to events that undermined key pillars of containment, especially the 
crushing of the opposition from 1995-1996. Unlike Kennan and Nitze, theorists of the 
containment of Iraq developed few ideas about the role the Iraqi people might play in the 
fomenting of pressure on the regime besides their suffering under sanctions. This proved to be a 
dubious approach as the sanctions made the Iraqi people more dependent on the regime for 
survival and Saddam managed to insulate himself from their effects. They also rarely discussed 
how containment might exacerbate other possible “seeds of decay,” including ethnic separatism 
and power transitions upon Saddam’s death.45 
At the same time, the containment of Iraq offered none of the flexibility of Cold War 
containment. All three relevant presidencies declared that no negotiation or normalization with 
Iraq under its current regime was possible even if Iraq complied with the weapons inspectors. 
This rigidity, which I argue largely emerged from domestic political pressures, gave Iraq little 
reason to comply with the United Nations and reduced the cooperation of key members of the 
coalition. The ensuing stalemate with Iraq made the containment policy vulnerable to domestic 
political criticism. 
Second, comparing these containment strategies hints at a paradox of containing small 
states. The very weakness of the Iraqi state, in contrast to the Soviet Union, created the 
temptation to simply crush the foe rather than continue the irritating tasks of containment. The 
vagueness about containment’s end point and the lack of a superpower rival to deter such 
interventions compounded the shift to regime change. Containment in the Cold War was 
                                                        
45 Saddam was 65 when the United States invaded Iraq. 
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predicated on the idea that a war with the Soviet Union would lead to unacceptable losses on 
both sides. Such fears were drastically lower in the Iraq case, especially with an all-volunteer 
military that lightened the burdens of war on the average U.S. citizen and newfound belief in a 
“Revolution in Military Affairs” that would make wars fast, easy, and low-cost. Furthermore, the 
belief that Iraq probably had not yet acquired nuclear weapons decreased the perceived costs of a 
war in the near future compared to a hypothetical conflict with a nuclear-armed Iraq.46   
Third, the Iraq case suggests that containment strategies may have a fundamental 
disadvantage in a democratic political system. Kennan warned that containment should have 
“nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of 
outward ‘toughness.’”47 Kennan envisioned a “cool and collected” policy that ignored public 
opinion, avoided putting Russian prestige on the line, and responded flexibly to Russian 
signals.48 Kennan also wanted a clear distinction between essential areas like Western Europe 
and more peripheral interests like Southeast Asia.49  
To Kennan’s chagrin, however, exaggerated portrayals of foreign menaces and tough-guy 
blustering often play well in domestic politics. Democratic politics often does not allow fine 
distinctions of the national interest when politicians and intellectuals can declare, for example, 
that if the United States allows a country like Vietnam to fall into the communist orbit, alliances 
in more important areas will be undermined. As Gaddis argues, the perception that communism 
                                                        
46 David A. Lake, “Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War,” 
International Security 35, no. 3 (Winter 2010/2011), 7-52. 
 
47 Kennan, “Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 119. 
 
48 Kennan, “Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 119; H.W. Brands, What America Owes the World: The Struggle for the 
Soul of Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 167. 
 
49 For instance, Kennan argued that there were regions “where you could perfectly well let people fall prey to 
totalitarian domination without any tragic consequences for world peace.” Quote is from Gaddis, Kennan: A Life, 
256. See also: Kennan, Strategies of Containment, 57-62. 
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was on the march, even if that progress was in peripheral areas, created powerful political and 
psychological imperatives to stop that momentum. Part of the reason why Nitze deviated from 
Kennan in recommending a massive military buildup was his belief that the perception of 
communist momentum and U.S. weakness was as important as the material balance of power.50 
Leaving the door open for negotiations, moreover, made sense in the policy realm, but talking 
with the hated communist foe would open any president up to accusations of weakness. Even 
though containment retained bipartisan support in the Cold War, domestic politics tended to 
expand the definition of U.S. interests, homogenize different communist movements as a Soviet-
led conspiracy, and create pressures for armed intervention in peripheral areas. 
The containment of Iraq suffered from similar difficulties related to domestic politics. 
Richard Haass, Richard Clarke, and other early designers of containment privately envisioned a 
strategy in which the United States could mix punishments and incentives to compel Iraq to 
comply with the United Nations. This approach proved politically unsustainable. Shock and 
outrage at the invasion of Iraq in 1990 caused the U.S. political establishment to over-learn the 
lesson that Iraq could not negotiated with or positively incentivized. The incomplete victory in 
Desert Storm and the messy, tragic aftermath of the conflict created a powerful political bias for 
tougher measures against Saddam, particularly before he attained nuclear weapons. The desire of 
George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and many politicians to look tough on foreign affairs further 
worsened the rigidity of containment. The 1998 Iraq Liberation Act capped off this process by 
declaring the Iraqi regime to be illegitimate, something the United States did not assert about the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War. The post-Cold War perception of a unipolar international 
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system and a global trend toward liberalism, democracy, and capitalism further exacerbated 
dissatisfaction with containment. 
Fourth, while Kennan avoided portraying the Soviet leadership as implacable zealots, 
knowing that this could make conflict an inevitability, the successful framing of Iraq as a 
fanatical, inflexible totalitarian state garnered widespread political currency and undermined 
containment. Containment’s defenders tried to convey a messy, complicated portrait of Iraq as a 
belligerent but manageable autocracy that mainly wanted survival and enrichment. The 
totalitarian framing, however, was more morally clear and politically marketable. It explained 
the appalling villainy of Saddam, and it appealed to a cultural narrative of the United States as a 
heroic force defying totalitarianism in its many historical forms. Regime change advocates 
contended that in a society where the state controlled everything, containment could not generate 
sufficient internal pressures to change the behavior or ruling regime of the state. They thus 
concluded that only significant outside intervention could oust the regime.  
Containment strategies have relied on the assumption of the target’s simultaneous 
hostility and its basic rationality and risk acceptance. The concept of totalitarianism, however, 
can undermine this balancing act, creating rigidity in policy-making and paving the way for 
conflict. Kennan and Nitze, in contrast, did not deploy the concept of totalitarianism in a 
deterministic way. For them, the fact of Soviet totalitarianism did not make the regime’s foreign 
policy necessarily reckless, irrational, or completely unchangeable. Kennan, Nitze, and other 
Cold War strategists identified ways in which containment could exacerbate pre-existing Soviet 
weaknesses in order to facilitate the mellowing or collapse of the regime.51 
                                                        
51 Many crucial texts on the formation of the Cold War strategy of containment offer little or no discussion of the 
significance of ideas about totalitarianism in this process. Nonetheless, key documents like the Sources of Soviet 
Conduct and NSC-68 discuss totalitarianism frequently. Nitze in particular stresses the importance of totalitarianism 
in understanding the Soviet Union. See: Nitze, “NSC-68,” 27-28, 32-35, 43-44. Kennan uses the term more 
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Robust theories of change are vital for containment strategies both in terms of 
maintaining strategic coherence and political credibility. This conclusion should prompt some 
rethinking of containment as a category of strategy. Containment has a reputation as a classic 
realist strategy. Many of its major theorists and practitioners have identified as realist, and 
scholars also portray the policy as such. They tend to argue that containment is about shaping the 
international environment to limit another state’s ability to act against the U.S. national interest 
and eventually to alter that state’s behavior. Realists often treat the internal traits of a state as 
secondary in importance.52 We will not worry about what goes on inside a society, containment’s 
realist boosters argue, we will just contain its external behavior. As Richard Haass once 
described the containment of the Soviet Union: “Containment became a triumph of narrow 
realism, of carrying out a foreign policy largely based on the external rather than the internal 
behavior of government and other forces.”53  
In contrast, this dissertation suggests that containment strategies are inherently concerned 
with what goes on inside a state, making them far less realist than realists might claim. Theories 
of change in containment strategies are not just about external behavior but the nature and 
evolution of societies, ideas, political systems. Thus, the interpretation of those internal forces 
                                                        
sparingly, but the idea of a government seeking total control over its people played an important part in his thinking 
about the Soviet Union, as a later section of this conclusion explores. For limited discussions of the importance of 
totalitarianism in the development of containment in the Cold War, see: Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 34; 
Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 10-11. 
 
52 The sub-field of realism known as “neo-realism” treats the structural aspects of the international system, including 
anarchy and the balance of power, as the primary determinant of state behavior. In its purest iterations, neo-realism 
treats the internal characteristics of states as virtually irrelevant to their behavior. For major texts in neo-realism, see: 
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979); John Mearsheimer, The 
Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2nd edition (New York: W.W. Norton, 2014); Joseph Parent and Sebastian Rosato, 
“Balancing in Neorealism,” International Security 61, no. 2 (March 2009), 51-86. A particularly brief and effective 
explanation of realism in general be found in:  Richard Haass, The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States after the 
Cold War (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1997), 67-68. 
 
53 Haass, Reluctant Sheriff, 14. 
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are crucially important for understanding how containment strategies are conceived, executed, 
and criticized. The Iraq story suggests that contemporary practitioners of containment strategies 
against regional powers like Iran or North Korea need to think about how a strategy based on 
long-term, indirect change can remain politically sustainable, especially if these states have 
asymmetrical means of retaliation. Strategists of containment can remain focused primarily on 
changing the external behavior of states, as Kennan and Haass suggested, but to do so effectively 
they must think seriously about the internal traits of those states. 
The Concept of the Regime in American Foreign Relations 
There were also deeper forces in the history of American political thought that 
undermined the containment of Iraq and bolstered the regime change consensus. In particular, 
this dissertation speaks to the importance of ideas about regime type in U.S. foreign relations. 
Historians in the last several decades have been skeptical of the idea that the United States has 
consistently sought to spread democracy, pointing to interventions to destabilize elected leaders 
and/or install or prop up friendly autocrats.54  
As valid as these observations are, the importance of ideas about regime type should be 
differentiated from democracy promotion. As Kennan and Nitze argued about the Soviet Union, 
a state’s ideologies, internal power dynamics, and social and economic structures can shape 
foreign policy as much as external forces like the balance of power.55 States are Janus-faced, and 
                                                        
54 For texts that embrace this critique to varying degrees, see: Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: 
America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004); Andrew Bacevich, American 
Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); 
Fred Anderson and Andrew Cayton, The Dominion of War: Empire and Liberty in North America (New York: 
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Holt, 2001); Michael Hunt, The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained and Wielded Global 
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55 In the Long Telegram, Kennan claims: “The Soviet party line is not based on any objective analysis of the 
situation beyond Russia’s borders; that it has, indeed little to do with conditions outside of Russia; that it arises 
mainly from basic inner-Russian necessities.” Kennan, “Long Telegram, 3. 
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their foreign policies are almost always part of an attempt to preserve a certain internal 
arrangement of power, resources, and ideas.56 American leaders have frequently understood the 
external behavior of states as stemming in large part from these internal traits and imperatives; in 
short, from nature of different regimes.57 This perspective has fueled an inclination toward what 
Kennan called “universalistic” thinking: the belief that until the internal makeup of another state 
becomes more like the United States, it will continue to challenge U.S. values and interests.58 
Such universalism, at times, has morphed into what historian H.W. Brands calls the 
“vindicationist” tradition in which Americans believe they must “move beyond example and 
vindicate the right” by defeating tyranny and spreading freedom and democracy.59 
The pro-regime change argument on Iraq in the 1990s and early 2000s represented not 
just the universalistic approach but the more active vindicationism. Regime change advocates 
rarely said that Iraq had to adopt American values and institutions, but they adamantly believed 
that Iraq would continue to menace the region and the U.S. homeland until it became open and 
                                                        
56 Robert Jervis also echoes this point in: Robert Jervis, “Understanding the Bush Doctrine,” Political Science 
Quarterly 118, no. 3 (Fall 2003), 365-388. 
 
57 One exception to this trend could be the foreign policy of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, who more 
consciously embraced the realist tradition of focusing how the structure of the international political system shapes 
states’ behavior.  
 
58 Many scholars have tied this line of thinking in U.S. foreign relations to the American civil religion, or what the 
sociologist Philip Gorski describes as “prophetic republicanism.” By this he means a political culture and ideology 
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Tony Smith, “Making the World Safe for Democracy in the American Century,” Diplomatic History 23, no. 2 (April 
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59 Brands, America Owes the World, viii, 144-145. 
 369 
democratic. Iraq’s “resocialization,” they imagined, would have to include far more internal 
change than Kennan envisaged for the Soviet Union. The Baathists would have to be rooted out, 
a national identity forged, a capitalist economy created, and a multiparty democracy with a free 
press conjured. “Let Iraqis be Iraqis,” to paraphrase Kennan, was far more likely to be a pro-
containment sentiment. Figures like Haass and John Mearsheimer contended that the United 
States could not remake Iraqi society and did not have to in order to achieve its goals. With a 
variety of universalistic claims circulating through the political atmosphere, the first decade after 
the Cold War was a brutal time for Kennan’s “particularist” philosophy, and the containment of 
Iraq suffered as a result. 
This discussion uncovers important points for historians of the United States and the 
world in the 20th century. It suggests the enduring centrality of ideas in U.S. foreign policy, 
especially ideas about regime type. Just because the United States has not consistently prioritized 
the spread of democracy does not reduce the importance of ideas in Americans’ understanding of 
other states’ behavior. More specifically, core tenets of liberalism may have driven the United 
States toward destabilizing, universalistic conceptions of international politics. Liberal thinkers 
from Immanuel Kant to John Rawls have argued that international peace and the survival of 
liberalism itself can only be achieved if the vast majority of states are liberalized.60 Rawls, for 
instance, argued that liberal states have a responsibility “to leave the state of nature and to submit 
                                                        
60 Michael Desch, “America’s Liberal Illiberalism: The Ideological Origins of Overreaction in U.S. Foreign Policy,” 
International Security 32, no. 3 (December, 2007), 14-15. For more on Rawls, Kant, and liberalism’s historical 
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themselves along with others to the rule of a reasonable and just law.”61 Sovereignty in the 
liberal conception, moreover, comes less from the recognition of other states than the internal 
social contract in which the state must protect the rights and property of its citizens.  
States that do not fulfill these burdens and/or threaten international peace do not “earn” 
their sovereignty and may be legitimately subjected to regime change. Kant called such states the 
“unjust enemy,” or combatants who are outside the international community or, in an earlier 
iteration, the civilized world.62 These ideas can create what one political theorist calls a “liberal 
illiberalism” in foreign affairs: the inability or unwillingness of liberal states to tolerate illiberal 
or non-democratic states. This inclination creates a problem for Kennan’s “particularistic” 
approach to international affairs, or the pursuit of consensus and co-existence among multiple 
systems of government, each of which evolved from vastly different national histories.63  
The historian Russell Weigley posited an “American Way of War” in which the United 
States deploys its overwhelming industrial productivity and technological acumen to crush foes 
in a “strategy of annihilation” that sought decisive victories. The expansion of means as the 
United States became an industrial power caused an expansion of ends, encouraging the pursuit 
of “unlimited aims in war.”64 This study suggests a similar “American Way of Foreign Policy” in 
                                                        
61 Desch, “Liberal Illiberalism,” 15.  
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63 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 46-47; Frazier, “Kennan, ‘Universalism,’” 5. Kennan, “Sources of Soviet 
Conduct,” 110-112. 
 
64 Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy 
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which liberal ideology and democratic politics cultivate a desire for total victories and the 
transformation of recalcitrant, illiberal states into liberal democracies. Rather than accepting 
containment strategies premised on living with threats and evil, at least for a time, this mindset 
seems to drive the United States towards the eradication of threats, especially when there is no 
superpower rival to moderate U.S. actions.65 Historians should ask whether containment 
strategies as well as “milieu” strategies that seek to shape the structural conditions in which other 
states operate are systematically disadvantaged in American thought, politics, and foreign policy 
by these uncompromising potentials in liberalism.66 Moreover, it would be interesting to ask 
whether conservatives, who usually object to universalistic political ideologies, are more willing 
to tolerate particularism in the international system.67  
This dilemma is particularly acute in regard to totalitarian states. The success of the 
framing of Iraq as totalitarian reflects the resonance of the idea of the regime as a primary driver 
of a state’s external actions. Kennan can serve as a case in point. Although he was willing to let a 
reformed Soviet Union have its own political and economic systems even if they differed greatly 
from the United States, he drew the line at totalitarianism. For the Russian state to truly be 
resocialized into international norms, it could no longer cut its people off from the outside world, 
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enslave its own work force, and subject the people to hateful propaganda and atomization. 
Kennan reasoned as such: “When a regime sets out to enslave its own working population in this 
way, it requires for the maintenance of the arrangement so vast an apparatus of coercion that the 
imposition of the Iron Curtain follows almost automatically.” To maintain this level of control, 
the Soviet state would always need to “justify internal oppression by pointing to the menacing 
iniquity of the outside world.” He concluded: “In this way, excess of internal authority leads 
inevitably to unsocial and aggressive conduct as a government among governments.”68 
Even Kennan, who assiduously tried to limit the means and objectives of containment, 
held that totalitarian states by their nature, by the necessity of maintaining total control over 
human beings, were driven to aggressive and disruptive external behavior.69 He generally did not 
want the United States to concern itself with the internal composition of other states, but 
totalitarianism seems to have imposed a limit to this principle.70 This dynamic was less about the 
ideology of Communism and more about the imperatives of totalitarian governance.71 There are 
striking parallels between this argument and a key plank of the regime change consensus on Iraq, 
namely the idea that the totalitarian nature of the Iraqi regime compelled it towards aggression 
and defiance of the international community . 
                                                        
68 Kennan, “Russian Future” 138-139. When Nikita Khruschev issued his “Secret Speech” in 1956 and began the 
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The irony of this conclusion is that Kennan argued that even though the Soviet Union 
was totalitarian, it could still be contained. Advocates of regime change in Iraq made the 
opposite case: Iraqi totalitarianism meant that it would never cease its pursuit of total control at 
home, a WMD arsenal, regional power, and an apocalyptic showdown with the United States, 
Israel, and other enemies. The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 hinged on this more deterministic 
understanding of totalitarianism, one that precluded any indirect changes in the Iraqi system and 
called for absolute regime change.  
 This tentative conclusion suggests shifting and competing understandings of 
totalitarianism in U.S. political thought. One interesting avenue of inquiry would be the role of 
conceptions of totalitarianism in 20th century U.S. foreign policy, especially in the formation of 
containment after World War II. Totalitarian states appear to be the one system of government 
that most U.S. leaders and thinkers have believed that no co-existence or cooperation is possible, 
the one type of state that the United States must defeat or transform. In the Iraqi case, this belief 
was taken to an extreme, imposing a self-fulfilling prophecy of unavoidable conflict on U.S. 
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